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LE DILEMME DU PRISONNIER SPATIALISE

Identifieur interne : 000580 ( Hal/Curation ); précédent : 000579; suivant : 000581

LE DILEMME DU PRISONNIER SPATIALISE

Auteurs : Michel Bussi ; Eric Daudé [France]

Source :

RBID : Hal:halshs-01082645

Descripteurs français

Abstract

Territorial co-operation became a major stake in territorial development policies. The regional planning is presented from now on less in the form of one authoritative process and a descendant that like an incentive at emergent co-operations of the local territories, invited to put itself in synergy within relevant perimeters. It remains that the postulate of a spontaneous co-operation between territories may appear quite utopian, because even if all decision makers are altruistic, they will take nevertheless all their decisions for the interest of the territories which they represent. The territorial co-operation seems really credible only in a "win-win" strategy. The question "why territories should co-operate in a context of competing economy between territories?" returns clearly to the work of Robert Axelrod (1984) on the co-operative behavior theory, and more generally on the reflexions of the game theory around the "prisoner's dilemma". MOTS-CLÉS : dilemme du prisonnier, coopération territoriale, automate cellulaire.

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Le document en format XML

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<abstract xml:lang="en">Territorial co-operation became a major stake in territorial development policies. The regional planning is presented from now on less in the form of one authoritative process and a descendant that like an incentive at emergent co-operations of the local territories, invited to put itself in synergy within relevant perimeters. It remains that the postulate of a spontaneous co-operation between territories may appear quite utopian, because even if all decision makers are altruistic, they will take nevertheless all their decisions for the interest of the territories which they represent. The territorial co-operation seems really credible only in a "win-win" strategy. The question "why territories should co-operate in a context of competing economy between territories?" returns clearly to the work of Robert Axelrod (1984) on the co-operative behavior theory, and more generally on the reflexions of the game theory around the "prisoner's dilemma". MOTS-CLÉS : dilemme du prisonnier, coopération territoriale, automate cellulaire.</abstract>
<abstract xml:lang="fr">La coopération territoriale est devenue un enjeu majeur dans les politiques d'aménagement/développement du territoire. L'aménagement du territoire se présente désormais moins comme un processus autoritaire et descendant que comme une incitation à des coopérations émergentes des territoires locaux, invités à se mettre en synergie au sein de périmètres pertinents : l'additionnalité entre collectivités des financements des équipements structurants, la multiplication de la contractualisation territoriale, le développement de l'intercommunalité à fiscalité propre en sont autant d'exemples. Il reste que le postulat d'une coopération spontanée entre territoires peut apparaître bien utopique, dans le sens où chaque décideur, y compris s'il est lui même altruiste, prendra néanmoins avant tout sa décision dans le sens de l'intérêt du territoire qu'il représente. La coopération territoriale ne semble réellement crédible que dans une stratégie « gagnant-gagnant ». La question ainsi posée « pourquoi les territoires coopèreraient-ils dans un contexte d'économie concurrentielle entre territoires ? » renvoie clairement aux travaux de Robert Axelrod (1984) sur les théories du comportement coopératif, et plus généralement sur les réflexions de la théorie des jeux autour du « dilemme du prisonnier ».</abstract>
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