Accuracy and Evidence
Identifieur interne : 000233 ( Main/Merge ); précédent : 000232; suivant : 000234Accuracy and Evidence
Auteurs : Richard Pettigrew [Royaume-Uni]Source :
- Dialectica [ 0012-2017 ] ; 2013-12.
Abstract
In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Jim Joyce argues that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus by showing that, if they don't, there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems for Joyce's argument; the monist position avoids them. I endorse the latter.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12043
Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)
- to stream Istex, to step Corpus: 000A23
- to stream Istex, to step Curation: 000A23
- to stream Istex, to step Checkpoint: 000104
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:BDBF5F5477BF7A0464DA4F8A040D0D3EF73ED98ELe document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">Accuracy and Evidence</title><author><name sortKey="Pettigrew, Richard" sort="Pettigrew, Richard" uniqKey="Pettigrew R" first="Richard" last="Pettigrew">Richard Pettigrew</name></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:BDBF5F5477BF7A0464DA4F8A040D0D3EF73ED98E</idno><date when="2013" year="2013">2013</date><idno type="doi">10.1111/1746-8361.12043</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/BDBF5F5477BF7A0464DA4F8A040D0D3EF73ED98E/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">000A23</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">000A23</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Curation">000A23</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Checkpoint">000104</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Checkpoint">000104</idno><idno type="wicri:doubleKey">0012-2017:2013:Pettigrew R:accuracy:and:evidence</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Merge">000233</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Accuracy and Evidence</title><author><name sortKey="Pettigrew, Richard" sort="Pettigrew, Richard" uniqKey="Pettigrew R" first="Richard" last="Pettigrew">Richard Pettigrew</name><affiliation wicri:level="1"><country xml:lang="fr">Royaume-Uni</country><wicri:regionArea>Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, BS6 6JL, Bristol</wicri:regionArea><wicri:noRegion>Bristol</wicri:noRegion></affiliation><affiliation wicri:level="1"><country wicri:rule="url">Royaume-Uni</country></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Dialectica</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">Dialectica</title><idno type="ISSN">0012-2017</idno><idno type="eISSN">1746-8361</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><date type="published" when="2013-12">2013-12</date><biblScope unit="volume">67</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">4</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="579">579</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="596">596</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0012-2017</idno></series><idno type="istex">BDBF5F5477BF7A0464DA4F8A040D0D3EF73ED98E</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/1746-8361.12043</idno><idno type="ArticleID">DLTC12043</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0012-2017</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract">In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Jim Joyce argues that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus by showing that, if they don't, there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems for Joyce's argument; the monist position avoids them. I endorse the latter.</div></front></TEI></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Ticri/CIDE/explor/EpistemeV1/Data/Main/Merge
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 000233 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Main/Merge/biblio.hfd -nk 000233 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Ticri/CIDE
|area= EpistemeV1
|flux= Main
|étape= Merge
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:BDBF5F5477BF7A0464DA4F8A040D0D3EF73ED98E
|texte= Accuracy and Evidence
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.31. |  |