Accuracy and Evidence
Identifieur interne : 000A23 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000A22; suivant : 000A24Accuracy and Evidence
Auteurs : Richard PettigrewSource :
- Dialectica [ 0012-2017 ] ; 2013-12.
Abstract
In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Jim Joyce argues that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus by showing that, if they don't, there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems for Joyce's argument; the monist position avoids them. I endorse the latter.
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DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12043
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<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">Accuracy and Evidence</title><author><name sortKey="Pettigrew, Richard" sort="Pettigrew, Richard" uniqKey="Pettigrew R" first="Richard" last="Pettigrew">Richard Pettigrew</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, BS6 6JL, Bristol, UK</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: Richard.Pettigrew@bris.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:BDBF5F5477BF7A0464DA4F8A040D0D3EF73ED98E</idno><date when="2013" year="2013">2013</date><idno type="doi">10.1111/1746-8361.12043</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/BDBF5F5477BF7A0464DA4F8A040D0D3EF73ED98E/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">000A23</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">000A23</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Accuracy and Evidence</title><author><name sortKey="Pettigrew, Richard" sort="Pettigrew, Richard" uniqKey="Pettigrew R" first="Richard" last="Pettigrew">Richard Pettigrew</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, BS6 6JL, Bristol, UK</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: Richard.Pettigrew@bris.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Dialectica</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">Dialectica</title><idno type="ISSN">0012-2017</idno><idno type="eISSN">1746-8361</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><date type="published" when="2013-12">2013-12</date><biblScope unit="volume">67</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">4</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="579">579</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="596">596</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0012-2017</idno></series><idno type="istex">BDBF5F5477BF7A0464DA4F8A040D0D3EF73ED98E</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/1746-8361.12043</idno><idno type="ArticleID">DLTC12043</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0012-2017</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract">In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Jim Joyce argues that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus by showing that, if they don't, there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems for Joyce's argument; the monist position avoids them. I endorse the latter.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>wiley</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Richard Pettigrew</name><affiliations><json:string>Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, BS6 6JL, Bristol, UK</json:string><json:string>E-mail: Richard.Pettigrew@bris.ac.uk</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><articleId><json:string>DLTC12043</json:string></articleId><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Jim Joyce argues that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus by showing that, if they don't, there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems for Joyce's argument; the monist position avoids them. 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But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems for Joyce's argument; the monist position avoids them. I endorse the latter.</p></abstract><textClass><keywords scheme="Journal Subject"><list><head>article-category</head><item><term>Original Article</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2014-02-12">Created</change><change when="2013-12">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component type="serialArticle" version="2.0" xml:id="dltc12043" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/(ISSN)1746-8361</doi><issn type="print">0012-2017</issn><issn type="electronic">1746-8361</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="DLTC"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title sort="DIALECTICA" type="main">Dialectica</title><title type="short">Dialectica</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="12104"><doi>10.1111/dltc.2013.67.issue-4</doi><copyright ownership="thirdParty">Copyright © 2013 Editorial Board of <i>dialectica</i></copyright><numberingGroup><numbering number="67" type="journalVolume">67</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue">4</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2013-12">December 2013</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" position="100" status="forIssue" type="article"><doi>10.1111/1746-8361.12043</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="DLTC12043"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count number="18" type="pageTotal"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="tocHeading1">Original Articles</title><title type="articleCategory">Original Article</title></titleGroup><copyright ownership="thirdParty">© 2014 The Author <i>dialectica</i> © 2014 Editorial Board of <i>dialectica</i></copyright><eventGroup><event agent="bestset" date="2014-02-12" type="xmlCreated"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2014-03-14"></event><event type="firstOnline" date="2014-03-14"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.6.4 mode:FullText" date="2015-10-04"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst">579</numbering><numbering type="pageLast">596</numbering></numberingGroup><objectNameGroup><objectName elementName="mathStatement">Theorem</objectName></objectNameGroup><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file://DLTC.DLTC12043.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><titleGroup><title type="short">Accuracy and Evidence</title><title type="shortAuthors">Richard <fc>P</fc>ettigrew</title><title type="main">Accuracy and Evidence</title></titleGroup><creators><creator affiliationRef="#dltc12043-aff-0001" creatorRole="author" xml:id="dltc12043-cr-0001"><personName><givenNames>Richard</givenNames><familyName>Pettigrew</familyName></personName><contactDetails><email>Richard.Pettigrew@bris.ac.uk</email></contactDetails></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation countryCode="GB" xml:id="dltc12043-aff-0001"><orgDiv>Department of Philosophy</orgDiv><orgName>University of Bristol</orgName><address><street>Cotham House</street><city>Bristol</city><country>UK</country><postCode>BS6 6JL</postCode></address></affiliation></affiliationGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main"><title type="main">Abstract</title><p>In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, <fc>J</fc>im <fc>J</fc>oyce argues that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus by showing that, if they don't, there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems for <fc>J</fc>oyce's argument; the monist position avoids them. 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But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems for Joyce's argument; the monist position avoids them. I endorse the latter.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Dialectica</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>Dialectica</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><subject><genre>article-category</genre><topic>Original Article</topic></subject><identifier type="ISSN">0012-2017</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1746-8361</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1746-8361</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">DLTC</identifier><part><date>2013</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>67</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>4</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>579</start><end>596</end><total>18</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">BDBF5F5477BF7A0464DA4F8A040D0D3EF73ED98E</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/1746-8361.12043</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">DLTC12043</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">Copyright © 2013 Editorial Board of dialectica© 2014 The Author dialectica © 2014 Editorial Board of dialectica</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource>WILEY</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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