SrasV1, PascalFrancis, Curation, bibRecord, 000253

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces

Identifieur interne : 000253 ( PascalFrancis/Curation ); précédent : 000252; suivant : 000254

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces

Auteurs : Scott F. Dowell [États-Unis] ; James M. Simmerman [États-Unis] ; Dean D. Erdman [Thaïlande] ; Jiunn-Shyan Julian Wu [Thaïlande] ; Achara Chaovavanich [États-Unis] ; Massoud Javadi [États-Unis] ; Jyh-Yuan Yang ; Larry J. Anderson [Thaïlande] ; SUXIANG TONG [Thaïlande] ; MEI SHANG HO [Taïwan]

Source :

Clinical infectious diseases [ 1058-4838 ] ; 2004.

RBID : Pascal:05-0091279

Descripteurs français

Pascal (Inist)
- Syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère, Réaction chaîne polymérase, Lavage bronchoalvéolaire, Hôpital, Surface, Equipe soignante, Coronavirus, Méthode, Contamination, Transmission, Prélèvement, RNA-directed DNA polymerase, RNA, Expectoration, Sécrétion, Homme, Animal, Souris, Infirmier, Reverse transcriptase.
Wicri :
- topic : Homme.

English descriptors

KwdEn :
- Animal, Bronchoalveolar lavage, Contamination, Coronavirus, Health care staff, Hospital, Human, Method, Mouse, Nurse, Polymerase chain reaction, RNA, RNA-directed DNA polymerase, Samplings, Secretion, Severe acute respiratory syndrome, Sputum, Surface, Transmission.

Abstract

Background. Health care workers continued to contract severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), even after barrier precautions were widely implemented. Methods. We explored the possible contribution of contaminated hospital surfaces to SARS transmission by swabbing surfaces in 2 hospitals and testing the swab samples by reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and viral culture. Results. Twenty-six of 94 swab samples tested positive for viral RNA. Swab samples of respiratory secretions from each of the 4 patients examined tested positive by RT-PCR, as were 12 of 43 swabs from patient rooms and 10 of 47 swabs from other parts of the hospital, including the computer mouses at 2 nursing stations and the handrail of the public elevator. Specimens from areas with patients with SARS in the most infectious phase of illness (days 5-15 after onset) were more likely to he RNA positive than were swab specimens from elsewhere (24 of 63 samples vs. 2 of 31 samples; p = .001). All cultures showed no growth. Conclusions. Although the viruses identified may have been noninfectious, health care workers should be aware that SARS coronavirus can contaminate environmental surfaces in the hospital, and fomites should be considered to be a possible mode of transmission of SARS.

A01	`01`	`1`		`@0 1058-4838`
A02	`01`			`@0 CIDIEL`
A03		`1`		`@0 Clin. infect. dis.`
A05				`@2 39`
A06				`@2 5`
A08	`01`	`1`	`ENG`	`@1 Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces`
A11	`01`	`1`		`@1 DOWELL (Scott F.)`
A11	`02`	`1`		`@1 SIMMERMAN (James M.)`
A11	`03`	`1`		`@1 ERDMAN (Dean D.)`
A11	`04`	`1`		`@1 JULIAN WU (Jiunn-Shyan)`
A11	`05`	`1`		`@1 CHAOVAVANICH (Achara)`
A11	`06`	`1`		`@1 JAVADI (Massoud)`
A11	`07`	`1`		`@1 YANG (Jyh-Yuan)`
A11	`08`	`1`		`@1 ANDERSON (Larry J.)`
A11	`09`	`1`		`@1 SUXIANG TONG`
A11	`10`	`1`		`@1 MEI SHANG HO`
A14	`01`			`@1 International Emerging Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention @2 Atlanta, Georgia @3 USA @Z 1 aut. @Z 2 aut. @Z 6 aut.`
A14	`02`			`@1 Ministry of Public Health @2 Nonthahuri @3 THA @Z 3 aut. @Z 8 aut. @Z 9 aut.`
A14	`03`			`@1 Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health @2 Nonthaburi @3 THA @Z 4 aut.`
A14	`04`			`@1 Respiratory and Enteric Viruses Branch, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention @2 Atlanta, Georgia @3 USA @Z 5 aut.`
A14	`05`			`@1 Centers for Disease Control and Institute of Biomedical Sciences, Academia Sinica @2 Taipei @3 TWN @Z 10 aut.`
A20				`@1 652-657`
A21				`@1 2004`
A23	`01`			`@0 ENG`
A43	`01`			`@1 INIST @2 18407 @5 354000122362470050`
A44				`@0 0000 @1 © 2005 INIST-CNRS. All rights reserved.`
A45				`@0 16 ref.`
A47	`01`	`1`		`@0 05-0091279`
A60				`@1 P`
A61				`@0 A`
A64	`01`	`1`		`@0 Clinical infectious diseases`
A66	`01`			`@0 USA`
C01	`01`		`ENG`	@0 Background. Health care workers continued to contract severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), even after barrier precautions were widely implemented. Methods. We explored the possible contribution of contaminated hospital surfaces to SARS transmission by swabbing surfaces in 2 hospitals and testing the swab samples by reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and viral culture. Results. Twenty-six of 94 swab samples tested positive for viral RNA. Swab samples of respiratory secretions from each of the 4 patients examined tested positive by RT-PCR, as were 12 of 43 swabs from patient rooms and 10 of 47 swabs from other parts of the hospital, including the computer mouses at 2 nursing stations and the handrail of the public elevator. Specimens from areas with patients with SARS in the most infectious phase of illness (days 5-15 after onset) were more likely to he RNA positive than were swab specimens from elsewhere (24 of 63 samples vs. 2 of 31 samples; p = .001). All cultures showed no growth. Conclusions. Although the viruses identified may have been noninfectious, health care workers should be aware that SARS coronavirus can contaminate environmental surfaces in the hospital, and fomites should be considered to be a possible mode of transmission of SARS.
C02	`01`	`X`		`@0 002B05C02C`
C03	`01`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère @2 NM @5 01`
C03	`01`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Severe acute respiratory syndrome @2 NM @5 01`
C03	`01`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Síndrome respiratorio agudo severo @2 NM @5 01`
C03	`02`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Réaction chaîne polymérase @5 04`
C03	`02`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Polymerase chain reaction @5 04`
C03	`02`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Reacción cadena polimerasa @5 04`
C03	`03`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Lavage bronchoalvéolaire @5 05`
C03	`03`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Bronchoalveolar lavage @5 05`
C03	`03`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Lavado broncoalveolar @5 05`
C03	`04`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Hôpital @5 07`
C03	`04`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Hospital @5 07`
C03	`04`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Hospital @5 07`
C03	`05`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Surface @5 08`
C03	`05`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Surface @5 08`
C03	`05`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Superficie @5 08`
C03	`06`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Equipe soignante @5 09`
C03	`06`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Health care staff @5 09`
C03	`06`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Equipo de salud @5 09`
C03	`07`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Coronavirus @2 NW @5 10`
C03	`07`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Coronavirus @2 NW @5 10`
C03	`07`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Coronavirus @2 NW @5 10`
C03	`08`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Méthode @5 13`
C03	`08`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Method @5 13`
C03	`08`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Método @5 13`
C03	`09`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Contamination @5 14`
C03	`09`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Contamination @5 14`
C03	`09`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Contaminación @5 14`
C03	`10`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Transmission @5 15`
C03	`10`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Transmission @5 15`
C03	`10`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Transmisión @5 15`
C03	`11`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Prélèvement @5 17`
C03	`11`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Samplings @5 17`
C03	`11`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Toma de muestra @5 17`
C03	`12`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 RNA-directed DNA polymerase @2 FE @5 18`
C03	`12`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 RNA-directed DNA polymerase @2 FE @5 18`
C03	`12`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 RNA-directed DNA polymerase @2 FE @5 18`
C03	`13`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 RNA @5 19`
C03	`13`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 RNA @5 19`
C03	`13`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 RNA @5 19`
C03	`14`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Expectoration @5 20`
C03	`14`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Sputum @5 20`
C03	`14`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Expectoración @5 20`
C03	`15`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Sécrétion @5 21`
C03	`15`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Secretion @5 21`
C03	`15`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Secreción @5 21`
C03	`16`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Homme @5 22`
C03	`16`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Human @5 22`
C03	`16`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Hombre @5 22`
C03	`17`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Animal @5 23`
C03	`17`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Animal @5 23`
C03	`17`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Animal @5 23`
C03	`18`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Souris @5 24`
C03	`18`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Mouse @5 24`
C03	`18`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Ratón @5 24`
C03	`19`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Infirmier @5 35`
C03	`19`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Nurse @5 35`
C03	`19`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Enfermero @5 35`
C03	`20`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Reverse transcriptase @4 INC @5 86`
C07	`01`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Virose`
C07	`01`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Viral disease`
C07	`01`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Virosis`
C07	`02`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Infection`
C07	`02`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Infection`
C07	`02`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Infección`
C07	`03`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Coronaviridae @2 NW`
C07	`03`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Coronaviridae @2 NW`
C07	`03`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Coronaviridae @2 NW`
C07	`04`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Nidovirales @2 NW`
C07	`04`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Nidovirales @2 NW`
C07	`04`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Nidovirales @2 NW`
C07	`05`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Virus @2 NW`
C07	`05`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Virus @2 NW`
C07	`05`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Virus @2 NW`
C07	`06`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Nucleotidyltransferases @2 FE`
C07	`06`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Nucleotidyltransferases @2 FE`
C07	`06`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Nucleotidyltransferases @2 FE`
C07	`07`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Transferases @2 FE`
C07	`07`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Transferases @2 FE`
C07	`07`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Transferases @2 FE`
C07	`08`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Enzyme @2 FE`
C07	`08`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Enzyme @2 FE`
C07	`08`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Enzima @2 FE`
C07	`09`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Rodentia @2 NS`
C07	`09`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Rodentia @2 NS`
C07	`09`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Rodentia @2 NS`
C07	`10`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Mammalia @2 NS`
C07	`10`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Mammalia @2 NS`
C07	`10`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Mammalia @2 NS`
C07	`11`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Vertebrata @2 NS`
C07	`11`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Vertebrata @2 NS`
C07	`11`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Vertebrata @2 NS`
C07	`12`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Appareil respiratoire pathologie @5 37`
C07	`12`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Respiratory disease @5 37`
C07	`12`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Aparato respiratorio patología @5 37`
C07	`13`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Poumon pathologie @5 38`
C07	`13`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Lung disease @5 38`
C07	`13`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Pulmón patología @5 38`
C07	`14`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Biologie moléculaire @5 40`
C07	`14`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Molecular biology @5 40`
C07	`14`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Biología molecular @5 40`
N21				`@1 059`
N44	`01`			`@1 OTO`
N82				`@1 OTO`

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Pascal:05-0091279

Le document en format XML

<record><TEI><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en" level="a">Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces</title>
<author><name sortKey="Dowell, Scott F" sort="Dowell, Scott F" uniqKey="Dowell S" first="Scott F." last="Dowell">Scott F. Dowell</name>
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<author><name sortKey="Simmerman, James M" sort="Simmerman, James M" uniqKey="Simmerman J" first="James M." last="Simmerman">James M. Simmerman</name>
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<author><name sortKey="Erdman, Dean D" sort="Erdman, Dean D" uniqKey="Erdman D" first="Dean D." last="Erdman">Dean D. Erdman</name>
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<author><name sortKey="Julian Wu, Jiunn Shyan" sort="Julian Wu, Jiunn Shyan" uniqKey="Julian Wu J" first="Jiunn-Shyan" last="Julian Wu">Jiunn-Shyan Julian Wu</name>
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<author><name sortKey="Chaovavanich, Achara" sort="Chaovavanich, Achara" uniqKey="Chaovavanich A" first="Achara" last="Chaovavanich">Achara Chaovavanich</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="04"><s1>Respiratory and Enteric Viruses Branch, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</s1>
<s2>Atlanta, Georgia</s2>
<s3>USA</s3>
<sZ>5 aut.</sZ>
</inist:fA14>
<country>États-Unis</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Javadi, Massoud" sort="Javadi, Massoud" uniqKey="Javadi M" first="Massoud" last="Javadi">Massoud Javadi</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="01"><s1>International Emerging Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</s1>
<s2>Atlanta, Georgia</s2>
<s3>USA</s3>
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</inist:fA14>
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</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Yang, Jyh Yuan" sort="Yang, Jyh Yuan" uniqKey="Yang J" first="Jyh-Yuan" last="Yang">Jyh-Yuan Yang</name>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Anderson, Larry J" sort="Anderson, Larry J" uniqKey="Anderson L" first="Larry J." last="Anderson">Larry J. Anderson</name>
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<country>Thaïlande</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Suxiang Tong" sort="Suxiang Tong" uniqKey="Suxiang Tong" last="Suxiang Tong">SUXIANG TONG</name>
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<country>Thaïlande</country>
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</author>
<author><name sortKey="Mei Shang Ho" sort="Mei Shang Ho" uniqKey="Mei Shang Ho" last="Mei Shang Ho">MEI SHANG HO</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="05"><s1>Centers for Disease Control and Institute of Biomedical Sciences, Academia Sinica</s1>
<s2>Taipei</s2>
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<sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title xml:lang="en" level="a">Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces</title>
<author><name sortKey="Dowell, Scott F" sort="Dowell, Scott F" uniqKey="Dowell S" first="Scott F." last="Dowell">Scott F. Dowell</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="01"><s1>International Emerging Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</s1>
<s2>Atlanta, Georgia</s2>
<s3>USA</s3>
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<author><name sortKey="Simmerman, James M" sort="Simmerman, James M" uniqKey="Simmerman J" first="James M." last="Simmerman">James M. Simmerman</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="01"><s1>International Emerging Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</s1>
<s2>Atlanta, Georgia</s2>
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<sZ>1 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>2 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>6 aut.</sZ>
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<author><name sortKey="Erdman, Dean D" sort="Erdman, Dean D" uniqKey="Erdman D" first="Dean D." last="Erdman">Dean D. Erdman</name>
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<author><name sortKey="Julian Wu, Jiunn Shyan" sort="Julian Wu, Jiunn Shyan" uniqKey="Julian Wu J" first="Jiunn-Shyan" last="Julian Wu">Jiunn-Shyan Julian Wu</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="03"><s1>Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health</s1>
<s2>Nonthaburi</s2>
<s3>THA</s3>
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</inist:fA14>
<country>Thaïlande</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Chaovavanich, Achara" sort="Chaovavanich, Achara" uniqKey="Chaovavanich A" first="Achara" last="Chaovavanich">Achara Chaovavanich</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="04"><s1>Respiratory and Enteric Viruses Branch, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</s1>
<s2>Atlanta, Georgia</s2>
<s3>USA</s3>
<sZ>5 aut.</sZ>
</inist:fA14>
<country>États-Unis</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Javadi, Massoud" sort="Javadi, Massoud" uniqKey="Javadi M" first="Massoud" last="Javadi">Massoud Javadi</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="01"><s1>International Emerging Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</s1>
<s2>Atlanta, Georgia</s2>
<s3>USA</s3>
<sZ>1 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>2 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>6 aut.</sZ>
</inist:fA14>
<country>États-Unis</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Yang, Jyh Yuan" sort="Yang, Jyh Yuan" uniqKey="Yang J" first="Jyh-Yuan" last="Yang">Jyh-Yuan Yang</name>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Anderson, Larry J" sort="Anderson, Larry J" uniqKey="Anderson L" first="Larry J." last="Anderson">Larry J. Anderson</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="02"><s1>Ministry of Public Health</s1>
<s2>Nonthahuri</s2>
<s3>THA</s3>
<sZ>3 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>8 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>9 aut.</sZ>
</inist:fA14>
<country>Thaïlande</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Suxiang Tong" sort="Suxiang Tong" uniqKey="Suxiang Tong" last="Suxiang Tong">SUXIANG TONG</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="02"><s1>Ministry of Public Health</s1>
<s2>Nonthahuri</s2>
<s3>THA</s3>
<sZ>3 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>8 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>9 aut.</sZ>
</inist:fA14>
<country>Thaïlande</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Mei Shang Ho" sort="Mei Shang Ho" uniqKey="Mei Shang Ho" last="Mei Shang Ho">MEI SHANG HO</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="05"><s1>Centers for Disease Control and Institute of Biomedical Sciences, Academia Sinica</s1>
<s2>Taipei</s2>
<s3>TWN</s3>
<sZ>10 aut.</sZ>
</inist:fA14>
<country>Taïwan</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
</analytic>
<series><title level="j" type="main">Clinical infectious diseases</title>
<title level="j" type="abbreviated">Clin. infect. dis.</title>
<idno type="ISSN">1058-4838</idno>
<imprint><date when="2004">2004</date>
</imprint>
</series>
</biblStruct>
</sourceDesc>
<seriesStmt><title level="j" type="main">Clinical infectious diseases</title>
<title level="j" type="abbreviated">Clin. infect. dis.</title>
<idno type="ISSN">1058-4838</idno>
</seriesStmt>
</fileDesc>
<profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="KwdEn" xml:lang="en"><term>Animal</term>
<term>Bronchoalveolar lavage</term>
<term>Contamination</term>
<term>Coronavirus</term>
<term>Health care staff</term>
<term>Hospital</term>
<term>Human</term>
<term>Method</term>
<term>Mouse</term>
<term>Nurse</term>
<term>Polymerase chain reaction</term>
<term>RNA</term>
<term>RNA-directed DNA polymerase</term>
<term>Samplings</term>
<term>Secretion</term>
<term>Severe acute respiratory syndrome</term>
<term>Sputum</term>
<term>Surface</term>
<term>Transmission</term>
</keywords>
<keywords scheme="Pascal" xml:lang="fr"><term>Syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère</term>
<term>Réaction chaîne polymérase</term>
<term>Lavage bronchoalvéolaire</term>
<term>Hôpital</term>
<term>Surface</term>
<term>Equipe soignante</term>
<term>Coronavirus</term>
<term>Méthode</term>
<term>Contamination</term>
<term>Transmission</term>
<term>Prélèvement</term>
<term>RNA-directed DNA polymerase</term>
<term>RNA</term>
<term>Expectoration</term>
<term>Sécrétion</term>
<term>Homme</term>
<term>Animal</term>
<term>Souris</term>
<term>Infirmier</term>
<term>Reverse transcriptase</term>
</keywords>
<keywords scheme="Wicri" type="topic" xml:lang="fr"><term>Homme</term>
</keywords>
</textClass>
</profileDesc>
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<front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Background. Health care workers continued to contract severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), even after barrier precautions were widely implemented. Methods. We explored the possible contribution of contaminated hospital surfaces to SARS transmission by swabbing surfaces in 2 hospitals and testing the swab samples by reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and viral culture. Results. Twenty-six of 94 swab samples tested positive for viral RNA. Swab samples of respiratory secretions from each of the 4 patients examined tested positive by RT-PCR, as were 12 of 43 swabs from patient rooms and 10 of 47 swabs from other parts of the hospital, including the computer mouses at 2 nursing stations and the handrail of the public elevator. Specimens from areas with patients with SARS in the most infectious phase of illness (days 5-15 after onset) were more likely to he RNA positive than were swab specimens from elsewhere (24 of 63 samples vs. 2 of 31 samples; p = .001). All cultures showed no growth. Conclusions. Although the viruses identified may have been noninfectious, health care workers should be aware that SARS coronavirus can contaminate environmental surfaces in the hospital, and fomites should be considered to be a possible mode of transmission of SARS.</div>
</front>
</TEI>
<inist><standard h6="B"><pA><fA01 i1="01" i2="1"><s0>1058-4838</s0>
</fA01>
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</fA02>
<fA03 i2="1"><s0>Clin. infect. dis.</s0>
</fA03>
<fA05><s2>39</s2>
</fA05>
<fA06><s2>5</s2>
</fA06>
<fA08 i1="01" i2="1" l="ENG"><s1>Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces</s1>
</fA08>
<fA11 i1="01" i2="1"><s1>DOWELL (Scott F.)</s1>
</fA11>
<fA11 i1="02" i2="1"><s1>SIMMERMAN (James M.)</s1>
</fA11>
<fA11 i1="03" i2="1"><s1>ERDMAN (Dean D.)</s1>
</fA11>
<fA11 i1="04" i2="1"><s1>JULIAN WU (Jiunn-Shyan)</s1>
</fA11>
<fA11 i1="05" i2="1"><s1>CHAOVAVANICH (Achara)</s1>
</fA11>
<fA11 i1="06" i2="1"><s1>JAVADI (Massoud)</s1>
</fA11>
<fA11 i1="07" i2="1"><s1>YANG (Jyh-Yuan)</s1>
</fA11>
<fA11 i1="08" i2="1"><s1>ANDERSON (Larry J.)</s1>
</fA11>
<fA11 i1="09" i2="1"><s1>SUXIANG TONG</s1>
</fA11>
<fA11 i1="10" i2="1"><s1>MEI SHANG HO</s1>
</fA11>
<fA14 i1="01"><s1>International Emerging Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</s1>
<s2>Atlanta, Georgia</s2>
<s3>USA</s3>
<sZ>1 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>2 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>6 aut.</sZ>
</fA14>
<fA14 i1="02"><s1>Ministry of Public Health</s1>
<s2>Nonthahuri</s2>
<s3>THA</s3>
<sZ>3 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>8 aut.</sZ>
<sZ>9 aut.</sZ>
</fA14>
<fA14 i1="03"><s1>Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health</s1>
<s2>Nonthaburi</s2>
<s3>THA</s3>
<sZ>4 aut.</sZ>
</fA14>
<fA14 i1="04"><s1>Respiratory and Enteric Viruses Branch, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</s1>
<s2>Atlanta, Georgia</s2>
<s3>USA</s3>
<sZ>5 aut.</sZ>
</fA14>
<fA14 i1="05"><s1>Centers for Disease Control and Institute of Biomedical Sciences, Academia Sinica</s1>
<s2>Taipei</s2>
<s3>TWN</s3>
<sZ>10 aut.</sZ>
</fA14>
<fA20><s1>652-657</s1>
</fA20>
<fA21><s1>2004</s1>
</fA21>
<fA23 i1="01"><s0>ENG</s0>
</fA23>
<fA43 i1="01"><s1>INIST</s1>
<s2>18407</s2>
<s5>354000122362470050</s5>
</fA43>
<fA44><s0>0000</s0>
<s1>© 2005 INIST-CNRS. All rights reserved.</s1>
</fA44>
<fA45><s0>16 ref.</s0>
</fA45>
<fA47 i1="01" i2="1"><s0>05-0091279</s0>
</fA47>
<fA60><s1>P</s1>
</fA60>
<fA61><s0>A</s0>
</fA61>
<fA64 i1="01" i2="1"><s0>Clinical infectious diseases</s0>
</fA64>
<fA66 i1="01"><s0>USA</s0>
</fA66>
<fC01 i1="01" l="ENG"><s0>Background. Health care workers continued to contract severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), even after barrier precautions were widely implemented. Methods. We explored the possible contribution of contaminated hospital surfaces to SARS transmission by swabbing surfaces in 2 hospitals and testing the swab samples by reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and viral culture. Results. Twenty-six of 94 swab samples tested positive for viral RNA. Swab samples of respiratory secretions from each of the 4 patients examined tested positive by RT-PCR, as were 12 of 43 swabs from patient rooms and 10 of 47 swabs from other parts of the hospital, including the computer mouses at 2 nursing stations and the handrail of the public elevator. Specimens from areas with patients with SARS in the most infectious phase of illness (days 5-15 after onset) were more likely to he RNA positive than were swab specimens from elsewhere (24 of 63 samples vs. 2 of 31 samples; p = .001). All cultures showed no growth. Conclusions. Although the viruses identified may have been noninfectious, health care workers should be aware that SARS coronavirus can contaminate environmental surfaces in the hospital, and fomites should be considered to be a possible mode of transmission of SARS.</s0>
</fC01>
<fC02 i1="01" i2="X"><s0>002B05C02C</s0>
</fC02>
<fC03 i1="01" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère</s0>
<s2>NM</s2>
<s5>01</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="01" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Severe acute respiratory syndrome</s0>
<s2>NM</s2>
<s5>01</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="01" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Síndrome respiratorio agudo severo</s0>
<s2>NM</s2>
<s5>01</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="02" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Réaction chaîne polymérase</s0>
<s5>04</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="02" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Polymerase chain reaction</s0>
<s5>04</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="02" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Reacción cadena polimerasa</s0>
<s5>04</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="03" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Lavage bronchoalvéolaire</s0>
<s5>05</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="03" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Bronchoalveolar lavage</s0>
<s5>05</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="03" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Lavado broncoalveolar</s0>
<s5>05</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="04" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Hôpital</s0>
<s5>07</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="04" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Hospital</s0>
<s5>07</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="04" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Hospital</s0>
<s5>07</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="05" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Surface</s0>
<s5>08</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="05" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Surface</s0>
<s5>08</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="05" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Superficie</s0>
<s5>08</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="06" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Equipe soignante</s0>
<s5>09</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="06" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Health care staff</s0>
<s5>09</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="06" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Equipo de salud</s0>
<s5>09</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="07" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Coronavirus</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
<s5>10</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="07" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Coronavirus</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
<s5>10</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="07" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Coronavirus</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
<s5>10</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="08" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Méthode</s0>
<s5>13</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="08" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Method</s0>
<s5>13</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="08" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Método</s0>
<s5>13</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="09" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Contamination</s0>
<s5>14</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="09" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Contamination</s0>
<s5>14</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="09" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Contaminación</s0>
<s5>14</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="10" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Transmission</s0>
<s5>15</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="10" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Transmission</s0>
<s5>15</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="10" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Transmisión</s0>
<s5>15</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="11" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Prélèvement</s0>
<s5>17</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="11" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Samplings</s0>
<s5>17</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="11" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Toma de muestra</s0>
<s5>17</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="12" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>RNA-directed DNA polymerase</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
<s5>18</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="12" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>RNA-directed DNA polymerase</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
<s5>18</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="12" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>RNA-directed DNA polymerase</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
<s5>18</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="13" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>RNA</s0>
<s5>19</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="13" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>RNA</s0>
<s5>19</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="13" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>RNA</s0>
<s5>19</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="14" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Expectoration</s0>
<s5>20</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="14" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Sputum</s0>
<s5>20</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="14" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Expectoración</s0>
<s5>20</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="15" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Sécrétion</s0>
<s5>21</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="15" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Secretion</s0>
<s5>21</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="15" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Secreción</s0>
<s5>21</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="16" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Homme</s0>
<s5>22</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="16" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Human</s0>
<s5>22</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="16" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Hombre</s0>
<s5>22</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="17" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Animal</s0>
<s5>23</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="17" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Animal</s0>
<s5>23</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="17" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Animal</s0>
<s5>23</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="18" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Souris</s0>
<s5>24</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="18" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Mouse</s0>
<s5>24</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="18" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Ratón</s0>
<s5>24</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="19" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Infirmier</s0>
<s5>35</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="19" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Nurse</s0>
<s5>35</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="19" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Enfermero</s0>
<s5>35</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="20" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Reverse transcriptase</s0>
<s4>INC</s4>
<s5>86</s5>
</fC03>
<fC07 i1="01" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Virose</s0>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="01" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Viral disease</s0>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="01" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Virosis</s0>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="02" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Infection</s0>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="02" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Infection</s0>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="02" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Infección</s0>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="03" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Coronaviridae</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="03" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Coronaviridae</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="03" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Coronaviridae</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="04" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Nidovirales</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="04" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Nidovirales</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="04" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Nidovirales</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="05" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Virus</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="05" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Virus</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="05" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Virus</s0>
<s2>NW</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="06" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Nucleotidyltransferases</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="06" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Nucleotidyltransferases</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="06" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Nucleotidyltransferases</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="07" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Transferases</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="07" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Transferases</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="07" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Transferases</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="08" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Enzyme</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
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<fC07 i1="08" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Enzyme</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="08" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Enzima</s0>
<s2>FE</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="09" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Rodentia</s0>
<s2>NS</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="09" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Rodentia</s0>
<s2>NS</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="09" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Rodentia</s0>
<s2>NS</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="10" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Mammalia</s0>
<s2>NS</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="10" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Mammalia</s0>
<s2>NS</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="10" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Mammalia</s0>
<s2>NS</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="11" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Vertebrata</s0>
<s2>NS</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="11" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Vertebrata</s0>
<s2>NS</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="11" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Vertebrata</s0>
<s2>NS</s2>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="12" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Appareil respiratoire pathologie</s0>
<s5>37</s5>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="12" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Respiratory disease</s0>
<s5>37</s5>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="12" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Aparato respiratorio patología</s0>
<s5>37</s5>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="13" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Poumon pathologie</s0>
<s5>38</s5>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="13" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Lung disease</s0>
<s5>38</s5>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="13" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Pulmón patología</s0>
<s5>38</s5>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="14" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Biologie moléculaire</s0>
<s5>40</s5>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="14" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Molecular biology</s0>
<s5>40</s5>
</fC07>
<fC07 i1="14" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Biología molecular</s0>
<s5>40</s5>
</fC07>
<fN21><s1>059</s1>
</fN21>
<fN44 i1="01"><s1>OTO</s1>
</fN44>
<fN82><s1>OTO</s1>
</fN82>
</pA>
</standard>
</inist>
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Serveur d'exploration SRAS

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces

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