towards an intuitionist account of moral development
Identifieur interne : 007531 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 007530; suivant : 007532towards an intuitionist account of moral development
Auteurs : Karen Bartsch ; Jennifer Cole WrightSource :
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences [ 0140-525X ] ; 2005-08.
Abstract
sunstein's characterization of moral blunders jointly indicts an intuitive process and the structure of heuristics. but intuitions need not lead to error, and the problems with moral heuristics apply also to moral principles. accordingly, moral development may well involve more, rather than less, intuitive responsiveness. this suggests a novel trajectory for future research into the development of appropriate moral judgments.
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DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X05260090
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