Mapping Judicial Independence
Identifieur interne : 005036 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 005035; suivant : 005037Mapping Judicial Independence
Auteurs : Micah B. RankinSource :
- Global Journal of Comparative Law [ 2211-9051 ] ; 2013.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- American journal, Cambridge university press, Comparative purposes, Comparative taxonomy, Constitutional guarantees, Decisional independence, Definitional problems, Dependent judiciary, Entrenchment, Entrenchment criterion, Formal guarantees, Functional separation, Ginsburg, Global, Global journal, Guarantee, Hirschl, Ibid, Independence model, Independent judges, Independent judiciary, Individual judges, Institutionalisation, Institutionalisation criterion, Italian constitution, John ferejohn, Judicial, Judicial independence, Judicial review, Judiciary, Legal stud, National congress, Normative, Other branches, Other organs, Para, Peerenboom, Qualitative taxonomy, Randall peerenboom, Robust, Several models, Specific guarantees, Supreme court, Taxonomy, Textual guarantees.
- Teeft :
- American journal, Cambridge university press, Comparative purposes, Comparative taxonomy, Constitutional guarantees, Decisional independence, Definitional problems, Dependent judiciary, Entrenchment, Entrenchment criterion, Formal guarantees, Functional separation, Ginsburg, Global, Global journal, Guarantee, Hirschl, Ibid, Independence model, Independent judges, Independent judiciary, Individual judges, Institutionalisation, Institutionalisation criterion, Italian constitution, John ferejohn, Judicial, Judicial independence, Judicial review, Judiciary, Legal stud, National congress, Normative, Other branches, Other organs, Para, Peerenboom, Qualitative taxonomy, Randall peerenboom, Robust, Several models, Specific guarantees, Supreme court, Taxonomy, Textual guarantees.
Abstract
Judicial independence is increasingly viewed as a sine qua non of democratic constitutionalism. But in spite of a widespread consensus on the importance of having an independent judiciary, debates about the meaning of judicial independence persist in the literature. For scholars interested in comparative constitutional law, the uncertainty surrounding the definition of judicial independence is particularly vexing and raises several challenging questions: is there a universal set of conditions necessary for judicial independence? Or are there perhaps several models of a judicial independence? One issue that arises from these various questions is whether it is possible to develop a taxonomy of judicial independence. Although taxonomies inevitably produce an incomplete picture of the objects they classify, a taxonomy can assist comparative law scholars by providing an analytical framework for comparison. In Part 1 of this paper, the author explores the conceptual problems associated with finding a universal definition of judicial independence, arguing that there is no single, satisfactory definition of judicial independence. In Part 2 of the paper, the author addresses some of the methodological problems associated with developing a qualitative taxonomy. This is followed by a discussion of the organizing criteria that will be used to construct the four models of judicial independence found in the author’s proposed taxonomy.
Url:
DOI: 10.1163/2211906X-00201001
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:A0737AFBC642D56ABDF2760A813C908A295ADBAFLe document en format XML
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In Part 1 of this paper, the author explores the conceptual problems associated with finding a universal definition of judicial independence, arguing that there is no single, satisfactory definition of judicial independence. In Part 2 of the paper, the author addresses some of the methodological problems associated with developing a qualitative taxonomy. 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Social Sciences</json:string><json:string>2 - Social Sciences</json:string><json:string>3 - Law</json:string></scopus><inist><json:string>1 - sciences humaines et sociales</json:string><json:string>2 - philosophie</json:string></inist></categories><publicationDate>2013</publicationDate><copyrightDate>2013</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1163/2211906X-00201001</json:string></doi><id>A0737AFBC642D56ABDF2760A813C908A295ADBAF</id><score>1</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/A0737AFBC642D56ABDF2760A813C908A295ADBAF/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/A0737AFBC642D56ABDF2760A813C908A295ADBAF/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/A0737AFBC642D56ABDF2760A813C908A295ADBAF/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a">Mapping Judicial Independence</title><title level="a" type="sub">Toward a Comparative Taxonomy</title><respStmt><resp>Références bibliographiques récupérées via GROBID</resp><name resp="ISTEX-API">ISTEX-API (INIST-CNRS)</name></respStmt></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher scheme="https://publisher-list.data.istex.fr">Martinus Nijhoff Publishers</publisher><pubPlace>Leiden</pubPlace><availability><licence><p>© 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands</p></licence><p scheme="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-56W3KPD5-3">brill-journals</p></availability><date>2013</date></publicationStmt><notesStmt><note type="research-article" scheme="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</note><note type="journal" scheme="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</note></notesStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a">Mapping Judicial Independence</title><title level="a" type="sub">Toward a Comparative Taxonomy</title><author xml:id="author-0000"><persName><forename type="first">Micah B.</forename><surname>Rankin</surname></persName><email>Mrankin@tru.ca</email><affiliation>Thompson Rivers University</affiliation></author><idno type="istex">A0737AFBC642D56ABDF2760A813C908A295ADBAF</idno><idno type="ark">ark:/67375/JKT-MTSKGXNR-L</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1163/2211906X-00201001</idno><idno type="href">2211906X_002_01_S001_text.pdf</idno></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Global Journal of Comparative Law</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">GJCL</title><idno type="pISSN">2211-9051</idno><idno type="eISSN">2211-906X</idno><imprint><publisher>Martinus Nijhoff Publishers</publisher><pubPlace>Leiden</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2013"></date><biblScope unit="volume">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">1</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="1">1</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="26">26</biblScope></imprint></monogr></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2013</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract><p>Judicial independence is increasingly viewed as a sine qua non of democratic constitutionalism. But in spite of a widespread consensus on the importance of having an independent judiciary, debates about the meaning of judicial independence persist in the literature. For scholars interested in comparative constitutional law, the uncertainty surrounding the definition of judicial independence is particularly vexing and raises several challenging questions: is there a universal set of conditions necessary for judicial independence? Or are there perhaps several models of a judicial independence? One issue that arises from these various questions is whether it is possible to develop a taxonomy of judicial independence. Although taxonomies inevitably produce an incomplete picture of the objects they classify, a taxonomy can assist comparative law scholars by providing an analytical framework for comparison. In Part 1 of this paper, the author explores the conceptual problems associated with finding a universal definition of judicial independence, arguing that there is no single, satisfactory definition of judicial independence. In Part 2 of the paper, the author addresses some of the methodological problems associated with developing a qualitative taxonomy. This is followed by a discussion of the organizing criteria that will be used to construct the four models of judicial independence found in the author’s proposed taxonomy.</p></abstract><textClass><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>keywords</head><item><term>judicial independence</term></item><item><term>independence</term></item><item><term>separation of powers</term></item><item><term>taxonomy</term></item><item><term>comparative constitutional law</term></item><item><term>models</term></item><item><term>judiciary</term></item><item><term>comparative law</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2013">Created</change><change when="2013">Published</change><change xml:id="refBibs-istex" who="#ISTEX-API" when="2017-10-2">References added</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/A0737AFBC642D56ABDF2760A813C908A295ADBAF/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="corpus brill-journals not found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v2.3 20070202//EN" URI="http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/2.3/journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article article-type="research-article">
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<article-title>Mapping Judicial Independence</article-title>
<subtitle>Toward a Comparative Taxonomy</subtitle>
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<name><surname>Rankin</surname><given-names>Micah B.</given-names></name>
<aff>Assistant Professor, <institution>Thompson Rivers University</institution>, Faculty of Law; JD (Victoria), LLM (Toronto), Barrister & Solicitor (British Columbia), <email>Mrankin@tru.ca</email></aff>
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<copyright-statement>© 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands</copyright-statement>
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<p>Judicial independence is increasingly viewed as a <italic>sine qua non</italic> of democratic constitutionalism. But in spite of a widespread consensus on the importance of having an independent judiciary, debates about the meaning of judicial independence persist in the literature. For scholars interested in comparative constitutional law, the uncertainty surrounding the definition of judicial independence is particularly vexing and raises several challenging questions: is there a universal set of conditions necessary for judicial independence? Or are there perhaps several models of a judicial independence? One issue that arises from these various questions is whether it is possible to develop a taxonomy of judicial independence. Although taxonomies inevitably produce an incomplete picture of the objects they classify, a taxonomy can assist comparative law scholars by providing an analytical framework for comparison. In Part 1 of this paper, the author explores the conceptual problems associated with finding a universal definition of judicial independence, arguing that there is no single, satisfactory definition of judicial independence. In Part 2 of the paper, the author addresses some of the methodological problems associated with developing a qualitative taxonomy. This is followed by a discussion of the organizing criteria that will be used to construct the four models of judicial independence found in the author’s proposed taxonomy.</p>
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<sec sec-type="head1" id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_001"><label>1</label><title>Introduction</title>
<p>Few concepts have captured as much scholarly attention as judicial independence. With its roots in the doctrine of the separation of powers, the need for an independent judiciary is increasingly considered a <italic>sine qua non</italic> of democratic constitutionalism.<xref rid="fn1" ref-type="fn"><sup>1</sup></xref> But in spite of widespread consensus on the importance of having an independent judiciary, there is surprisingly little agreement on its conceptual parameters, or indeed on whether ‘it’ is one thing at all. As one observer remarks, ‘[J]udicial independence has become like freedom: everyone wants it but no one knows quite what it looks like.’<xref rid="fn2" ref-type="fn"><sup>2</sup></xref> For scholars interested in comparative constitutional law, the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of judicial independence is particularly vexing and raises several challenging questions. Is there a universal set of conditions necessary for judicial independence? Or are there perhaps several models of judicial independence? If there are several models, must a state establish at least a core set of guarantees before it can be said to have an independent judiciary? Although some of these issues may seem obscure to the uninitiated, exploring them has taken on greater urgency as the newly democratising countries of the Middle East and North Africa begin to struggle with the difficult question of constitutional reform.</p>
<p>Of the many unexamined issues surrounding judicial independence, one of the least explored is the question of whether it is possible to develop a taxonomy of judicial independence.<xref rid="fn3" ref-type="fn"><sup>3</sup></xref> Although taxonomies almost inevitably result in an incomplete picture of the objects they classify, they can assist scholars by providing an intellectual framework for analytical and comparative purposes. This paper attempts to provide just such an analytical framework. Part I of the paper explores the conceptual problems associated with finding a universal definition of judicial independence. In Part II, certain methodological problems associated with developing a qualitative taxonomy are examined. This is followed by a discussion of the organising principles that will be used to develop the models of judicial independence that will be proposed. In Part III, the paper turns to an elaboration of a taxonomy built around four models of judicial independence, each of which is illustrated by a prototypical nation state example: (1) ‘Strict Entrenched Judicial Independence’ (Italy); (2) ‘Casual Entrenched Judicial Independence’ (Canada); (3) ‘Normative Institutional Judicial Independence’ (Israel); and (4) ‘Institutional Judicial Interdependence’ (China). Part V of the paper concludes with some brief sketches of possible directions for future research.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_002" sec-type="head1"><label>2</label><title>The concept of judicial independence</title>
<p>No discussion of judicial independence can avoid the thorny question of how one should go about defining the concept. The task is not an easy one. Indeed, the definitional problems associated with judicial independence have caused such intellectual paroxysms that some scholars have concluded that it is nothing but a ‘rhetorical notion’<xref rid="fn4" ref-type="fn"><sup>4</sup></xref> that should be eliminated from discussion altogether.<xref rid="fn5" ref-type="fn"><sup>5</sup></xref> However, the idea of abandoning the concept is at once extreme and seemingly impractical; for all of its conceptual vicissitudes, the idea that political systems require some kind of independent judicial oversight is deeply embedded in the idea of constitutionalism itself. Moreover, it may be that the endless churning of the definitional debate has led to scholars becoming hostages of a problem of their own making. As developed below, for comparativists a focus on the end (or ends) served by judicial independence may prove a more fruitful method of studying the concept – and one that avoids endlessly tilting at definitional windmills.</p>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_003" sec-type="head2"><label>2.1</label><title>Conceptualising Judicial Independence</title>
<p>Whatever may be said of the purposes of judicial independence, there is much to the criticism that discussions about it often resolve to little more than rhetorical platitudes. Examples abound. ‘Judicial independence’, says one jurist, is the ‘life blood of constitutionalism in democratic societies.’<xref rid="fn6" ref-type="fn"><sup>6</sup></xref> In similarly inspiring terms, others have touted its important role in maintaining the rule of law, noting, among other things, that ‘governments of all stripes recognize that judicial independence is a cornerstone of democracy’.<xref rid="fn7" ref-type="fn"><sup>7</sup></xref> Although most would agree with these hortatory expressions, it is important that our political commitments to judicial independence do not gloss over the deep tensions permeating the concept.</p>
<p>Even a cursory survey of the literature reveals widely diverging views about the objects and goals of judicial independence. For some, judicial independence is not a state of affairs, but an outcome that flows from a constitution based upon the separation of powers; it is a ‘checks and balances’ device against the executive and legislative branches.<xref rid="fn8" ref-type="fn"><sup>8</sup></xref> Others hold that it concerns the ability of judges to adjudicate without bias; to be independent, therefore, means that judges are the ‘authors of their own opinions’ and that each decision should only represent a judge’s personal preferences. Still others emphasise that judicial independence requires not only that judges resolve cases according to their preferences, but also that the other branches of government comply with their decisions. And yet still others hold that judicial independence is fundamentally related to ‘the rule of law’<xref rid="fn9" ref-type="fn"><sup>9</sup></xref> – an equally contestable concept.<xref rid="fn10" ref-type="fn"><sup>10</sup></xref></p>
<p>These different views about the objects of judicial independence often correspond to conflicting methodological approaches. Legal theorists have tended to emphasise a formalistic account of judicial independence that requires rigorously demarcated boundaries between the judicial and other branches of government.<xref rid="fn11" ref-type="fn"><sup>11</sup></xref> Others favour a functionalist approach according to which strictly defined boundaries may be breached in order to achieve desirable policy goals.<xref rid="fn12" ref-type="fn"><sup>12</sup></xref> This theoretical wrangling has in turn produced an eruption of ever subtler sub-forms of judicial independence accompanied by a rich nomenclature that includes such things as: ‘institutional independence’,<xref rid="fn13" ref-type="fn"><sup>13</sup></xref> ‘decisional independence’,<xref rid="fn14" ref-type="fn"><sup>14</sup></xref> ‘counter-majoritarian independence’,<xref rid="fn15" ref-type="fn"><sup>15</sup></xref> ‘lawmaking independence’,<xref rid="fn16" ref-type="fn"><sup>16</sup></xref> ‘structural independence’,<xref rid="fn17" ref-type="fn"><sup>17</sup></xref> ‘individual independence’,<xref rid="fn18" ref-type="fn"><sup>18</sup></xref> ‘collective independence’,<xref rid="fn19" ref-type="fn"><sup>19</sup></xref> ‘personal independence’,<xref rid="fn20" ref-type="fn"><sup>20</sup></xref> and ‘external’ and ‘internal independence’.<xref rid="fn21" ref-type="fn"><sup>21</sup></xref></p>
<p>Comparative law scholarship evidences its own patterns and predilections. To the extent generalisations can fairly be made, it can be fairly said that the comparative law literature is mainly composed of what Hirschl calls free-standing, single-country studies of judicial independence.<xref rid="fn22" ref-type="fn"><sup>22</sup></xref> Although there are some notable exceptions to this rule,<xref rid="fn23" ref-type="fn"><sup>23</sup></xref> country studies tend to provide a sort of expressivist<xref rid="fn24" ref-type="fn"><sup>24</sup></xref> glimpse into the inner workings of judicial independence in one and sometimes more jurisdictions. There is, however, usually very little comparison to speak of.<xref rid="fn25" ref-type="fn"><sup>25</sup></xref> Another feature of comparative studies is an arguably heavy emphasis on the presence or absence of formal guarantees of independence in written constitutions.<xref rid="fn26" ref-type="fn"><sup>26</sup></xref> Though not always an express claim, there is sometimes an intimation of a causal relationship between the <italic>de jure</italic> and <italic>de facto</italic> independence of a judiciary. The problem with drawing this connection is that it does not account for the presence of strong judiciaries in states without written constitutions such as Great Britain and Sweden; and, in turn, it does not explain why many states with written constitutions manipulate, coerce, and undermine their judiciaries.</p>
<p>What then explains this veritable quagmire of opinions, terminology and approaches? In the first place, it must be recognised that there are inherent difficulties with the concept of judicial independence. For instance, what exactly is it that is supposed to be independent? Is it the judges themselves, or is it the courts as an organ of the state? Furthermore, what kind of separation is envisioned? Is it an institutional separation or a functional one? And if there is a separation, does this mean that there can be no institutional overlap whatsoever? Of course, we know that in practice a true separation is impossible. Legislatures and executives often perform functions that are ostensibly adjudicative. Likewise, when judges interpret statutes or, in the common law world, produce case law, they exercise functions that are legislative in nature and effect. In the real world, therefore, interactions and interdependencies between courts, judges and the other branches of government are commonplace and necessary: judges must be appointed and paid and the laws they apply must be passed by legislatures. All of these activities require inputs, outputs and interactions that involve the other organs of the state.</p>
<p>Coming to a satisfactory definition of judicial independence is also made difficult because of competing concerns about judicial accountability.<xref rid="fn27" ref-type="fn"><sup>27</sup></xref> Even assuming it were possible to achieve a truly independent judiciary, one is then confronted with the question of whether such a high degree of independence is desirable. In the United States, this question has largely been framed against the backdrop of a partially elected judiciary. Elsewhere comparative scholars have examined the design of discipline and appointment commissions with a view to understanding how we can balance the sometimes conflicting goals of judicial independence. The upshot is that judicial independence is a concept that pushes and pulls in many directions; it should therefore come as no surprise that it produces apparently irresolvable intellectual dilemmas.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_004" sec-type="head2"><label>2.2</label><title>A Purposive Approach to Judicial Independence</title>
<p>With all of the shortcomings identified above one might justifiably ask whether judicial independence could ever be the subject of a meaningful comparative taxonomy. Answering this objection lies, first and foremost, in the recognition that the quest for conceptual certainty may be a fool’s errand.<xref rid="fn28" ref-type="fn"><sup>28</sup></xref> In the same way that the concept of a ‘democracy’ is capable of supporting a multiplicity of different formulations,<xref rid="fn29" ref-type="fn"><sup>29</sup></xref> judicial independence may not be a formally ascertainable state of affairs, except perhaps in its extreme absence. Put differently, requiring a strict definition of judicial independence imposes a paralysing definitional requirement. Such an approach offers little to comparativists who eschew the idea of one-size-fits-all constitutional models.</p>
<p>What, then, does it mean to say that a judiciary is independent? There is and probably cannot be a standard account of judicial independence.<xref rid="fn30" ref-type="fn"><sup>30</sup></xref> On a conceptual level, however, virtually all definitions of judicial independence seem to coalesce around two inter-related purposes: the functional separation of sources of public power in a state and the preservation of impartial adjudication.<xref rid="fn31" ref-type="fn"><sup>31</sup></xref> The first purpose is structural in nature and holds that public powers ought to be exercised by different organs of the state – usually the legislative, executive and judicial organs – and that each, at least in general terms, should be able to exercise its designated powers free from interference by a coordinate organ of the state.<xref rid="fn32" ref-type="fn"><sup>32</sup></xref> While there are many reasons to prefer this kind of organisation, there are two reasons that are most commonly cited. The first is the Montesquieuan notion that separating state organs will prevent the dominance of one organ over the others and will thereby prevent it from being capable of abusing its power;<xref rid="fn33" ref-type="fn"><sup>33</sup></xref> in short, the possibility of oppressive government is thought to be diminished by ‘building plurality into the system’.<xref rid="fn34" ref-type="fn"><sup>34</sup></xref> A second and often overlooked rationale for the separation of powers holds that a functional separation of power enhances the administrative efficiency of government. Although there is obviously an overlap between the two structural rationales, they each support slightly different types of constitutional or institutional guarantees.</p>
<p>The second overarching purpose of judicial independence is the preservation of impartial adjudication.<xref rid="fn35" ref-type="fn"><sup>35</sup></xref> Here the claim is that individual judges themselves must be able to make decisions that are not ‘coloured by personal values, biases and inclinations as well as the contingent situation that individual happens to be in’.<xref rid="fn36" ref-type="fn"><sup>36</sup></xref> There are of course many reasons why one might a process of impartial judicial decision-making. First among these is the preservation of a judge’s decisional independence so that they may ‘referee’ a structural separation of powers in a state. For an institutional separation of powers to exist some measures must be taken to ensure that judges do not favour – and are not forced to favour – one organ of the state over another. Independent judges are able and to limit state organs to their predefined spheres, thereby ensuring that the rewards of a formal separation of powers can be reaped. A second reason for maintaining the independence of individual judges is purely functional. As Shapiro has famously argued, neutral, tripartite, third party adjudication presupposes the impartiality of the adjudicator.<xref rid="fn37" ref-type="fn"><sup>37</sup></xref> Put somewhat differently, when a judge is not impartial but joins forces with one or other of the parties to a dispute, he or she is no longer judging but doing some other kind of activity.<xref rid="fn38" ref-type="fn"><sup>38</sup></xref> Significantly, this means that an independent judiciary may be desirable for reasons independent of a society’s normative commitment to the separation of powers.</p>
<p>Despite there being no single definition of judicial independence, there are readily definable ends that judicial independence seeks to achieve. These purposes and their rationales, moreover, correspond to different kinds of guarantees. For example, controlling the excess of an oppressive government may favour an entrenched separation of powers in a written constitution that defines a distribution of public power. On the other hand, such formal entrenchment may be less important if judicial independence principally serves administrative efficiency. Protecting the independence of individual judges similarly depends upon the end that judicial independence is intended to achieve. For example, in an authoritarian state that does not wish for judges to judicially review the exercise of the central organ’s power, the state may nevertheless wish to ensure that judges are independent enough to adjudicate without bias over a specific set of legal controversies. Although there are probably not an infinite number of formulations that will achieve the purposes I have identified, it does suggest that a monolithic definition of judicial independence may be impossible.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_005" sec-type="head1"><label>3</label><title>Judicial Independence: From Definition to Taxonomy</title>
<p>One might be compelled to conclude from this discussion that a comparative taxonomy of judicial independence should be a relatively straightforward project: we simply examine a constitution, define its purposes and objects, and then add up the various structural and/or individualised guarantees provided to courts and judges. This would be a mistake. Although formal written guarantees are important, any meaningful taxonomy must contextualise structural guarantees in the matrix of a constitution.<xref rid="fn39" ref-type="fn"><sup>39</sup></xref> In the absence, for example, of a power of judicial review, the goals of judicial independence can easily be thwarted. Likewise, judicial independence may be curtailed if purportedly entrenched guarantees are subject to constant executive and legislative override.</p>
<p>To be of any utility, a taxonomy of judicial independence must put some institutional meat on formal constitutional bones, as well as accounting for those states that manage to protect judicial independence without a written constitution. With this in mind, it is appropriate to return to a question at the heart of this paper: is it possible to develop a comparative taxonomy of judicial independence and, if so, what would it look like? As argued above, this involves moving beyond a list of formal criteria toward a more purposive understanding of the concept. Prior to defining the parameters of the proposed models, it will be useful to begin this section by addressing some of the prickly methodological questions that arise when one attempts to develop qualitative typologies. From there, the discussion will turn to the criteria that will be used to construct a four-model taxonomy of judicial independence.</p>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_006" sec-type="head2"><label>3.1</label><title>The Need for a Comparative Taxonomy</title>
<p>Questions about methodology and case selection loom large in any comparative law study.<xref rid="fn40" ref-type="fn"><sup>40</sup></xref> The method relied upon in this paper emphasises qualitative indicators of judicial independence. There are, of course, recognisable drawbacks to this approach. One such drawback is that a qualitative taxonomy may simply perpetuate the definitional problems already identified above. While a qualitative analysis cannot overcome all definitional problems, the approach taken here is premised on the assumption that there is no single judicial independence. The taxonomy offered below is premised on the rejection of the notion that there is a monolithic model of the independent judiciary. It instead emphasises the view that ‘judicial independence’ is not something that exists or does not exist. Instead, it assumes that judicial independence is something more like a spectrum, ranging from judiciaries that are completely subservient to the other organs of the state to those which are seemingly free from state control.</p>
<p>A second objection concerns the utility of a comparative taxonomy: what possible benefit can come from categorising countries according to predetermined selection criteria? To be clear, the response to this is not that grouping states is intended to be a normative exercise in identifying the ‘right’ model of judicial independence;<xref rid="fn41" ref-type="fn"><sup>41</sup></xref> rather, this paper challenges an often unspoken assumption about the conditions necessary for judicial independence, including the need for a written constitution. Countries such as Israel, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Sweden – all of which have strong judiciaries – plainly challenge the view that an entrenched, written constitution is a prerequisite to judicial independence.<xref rid="fn42" ref-type="fn"><sup>42</sup></xref> Comparativists interested in studying judicial independence must explain how countries with unwritten constitutions have such robust judiciaries. Furthermore, while taxonomies have their limits,<xref rid="fn43" ref-type="fn"><sup>43</sup></xref> they can assist scholars by providing an intellectual framework. As one scholar puts it, ‘taxonomy is the grammar of legal discourse’<xref rid="fn44" ref-type="fn"><sup>44</sup></xref> and, as such, it provides a means of having a coherent framework for discussion about constitutional design.</p>
<p>A further reason for the creation of a taxonomy is that studies that rely upon a quantitative method are often very unsatisfactory. For a variety of reasons, ‘the component concepts of judicial independence do not automatically lend themselves to rigid scientific analysis.’<xref rid="fn45" ref-type="fn"><sup>45</sup></xref> For one, quantitative studies cannot avoid the problem of finding some kind of definition of judicial independence. Although some studies have attempted to solve this by emphasising textual features of a written constitution, these fail to capture the many endogenous<xref rid="fn46" ref-type="fn"><sup>46</sup></xref> and exogenous<xref rid="fn47" ref-type="fn"><sup>47</sup></xref> circumstances that may influence the constitutional text. Indirect or inductive studies face similar problems. Most significantly, these studies often rely upon an ‘interest group’ analysis<xref rid="fn48" ref-type="fn"><sup>48</sup></xref> and, with few exceptions,<xref rid="fn49" ref-type="fn"><sup>49</sup></xref> concern the United States Supreme Courts. While not without value, this scholarship typically relies upon an abstract ‘checks and balances’ model that assumes that the three branches of government are in a struggle to advance their competing policy objectives. Judicial independence is therefore measured by coordinate ‘agency compliance’;<xref rid="fn50" ref-type="fn"><sup>50</sup></xref> that is to say, by whether competing branches of government comply with a court’s rulings. In the end, an independent judiciary is equated with an effective judiciary.<xref rid="fn51" ref-type="fn"><sup>51</sup></xref></p>
<p>A reviewing of all of the methodological problems arising from interest group studies is beyond the ambition of this paper; however, a few issues stand out as particularly problematic. One of these is that a strict separation of powers is not followed in every state, making it difficult to replicate the model for comparative purposes.<xref rid="fn52" ref-type="fn"><sup>52</sup></xref> Furthermore, the notion that ‘agency compliance’ is an effective measure of independence seems doubtful. The fact that a judiciary renders decisions against a non-compliant executive could arguably indicate that it feels independent enough to countermand another state organ. Conversely, an apparently compliant executive may in fact be evidence of a subservient judiciary which issues decisions that systematically align with the executive’s preferences. Lastly, an interest group analysis does little to explain how judicial independence arises or how it is limited by interactions between courts and political actors. Thus, although there are problems with a qualitative analysis, these problems are by no means resolved by using a quantitative method. Overall, a qualitative taxonomy may better account for patterns that emerge across multiple jurisdictions.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_007" sec-type="head2"><label>3.2</label><title>Modelling Judicial Independence</title>
<p>The absence of a unitary definition of judicial independence does not make a comparative taxonomy impracticable. However, to be a useful tool, the criteria that inform the proposed taxonomy must offer some kind of coherent conceptual reference points or else it will become a haphazard collection of characteristics disconnected from the purposes underlying judicial independence. The four models of judicial independence set out below are organised around two core criteria: (1) the degree to which an independent judiciary is constitutionally ‘entrenched’; and (2) the degree to which it is ‘institutionalised’.</p>
<p>As for ‘entrenchment’, this refers to the formal or <italic>de jure</italic> dimension of the taxonomy. Entrenchment may be ‘strict’ or ‘casual’ depending upon the specificity of textual guarantees in a written constitution and their relative ‘embeddedness’ in a given constitutional scheme. Evaluating the strictness or casualness of entrenchment requires consideration of: (a) the presence or absence of structural (formal separation of powers) and individual (security of tenure, finance, etc.) guarantees in a written constitutional document; (b) whether the constitution permits judicial review and the nature of that review (i.e. <italic>a priori</italic>, <italic>a posteriori</italic>, abstract or concrete);<xref rid="fn53" ref-type="fn"><sup>53</sup></xref> and (c) whether the constitution allows for easy amendment (i.e. requirement for special majority for amendments),<xref rid="fn54" ref-type="fn"><sup>54</sup></xref> legislative overrides, or other mechanism for reversing judicial decisions. The entrenchment criterion acknowledges the special role of written constitutions yet it also attempts to bring some depth to formalism by distinguishing between proclaimed and legally effective constitutional guarantees. In this way, the entrenchment dimension recognises that explicit guarantees of judicial independence may effectively be subordinated by other provisions in a written constitution.</p>
<p>The institutionalisation criterion is concerned with the actualisation of judicial independence through institutions. ‘Institutions’ can be defined as ‘stable, valued and recurring patterns of behaviour’,<xref rid="fn55" ref-type="fn"><sup>55</sup></xref> whereas ‘institutionalisation’ refers to the process by which ‘organizations and procedures acquire value and stability’.<xref rid="fn56" ref-type="fn"><sup>56</sup></xref> In any state, institutionalisation may be ‘weak’ or ‘robust’ depending upon whether institutions are long-standing or intermittent<xref rid="fn57" ref-type="fn"><sup>57</sup></xref> and are otherwise complex, autonomous and coherent.<xref rid="fn58" ref-type="fn"><sup>58</sup></xref> Measuring the degree of institutionalisation involves examining the institutions to determine whether they have acquired a ‘cumulative capacity’ to adapt to changes in their environment, have become internally complex, have established boundaries with other institutions, and have developed a capacity for coordination.<xref rid="fn59" ref-type="fn"><sup>59</sup></xref> This is not to suggest that the process of institutionalisation is unidirectional; deinstitutionalisation may also occur. Overall, however, institutionalisation is an important indicator of judicial independence because it provides evidence either of whether state organs, in practice, follow the constitutional rules of the game or, in the absence of a written constitution, whether an independent judiciary has been guaranteed by non-constitutional norms.</p>
<p>As concerns the institutionalisation of judicial independence, there is no single list of that can be identified. But there are certain indicators suggestive of weaker or more robust institutions, including: (1) the presence of conventions insulating the management and administration of judges and courts from the political branches of government; (2) statutory rules and procedures for protection of salaries and tenure and similar guarantees; and (3) specialised for the appointment and disciplining of judges. As this indicates, there is an overlap between entrenchment and institutionalisation; the difference, however, lies in the fact that the institutionalisation criterion captures formal as well as informal patterns of behaviour surrounding a state’s judiciary.</p>
<p>By combining the institutionalisation and entrenchment criteria, we are able to devise at least four archetypal models of judicial independence. These range from a model of judicial independence built around strictly entrenched and institutionally robust guarantees to one in which there is no entrenchment and only a weak degree of institutionalisation. The relationship between the four models and the two criteria is illustrated by <xref rid="fig1" ref-type="fig">Figure 1</xref>.
<fig position="float" id="fig1">
<label>Figure 1</label>
<caption>
<p>Four models of judicial independence.</p>
</caption>
<graphic xlink:href="2211906X_002_01_S001_i0001.jpg"></graphic>
</fig>
</p>
<p>Before turning to an examination of the four models in the taxonomy, it is important to dispel one misapprehension that may have arisen – namely, that more entrenchment and/or institutionalisation mean greater independence. The purpose of this proposed taxonomy is not to advocate for one or another model of judicial independence, but to provide a means of describing different typologies for comparative purposes. Although a non-entrenched, thinly institutionalised judiciary may justifiably be seen as one lacking in independence, it does not follow that strictly entrenched, robustly institutionalised judiciaries are more independent <italic>per se</italic>. With this qualification in mind, each of the four models will be discussed below using a prototypical nation state example to briefly illuminate its major salient features.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_008" sec-type="head1"><label>4</label><title>Four Models of Judicial Independence</title>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_009" sec-type="head2"><label>4.1</label><title>Strict Entrenched Independence</title>
<p>The first of the four models is the Strict Entrenched Judicial Independence model. As concerns the ‘entrenchment’ criterion, under this model, judicial independence is guaranteed through highly specific textual guarantees in a written constitution. This means that there must be a formal statement that courts form a separate organ of the state as well as specific guarantees for judges’ individual independence, including security of tenure and financial security. Additionally, these written guarantees must necessarily be embedded in a constitutional system that grants courts strong powers of judicial review over most, if not all, acts of government, combined with limited possibilities for legislative override of judicial decisions. As for the ‘institutionalisation’ criterion, the Strict Entrenched model is characterised by the presence of long-standing, complex and durable institutional guarantees of independence. A state with a judiciary that would fit into this model would have a wide body of institutional norms and rules that have been built up around the entrenched constitutional guarantees. These institutions would insulate courts and judges from the state by placing such things as court management and discipline in the hands of the judiciary itself.</p>
<p>There are relatively few examples of states that would fall into the Strict Entrenched Independence model; however, Italy’s Constitutional Court provides one cogent example. As for ‘entrenchment’, the independence of the Italian judiciary is provided for in several provisions of its Constitution, which was enacted in 1948.<xref rid="fn60" ref-type="fn"><sup>60</sup></xref> The Italian Constitution establishes that the judiciary ‘is a branch that is autonomous and independent of all powers’<xref rid="fn61" ref-type="fn"><sup>61</sup></xref> and also states that ‘judges are only subject to law’.<xref rid="fn62" ref-type="fn"><sup>62</sup></xref> The Italian Constitution also creates a centralised Constitutional Court which, like Italy’s ordinary courts, is self-regulating.<xref rid="fn63" ref-type="fn"><sup>63</sup></xref> However, unlike the life tenure enjoyed by the judges of ordinary courts, members of the constitutional court hold office for a non-renewable, nine-year term with no possibility for reappointment. Lastly, the Italian Constitutional Court enjoys broad powers of judicial review with the Constitution prohibiting legislative reversals of its decision through retroactive legislation.<xref rid="fn64" ref-type="fn"><sup>64</sup></xref> By any account, judicial independence is strictly entrenched in the Italian Constitution. This provides a stark contrast with Israel and China, where there are no entrenched constitutional guarantees, and to a lesser extent with Canada, where there are comparatively few specific guarantees in the text of its constitution.</p>
<p>As concerns the ‘institutionalisation’ dimension of the Strict Entrenched model, the Italian Constitutional Court (and the Italian judicial system more generally) can properly be described as robustly institutionalised. Like the ordinary courts,<xref rid="fn65" ref-type="fn"><sup>65</sup></xref> Italy’s Constitutional Court is a self-regulating entity composed of 15 members, of whom five are appointed by the President of the Republic, five are elected by the magistrates of the Higher ordinary Courts and five are elected by Parliament.<xref rid="fn66" ref-type="fn"><sup>66</sup></xref> Apart from the appointment process, all other questions concerning salary and administration are left with the Court and judiciary itself. A variety of institutional structures have built up around the provisions of the Italian Constitution, particularly as relates to the presidential and legislative appointments process. Furthermore, since the Italian Constitution does not specify a particular means of disciplining Constitutional Court judges, a body of ‘informal’ norms have evolved around discipline. In short, the Italian judicial system not only provides entrenched formal guarantees but also has implemented judicial independence through robust and complex institutional arrangements.<xref rid="fn67" ref-type="fn"><sup>67</sup></xref></p>
<p>However, lest the above leave the impression that Italy is the ‘best’ model of judicial independence, it should be noted that the Italian judiciary is notorious for its inefficiency and unresponsiveness. Paradoxically, the Italian approach to judicial independence may turn out to be self-defeating, resulting in independence sometimes being pursued at the expense of accountability. It is, for example, not uncommon for civil and criminal proceedings to last ten years or more; in fact, Italy has been frequently subjected to monetary sanctions for breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights, which requires Convention Members to hear cases in a reasonable time.<xref rid="fn68" ref-type="fn"><sup>68</sup></xref> Some scholars suggest that the judiciary has become ossified under the weight of its own constitutionally entrenched structures. Therefore, the Strict Entrenched Judicial Independence model is intended to be descriptive, not prescriptive. Nonetheless, we may conjecture that states that adopt such a model might frequently face difficulties in balancing independence with accountability.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_010" sec-type="head2"><label>4.2</label><title>Casual Entrenched Independence</title>
<p>Casual Entrenched Judicial Independence is the next model in the taxonomy. The central features of this model are, first, a reduced emphasis on specific textual guarantees in a written constitution and, second, the presence of a more moderate or weaker degree of institutionalisation. This model of judicial independence is almost certainly the most common of the four and would include most former British colonies, such as Australia, Canada, the United States and India, as well as several states in Continental Europe. The entrenchment criterion is deemed ‘casual’ because there typically would be certain guarantees of independence but only a ‘weak form’<xref rid="fn69" ref-type="fn"><sup>69</sup></xref> judicial review as well as opportunities for legislative reversals short of amendment. As far as the institutionalisation criterion goes, the Casual Entrenchment model is characterised by the presence of moderately robust norms and practices, often developed through legislation, convention or more informal patterns of practice.</p>
<p>Canada provides a prototypical example of a country that would fit into the Casual Entrenched Independence model. Canada is also a good choice for comparative purposes because, unlike certain members of the Commonwealth,<xref rid="fn70" ref-type="fn"><sup>70</sup></xref> Canada both has an entrenched Bill of Rights and is a federated state. With respect to the entrenchment criterion, the Canadian Constitution contains some formal guarantees of judicial independence. Although Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867<xref rid="fn71" ref-type="fn"><sup>71</sup></xref> contains no explicit declaration that the judiciary is a separate organ of the state, it does guarantee that federally appointed judges hold their office during good behaviour until the age of 75, protecting their salaries and prohibiting the removal of judges except through a joint address of both Houses of Parliament.<xref rid="fn72" ref-type="fn"><sup>72</sup></xref> In addition, Section 11(d) of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms<xref rid="fn73" ref-type="fn"><sup>73</sup></xref> provides a further indirect written guarantee for the judiciary by conferring on criminally accused persons the right to a ‘fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal’. Although the guarantees in Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867 and Charter of Rights and Freedoms are relatively unspecific, their scope has been considerably expanded through constitutional interpretation. Canada’s Supreme Court has, for example, described judicial independence as a ‘foundational principle’<xref rid="fn74" ref-type="fn"><sup>74</sup></xref> of Canada’s Constitution and has defined ‘core characteristics’ of the judicial independence much more broadly than might be suggested by the plain constitutional text.<xref rid="fn75" ref-type="fn"><sup>75</sup></xref> In addition to the textual guarantees, judicial independence under the Canadian Constitution is supported by a broad power of judicial review.<xref rid="fn76" ref-type="fn"><sup>76</sup></xref> On the other hand, Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms permits legislative override of Canada’s certain guarantees. On the whole, however, we can see that in comparison with the Strict Entrenched Independence model as exemplified by Italy, the constitutional framework in Canada is much more general in defining the institutional arrangements of the state and the specific guarantees enjoyed by judges and courts.</p>
<p>As for the institutionalisation criterion, Canada has developed a rich set of institutions around the appointment of judges, judicial discipline and the terms of financial compensation.<xref rid="fn77" ref-type="fn"><sup>77</sup></xref> Perhaps the most significant feature of the Canadian system is that only Canada’s federally appointed provincial superior courts have specific constitutional guarantees. The Supreme Court of Canada, Canada’s apex court, does not have a formal constitutional status.<xref rid="fn78" ref-type="fn"><sup>78</sup></xref> In this sense, the institution at the very heart of Canada’s legal system is the product of ordinary legislation.<xref rid="fn79" ref-type="fn"><sup>79</sup></xref></p>
<p>Canada has also developed a number of more or less informal institutional arrangements that insulate individual judges from executive or legislative fiat. One of the most important examples is the Canadian Judicial Council created in 1971.<xref rid="fn80" ref-type="fn"><sup>80</sup></xref> Like the Italian High Council, this body is composed exclusively of judges; however, unlike the Italian High Council, the Canadian Judicial Council does not have any constitutional status or powers, and has a much more limited mandate. Its principal mandate is to investigate complaints made against federally appointed judges, as well as formal procedures for discipline short of dismissal.<xref rid="fn81" ref-type="fn"><sup>81</sup></xref> A more controversial process that has recently developed in Canada is its judicial compensation commissions. These commissions resulted from a direction from the Supreme Court of Canada that decisions surrounding judicial compensation had to be decided through a process independent of the government<xref rid="fn82" ref-type="fn"><sup>82</sup></xref>; however, the judicial compensation commissions are only able to make recommendations on judicial compensation – recommendations that can be and have been rejected.<xref rid="fn83" ref-type="fn"><sup>83</sup></xref></p>
<p>The upshot from this discussion is that Canada – as exemplar of the Casual Entrenched model – has developed complex and durable institutions despite having fewer formal textual guarantees associated with judicial independence in its written constitution. As an overall observation, the Casual Entrenched Independence model suggests that independence can be guaranteed through a mixture of formal guarantees and informal institutions. Again, this is not to suggest that this model provides a better approach to judicial independence. Some of the developments around judicial compensation in Canada have been met with shock and scepticism, leading observers to criticise judges for having judicially amended Canada’s written constitution.<xref rid="fn84" ref-type="fn"><sup>84</sup></xref> This is perhaps especially troubling since the courts have an interest in the subject matter. Others have suggested that the Canadian Judicial Council is inefficient and toothless. Flexibility, therefore, gives rise to its own problems; consequently, the Casual Entrenched Independence model should not be seen as a better model; for comparative purposes, we may at least conclude that the absence of formal constitutional guarantees may be a poor predictor of the presence or absence of an independent judiciary.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_011" sec-type="head2"><label>4.3</label><title>Normative Institutional Independence</title>
<p>The next model in the proposed taxonomy is the Non-Entrenched Institutional Independence model. This model includes states that have no constitutionally entrenched guarantees of judicial independence and yet evidence a robust institutionalisation. The most important feature of this model distinguishing it from the Strict and Casual Entrenched models discussed above is the absence of a written constitution permitting judicial review. Several examples of the Normative Institutional Independence model exist today and have existed historically. Prominent contemporary examples would include the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Israel<xref rid="fn85" ref-type="fn"><sup>85</sup></xref> and Sweden<xref rid="fn86" ref-type="fn"><sup>86</sup></xref> – all countries which, though they lack a constitutionally entrenched judiciary, have developed robust institutions insulating and protecting their judiciaries from the overweening influence of the other organs of the state.</p>
<p>Of the several countries identified above, Israel represents a compelling example of a state that has managed to support an independent judiciary in the absence of a written constitution. To begin with, as concerns the entrenchment criterion, Israel has no written constitution containing provisions guaranteeing judicial independence. Despite there being a commitment in Israel’s Declaration of Independence to create a written constitution, Israel has never managed to bridge the ideological division between the different political groups in the state in order to achieve a formal constitutional compromise.<xref rid="fn87" ref-type="fn"><sup>87</sup></xref> Parliamentary supremacy, at least in a formal sense, has been the guiding principle underlying Israel’s unwritten constitution. Although some features of Israel’s unwritten constitution appear to have gained a quasi-entrenched status and are subject to judicial review,<xref rid="fn88" ref-type="fn"><sup>88</sup></xref> the Israeli Supreme Court does not enjoy a formal constitutional status in an entrenched written constitution.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Israel has through ‘a gradual and cumulative effect’<xref rid="fn89" ref-type="fn"><sup>89</sup></xref> developed a set of robust institutional guarantees that easily rival the protections given to judiciaries in states that would fall under the rubric of the Casual Entrenched Independence model described above.<xref rid="fn90" ref-type="fn"><sup>90</sup></xref> Foremost among these non-constitutional guarantees is the guarantee provided by Israel’s Basic Law: The Judiciary, passed in 1984. Under Article 2 of that Basic Law, judges and courts ‘shall not, in judicial matters, be subject to any authority but that of the Law’. In addition, the Basic Law guarantees judges tenure for life;<xref rid="fn91" ref-type="fn"><sup>91</sup></xref> it protects judicial salaries and benefits;<xref rid="fn92" ref-type="fn"><sup>92</sup></xref> and it grants judges substantial immunities.<xref rid="fn93" ref-type="fn"><sup>93</sup></xref> Israel has also developed complex and relatively stable institutions for the appointment of judges.<xref rid="fn94" ref-type="fn"><sup>94</sup></xref> Thus, despite the absence of a written constitution, Israel has managed to establish a highly professionalised judiciary and an independent system of courts.</p>
<p>From the point of view of comparative constitutional law, the identification of a model of judicial independence that does not depend upon a written constitution is of importance; it fundamentally challenges scholars to look beyond formal indicators of judicial independence. In this regard, states like the United Kingdom also provide evidence of how judicial independence may result from long-standing practice and convention. Of course, this is not to underplay the significance of the written constitution. It would be incorrect to suppose that judicial independence is best guaranteed through ordinary legislation and informal institutions. Indeed, many of the states that would fall under the Normative Institutional Entrenchment model have developed this robust institutional practice over long periods of time or, as in the case of many Commonwealth countries, are inheritors of the British constitutional tradition. For comparative purposes, one thing the Normative Institutional Independence model does suggest is that formally entrenched guarantees must always be buttressed by institutional norms and practices to be effective.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_012" sec-type="head2"><label>4.4</label><title>Judicial Interdependence</title>
<p>The last model in this proposed taxonomy is the Judicial Interdependence model. In contrast with the three models already described, this final model is characterised by the absence of entrenched guarantees of judicial independence as well as by weak institutions. In contradistinction with Casual and Strict Entrenched Independence, this model only includes states where there is no meaningful entrenchment.<xref rid="fn95" ref-type="fn"><sup>95</sup></xref> However, like the Normative Institutional Independence model, this model recognises that independence may result from a process of institutionalisation. But in contrast with the Normative Institutional Independence model, the Judicial Interdependence model is characterised by a weaker or thinner body of institutions that are largely directed at producing a functional separation between the judiciary and the political organs of the state. The result is a model that permits an overt intermingling of political and judicial powers that both supports and limits the judiciary’s independence. Very often, this means ensuring impartial adjudication over a subset of mainly private civil disputes.</p>
<p>One objection that could be levelled against this model at the outset is that it appears to describe a situation where there is no judicial independence whatsoever. This objection, however, is symptomatic of a widespread misconception that judicial independence cannot exist in states where the judiciary is formally subordinated to the political branches of government, such as in the case of authoritarian regimes.<xref rid="fn96" ref-type="fn"><sup>96</sup></xref> A significant body of evidence indicates that authoritarian regimes are often capable of supporting moderately independent judiciaries which facilitate economic growth and which are necessary for the ordinary administration of the state.<xref rid="fn97" ref-type="fn"><sup>97</sup></xref> One reason for the reluctance to accept that authoritarian regimes can support a partially independent judiciary is observer bias; there is a tendency for those who are interested in judicial independence to focus on the most politically sensitive cases, rather than examining adjudication of more run-of-the-mill legal disputes.<xref rid="fn98" ref-type="fn"><sup>98</sup></xref> However, focusing on politically charged cases can result in a distorted image of a given state’s relationship with its judiciary.</p>
<p>There are many examples of states that would fall into the Institutional Interdependence model, including many countries in the Middle East and North Africa. However, China provides one of the better examples of this model because it is has a relatively stable institutional regime that has been in place for decades.<xref rid="fn99" ref-type="fn"><sup>99</sup></xref> Beginning with entrenchment, China does not have a constitutionally entrenched guarantee of judicial independence. China’s current State Constitution was adopted by the National People’s Congress on 4 December 1982. Although several provisions of the 1982 Constitution refer, among other things, to the establishment of the Supreme People’s Court and provide general terms for the creation of courts, these are more properly viewed as creating a functional separation of powers. The Chinese constitutional system is not a system of checks and balances, but rather a system dominated by the National People’s Congress, which, under the Chinese Constitution, is the highest organ of the state. Although there is some functional separation between the NPC and the courts, ‘the NPC has the right to supervise the judiciary’.<xref rid="fn100" ref-type="fn"><sup>100</sup></xref> Furthermore, the Chinese Constitution in no sense grants powers of judicial review.<xref rid="fn101" ref-type="fn"><sup>101</sup></xref></p>
<p>It would, however, be a mistake to conclude from China’s Constitution that the judiciary is not, at least in a functional sense, <italic>partially</italic> independent from the state. As Ginsburg points out in his recent study of the Chinese judiciary, ‘a competent and professional judiciary is a central component of the “socialist rule of law”, and China has made significant investments in institutional quality’.<xref rid="fn102" ref-type="fn"><sup>102</sup></xref> A number of studies have indicated that China has provided increasing institutional guarantees to courts and has fostered some separation between the National People’s Congress and the judiciary. There has been a strengthening of the courts and judicial institutions resulting from increased budgets and efforts to increase the authority of the courts. In more developed cities like Shanghai and Beijing, courts have been given greater resources and infrastructure, and judges have become increasingly professionalised. The Chinese government has passed laws granting judges some immunity from external influence.<xref rid="fn103" ref-type="fn"><sup>103</sup></xref> This increased institutionalisation appears to have resulted in some independence in fact, and not simply in form. According to Peerenboom, for instance, there has been a ‘high rate of administrative litigation cases where courts quash administrative agency decisions or a case is withdrawn after the agency changes the decision. Plaintiffs are [statistically] much more successful in China than in the United States, France, and Taiwan.’<xref rid="fn104" ref-type="fn"><sup>104</sup></xref> Indeed, apart from politically sensitive cases,<xref rid="fn105" ref-type="fn"><sup>105</sup></xref> courts are often prepared to rule against the government in administrative, labour, civil-commercial, and non-political criminal cases.</p>
<p>It would, however, be an overstatement to suggest that the Chinese judiciary enjoys the same degree of independence as judiciaries in countries like England, New Zealand, or Israel. The process of institutionalisation in China – and indeed in similar authoritarian regimes – emphasises an interdependency between the organs of the state. Thus, in practice, both the Chinese Communist Party and the National People’s Congress exert significant influence ‘in ideology, policy, and personal matters [and] sometimes [are] involved in deciding the outcome of particular cases’.<xref rid="fn106" ref-type="fn"><sup>106</sup></xref> What the Institutional Interdependence model points to, however, is the need to examine the concept of judicial independence as it pertains to the purely adjudicative functions of courts. Judiciaries in states like China have built up a cumulative capacity for impartial adjudication over some, but not all, subject matters. Again, with respect to comparative law, for comparative purposes, this suggests that some degree of functional independence can exist in the absence of robust institutionalisation or entrenched constitutional guarantees.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec sec-type="head1" id="B10.1163_2211906X_00102001_013"><label>5</label><title>Conclusion</title>
<p>Judicial independence is a deeply and, some might argue, essentially contested concept.<xref rid="fn107" ref-type="fn"><sup>107</sup></xref> For some, the taxonomy described in this article may seem distant from the central concerns of judicial independence: the promotion of democracy and the rule of law. If, however, we are to understand judicial independence, particularly from a comparative point of view, it will be necessary to move beyond rhetorical statements and political commitments. The taxonomy developed in this paper attempts to identify the salient features of judicial independence and it ultimately suggests that there is no single model for judicial independence. By using these four models in the proposed taxonomy, it is, however, possible to identify recurring patterns in the way states have organised their judiciaries in order to give effect to one or the other of the core purposes of judicial independence.</p>
<p>The proposed taxonomy is not, however, intended to resolve all the issues associated with categorisation. One of the difficulties arising from a taxonomy of any kind is that it tends to essentialise the objects it classifies. There can be no real debate that much is lost when one focuses on a narrow set of attributes. Indeed, some might suggest that the taxonomy proposed above leads to an over-simplistic grouping of disparate states that have very little to do with one another. This perhaps points to the need to further refine the criteria, or perhaps to expand the taxonomy to include a greater number of typologies. Still, far from being a cold academic exercise, the process of categorisation may lead to a better understanding of those features of constitutional design that lead to the most effective, efficient and legitimate forms of judicial independence.</p>
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<fn id="fn1">
<p><sup>1</sup> See e.g. Linda Camp Keith, ‘Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection around the World’ <italic>Judicature</italic> 85 (2001–2002) 195.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn2">
<p><sup>2</sup> T. Ginsburg, ‘Judicial Independence in East Asia: Implications for China’, in: Randall Peerenboom (ed.), <italic>Judicial Independence in China</italic> (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 248.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn3">
<p><sup>3</sup> Although comparative law scholars have provided taxonomical models for a variety of purposes, none has yet been developed for judicial independence; see Miguel Schor, ‘Mapping Comparative Judicial Review’, <italic>Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev.</italic> 7 (2008) 257; Dr Ann Mavčič, <italic>Constitutional / Judicial Review Around the World</italic>, <ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.concourts.net/comparison.php">http://www.concourts.net/comparison.php</ext-link>; Ran Hirschl, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law and Religion’, in: Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds), <italic>Comparative Constitutional Law</italic>: <italic>Research Handbook in Comparative Law</italic> (Edward Elgar, 2011); R. David and C. Jauffret-Spinosi, <italic>Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains</italic> (Dalloz, 1992); J. Langbein, ‘The German Advantage in Civil Procedure’, <italic>U. Chi. L. Rev.</italic> 52 (1985) 823 (noting at the time that ‘[t]he taxonomic orientation of the founding generation [of comparative lawyers] largely spent itself … once Rene David has written, once you have Zweigert & Kotz on the shelf, there seems to be less reason to keep doing it’).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn4">
<p><sup>4</sup> S. B. Burbank and B. Friedman, ‘Reconsidering Judicial Independence’, in: Burbank and Friedman (eds), <italic>Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach</italic> (Sage Publications, 2002) at 9.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn5">
<p><sup>5</sup> Lewis A. Kornhauser, ‘Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?’, in: Burbank and Friedman (eds), <italic>Judicial Independence at the Crossroads</italic> (n 4) at 45. (Kornhauser maintains that discussions about judicial independence obfuscate the more central issue, which is the actual performance of courts in practice).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn6">
<p><sup>6</sup> <italic>Beauregard</italic> v. <italic>Canada</italic>, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 (per Dickson C.J.C.).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn7">
<p><sup>7</sup> Adam Dodek and Lorne Sossin, 2007. ‘Why Judicial Independence Matters.’ <italic>Globe and Mail</italic>, 23 November.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn8">
<p><sup>8</sup> See John A. Ferejohn and Larry D. Kramer, ‘Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraints’, <italic>New York University Law Review</italic> 77 (2002) 962.</p>
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<p><sup>9</sup> Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtues’, <italic>Law Review Quarterly</italic> (1977) 95.</p>
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<fn id="fn10">
<p><sup>10</sup> See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’, <italic>Law and Philosophy</italic> 21 (2002) 137 at 164.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn11">
<p><sup>11</sup> Peter A. Gerangelos, <italic>The Separation of Powers and Legislative Interference in Judicial Process: Constitutional Principles and Limitations</italic> (Hart Publishing, 2009) 16.</p>
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<fn id="fn12">
<p><sup>12</sup> <italic>Ibid.</italic> at 19.</p>
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<fn id="fn13">
<p><sup>13</sup> See Frances Kahn Zemans, ‘The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence’, <italic>S Cal L Rev</italic> 72 (1999) 625 (discussing institutional versus decisional independence).</p>
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<fn id="fn14">
<p><sup>14</sup> See e.g. Martin H. Redish, ‘Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives’, <italic>Mercer L Rev</italic> 46 (1994–1995) 697; Joseph M. Hood, ‘Judicial Independence’, <italic>J Nat’l Ass’n Admin L Judges</italic> 23 (2003–2004) 137 at 138–140; Gordon Bermant and Russell R. Wheeler, ‘Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Respondence and Accountability’, <italic>Mercer L Rev</italic> 46 (1994–1995) 836 (identifying different levels of independence, including decisional independence, personal independence, procedural independence, administrative independence; and different levels of accountability, namely internal v. external accountability); Harold See, ‘Judicial Selection and Decisional Independence’, <italic>Law and Contemp Probs</italic> 61 (1998) 141; and see Stephen B. Burbank, ‘What <italic>Do</italic> We Mean by Judicial Independence?’, <italic>Ohio St LJ</italic> 64 (2003) 322 at 326.</p>
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<fn id="fn15">
<p><sup>15</sup> Joseph H. Rodriguez, ‘New Threats to Judicial Independence’, <italic>Judges J</italic> 35 (1996) 27.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn16">
<p><sup>16</sup> <italic>Ibid.</italic></p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn17">
<p><sup>17</sup> David Pimentel, ‘Reframing the Independence v. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure in Light of Judges’ Courage and Integrity’, <italic>Clev St L Rev</italic> 57 (2009) 1; Charles Gardner Geyh, ‘Straddling the Fence between Truth and Pretense: The Role of Law and Preference in Judicial Decision Making and the Future of Judicial Independence’, <italic>Notre Dame JL Ethics & Pub Pol’y</italic> 22 (2008) 435 at 443.</p>
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<fn id="fn18">
<p><sup>18</sup> Pimentel (n 17).</p>
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<fn id="fn19">
<p><sup>19</sup> <italic>Ibid.</italic> 75.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn20">
<p><sup>20</sup> <italic>Ibid.</italic> 76.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn21">
<p><sup>21</sup> <italic>Ibid.</italic> 77–78.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn22">
<p><sup>22</sup> See Ran Hirschl, ‘The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law’, <italic>American Journal of Comparative Law</italic> 53 (2005) 125.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn23">
<p><sup>23</sup> Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Who Watches the Watchmen? A Comparative Study on Judicial Responsibility’, <italic>American Journal of Comparative Law</italic> 31 (1983) 1; Tom Ginsburg and Nuno Garoupa, ‘Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence’, <italic>American Journal of Comparative Law</italic> 57 (2009) 201–232.</p>
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<p><sup>24</sup> Mark Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’, <italic>Yale Law Journal</italic> 108 (1999) 1225, 1238.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn25">
<p><sup>25</sup> There are simply too many to list in a footnote.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn26">
<p><sup>26</sup> See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, <italic>The Comparative Constitutions Project: A Cross-National Historical Dataset of Written Constitutions</italic>; see: Judicial Independence (<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/judicial_independence.pdf">http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/judicial_independence.pdf</ext-link>); Term Length for Judges of the Highest Courts (<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/term_length_hoc.pdf">http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/term_length_hoc.pdf</ext-link>); Protection of Judicial Salaries (<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/judicial_salaries.pdf">http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/judicial_salaries.pdf</ext-link>); Protection Against Illegal Administrative Acts (<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/protections_against_illegal_administrative_acts.pdf">http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/protections_against_illegal_administrative_acts.pdf</ext-link>).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn27">
<p><sup>27</sup> See e.g. Cappelletti (n 23); Ginsburg and Garoupa (n 23).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn28">
<p><sup>28</sup> Kornhauser (n 5) at 45.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn29">
<p><sup>29</sup> See e.g. David Held, <italic>Models of Democracy</italic> (Polity Press, 2007); and see Robert A. Dahl, <italic>Democracy and Its Critics</italic> (Yale University Press, 1989).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn30">
<p><sup>30</sup> There are, of course, well-established guidelines and standards but these largely consist in a list of best practices; see The International Bar Association Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence (1982); Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (1983); Beijing Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1997); Universal Charter of the Judge, approved by the International Association of Judges (1999).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn31">
<p><sup>31</sup> John Ferejohn, ‘Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence’, <italic>Southern California Law Review</italic> 72 (1998–1999) 353 at 365.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn32">
<p><sup>32</sup> M.J.C. Vile, <italic>Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers</italic> (Liberty Fund, 1998) at 349.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn33">
<p><sup>33</sup> Cheryl Saunders, ‘Separation of Powers and the Judicial Branch’, <italic>Jud Rev</italic> 11 (2006) 337.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn34">
<p><sup>34</sup> Jeremy Webber, ‘Supreme Courts, Independence and Democratic Agency’, <italic>Legal Stud</italic> 24 (2004) at 60 (citing Ronald Dworkin for this idea).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn35">
<p><sup>35</sup> John Ferejohn and Larry Kramer, ‘Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint’, <italic>NYUL Rev</italic> 77 (2002) 962 (arguing that independence and accountability aim at a well-functioning system of adjudication).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn36">
<p><sup>36</sup> Idil Boran, ‘On Distinguishing between Types of Impartiality’, <italic>J Value Inq</italic> 38 (2004) 333 at 333; and see Amartya Sen, ‘Open and Closed Impartiality’, <italic>J Phil</italic> 99 (2002) 445 at 445–469. Impartiality can be contrasted with moral partialism; see M. Baron, ‘Impartiality and Friendship’, <italic>Ethics</italic> 101 (1991) 836 at 837 (discussing the role of impartiality in personal relationships though ultimately arguing that impartiality does not require that we treat no one as special).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn37">
<p><sup>37</sup> Martin Shapiro, <italic>Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis</italic> (University of Chicago Press, 1981) at 17–19; and see Christopher M. Larkins, ‘Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis’, <italic>American Journal of Comparative Law</italic> 44 (1996) 605.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn38">
<p><sup>38</sup> See William Lucy, ‘The Possibility of Impartiality’, <italic>Oxford J of Legal Stud</italic> 25 (2005) 3 at 11.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn39">
<p><sup>39</sup> See Larkins (n 37).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn40">
<p><sup>40</sup> See Ran Hirschl (n 22).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn41">
<p><sup>41</sup> This, of course, assumes that comparative law can be used as a sort of engineering: see Mark Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’, <italic>Yale Law Journal</italic> 108 (1999) 1225 at 1229.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn42">
<p><sup>42</sup> The words of Lord Lane are apposite: ‘Few constitutional precepts are more generally accepted there in England, the land which boasts no written Constitution, than the necessity for the judiciary to be secure from undue influence and autonomous within its own field’; see Lord Lane, ‘Judicial Independence and the Increasing Executive Role in Judicial Administration’, in: S. Shetreet and J. Deschênes (eds), <italic>Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate</italic> (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) 525.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn43">
<p><sup>43</sup> Kelvin Low, ‘The Use and Abuse of Taxonomy’, <italic>Legal Stud</italic> 29 (2009) 355 at 360.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn44">
<p><sup>44</sup> Ugo Mattei, ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems’, <italic>Am J of Comp L</italic> 45 (1997) 5 at 5.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn45">
<p><sup>45</sup> Larkins (n 37) at 615.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn46">
<p><sup>46</sup> By endogenous considerations, I mean such matters as the limiting language in the document, the difficulty of amending the constitution, case law and judicial interpretations, and of course, whether judges enjoy a power of judicial review.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn47">
<p><sup>47</sup> Exogenous considerations include factors such as the political, social and cultural setting, the social status of judges, or even ‘emergent circumstances’ like a state of war or other emergencies. All of these factors may influence the independence of the judiciary in any given moment; see Ginsburg, <italic>Guarding supra</italic> at 614.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn48">
<p><sup>48</sup> The seminal example of this approach comes from W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, ‘The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective’, <italic>Jour of L and Econ</italic> (1975) at 875–901; and see E. Sazleberger and P. Fenn, ‘Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal’, <italic>Jour of L and Econ</italic> 42 (1999) at 831–847.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn49">
<p><sup>49</sup> M. Santoni and F. Zuccinhi, ‘Does Policy Stability Increase the Constitutional Court’s Independence? The Case of Italy during the First Republic (1956–1992)’, <italic>Public Choice</italic> (2006) at 439–461; J.M. Ramseyer, ‘The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach’, <italic>Jour of L Stud</italic> 23 (1994) 721–747.</p>
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<fn id="fn50">
<p><sup>50</sup> McNollgast, ‘Conditions for Judicial Independence’, <italic>J. Contemp. Legal Issues</italic> 15 (2006) 106, 110.</p>
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<fn id="fn51">
<p><sup>51</sup> David S. Clark, ‘Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America’, <italic>Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly</italic> 2 (1975) 405 at 442.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn52">
<p><sup>52</sup> Ronald J. Krotoszynski, ‘The Separation of Legislative and Executive Powers’, in: Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds), <italic>Comparative Constitutional Law</italic>: <italic>Research Handbook in Comparative Law</italic> (Edward Elgar, 2011) 234 at 248 (noting that ‘the specific US concern with the conflation of legislative and executive power, and the concomitant of enforcement of this separation of powers by the federal judiciary, has failed to gain much traction, not only in places like France or Germany, but also in neighboring common law jurisdictions like Canada’).</p>
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<fn id="fn53">
<p><sup>53</sup> Hirschl, <italic>Rise supra</italic> at 19. Hirschl for example compares abstract, <italic>a priori</italic> review by France’s Conseil Constitutionel with the United States where only <italic>a posteriori</italic> review can take place in concrete adversarial litigation.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn54">
<p><sup>54</sup> John Ferejohn, ‘The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions’, <italic>Law & Soc. Inquiry</italic> 22 (1997) 513.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn55">
<p><sup>55</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, <italic>Political Order in Changing Societies</italic> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) 12; and see R. Goodin, ‘Institutions and Their Design’, in: R. Goodin (ed.), <italic>The Theory of Institutional Design</italic> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).</p>
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<fn id="fn56">
<p><sup>56</sup> Huntington (n 55) at 394.</p>
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<fn id="fn57">
<p><sup>57</sup> See Adrian Vermeule, ‘Intermittent Institutions’, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 10-13 (January 2010).</p>
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<fn id="fn58">
<p><sup>58</sup> Huntington (n 55) at 394.</p>
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<fn id="fn59">
<p><sup>59</sup> <italic>Ibid.</italic> 396–404.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn60">
<p><sup>60</sup> See Nadia Fiorino, Fabio Fadovano and Grazia Scarra, ‘The Determinants of Judicial Independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court (1956–2002)’, Centro Studi Confindustria (29 May 2004), <ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/41403/Paper-216.pdf">http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/41403/Paper-216.pdf</ext-link>; and see A. Pizzorusso, ‘Italy’, in: S. Shetreet and J. Deschênes (eds), <italic>Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate</italic> (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) 196.</p>
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<fn id="fn61">
<p><sup>61</sup> Constitution of Italy, Art. 104(1).</p>
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<fn id="fn62">
<p><sup>62</sup> <italic>Ibid</italic>. Art. 101.</p>
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<fn id="fn63">
<p><sup>63</sup> <italic>Ibid</italic>. Arts 134–139.</p>
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<fn id="fn64">
<p><sup>64</sup> <italic>Ibid</italic>. Art. 137(3).</p>
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<fn id="fn65">
<p><sup>65</sup> The ordinary court system is governed by a centralised agency known as the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (the Council). This organisation makes all decisions concerning judges from recruitment to retirement (promotions, transfers, discipline, disability, etc.).</p>
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<fn id="fn66">
<p><sup>66</sup> Pizzorusso (n 60) at 208.</p>
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<fn id="fn67">
<p><sup>67</sup> Giuseppe Di Federico, ‘Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary in Italy: The Experience of a Former Transitional Country in a Comparative Perspective’, in: Andras Sajo (ed.), <italic>Judicial Integrity</italic> (Leiden: Brill, 2004); available at <ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/DiFedericopaper.pdf">http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/DiFedericopaper.pdf</ext-link>.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn68">
<p><sup>68</sup> Italy has been subject to the highest number of monetary penalties for violating Art. 6, para. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right ‘to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. See e.g. <italic>Cocchiarella</italic> v. <italic>Italy</italic> (App no 64886/01) ECHR 29 March 2006.</p>
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<fn id="fn69">
<p><sup>69</sup> Hirschl, <italic>Rising supra</italic> 22 identifies weak form judicial as being characteristic of political decisions in which parliamentary sovereignty has played a strong role in its constitutional arrangements. Other examples would include Britain, Israel, South Africa and New Zealand.</p>
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<fn id="fn70">
<p><sup>70</sup> Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon.</p>
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<fn id="fn71">
<p><sup>71</sup> The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3 (U.K.).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn72">
<p><sup>72</sup> The judicature provisions are found in sections 96–100 of Canada’s Constitution, 1867. Section 96 provides that the Governor General shall appoint the judges of the superior, district, and county courts in each province. This has been interpreted as a prohibition against creating ‘inferior’ courts to undermine the ‘historical jurisdiction’ of the named courts by the provinces (or indeed by the federal Parliament). Section 99 guarantees security of tenure by providing that ‘the Judges of the Superior Courts shall hold office during good behaviour’. Finally, Section 100 ensures financial security by requiring the federal Parliament to pay the salaries and pensions of superior, district and county court judges. These can of course be traced back to the guarantees found in the Act of Settlement, 1701: see David Lemmings, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary in Eighteenth-Century England’, in: Peter Birks (ed.), <italic>The Life of the Law: Proceedings of the Tenth British Legal History Conference Oxford 1991</italic> (London: Hambledon Press, 1993).</p>
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<fn id="fn73">
<p><sup>73</sup> Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 [‘Charter’].</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn74">
<p><sup>74</sup> <italic>Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island</italic>, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 109.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn75">
<p><sup>75</sup> See <italic>MacKeigan</italic> v. <italic>Hickman</italic>, [1989] 2 SCR 796 at 828; see also <italic>Valente</italic> v. <italic>The Queen</italic>, [1985] 2 SCR 673 at 686– 687; <italic>Beauregard</italic> v. <italic>Canada</italic>, [1986] 2 SCR 56 at 73 and 75; <italic>R.</italic> v. <italic>Lippé</italic>, [1991] 2 SCR 114, at 152–154; <italic>Babcock</italic> v. <italic>Canada (Attorney General)</italic>, [2002] 3 SCR 3, 2002 SCC 57 at para. 57; <italic>Court Judges’ Assn of New Brunswick</italic> v. <italic>New Brunswick (Minister of Justice)</italic>, [2005] 2 SCR 286, 2005 SCC 44 at para. 6; <italic>British Columbia</italic> v. <italic>Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd</italic>, 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 SCR 473 at para. 47; <italic>Ell</italic> v. <italic>Alberta</italic>, [2003] 1 SCR 857, 2003 SCC 35 at para. 29; <italic>Application under s 8328 of the Criminal Code (Re)</italic>, [2004] 2 SCR 248, 2004 SCC 42 at paras 80–81.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn76">
<p><sup>76</sup> See Charter (n 73) ss. 24(1) and 24(2); Constitution Act, 1867, s. 52.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn77">
<p><sup>77</sup> For a history of the Canadian approach see: William R. Lederman, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary’, <italic>The Canadian Bar Review</italic> 34 (1956) 769–809; and William R. Lederman, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary’, The <italic>Canadian Bar Review</italic> 34 (1956) 1139–1179.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn78">
<p><sup>78</sup> See Warren J. Newman, ‘The Constitutional Status of the Supreme Court of Canada’, <italic>Supreme Court Law Review</italic> 47 (2009) 429, noting that the Supreme Court was not created by the Constitutions of Canada, but only contemplated by section 101 of the Constitution, 1867; and see P.W. Hogg, <italic>Constitutional Law of Canada</italic>, 5th edn (Scarborough: Thomson Carswell, 2007) ch. 1.2 at 5.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn79">
<p><sup>79</sup> Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, s. 35. Arguably the Supreme of Canada has developed a constitutional or quasi-constitutional status; however, this has not been definitively resolved. The Supreme Court Act is not, for example, one of the Acts listed in the schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn80">
<p><sup>80</sup> The Council is given a formal status through the Judges’ Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1, ss. 58–71.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn81">
<p><sup>81</sup> Fabien Gélinas, ‘Judicial Independence in Canada: A Critical Overview’, in: Anja Seibert-Fohr (ed.), <italic>Judicial Independence in Transition – Strengthening the Rule of Law in the OSCE Region</italic> (Heidelberg: Springer, forthcoming), <ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1577842">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1577842</ext-link>.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn82">
<p><sup>82</sup> <italic>Provincial Judges Reference</italic> [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn83">
<p><sup>83</sup> See e.g. <italic>Alberta</italic> v. <italic>Bodner</italic>, 2003 ABCA 102.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn84">
<p><sup>84</sup> Peter W. Hogg and Cara F. Zwibel, ‘The Rule of Law in the Supreme Court of Canada’, <italic>UTLJ</italic> 55 (2005) 71 at 728–729.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn85">
<p><sup>85</sup> S. Navot, <italic>The Constitutional Law of Israel</italic> (Kluwer 2007) ch. 3 at 36. Israel may be something of a special case. While historically the country was committed to the notion of parliamentary supremacy, Israel saw something of a constitutional revolution in 1992 when it adopted two Basic Laws that have since gained a quasi-constitutional status; see e.g. <italic>Mizrachi Bank</italic> v. <italic>Migdal Co-Operative Village</italic> [1995] IsrSC 49(4).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn86">
<p><sup>86</sup> John Bell, ‘Sweden’s Contribution to Governance of the Judiciary’ (Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law), <ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/50-5.pdf">http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/50-5.pdf</ext-link>.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn87">
<p><sup>87</sup> See e.g. Gidon Sapir, ‘The Israeli Constitutional Revolution – How Did it Happen?’, Bar Ilan Univ. Pub Law Working Paper No. 08-02 (2008).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn88">
<p><sup>88</sup> Navot (n 85); and see Daphne Barak-Erez, ‘From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective’, <italic>Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev</italic>. (1994–1995) 309.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn89">
<p><sup>89</sup> See Shimon Shetreet, ‘Judicial Independence and Accountability in Israel’, <italic>International and Comparative Law Quarterly</italic> 33 (1984) 979.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn90">
<p><sup>90</sup> Art. 22.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn91">
<p><sup>91</sup> Basic Law: The Judiciary, Art. 7(1).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn92">
<p><sup>92</sup> <italic>Ibid.</italic> Art. 10(a) and (b).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn93">
<p><sup>93</sup> <italic>Ibid</italic>. Art. 12.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn94">
<p><sup>94</sup> Eli M. Salzberger, ‘Judicial Appointments and Promotions in Israel: Constitution, Law, and Politics’, in: Kate Malleson and Peter H. Russell (eds), <italic>Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power</italic> (University of Toronto Press, 2006) 241, 249.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn95">
<p><sup>95</sup> Thus, the mere fact there is a clause in a written constitution that there is a judiciary would not be sufficient to move a country outside of this model.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn96">
<p><sup>96</sup> Carlo Guarnieri, ‘Judicial Independence in Authoritarian Regimes: Lessons from Continental Europe’, in: Randall Peerenboom (ed.), <italic>Judicial Independence in China</italic> (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 234.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn97">
<p><sup>97</sup> See Larkins (n 37); and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Judicial Independence in East Asia: Lessons for China’, in: Randall Peerenboom (ed.), <italic>Judicial Independence in China</italic> (Cambridge University Press, 2010). Ginsburg points to the experience in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as providing an example of this process at work in Southeast Asia; see also Jose Toharia, ‘Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Contemporary Spain’, 9 <italic>Law and Society Review</italic> 9 (1975) 475–96.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn98">
<p><sup>98</sup> Fu Yulin and Tom Ginsburg, ‘A New Analytic Framework for Understanding and Promoting Judicial Independence in China’, in: Randall Peerenboom (ed.), <italic>Judicial Independence in China</italic> (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 95.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn99">
<p><sup>99</sup> In certain respects, China is difficult to define as a prototypical example. For one thing, China is a moving target and has been engaging in a process of reform from a country whose system of law was built around a mode of ‘socialist rule of law’ to one in which the judiciary enjoys a greater degree of independence.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn100">
<p><sup>100</sup> Randall Peerenboom, ‘Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded Assumptions’, in: Randall Peerenboom (ed.), <italic>Judicial Independence in China</italic> (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 81.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn101">
<p><sup>101</sup> Xin He, ‘Ideology or Reality? Limited Judicial Independence in Contemporary China’, <italic>Chilean Journal of Asian Law</italic> 6 (2004).</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn102">
<p><sup>102</sup> Ginsburg, ‘Lessons’ (n 97) at 247.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn103">
<p><sup>103</sup> Peerenboom, ‘Judicial Independence in China’ (n 100) at 77.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn104">
<p><sup>104</sup> <italic>Ibid.</italic> at 75.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn105">
<p><sup>105</sup> One example of this is the prohibition of cases brought by the Falun Gong disciples.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn106">
<p><sup>106</sup> Peerenboom, ‘Judicial Independence in China’ (n 100) at 75.</p>
</fn>
<fn id="fn107">
<p><sup>107</sup> Although no one appears to have yet suggested this, judicial independence is, like democracy or the rule of law, one of those concepts that ‘inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’: in W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, <italic>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</italic> (1956) 167 at 169.</p>
</fn>
</fn-group>
</back>
</article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>Mapping Judicial Independence</title><subTitle>Toward a Comparative Taxonomy</subTitle></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>Mapping Judicial Independence</title><subTitle>Toward a Comparative Taxonomy</subTitle></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Micah B.</namePart><namePart type="family">Rankin</namePart><affiliation>Thompson Rivers University</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: Mrankin@tru.ca</affiliation></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Martinus Nijhoff Publishers</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Leiden</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2013</dateIssued><dateCreated encoding="w3cdtf">2013</dateCreated><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2013</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><abstract>Judicial independence is increasingly viewed as a sine qua non of democratic constitutionalism. But in spite of a widespread consensus on the importance of having an independent judiciary, debates about the meaning of judicial independence persist in the literature. For scholars interested in comparative constitutional law, the uncertainty surrounding the definition of judicial independence is particularly vexing and raises several challenging questions: is there a universal set of conditions necessary for judicial independence? Or are there perhaps several models of a judicial independence? One issue that arises from these various questions is whether it is possible to develop a taxonomy of judicial independence. Although taxonomies inevitably produce an incomplete picture of the objects they classify, a taxonomy can assist comparative law scholars by providing an analytical framework for comparison. In Part 1 of this paper, the author explores the conceptual problems associated with finding a universal definition of judicial independence, arguing that there is no single, satisfactory definition of judicial independence. In Part 2 of the paper, the author addresses some of the methodological problems associated with developing a qualitative taxonomy. This is followed by a discussion of the organizing criteria that will be used to construct the four models of judicial independence found in the author’s proposed taxonomy.</abstract><subject><genre>keywords</genre><topic>judicial independence</topic><topic>independence</topic><topic>separation of powers</topic><topic>taxonomy</topic><topic>comparative constitutional law</topic><topic>models</topic><topic>judiciary</topic><topic>comparative law</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Global Journal of Comparative Law</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>GJCL</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">2211-9051</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">2211-906X</identifier><part><date>2013</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>2</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>1</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>1</start><end>26</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">A0737AFBC642D56ABDF2760A813C908A295ADBAF</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/JKT-MTSKGXNR-L</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1163/2211906X-00201001</identifier><identifier type="href">2211906X_002_01_S001_text.pdf</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-56W3KPD5-3">brill-journals</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>© 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/A0737AFBC642D56ABDF2760A813C908A295ADBAF/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><annexes><json:item><extension>jpeg</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>image/jpeg</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/A0737AFBC642D56ABDF2760A813C908A295ADBAF/annexes/jpeg</uri></json:item></annexes><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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