New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Identifieur interne : 004E80 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 004E79; suivant : 004E81New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Auteurs : John Lewis GaddisSource :
- Diplomatic History [ 0145-2096 ] ; 1990-07.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00098.x
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:9D8C6AAF362A94FE65573DC2F919E083DF65BE8FLe document en format XML
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1972</json:string><json:string>Princeton, 1980</json:string><json:string>June 1988</json:string><json:string>New York, 1987</json:string><json:string>Ithaca, 1983</json:string><json:string>March 1987</json:string><json:string>Princeton, 1985</json:string><json:string>American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941</json:string><json:string>Ithaca, 1988</json:string><json:string>New York, 1970</json:string><json:string>Summer 1987</json:string><json:string>New York, 1981</json:string><json:string>New York, 1964</json:string><json:string>New Brunswick, 1987</json:string><json:string>May 1971</json:string><json:string>Fall 1986</json:string><json:string>London, 1980</json:string><json:string>Pitlsburgh, 1978</json:string><json:string>Spring 1985</json:string><json:string>New Yo&, 1971</json:string><json:string>Westport, 1973</json:string><json:string>Baltimore, 1954</json:string><json:string>Ithaca, 1987</json:string><json:string>Baltimore, 1982</json:string><json:string>World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943</json:string><json:string>Britain and America, 1944</json:string><json:string>New York, 1980</json:string><json:string>New Yolk, 1983</json:string><json:string>October 1988</json:string><json:string>Time and Space, 18801918</json:string><json:string>Cambridge, England, 1981</json:string><json:string>Princeton, 1961</json:string><json:string>Chapel Ilill, 1988</json:string><json:string>New York, 1985</json:string><json:string>October 1960</json:string><json:string>New York, 1979</json:string><json:string>Miami, 1986</json:string><json:string>Spring 1989</json:string><json:string>New Haven, 1977</json:string><json:string>Beverly Hills, 1980</json:string><json:string>Lawrence, 1981</json:string><json:string>February 1973</json:string><json:string>Princeton, 1988</json:string><json:string>Winter 1989</json:string><json:string>American Foreign Relations, 1815</json:string><json:string>New York, 1984</json:string><json:string>New York, 1967</json:string><json:string>Ithaca, 1980</json:string><json:string>March 1984</json:string><json:string>New York, 1989</json:string><json:string>Spring 1988</json:string><json:string>Ithaca, 1985</json:string><json:string>New Haven, 1987</json:string><json:string>December 1988</json:string><json:string>Princeton, 1987</json:string><json:string>New York, 1961</json:string><json:string>Summer 1978</json:string><json:string>Chicago, 1970</json:string><json:string>Baltimore, 1985</json:string><json:string>Autumn 1988</json:string><json:string>Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941</json:string><json:string>Summer 1989</json:string><json:string>Berkeley, 1973</json:string><json:string>September 1986</json:string><json:string>June 1978</json:string><json:string>Fall 1988</json:string><json:string>American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890</json:string><json:string>December 1982</json:string><json:string>United States and Westem Europe, 1945</json:string><json:string>New York, 1988</json:string><json:string>Spring 1987</json:string><json:string>and American Foreign Policy, 1874</json:string><json:string>Summer 1983</json:string><json:string>Chapel Hill, 1981</json:string><json:string>New Haven, 1986</json:string><json:string>Cambridge, England, 1989</json:string><json:string>Baltimore, 1973</json:string><json:string>November 1988</json:string></ref_bibl><bibl></bibl></unitex></namedEntities><ark><json:string>ark:/67375/HXZ-VSBQVQXP-0</json:string></ark><categories><wos><json:string>arts and humanities</json:string><json:string>history</json:string></wos><scienceMetrix><json:string>arts & humanities</json:string><json:string>historical studies</json:string><json:string>history</json:string></scienceMetrix><scopus><json:string>1 - Social Sciences</json:string><json:string>2 - Arts and Humanities</json:string><json:string>3 - History</json:string></scopus></categories><publicationDate>1990</publicationDate><copyrightDate>1990</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00098.x</json:string></doi><id>9D8C6AAF362A94FE65573DC2F919E083DF65BE8F</id><score>1</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/9D8C6AAF362A94FE65573DC2F919E083DF65BE8F/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/9D8C6AAF362A94FE65573DC2F919E083DF65BE8F/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/9D8C6AAF362A94FE65573DC2F919E083DF65BE8F/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a">New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives</title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher scheme="https://publisher-list.data.istex.fr">Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><availability><licence><p>© The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)</p></licence><p scheme="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-GTWS0RDP-M">oup</p></availability><date>2007-06-01</date></publicationStmt><notesStmt><note type="research-article" scheme="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</note><note type="journal" scheme="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</note><note>This article was originally prepared for delivery at the annual convention of the American Historical Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, 28 December 1988. Robert Beisner, Michael Hunt, Paul Kennedy, and Thomas McComick have provided helpful comments, for which the author is most grateful. He would also like to thank the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and the Department of History at Northwestern University for providing opportunities to discuss some of these ideas, as well as his seminar students in the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University and the Politics Department at Princeton University, who have contributed much to what is contained here without, of course, bearing responsibility for the form he has given it.</note></notesStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a">New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives</title><author xml:id="author-0000"><persName><forename type="first">John Lewis</forename><surname>Gaddis</surname></persName><affiliation>JOHN LEWIS GADDIS is Distinguished Professor of History and director of the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University. A graduate of the University of Texas, where he studied with Robert Divine, his books include The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (1972), Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States (1978), Strategies of Containment (1982), and, most recently, The Long Peace (1987).</affiliation></author><idno type="istex">9D8C6AAF362A94FE65573DC2F919E083DF65BE8F</idno><idno type="ark">ark:/67375/HXZ-VSBQVQXP-0</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00098.x</idno></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Diplomatic History</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">Diplomatic History</title><idno type="pISSN">0145-2096</idno><idno type="eISSN">1467-7709</idno><idno type="publisher-id">dh</idno><idno type="PublisherID-hwp">dh</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="1990-07"></date><biblScope unit="volume">14</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="405">405</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="424">424</biblScope></imprint></monogr></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2007-06-01</date></creation></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2007-06-01">Created</change><change when="1990-07">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/9D8C6AAF362A94FE65573DC2F919E083DF65BE8F/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="corpus oup, element #text not found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v2.3 20070202//EN" URI="journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article article-type="research-article">
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<article-categories>
<subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
<subject>Articles</subject>
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<title-group>
<article-title>New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f1">*</xref></article-title>
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<contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Gaddis</surname><given-names>John Lewis</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="au1"></xref></contrib>
<aff id="au1">JOHN LEWIS GADDIS is Distinguished Professor of History and director of the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University. A graduate of the University of Texas, where he studied with Robert Divine, his books include <italic>The United States and the Origins of the Cold War</italic> (1972), <italic>Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States</italic> (1978), <italic>Strategies of Containment</italic> (1982), and, most recently, <italic>The Long Peace</italic> (1987).</aff>
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<author-notes>
<fn id="f1"><label>*</label><p>This article was originally prepared for delivery at the annual convention of the American Historical Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, 28 December 1988. Robert Beisner, Michael Hunt, Paul Kennedy, and Thomas McComick have provided helpful comments, for which the author is most grateful. He would also like to thank the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and the Department of History at Northwestern University for providing opportunities to discuss some of these ideas, as well as his seminar students in the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University and the Politics Department at Princeton University, who have contributed much to what is contained here without, of course, bearing responsibility for the form he has given it.</p></fn>
</author-notes>
<pub-date pub-type="ppub">
<month>7</month>
<year>1990</year>
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<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>01</day>
<month>6</month>
<year>2007</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>14</volume>
<issue>3</issue>
<fpage>405</fpage>
<lpage>424</lpage>
<copyright-statement>© The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)</copyright-statement>
<copyright-year>1990</copyright-year>
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<p>In the summer of 1948, John Von Neumann, the great mathematician who is said to have invented the digital computer, delivered a series of lectures at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton on the subject of self-replicating machines. There was no theoretical reason, Von Neumann insisted, why one could not construct an automaton—a robot—capable, with access to sufficient raw materials, of duplicating itself. All it would need would be the ability to compare its own dimensions with those of the resources available, and then make the necessary adjustments. Von Neumann went on to point out, though, that such machines would lack the capacity for evolutionary development: that would come only if an automaton bumped up against something by accident, thereby altering its own shape and creating a new template from which a slightly different, and perhaps slightly improved, copy might be made. Without the bump, innovation could not occur.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1">1</xref></p>
<p>Von Neumann's concept of a self-replicating automaton provides a good model for how academic disciplines develop, for without occasional bumps against those that lie nearby there is a tendency for fields—and the minds that inhabit them—simply to replicate themselves, without evolutionary progress. It might be a good thing for disciplines to consider whether they are in fact bumping up against their neighbors with sufficient regularity to move beyond the monotony of self-replication; if not, then a wider and more vigorous range of activity might be advisable.</p>
<p>Critics have long singled out American diplomatic history as a field particularly given to automatous self-replication: we do not, it is alleged, bump up against other disciplines often enough to allow our subject to advance very far on the evolutionary scale.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn2">2</xref> Just as we are said to preoccupy ourselves in our research with what clerks wrote to other clerks, so we are seen when it comes to the training of graduate students as turning out clones who will dutifully turn out other clones.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn3">3</xref> We are said to occupy, in the academic world, something like the evolutionary niche filled by the crocodile, the armadillo, and the cockroach: we have been around for a long time and are in no immediate danger of extinction; but we are still rather primitive and, for that reason, not very interesting.</p>
<p>To be sure, there are some things we do well. We are very good at narration, which is to say that we have no difficulty demonstrating a favorite proposition of the historian Edward Potts Cheyney: that “all events, conditions, institutions … come from immediately preceding events, conditions, and institutions.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn4">4</xref> We are equally good at archival research, so long as the sources are mostly in English.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn5">5</xref> We can hardly be accused of antiquarianism: when one considers that half or more of American diplomatic historians today are concentrating their research on the period since the beginning of World War II,<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn6">6</xref> one would have to acknowledge that our discipline is very much up-to-date. It is also probably quicker than most others to assimilate new evidence; the closely related field of political science has been particularly slow to do this.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn7">7</xref> But where we are weak—and where we leave ourselves open to the charge of evolutionary stagnation—is in the area of generalization.</p>
<p>Generalization is something all historians have to do: one can no more recapture in historical writing “what actually happened” than one can replicate on a map “what actually exists.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn8">8</xref> But practitioners in some fields think more about how to generalize than do others, and in this respect the claim that American diplomatic history has not progressed very far seems to me justified. One reason may be that we do not allow ourselves to be “bumped” regularly enough by our sister disciplines. This essay is an attempt to specify some areas in which our generalizations have not been as sophisticated as they might have been, and to suggest some ways in which “bumping”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn9">9</xref> up against other disciplines might enrich what we do.</p>
<p>The first such area has to do with our tendency to seek synthesis through reductionism: to assume that the explanation of complex events requires the identification of single causes,<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn10">10</xref> or, more often, single categories of causes.</p>
<p>For years the dominant interpretive paradigm in American diplomatic history was that of the “Open Door,” the attempt of William Appleman Williams and those he influenced to explain the emergence and subsequent behavior of the United States as a world power almost exclusively in economic terms.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn11">11</xref> Despite the obvious value of this approach in establishing linkages between foreign policy and domestic capitalism, it devoted little attention to the role of party politics, national security concerns, international developments, distinctive individuals, or unforeseen events.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn12">12</xref> More recently the search for an admittedly broader “corporatist” synthesis, while helpful in deepening our understanding of the 1920s and to some extent the late 1940s, has nonetheless obscured discontinuities that arose from such equally important influences as the constraints of isolationism or alarm over disruptions of the balance of power in Europe and Asia.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn13">13</xref></p>
<p>Michael Hunt has recently proposed an important new synthesis that appears, at first glance, to go beyond the reductionism of Williams and the corporatists. Objecting to the tendency “to posit a single, simple reason for the origins and persistence of a particular ideology,” he identifies “three core ideas” as having shaped American foreign policy and “the substance of American life to an unprecedented degree": a “quest for national greatness closely coupled to the promotion of liberty,” a tendency to view other peoples “in terms of a racial hierarchy,” and the fear of political and social revolution.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn14">14</xref> The difficulty here is that Hunt then goes on, in apparent violation of his own critique of reductionism, to place race “at the center of [the American] world view. Public policy in general and foreign policy in particular had from the start of the national experience reflected the central role that race thinking played.” But Hunt is also careful to acknowledge that “Americans were hardly unique” in their racism.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn15">15</xref> The result is to leave us with an American “ideology” defined as exceptional in terms of a reductionist category that turns out not to be exceptional at all.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn16">16</xref></p>
<p>It is not at all clear why the search for synthesis should require reductionism of the kind that Williams, the corporatists, and Hunt have put forward: one employs a synthesis in order to generalize about complex phenomena, to be sure, and that requires simplification. But if that simplification is achieved by concentrating upon a single category of phenomena—whether economic, corporatist, or racist—and by excluding others, then the effect is likely to be what J. H. Hexter has called “tunnel history,” the tendency to “split the past into a series of tunnels, each continuous from the remote past to the present, but practically self-contained at every point and sealed off from contact with or contamination by anything that was going on in any of the other tunnels.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn17">17</xref> Certainly if one is to avoid that kind of history, the burden would appear to be on the historian who proposes synthesis through reductionism to justify that procedure as explicitly as possible.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn18">18</xref> It is the absence of that explicit justification for excluding alternative explanations that has too often weakened the search for synthesis in American diplomatic history.</p>
<p>There is, to be sure, the danger of proliferating explanations to the point of mindless eclecticism:<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn19">19</xref> such a synthesis would be no more useful than one that teeters precariously upon a monocausal base. But surely these are not the only possibilities. Why should social scientists seek explanations that attempt to account for all—or almost all—detectable phenomena in the first place? Such things may be possible in the physical and biological sciences, as the success of theories like relativity, plate tectonics, and natural selection amply testify. But ours is, after all, a <italic>social</italic> science, which is to say that it operates on a far shorter time scale than do expanding universes, continental drift, or evolution; it also involves unpredictable human beings who, like certain particles in quantum mechanics, resist appearing in the expected place at the expected time to do the expected thing. We are left, then, with little choice but to work with imperfect explanations that aspire to account for something less than “life, the universe, and everything,”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn20">20</xref> and that fact would appear to require openness to a considerable amount of electicism in our search for synthesis.</p>
<p>Other disciplines accept as a matter of course the compatibility of synthesis with multiple causation. Consider “super-string” theory, whose practitioners routinely speculate about the possibility of a post-Einstein nine-dimensional universe;<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn21">21</xref> the great man himself allowed for four. Political scientists regularly incorporate multiple variables into their work,<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn22">22</xref> and even the two-dimensional models of economists allow for the operation of more than one variable. One would think that historians, who are not obliged to try to fit what they do within predictive models in any event, would be more comfortable with explanatory complexity than anyone else.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn23">23</xref> It is all the more puzzling, therefore, that the search for synthesis in diplomatic history so often seeks to reduce reality to one independent and a series of dependent variables: if X, Y, and Z happened, it can only be because W is back there lurking somewhere in Professor Hexter's tunnel.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn24">24</xref></p>
<p>A first step toward invigorating the field of American diplomatic history, then, might be to get beyond the tendency to equate synthesis with reductionism. The purpose of a synthesis, after all, is not to exclude but rather to account for complexity. A little interdisciplinary “bumping” could remind us that, until our explanations begin to approach the comprehensive rigor of a Darwin or an Einstein, we should probably be cautious about framing them in reductionist terms.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn25">25</xref></p>
<p>A second area in which American diplomatic history lacks methodological sophistication has to do with what is, in a way, the opposite of reductionism: it is the tendency to construct a complex and multifaceted explanation of a series of events, full of causes intersecting and individuals interacting, but then to apply it in an indiscriminate way. It is what one might call the “crop-duster” approach to history.</p>
<p>An example can be found in Emily Rosenberg's well-written and innovative book, <italic>Spreading the American Dream,</italic> which works out an entirely plausible integration of American diplomacy, corporate behavior, and cultural expansionism that reflects very well both multiple causes and internal contradictions. But she then weakens her analysis by concluding that the resulting policy—which she calls “liberal-developmentalism”—allowed the United States to dominate those countries subjected to it in such a way as to constrict their political, economic, and cultural autonomy. American “liberal-expansionists” believed, she writes, that there could be “no truly enlightened dissent against the ultimate acceptance of American ways, and this faith bred an intolerance, a narrowness, that was the very opposite of liberality.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn26">26</xref></p>
<p>True enough, no doubt, for some parts of the world: this interpretation seems convincing enough when one considers the American role in such countries as Guatemala, Iran, and perhaps South Vietnam. Upon reading Rosenberg's book, though, my students wanted to know: “What about South Korea, or Japan, or West Germany?” The American “liberal-developmentalist” model was surely as strong in those countries as in Central America, the Middle East, or Southeast Asia; indeed, it was probably stronger because the force of military occupation, at least for a time, backed it up. But far from constraining the Japanese, the Koreans, and the Germans, “liberal-developmentalism” would appear to have transformed them into vigorous competitors who for years have been beating the original “liberal-developmentalists” at their own game. What about Taiwan, or India, or Brazil, or Israel, all countries in which American postwar influence was also strong, but in each of which it produced—because it was hardly the only influence operating—very different results? All of which is simply to suggest that the need for methodological sophistication does not end with an explanation of the roots of foreign policy: one must also—if one is to avoid the “crop-duster” syndrome—be sensitive to its <italic>application,</italic> recognizing the virtual certainty that consequences will vary from place to place and from time to time.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn27">27</xref></p>
<p>A peculiar assumption that appears to underlie “crop-duster” history is that influence in international affairs flows only in one direction: outward from the United States. The Rosenberg thesis reflects this view; so too do proponents of the “Open Door” and the “corporatist” syntheses, as well as Hunt's recent “ideological” approach. Somehow Americans affect what happens to other nations and peoples, but other nations and people seldom affect what happens to Americans.</p>
<p>Does the existence of acknowledged disparities in political, economic, or military power in fact cause influence to flow only from areas of strength to those of weakness? The comparative study of empires can suggest answers to this question, for what is an empire if not a situation in which those who have power dominate those who do not? But American diplomatic historians—and especially those who are inclined to see the United States as an empire itself—tend to neglect this field. Or at least they seem unaware of one of the most persistent themes in imperial history, which is the way in which influence can also flow from areas of “weakness” to those of “strength.”</p>
<p>In an ambitious study of European empires from ancient Greece through the end of the nineteenth century, the political scientist Michael Doyle has argued strongly for giving at least equal weight to what he calls “pericentric” as well as “metrocentric” flows of influence. “Metrocentric” imperialism does indeed involve the expansion of influence outward from within a society; it is consistent with the explanations of empire provided by Hobson, Lenin, and (for a different set of reasons) Schumpeter. But Doyle shows convincingly that influence can also flow from “peripheries” back to the “metropole": those who are on the receiving end of imperialism can substantially affect its costs by choosing resistance over collaboration; those who administer imperial outposts can, through their immediate response to local circumstances, commit a metropole to peripheral responsibilities it never sought. The effect, in either situation, can be to force modifications in the behavior of even the most powerful imperial state.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn28">28</xref></p>
<p>American diplomatic historians ought not to find this pattern strange. Our own revolution demonstrated the difficulty a metropole can encounter in attempting to “manage” a periphery.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn29">29</xref> It certainly made a difference that the influential citizens of Texas, Oregon, California, and Hawaii welcomed annexation to the United States—which is to say, they “collaborated”—but that their Mexican and Canadian counterparts would not have.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn30">30</xref> Filipino resistance between 1898 and 1902 substantially altered American views on the desirability and the costs of formal empire.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn31">31</xref> Difficulties encountered in Mexico certainly influenced Woodrow Wilson's thinking—and that of the Republican administrations that succeeded him—on the benefits of military intervention south of the border.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn32">32</xref> And it was the self-destructive behavior of Europeans as much as it was the deliberate calculations of Americans that transformed the United States into a global economic metropole after World War I, and into a political-military one as well after World War II.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn33">33</xref></p>
<p>Although early revisionist writing on Cold War origins did tend to take the view that influence flowed only outward from the United States,<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn34">34</xref> more recent studies have in fact shifted toward a “pericentric” emphasis as the increasing availability of archival material has made it clear that governments in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and even the Middle East generally welcomed their incorporation within an American sphere of influence, given the perceived alternative.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn35">35</xref> With regard to the Cold War in Asia, it was always difficult to sustain an exclusively “metrocentric” perspective: where one had prominent Asian potentates like Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, Ngo Dinh Diem, and Douglas MacArthur manipulating Washington, there had long been reason to suspect that influence flowed in both directions, although historians are only beginning to chronicle that process.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn36">36</xref></p>
<p>These trends make all the more conspicuous, then, the tendency of American diplomatic historians to assume unidirectional influence when they write about Latin America. These accounts almost always feature the United States manipulating its neighbors to the south; but the neighbors are never (or almost never) seen to be manipulating the Americans. There often follows the conclusion—stated or implied—that Washington bears primary responsibility for the conditions of economic stagnation, social inequality, and political repression that pervade Latin America, and that only a drastic modification of U.S. policy can alter this situation.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn37">37</xref></p>
<p>What seems to be involved here is an uncritical acceptance, at times consciously and at times not, of “dependency” theory: the assertion that political, economic, and social conditions in Third World countries can be understood only within the framework of an international system dominated by mature capitalist economies. These “developed” states, it is argued, employ the instruments of trade and investment to ensnare their “lesser developed” counterparts into a pattern of dependency not greatly different from that of the drug addict upon the drug dealer. The “North,” by this logic, is as responsible for the self-destructive behavior of the “South” as the “pusher” is for that of those he manages to “hook.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn38">38</xref></p>
<p>The difficulty with this thesis—and with its use as an analytical framework for understanding U.S.-Latin American relations—is that dependency theory is now widely regarded, outside the field of American diplomatic history, as a considerable oversimplification. Dependency theorists allow little or no room for the influence of distinctive economic, cultural, or political phenomena: despite their apparent sympathy for it, they treat the Third World as a homogenous and featureless mass. Nor has empirical investigation borne out their insistence that integration into the world economy necessarily retards economic growth: indeed, the experiences of nations like South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore suggest considerable evidence to the contrary. Nor do the dependency theorists explain how we could be sure that, if the oppressive presence of mature “Northern” capitalism should someday disappear, the states of the “South” would then find their way to social stability, economic equality, and political democracy.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn39">39</xref> In short, to write history on the basis of dependency theory is to combine the worst features of the “reductionist” and “crop-duster” approaches, in that complex phenomena are reduced to a single cause, but the resulting conclusions are then indiscriminately applied.</p>
<p>The world is a diverse place, and the United States—whether for good or ill—controls only a small portion of what goes on within it. American diplomatic historians could overcome much of their alleged lack of sophistication by recognizing that fact, by turning their attention to the task of specifying those areas into which this country's influence, in all of its own diversity, does extend, and by distinguishing those as precisely as possible from the ones in which it does not.</p>
<p>A third problem that causes American diplomatic history to suffer from methodological impoverishment is cultural and temporal parochialism: we tend to assume that the experience of the United States in time and space is unique and therefore defining: we seem to think that the experiences of other nations at other times and in other parts of the world can shed little useful light upon our own.</p>
<p>American exceptionalism is, of course, nothing new; indeed, this country's most defensible claim to being exceptional may lie in the tenacity with which we believe that we are. No one could deny that certain things in the historical experience of the United States are unique, just as would be the case—unexceptionably—with any other country. But it is interesting that American diplomatic historians, who can be quite critical of “exceptionalism” when they encounter it in the diplomats about whom they write, find it so difficult to free themselves from that tendency in their own work.</p>
<p>Consider the narrow framework within which diplomatic historians have treated the role of the United States as an empire. They have not hesitated to portray American diplomacy in “imperial” terms,<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn40">40</xref> and in my view, properly so: the Founding Fathers themselves used the term “empire” without embarrassment;<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn41">41</xref> expansion in the nineteenth century took place on a scale sufficient to merit the adjective “imperial” by any standard; and in the twentieth century disparities of economic and military power have placed the United States in a “hegemonic” position with respect to much of the rest of the world.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn42">42</xref> How often, though, have those who write about the American imperial experience considered it in comparison to, and in light of, the experiences of other empires?</p>
<p>Two books that illustrate how useful such comparisons can be are Tony Smith's <italic>The Pattern of Imperialism</italic> and Philip Darby's <italic>Three Faces of Imperialism</italic>: not only do they illustrate the role “pericentric” as well as “metrocentric” forces played in the emergence of the United States as a world power; they also show how studying the rise and decline of the British Empire can shed new light on American foreign policy in the Cold War.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn43">43</xref> Michael Doyle's comparative study <italic>Empires</italic> hardly mentions the United States, but it is filled with insights that bear on the American experience, as is Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson's <italic>The Fall of the First British Empire.</italic><xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn44">44</xref> But despite the heavy reliance on historical research that characterizes each of them, every one of these recent books is by a political scientist. No American diplomatic historian that I know of has, at least within recent years, undertaken anything approaching these studies in terms of comparative sweep and analytical rigor.</p>
<p>Or consider the history of American geopolitical thought. The work of James Hutson and, more recently, Daniel Lang, has made it clear that the Founding Fathers approached international relations very much in the tradition of European realpolitik; the combination of idealism and naiveté that Felix Gilbert once detected in their thinking was, it now appears, somewhat exaggerated.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn45">45</xref> But how many historians of American foreign policy have attempted to pursue that argument against exceptionalism through the latter three fourths of the nineteenth century and into the first half of the twentieth? How did it happen that a wholly unexceptional variety of European “realism” came to inform this nation's diplomacy at its birth, then disappeared, only to be reincarnated a century and a half later in the minds of Hans Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, and Reinhold Niebuhr?<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn46">46</xref> It is difficult to believe that “exceptional” characteristics can so suddenly replace “unexceptional” ones, and then in turn and with equal abruptness be replaced by them: a more plausible explanation might link the intensity of American “realism” to shifting perceptions of threats to the nation's security. But who, among American diplomatic historians, has attempted this?<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn47">47</xref></p>
<p>Or consider the extent to which historians of American foreign policy have neglected so elemental a matter as the perception of space and time in relation to the conduct of diplomacy.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn48">48</xref> There is no reason to assume that all nations—or all individuals within nations—perceive space and time in precisely the same way on all occasions. One reason a thinly populated and politically divided group of North American colonies was willing to take on the world's most powerful nation after 1763 was that their inhabitants saw space and time as working for them: not only would the task of supplying an army across an ocean hamper the British; it seemed unlikely, as well, that an island could ever permanently subdue a continent.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn49">49</xref> But by the 1840s, as Thomas Hietala has shown, Americans had come to view space as closing in on them and time as working against them: it was fear as much as self-confidence, he argues—fear manifesting itself in racial, economic, and geopolitical terms—that motivated the “anxious aggrandizement” of the late Jacksonian period.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn50">50</xref> Robert L. Beisner has identified a similar shift in spatial and temporal perceptions in the transition from what he calls the “old paradigm” to the “new” in late nineteenth-century American foreign policy.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn51">51</xref></p>
<p>But precisely how did Woodrow Wilson come to view a German victory in World War I as likely to endanger the United States? What was it in the behavior of Germany and Japan in the 1930s that evoked comparable fears in the mind of Franklin D. Roosevelt? How, specifically, did American and West European leaders see their nations' interests as threatened by what the Soviet Union was doing in Eastern Europe after 1945?<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn52">52</xref> It is easy enough to show that nation A saw nation B as a “threat,” but only rarely do we specify <italic>just what it was</italic> in B's behavior that nation A considered threatening. And threats are themselves a matter of perception: what one nation finds threatening, another may not.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn53">53</xref></p>
<p>Some attention to how policymakers think about space and time might help in dealing with such issues. Perceptions, after all, are to a large part shaped by the spatial and temporal context within which individuals—and nations—exist:<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn54">54</xref> the world can look a good deal more ominous if one views space and time as working against rather than in one's favor.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn55">55</xref> Paul Kennedy's account of how the British came to feel this way prior to World War I could provide an interesting standard against which to contrast Wilson's thinking between 1914 and 1917.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn56">56</xref> Waldo Heinrichs's new account of the coming of World War II emphasizes the important but oddly neglected fact that Roosevelt in 1941 had <italic>two</italic> potential threats to deal with at the same time.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn57">57</xref> Michael Sherry and Alan Henrikson have suggested that shifts in the spatial thinking of American strategists at the end of World War II played a role in altering their view of the Soviet Union from one of ally to adversary.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn58">58</xref> And it seems very likely that an important shift in temporal thinking must have taken place as the Eisenhower administration came into office in 1953: otherwise it is difficult to account for the new chief executive's abrupt abandonment of the “period of peak danger” concept which, since the drafting of NSC-68 three years earlier, had assumed time to be working against the United States and its allies to such an extent that if nothing was done a Soviet attack was thought certain to occur by 1954.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn59">59</xref></p>
<p>Overcoming spatial and temporal parochialism requires being willing to undertake comparative studies. Historians are not particularly receptive to this approach: we tend to assume that the comparativist cannot know as much about a particular subject as the specialist does, and we are correct in assuming that. But the specialist is less likely than the comparativist to ask interesting questions; even more important, the comparativist alone can draw upon a range of empirical evidence—extending across space and through time—to suggest answers. If it is true that good history is as much a matter of providing less than definitive answers to difficult questions as it is a matter of answering easy questions thoroughly—and I tend to think it is—then the techniques of the comparativist would appear to have as great a claim upon our attention as do those of the narrativist.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn60">60</xref></p>
<p>One consequence of the spatial and temporal parochialism of American diplomatic historians—and their resulting reluctance to approach their subject from a comparative perspective—is systemic innocence: it does not often occur to us that the United States is and always has been part of an international system, the characteristics of which add up to something more than just the sum of its parts.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn61">61</xref> The mixture of astonishment and acclaim that greeted Paul Kennedy's <italic>The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers</italic> when it appeared late in 1987 is surely a reflection of systemic innocence. The book advances what should have been an unsurprising argument: that because the United States exists within a larger systemic context, its experience as a great power may replicate that of other great powers in the past.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn62">62</xref> But it took a historian of European diplomacy and strategy to see this; American diplomatic historians have been remarkably slow to incorporate systemic perspectives into their own work.</p>
<p>The reason almost certainly lies in our preference for narration over generalization. We are far more comfortable treating history as a linear than as a cyclical phenomenon, and hence we tend not to recognize systemic phenomena—which often have cyclical characteristics—when we come across them. Preoccupied with the progression from tree to tree, we lose sight of the fact that we are part of a forest.</p>
<p>As a result, some important books have gone unwritten. One is a history of the American conception of national security from the achievement of independence to the present that would seek to answer the following question: Was this nation's isolationism the product of a conscious determination to avoid European political entanglements, or was it the largely unconscious consequence of an unusually stable world order?<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn63">63</xref> Where systemic instability has developed—whether in the recurring wars of the eighteenth century, the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, World Wars I and II, or the Cold War—the effect has been sooner or later to compromise American isolationism.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn64">64</xref> Who really decided our fate, then: ourselves, or the workings of an international system we only dimly understood?<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn65">65</xref></p>
<p>A second book that has yet to be written would relate American foreign policy to the sources of international systemic stability. There is, as yet, no consensus among theorists on what brings that condition about: Hans Morgenthau saw stability as coming from carefully balancing multiple sources of power, but Kenneth Waltz has found bipolarity to be more stable than multipolarity; still others such as Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Gilpin have suggested the need for a single stabilizing “hegemon” before order can be achieved.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn66">66</xref> The point here is not who is right, but rather that American diplomatic historians have played no role at all in this debate. And yet the theorists, whatever their persuasion, would all agree that the United States has played a major role in determining when international equilibrium has been achieved in this century. American diplomatic historians are selling themselves and their readers short by remaining aloof from this discussion, which concerns nothing less than the nature of this country's involvement with the rest of the world.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn67">67</xref></p>
<p>A third unwritten book—again reflecting the importance of systemic perspectives—might deal with that hearty perennial in the history of American foreign relations, the “domino” theory. We have traced clearly enough where the idea came from: indeed, the term “Munich mentality” has long been a synonym for it.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn68">68</xref> But no diplomatic historian that I know of has been willing to pursue two obvious questions about the “domino” theory: is it unique, and is it correct? Answering the first question would require some comparative history, but that ought not to be too difficult. Thucydides himself provides as good a description of “domino” thinking as we are likely to find; and there is reason to suspect that such attitudes have existed in overextended empires ever since.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn69">69</xref> More difficult is the question of whether “dominoes” really do fall, which is to say, whether nations “bandwagon” when confronted with what appears to be superior strength. But a careful new study by the political scientist Stephen Walt argues persuasively that they tend not to, that “balancing” against threats is the more frequent pattern of behavior than “bandwagoning” before them.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn70">70</xref> The point may require further research to confirm, but the Walt book—and Thucydides—provide ample evidence of how much a student of “domino” theories could gain from a systemic perspective.</p>
<p>In some ways, the most intriguing research going on now about the behavior of international systems grows out of the fields of game theory and political economy. It suggests that limited forms of cooperation between rival great powers may emerge, even under conditions of anarchy; that states do, over time, learn to behave like corporations—or professional football teams—in that they contend vigorously (most of the time) without trying to kill one another and without destroying the environment in which they function.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn71">71</xref> This theoretical finding—that competition and cooperation can themselves coexist—could take us a long way toward explaining how, against all expectations, the Soviet-American rivalry that has now extended over four and a half decades has yet to produce armed conflict: a little interdisciplinary “bumping” here could pay particularly handsome dividends for historians of the Cold War.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn72">72</xref></p>
<p>To be sure, American diplomatic historians are not alone in their parochialism about international systems: there is a disconcerting tendency among the systems theorists themselves to give little attention to how their respective findings might mesh. How, for example, do the cycles of great power rise and fall that Paul Kennedy has identified relate to the “hegemonic stability” cycles of Kindleberger and Gilpin? How might these, in turn, tie in with the possibility that international cooperation can emerge under conditions of anarchy, or with the role nuclear weapons have played (whatever it is)<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn73">73</xref> in ensuring stability? There is, in short, some danger here of “paradigm fratricide”;<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn74">74</xref> American diplomatic historians willing to inform themselves about these discussions might be in a good position to help stave off that catastrophe by subjecting these hypotheses to the good old-fashioned test of empirical evidence.</p>
<p>If we are to play that role, though, we will have to get over our own old sense that once we have paid obligatory deference to Cheyney's principle—once we have established what came after what—our responsibilities are over. For the fact is that there are cyclical as well as linear patterns in history; there is system as well as sequence. And just as the physicists have come to see light as having the qualities of both particles and waves, so we too should accept rather than resist “complementarity,” and learn to make the most of it.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn75">75</xref></p>
<p>For those who will seek out its patterns, history does have a certain—although limited—predictive utility. It is not like mathematics and chemistry, where the repeated combination of variables in the same amounts and under the same conditions will always produce the same result. It certainly is not, in and of itself, a guide to the future: those who have sought to use history in this way—by assuming that the future will replicate the past—can count on only two certainties, which are that it will not and that they will be surprised as a consequence.</p>
<p>But history can serve something of the function a rear-view mirror does in an automobile. One would not want to drive down the road with eyes glued to the mirror because sooner or later one would wind up in the ditch. But the mirror is useful in determining where one has been; it is even more helpful in revealing who, or what, is coming up from behind, a consideration of some importance in what is still a competitive international environment. It makes a difference whether it is the geopolitical equivalent of an aging Volkswagen or a Mack truck.</p>
<p>History can also make one aware of those long-term patterns that tend to hold up across time and space: that great powers do rise and fall; that empires do overextend themselves; that there is a relationship between solvency and security; that individuals are rarely automatons; that events have complex roots.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn76">76</xref></p>
<p>In a world that continues to be dangerous—but often in ways we have least expected—there is no question that this expansion of immediate experience, this awareness of long-term patterns, this “rear-view mirror” approach to the problems we face; that all of this has the potential to make diplomatic history relevant. Indeed, it could be the most “relevant” of all the branches of history as far as policymaking is concerned. The only real question is whether we diplomatic historians—a pretty unimaginative lot, to be perfectly honest about it—are capable of seeing our discipline in sufficiently expansive terms to allow that to happen.</p></body>
<back>
<fn-group>
<title>Footnotes</title>
<fn id="fn1"><label>1</label><p>The story is told in Freeman Dyson. <italic>Disturbing the Universe</italic> (New York, 1979), 194–96; and in Ed Regis, <italic>Who Got Einstein's Office? Eccentricity and Genius at the Institute for Advanced Study</italic> (New York, 1987), 114–21.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn2"><label>2</label><p>For a sampling of such complaints see Charles S. Maier. “Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations.” in <italic>The Past before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States</italic>, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, 1980), 335–87; <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Lewis Caddis</surname><given-names>John</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War</article-title>,”<source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>7</volume>, (<year>1983</year>): <fpage>171</fpage>–<lpage>90</lpage></citation>; and Christopher Thorne, “After the Europeans: American Designs for the Remaking of Southeast Asia,” ibid. 12 (Spring 1988): 201–8. See also Robert Beisner's comment on <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Field</surname><given-names>James A.</given-names> <suffix>Jr.</suffix></name></person-group>, “<article-title>American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book</article-title>. <source>American Historical Review</source>, <volume>83</volume>, (<year>1978</year>): <fpage>672</fpage>–<lpage>83</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn3"><label>3</label><p>See <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Ninkovich</surname><given-names>Frank</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>Interests and Discourse in Diplomatic History</article-title>,”<source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>13</volume>, (<year>1989</year>): <fpage>154</fpage>–<lpage>55</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn4"><label>4</label><p>Edward P. Cheyney, <italic>Law in History and Other Essays</italic> (New York, 1927), 10–11.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn5"><label>5</label><p>See, on this point, <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Marks</surname><given-names>Sally</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>The World According to Washington</article-title>,”<source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>11</volume>, (<year>1987</year>): <fpage>265</fpage>–<lpage>82</lpage></citation>. I readily include myself among those who an deficient with respect to foreign languages.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn6"><label>6</label><p>Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis,” 171.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn7"><label>7</label><p>See <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Lewis Gaddis</surname><given-names>John</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies</article-title>. <source>International Security</source>, <volume>12</volume>, (<year>1987</year>): <fpage>3</fpage>–<lpage>21</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn8"><label>8</label><p>The problem is nicely discussed in David Hackett Fischer, <italic>Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought</italic> (New York, 1970), 65–68; but for another illustration that draws on recent advances in the field of fractal geometry see James Gleick, <italic>Chaos: Making a New Science</italic> (New York, 1987), 94–96.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn9"><label>9</label><p>Having become known, at one time or another, as an advocate of both “lumping” and “splitting,” I am somewhat hesitant to add “bumping” to the list. but the term does seem preferable to the only alternative I can think of, which is “interdisciplinary interaction.” For a defense of “bumping” from the standpoint of systems theory see Heinz Pagels, <italic>The Dream of Reason: The Computer and the Rise of the Sciences of Complexity</italic> (New York, 1988), 138–39.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn10"><label>10</label><p>Two books that do quite literally reduce a complex series of events to a single cause are William Shawcross, <italic>Sideshow: Kissinger, Nuon and the Destruction of Cambodia</italic> (New York, 1979). which attributes Khmer Rouge atrocities after 1975 to the Nixon administration's bombing and subsequent invasion of that country in 1969 and 1970; and Fraser Harbutt, <italic>The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War</italic> (New York. 1986). which explains the Truman administration's toughening of policy toward the Soviet Union almost exclusively as a response to Winston Churchill's March 1946, speech at Fulton, Missouri.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn11"><label>11</label><p>William Appleman Williams, <italic>The Tragedy of American Diplomacy</italic> (1959; reprint ed., New York, 1972). Other books that followed that volume's emphasis on domestic economic causation include Williams's own <italic>The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society</italic> (New York, 1969); also Walter LsFeber. <italic>The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansionism, 1860–1898</italic> (Ithaca. 1963); Lloyd C. Gardner. <italic>Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy</italic> (Madison, 1964); Thomas J. McCormick. <italic>China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901</italic> (Chicago, 1%7); Carl P. Pamni, <italic>Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923</italic> (Pittsburgh, 1969); Tom E. Ted, <italic>The Tariff Politics, and American Foreign Policy, 1874–1901</italic> (Westport, 1973); Edward Crapol, <italic>America for Americans: Economic Nationalism and Anglophobia in the Lure Nineteenth Century</italic> (Westport, 1973); and, after a lapse of many years in which few such accounts appeared. Daniel M. Crane and Thomas A. Breslin. <italic>An Ordinary Relationship: American Opposition to Republican Revolution in China</italic> (Miami, 1986); and Patrick J. Hearden. <italic>Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America's Entry into World War II</italic> (DeKalb, IL, 1987). One recent review essay has described Williams, accurately in my view, as “the most influential American diplomatic historian of his generation.” See <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Hess</surname><given-names>Gary R.</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>After the Tumult: The Wisconsin School's Tribute to William Appleman Williams</article-title>. <source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>12</volume>, (<year>1988</year>): <fpage>499</fpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn12"><label>12</label><p>The most balanced recent evaluation of the Williams thesis and its historiographical influence is Bradford Perkins, <citation citation-type="journal">“<article-title>‘The Tragedy of American Diplomacy’: Twenty-Five Years After</article-title>,”<source>Reviews in American History</source>, <volume>12</volume>, (<year>1984</year>): <fpage>1</fpage>–<lpage>15</lpage></citation>; but see also Lloyd C. Gardner, ed., <italic>Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams</italic> (Corvallis, OR, 1986).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn13"><label>13</label><p>See <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>McCormick</surname><given-names>Thomas I.</given-names></name></person-group>. <article-title>Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History</article-title>. <source>Reviews in American History</source>, <volume>10</volume>, (<year>1982</year>): <fpage>318</fpage>–<lpage>30</lpage></citation>; also <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Lewis Gaddis</surname><given-names>John</given-names></name></person-group>. <article-title>The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View</article-title>,”<source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>10</volume>, (<year>1986</year>): <fpage>35742</fpage></citation>; and <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Hogan</surname><given-names>Michael J.</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal</article-title>,”<source>Diplomatic History</source> <volume>10</volume> (<year>1986</year>): <fpage>363</fpage>–<lpage>72</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn14"><label>14</label><p>Michael H. Hunt, <italic>Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy</italic> (New Haven, 1987), 12, 17–18.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn15"><label>15</label><p>Ibid., 90–91. Even more tenuous, in my view, is Hunt's attempt to explain post-World War II development theory as old-fashioned racism in modern garb (pp. 161–62). Equally critical but far more plausible analyses of development theory can be found in Robert A. Packenham, <italic>Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science</italic> (Princeton. 1973); and D. Michael Shafer, <italic>Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US. Counterinsurgency Policy</italic> (Princeton, 1988).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn16"><label>16</label><p>For a parallel criticism of Richard H. Collin, <italic>Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A New View of American Imperialism</italic> (Baton Rouge, 1985), see <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Iriye</surname><given-names>Akira</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>Exceptionalism Revisited</article-title>,”<source>Reviews in American History</source>, <volume>16</volume>, (<year>1988</year>): <fpage>293</fpage>–<lpage>95</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn17"><label>17</label><p>J. H. Hexter, <italic>Reappraisals in History</italic> (Evanston, IL. 1961), 194.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn18"><label>18</label><p>One strength of Gabriel Kolko's writing about Cold War origins was his willingness to provide an explicit methodological justification for reductionism—whether one agreed with it or not. See his <italic>The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945</italic> (New York. 1968). 8.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn19"><label>19</label><p>Or, in Fischer's catalog of fallacies, “indiscriminate pluralism.” See <italic>Historians’ Fallacies</italic>, 175–76. For suggestions that “postrevisionism” in Cold War historiography commits this error see <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Kimball</surname><given-names>Warren F.</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>The Cold War Warmed Over</article-title>,”<source>American Historical Review</source>, <volume>79</volume>, (<year>1974</year>): <fpage>1119</fpage>–<lpage>36</lpage></citation>; <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Eisenberg</surname><given-names>Carolyn</given-names></name></person-group>. <article-title>Reflections on a Toothless Revisionism</article-title>. <source>Diplomatic History</source> <volume>2</volume> (<year>1978</year>): <fpage>295</fpage>–<lpage>305</lpage></citation>; and <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Hogan</surname><given-names>Michael J.</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>The Search for Synthesis: Economic Diplomacy in the Cold War</article-title>. <source>Reviews in American History</source>, <volume>15</volume>, (<year>1987</year>): <fpage>493</fpage>–<lpage>98</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn20"><label>20</label><p>The reference is to Douglas Adams. <italic>The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Gallery</italic> (New York, 1979), its successor volumes, and the television series of the same name, all of which can teach quite a lot about interdisciplinary “bumping.”</p></fn>
<fn id="fn21"><label>21</label><p>Regis, <italic>Who Got Einstein's Office?</italic>, 255–74. makes this speculation about as intelligible as it is likely to get for the layperson.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn22"><label>22</label><p>For some good examples based on historical research see Theda Skocpol, <italic>States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China</italic> (Cambridge, England, 1979); Robert Gilpin. <italic>War and Change in World Politics</italic> (Cambridge, England, 1981); Michael W. Doyle, <italic>Empires</italic> (Ithaca, 1986); and Aaron Friedberg, <italic>The Weary Titan: Briluin and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905</italic> (Princeton. 1988).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn23"><label>23</label><p>For a succinct example of how to incorporate complexity within a readily comprehensible interpretive framework see Robert L. Beisner. <italic>From the Old Diplomacy 10 the New, 1865–1900</italic>. 2d ed. (Arlington Heights, IL, 1986).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn24"><label>24</label><p>Kennerh Waltz has pointed out that the reductionist commits the error “of predicting outcomes from attributes. To try to do that amounts to overlooking the difference between these two statements: ‘He is a troublemaker.’‘He makes trouble.’ The second statement does not follow from the first one if the attributes of actors do not uniquely determine outcomes. Just as peacemakers may fail to make pace. so troublemakers may fail to make trouble. From attributes one cannot predict outcomes if outcomes depend on the situation of the actors as well as on their attributes.” See <italic>Theory of International Politics</italic> (New York. 1979), 6061.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn25"><label>25</label><p>For one such helpful reminder see <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Pelz</surname><given-names>Stephen E.</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>A Taxonomy for American Diplomatic History</article-title>. <source>Journal of Inlerdisciplinary History</source>, <volume>19</volume>, (<year>1988</year>): <fpage>259</fpage>–<lpage>76</lpage></citation>. Even the so-called hard sciences these days are moving toward an acceptance of complexity and a certain humility about their ability to replicate or describe it. See Gleick, <italic>Chaos;</italic> Pagels, <italic>The Dream of Reason;</italic> and Stephen W. Hawking. <italic>A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes</italic> (New York, 1988), esp. 16669.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn26"><label>26</label><p>Emily S. Rosenberg, <italic>Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945</italic> (New York, 1982), 234.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn27"><label>27</label><p>To be fair, Rosenberg is aware of this point. Nor did she intend to deal comprehensively in her book with the effects of “liberal-developmentalism” in the world at large. See ibid., 13. The difficulty is that her conclusion leaves the reader with the clear impression that he effects of “Liberal-developmentalism” have been consistently negative for the countries involved, without providing the proof that would be necessary to sustain that conclusion.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn28"><label>28</label><p>Doyle, <italic>Empires</italic>, 22–26. Doyle's “pericentric” framework builds in particular upon the earlier work of Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, most conveniently sampled in their classic book (written with Alice Denny) <italic>Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism</italic> (New York, 1961), For a succinct case study that nicely illustrates “pericentrism” see Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L George, <italic>Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time</italic> (New Yolk, 1983), 265–68, on Gladstone, Gordon, and the relief of Khartoum in 1884 and 1885.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn29"><label>29</label><p>The argument goes back, of course, to Lawrence Henry Gipson. but it has recently been reincarnated in an imponant book by two political scientists, Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson. <italic>The Fall of the First British Empire: Origk of the American War for Independence</italic> (Baltimore, 1982).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn30"><label>30</label><p>It has long been understood that American continental expansion—apart, of course, from the treatment of Indians—did not extend to the point of forcibly annexing unwilling neighbors. See Frederick Merk, <italic>Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation</italic> (New York, 1963), 107–8. 261–66; also Reginald C. Stuart, <italic>United Slates Expansionism and British North America, 1775–1871</italic> (Chapel Hill, 1988), esp. xii. The prospect of resislance to annexation, therefore, could deter it.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn31"><label>31</label><p>A point made effectively by the most influential exponent of “metrocentrism” in American diplomatic history, William Applernan Wfiams in <italic>The Tragedy of American Diplomacy</italic>, 46–50.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn32"><label>32</label><p>Roben E. Quirk, <italic>An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz</italic> (Lexington, KY, 1962), 171; Arthur S. Link, <italic>Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, Peace</italic> (Arlington Heights, IL, 1979), 12; Dana G. Munro, <italic>The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921–1933</italic> (Princeton, 1974), 311–83.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn33"><label>33</label><p>Paul Kennedy. <italic>The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000</italic> (New York, 1987), 327–33. Donald W. White points out, though, that external power vacuums <italic>alone</italic> cannot account for the United States's emergence as a postwar superpower: by that logic. Australia, Brazil, India, and Canada should have been superpowers also. See <citation citation-type="journal">“<article-title>World Power in American History</article-title>,”<source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>11</volume>, (<year>1987</year>): <fpage>187</fpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn34"><label>34</label><p>See Williams, <italic>The Tragedy of American Diplomacy</italic>, 258–75; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, <italic>The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954</italic> (New York. 1972). 359–83; Bruce Kuklick, <italic>American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations</italic> (Ithaca, 1972), 226–31; Thomas G. Paterson, <italic>Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War</italic> (Baltimore, 1973), 260–67; and, most recently, Lawrence S. Wittner, <italic>American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949</italic> (New York, 1982), esp. 311–12.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn35"><label>35</label><p>For examples see Harbutt. <italic>The Iron Curtain;</italic> Geir Lundestad, <italic>America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945–1949</italic> (New York, 1980); Bruce R. Kuniholm, <italic>The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece</italic> (Princeton, 1980); Terry H. Anderson, <italic>The United Stoles, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944–1947</italic> (Columbia, MO, 1981); Robert M. Hathaway, <italic>Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944–1947</italic> (New York, 1981); James Edward Miller, <italic>The United States and Italy, 1940–1950: The Politics and Diplomocy of Stabilization</italic> (Chapel Hill, 1986); and, in an effective integration of “corporatist” and “pericentric” perspectives, Michael J. Hogan, <italic>The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952</italic> (New York. 1987). See also <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Lundestad</surname></name></person-group>, “<article-title>Empire by Invitation? The United States and Westem Europe, 1945–1952</article-title>,”<source>Journal of Peace Research</source>, <volume>23</volume>, (<year>1986</year>): <fpage>263</fpage>–<lpage>77</lpage></citation>; and John Lewis Gaddis, <italic>The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War</italic> mew York, 1987), 57–71. In a recent review otherwise critical of American diplomatic historians for not embracing “pericentric” viewpoints, Christopher Thorne derides “the notion, now so sedulously advanced by the professionally emollient, that the expansion of the American empire which took place immediately following the Second World War occurred strictly by invitation only.” See “After the Europeans,” 206. I am not aware that anyone has ever claimed universal applicability for the “empire by invitation” thesis; the criticism, however, does afford Thorne the opportunity to recount a good story about the Duke of Wellington.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn36"><label>36</label><p>See, for examples, William Whitney Stueck, Jr., <italic>The Rood to Confrontation: American Policy toward Chino and Korea, 1947–1950</italic> (Chapel Hill, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs. <italic>The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945–1950</italic> (Kent, OH, 1981); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, <italic>Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950</italic> (New York. 1983); Michael Schaller. <italic>The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia</italic> (New York. 1985); Ronald H. Spector, <italic>Advice and Support: The Early Years of the US. Army in Vietnam, 1941–1960</italic> (New York, 1985); also, and most recently, <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>McMahon</surname><given-names>Robert J.</given-names></name></person-group>. <article-title>United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan</article-title>,”<source>Journal of American History</source>, <volume>75</volume>, (<year>1988</year>): <fpage>812</fpage>–<lpage>40</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn37"><label>37</label><p>Examples include Walter LaFeber. <italic>Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America</italic> (New York. 1984); John A. Findling, <italic>Close Neighbors, Distant Friends: United States-Central American Relations</italic> (New York, 1987); <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Benjamin</surname><given-names>Jules R.</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>The Framework of US. Relations with Lah America: An Interpretive Essay</article-title>. <source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>11</volume>, (<year>1987</year>): <fpage>91</fpage>–<lpage>112</lpage></citation>; and Stephen G. Rabe. <italic>Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism</italic> (Chapel Hill, 1988). Exceptions to his pattern include Louis A. Perez. Jr., <italic>Intervention, Revolution, and Politics in Cuba, 1913–1921</italic> (Pitlsburgh, 1978); Michael Grow, <italic>The Good Neighbor Policy and Authoritarianism in Paraguay: United States Economic Expansion and Great-Power Rivalry in Latin America during World War II</italic> (Lawrence, 1981); and a recent account by a retired diplomat, Frank McNeil. <italic>War and Peace in Central America</italic> (New York, 1988), See also a brief acknowledgment of the problem by <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Rabe</surname><given-names>Stephen</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>Marching Ahead (Slowly): The Historiography of Inter-American Relations</article-title>,”<source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>13</volume>, (<year>1989</year>): <fpage>316</fpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn38"><label>38</label><p>The most influential sbtement of his Theory can be found in articlcs by André Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson in <italic>Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy</italic>, ed. James D. Cockcroft, Andeé Gunder Frank. and Dale L. Johnson (Gardcn City. NY. 1972). esp. 3–45, 71–111, 321–91; but see also <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Bodenheimer</surname><given-names>Susanne J.</given-names></name></person-group>. <article-title>Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin Ameriean Underdevelopment</article-title>,”<source>Politics and Society</source>, <volume>1</volume>, (<year>1971</year>): <fpage>327</fpage>–<lpage>57</lpage></citation>. Immanuel Wallerstein has extended this theory to international relations as a whole in <italic>The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century</italic> (New York, 1974), and <italic>The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750</italic> (New York, 1980), For the influence of dependency theory on the writing of American diplomatic historians see <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Langley</surname><given-names>Lester D.</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>Fire Down Below: A Review Essay on the Central American Crisis</article-title>,”<source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>9</volume>, (<year>1985</year>): <fpage>161</fpage>–<lpage>67</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn39"><label>39</label><p>For a sampling of critiques of dependency theory see Packenham, <italic>Liberal America and the Third World</italic>, 353–58: Tony Smith, <italic>The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, and the late-industrializing world since 1815</italic> (Cambridge, England, 1981), 68–84; <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Ray</surname><given-names>David</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment: Three Basic Fallacies</article-title>,”<source>Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs</source>, <volume>15</volume>, (<year>1973</year>): <fpage>4</fpage>–<lpage>20</lpage></citation>; and on <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Wallerstein</surname></name><name><surname>Stem</surname><given-names>Steve J.</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean</article-title>,”<source>American Historical Review</source>, <volume>93</volume>, (<year>1988</year>): <fpage>829</fpage>–<lpage>72</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn40"><label>40</label><p>Consider the following book titles: <italic>The Rising American Empire</italic> and <italic>Empire and Independence</italic> (Richard Van Alstyne), <italic>Imperial Democracy</italic> (Ernest R. May), <italic>Empire on the Pacific</italic> (Norman Graebner), <italic>The Roots of the Modern American Empire</italic> and <italic>Empire as a Way of Life</italic> (William Appleman Williams), <italic>The New Empire</italic> (Walter LaFeber). <italic>Creation of the American Empire</italic> (LaFeber, Lloyd Gardner, and Thomas McCormick), and <italic>The Imperial Years</italic> (Alonzo L. Hamby).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn41"><label>41</label><p>See Marc Egnal, <italic>A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution</italic> (Ithaca, 1988); also the first paragraph of <italic>The Federalist</italic>, in which Hamilton writes of the debate over the Constitution “comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world.” See <italic>The Federolist</italic> (New York, n.d.), 3.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn42"><label>42</label><p>Doyle insists upon the distinction between “imperial” and “hegemonic” power, defining the former as involving the metropole's “political control over the internal and external policy—the effective sovereignty—of [a]…subordinate periphery,” while in the latter situation international inequality allows a state to control “much or all of the external, but little or none of the internal, policy of other states.” He acknowledges, though, that “the study of empires shares much ground with the study of international relations [which includes hegemons], both in method and in conception.” See <italic>Empires</italic>, 12–13.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn43"><label>43</label><p>Smith, <italic>The Pattern of Imperialism</italic> Philip Darby, <italic>Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American Approoches to Asia and Africo, 1870–1970</italic> (New Haven, 1987). See also Friedburg, <italic>The Weary Titan</italic>, for another example of how the British experience can be made relevant to that of the United States.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn44"><label>44</label><p>Doyle, <italic>Empires:</italic> Tucker and Hendrickson, <italic>The Fall of the First British Empire</italic>. The latter two authors note that “those familiar with the whole of the European imperial experience and the historiography that has emerged to account for this experience cannot fail to be struck by the existence of common explanatory categories across the whole field of modem empire, a fact that reflects the existence of common intellectual problems.” See <italic>The Fall of the First British Empire</italic>, 6.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn45"><label>45</label><p>James H. Hutson, <italic>John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution</italic> (Lexington. KY, 1980); Daniel G. Lang. <italic>Foreign Policy in the Early Republic: The Law of Notions and the Balance of Power</italic> (Baton Rouge, 1985). Gilbert's argument, of course, appears in <italic>To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy</italic> (Princeton, 1961).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn46"><label>46</label><p>One of the few attempts that I know of to consider whether “realism” continued to shape American foreign policy after the early national period is Alan Dowty, <italic>The Limits of American Isolation: The United States and the Crimeon War</italic> (New York, 1971). It is no accident that Dowty trained as a political scientist under Hans Morgenthau at the University of Chicago.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn47"><label>47</label><p>A few are beginning to think along these lines, among them Thomas R. Hietala, whose work is discussed below. See also <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Brauer</surname><given-names>Kinley</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>The Great American Desert Revisited: Recent Literature and Prospects for the Study of American Foreign Relations, 1815–61</article-title>. <source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>13</volume>, (<year>1989</year>): <fpage>395</fpage>–<lpage>417</lpage></citation>. One important effort to take seriously the phenomenon of mid-nineteenth-century realism is, of course, Norman A. Graebner's classic documentary collection, <italic>Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy</italic> (New York, 1964).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn48"><label>48</label><p>For a remarkable illustration of how shifting spatial and temporal perceptions can be linked to the conduct of diplomacy see Stephen Kem, <italic>The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918</italic> (Cambridge, MA, 1983).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn49"><label>49</label><p>See Egnal, <italic>A Mighty Empire</italic>. 6–15; Tucker and Hendrickson. <italic>The Fall of the First British Empire</italic>, 229–31; D. W. Meinig, <italic>The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History: Atlantic America. 1492–1800</italic> (New Haven, 1986), 381–83; and Esmond Wright, <italic>Franklin of Phitodelphia</italic> (Cambridge, MA, 1986), 173–83.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn50"><label>50</label><p>Thomas R. Hietala, <italic>Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America</italic> (Ithaca, 1985), esp. 8–9, 255–72. These arguments are by no means new, as George B. Forgie has pointed out in a critical review of Hietala's book, <citation citation-type="journal">“<article-title>Anxiety and Expansionism in the 1840s</article-title>. <source>Reviews in American History</source>, <volume>15</volume>, (<year>1987</year>): <fpage>38</fpage>–<lpage>43</lpage></citation>. But Hietala has, I think, brought them together in an impressively nonreductionist synthesis organized around the argument that security was by no means “free” in the 1840s or, by implication, at any other point in the so-called era of “free security.” The best-known countervailing argument is <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Vann Woodward</surname><given-names>C.</given-names></name></person-group>. <article-title>The Age of Reinterpretation</article-title>,”<source>American Historical Review</source>, <volume>66</volume>, (<year>1960</year>): <fpage>1</fpage>–<lpage>19</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn51"><label>51</label><p>Beisner. <italic>From the Old Diplomacy to the New</italic>. Beisner's use of “paradigms” is in turn drawn from Thomas S. Kuhn, <italic>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</italic>, 2d ed. (Chicago, 1970).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn52"><label>52</label><p>My own attempt to answer this last question appears in <italic>The Long Peace</italic>, 20–47.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn53"><label>53</label><p>Political scientists, drawing upon the field of cognitive social psychology, have begun to examine the nature of threat perception. See, in particular, Deborah Welch Larson, <italic>Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation</italic> (Princeton, 1985), esp. 24–65; and Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in <italic>Psychology and Deterrence</italic>, ed. Robert Jervis. Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore, 1985), 13–33.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn54"><label>54</label><p>See Kem, <italic>The Culture of Time and Space</italic>, 2.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn55"><label>55</label><p>Richard Ned Lebow has argued, on the basis of historical evidence, that the single most important consideration leading states to provoke confrontations with other states is the “expectation by policy-makers of a dramatic impending shift in the balance of power in an adversary's favor.” See <italic>Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis</italic> (Baltimore. 1981), 62. And John Mearsheimer has suggested, also on the basis of historical investigation, that conventional deterrence works best when the defenders can convince aggressors that they will not be able to achieve a quick and cheap victory. See <italic>Conventional Deterrence</italic> (Ithaca, 1983), 203–6.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn56"><label>56</label><p>Kennedy. <italic>The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers</italic>, 224–29. See also idem, <italic>The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914</italic> (London, 1980).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn57"><label>57</label><p>Waldo Heinrichs, <italic>Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II</italic> (New York, 1988). For interesting observations on how recent a phenomenon such “simultaneity” really is see Kern, <italic>The Culture of Time and Space</italic>, 67–81.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn58"><label>58</label><p>See Michael S. Sherry. <italic>Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941–1945</italic> (New Haven, 1977), 45–46; Alan K. Henrikson, “America's Changing Place in the World From ‘Periphery’ to ‘Center'” in <italic>Center and Periphery: Spatial Variation in Politics</italic>, ed. Jean Gottmann (Beverly Hills, 1980), 73–100, also Gaddis, <italic>The Long Peace</italic>, 21–29.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn59"><label>59</label><p>The two strategies are compared in Gaddis, <italic>Strategies of Containment</italic>, 89–109, 127–63; but see also McGeorge Bundy, <italic>Danger and Survival: Choices aboui the Bomb in the First Fifty Years</italic> (New York, 1988), 291.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn60"><label>60</label><p>For an excellent brief statement of how comparative history differs from narrative history see Skocpol, <italic>States and Social Revolutions</italic>, xiv.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn61"><label>61</label><p>The best brief discussion of international systems and how their characteristics differ from those of the states that make them up is in Waltz, <italic>Theory of International Politics</italic>, 79–101.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn62"><label>62</label><p>Kennedy. <italic>The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers</italic>, esp. 514–35. For the reception of Kennedy's book and its place within the framework of what has now come to be known as the “decline” school see Peter Schmeisser. “Taking Stock: Is America in Decline?”<italic>New York Times Magazine</italic>. 17 April 1988.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn63"><label>63</label><p>James Chace and Caleb Carr have recently come close with their <italic>America Invulnerable: The Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 10 Star Wars</italic> (New York, 1988), but the book lacks the comparative perspective that would help to explain how—if at all—American thinking about national security differed from hat of other countries, or the extent to which international systemic influences shaped it.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn64"><label>64</label><p>Craig and George, <italic>Force and Statecraft</italic>. 3–131, provide a conferment overview of how the international system has evolved since the seventeenth century.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn65"><label>65</label><p>The author of a classic work on isolationism. Selig Adler, long ago took a stand on this issue: American isolationism. he suggested, was like glaciation, in that it could exist only under certain specific and relatively infrequent climatic conditions. See <italic>The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction</italic> brew York, 1957), 471.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn66"><label>66</label><p>Waltz, <italic>Theory of International Politics</italic>. 134–38, 163–70; Hans J. Morgenthau, <italic>Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace</italic>, 5th ed. (New York, 1973), 167–221; Charles P. Kindleberger, <italic>The World in Depression, 1929–1939</italic> (Berkeley, 1973), 291–308; Robert Gilpin, <italic>War and Change in World Politics</italic> (New York, 1981), 144–54; and idem, <italic>The Political Economy of International Relations</italic> (Princeton, 1987), 72–80.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn67"><label>67</label><p>For an excellent brief introduction to the literature, especially written for diplomatic historians, see <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Holsti</surname><given-names>Ole R.</given-names></name></person-group>. <article-title>Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy</article-title>,”<source>Diplomatic History</source>, <volume>13</volume>, (<year>1989</year>): <fpage>15</fpage>–<lpage>43</lpage></citation>. Another helpful guide is Patrick M. Morgan, <italic>Theories and Approaches to International Relations: What Are We to Think?</italic>, 4th ed. (New Brunswick, 1987).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn68"><label>68</label><p>For the origins see, among others, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., <italic>The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941–1966</italic> (New York, 1967); Ernest R. May, <italic>”Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy</italic> (New York. 1973), esp. 80–86; also Patrick M. Morgan, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, eds., <italic>Psychology and Deterrence</italic>, 125–52.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn69"><label>69</label><p>”Your empire is now like a tyranny,” Thucydides has Pericles telling the Athenians in 427 B.C.: “It may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.” See <italic>The Peloponnesian War</italic>, trans. Rex Warner (Baltimore, 1954), 161. See also, on “domino” thinking among the seventeenth-century Spanish Hapsburgs, Kennedy, <italic>The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers</italic>, 51. “Myths of Empire,” an important but as yet unpublished manuscript by the political scientist Jack Snyder, compares domino thinking in Great Britain, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States at various points in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn70"><label>70</label><p>Stephen M. Walt, <italic>The Origins of Allionces</italic> (Ithaca, 1987).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn71"><label>71</label><p>See Robert Axelrod, <italic>The Evolution of Cooperation</italic> (New York, 1984); Kenneth A. Oye, ed., <italic>Cooperation under Anarchy</italic> (Princeton, 1986); and for a clear summary of this work—despite the accompanying mathematical formulas—Michael Nicolson, <italic>Formal Theories in International Relations</italic> (Cambridge, England, 1989), 26–51.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn72"><label>72</label><p>A decided weakness of my own effort to explain his phenomena in <italic>The Long Peace</italic> is the failure to draw on his literature; his does, however, illustrate all too clearly my point about disciplinary parochialism.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn73"><label>73</label><p>A new and very interesting book by the political scientist John Mueller, <italic>Retreat from Doomday: The Obsolescence of Major War</italic> (New York, 1989), suggests that it has been minimal, that wars between great powers are becoming obsolete quite apart from any influence that nuclear weapons may have had on that process.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn74"><label>74</label><p>For more on this admittedly arcane concept see John Lewis Gaddir. “Great Illusions, the Long Peace, and the Future of the International System,” in <italic>The Long Postwar Peace: The Sources of Great Power Stability</italic>, ed. Charles W. Kegley (forthcoming).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn75"><label>75</label><p>A most elegant interdisciplinary “bump” in this direction, is Stephen Jay Gould, <italic>Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time</italic> (Cambridge, MA, 1987). The term “complementarity” is Niels Bohr's. See Richard modes, <italic>The Making of the Atomic Bomb</italic> (New York. 1986), 131–32. For an intriguing application of this idea to the world of contemporary affairs see Strobe Talbott, <italic>The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace</italic> (New York. 1988). esp. 35–36.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn76"><label>76</label><p>For a particularly convincing essay illustrating the importance of looking at history in this way see <citation citation-type="journal"><person-group person-group-type="author"><name><surname>Gagnon</surname><given-names>Paul</given-names></name></person-group>, “<article-title>Why Study History?</article-title> <source>Atlantic Monthly</source>, <volume>262</volume>, (<year>1988</year>): <fpage>43</fpage>–<lpage>66</lpage></citation>.</p></fn>
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</istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">John Lewis</namePart><namePart type="family">Gaddis</namePart><affiliation>JOHN LEWIS GADDIS is Distinguished Professor of History and director of the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University. A graduate of the University of Texas, where he studied with Robert Divine, his books include The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (1972), Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States (1978), Strategies of Containment (1982), and, most recently, The Long Peace (1987).</affiliation></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1990-07</dateIssued><dateCreated encoding="w3cdtf">2007-06-01</dateCreated><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">1990</copyrightDate></originInfo><note type="footnotes">This article was originally prepared for delivery at the annual convention of the American Historical Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, 28 December 1988. Robert Beisner, Michael Hunt, Paul Kennedy, and Thomas McComick have provided helpful comments, for which the author is most grateful. He would also like to thank the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and the Department of History at Northwestern University for providing opportunities to discuss some of these ideas, as well as his seminar students in the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University and the Politics Department at Princeton University, who have contributed much to what is contained here without, of course, bearing responsibility for the form he has given it.</note><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Diplomatic History</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>Diplomatic History</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0145-2096</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1467-7709</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">dh</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID-hwp">dh</identifier><part><date>1990</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>14</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>3</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>405</start><end>424</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">9D8C6AAF362A94FE65573DC2F919E083DF65BE8F</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00098.x</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-GTWS0RDP-M">oup</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>© The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/9D8C6AAF362A94FE65573DC2F919E083DF65BE8F/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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