Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis
Identifieur interne : 000A76 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000A75; suivant : 000A77Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis
Auteurs : Barton L. Lipman [États-Unis]Source :
- Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control [ 0165-1889 ] ; 1990.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Cauchy sequence, Complete information, Contradictory influences, Convex combination, David kreps, Delay entry, Deterrence, Dynamic limit pricing, Economic theory, Entrant, Entry, Entry date, Entry decisions, Entry deterrence, Entry times, Equilibrium, Equilibrium strategies, Exponential distribution, Externality, Federal trade commission, Greater incentive, Hazard rate, Incomplete information, Incumbent, Incumbent preys, Incumbent shares, Interesting values, John roberts, Kreps, Last restriction, Limit pricing, Lipman, Lipmun, Mass points, Maynard smith, Milgrom, Next section, Nondecreasing, Optimal value function, Other entrants, Other factors, Payoff, Potential entrant, Potential entrants, Predation, Prey, Pure strategies, Pure strategy, Robert wilson, Sequential equilibria, Sequential equilibrium, Single market, Surprising ambiguities, Theoretical biology, Unique equilibrium.
Abstract
Abstract: Few models in the entry literature consider interaction among potential entrants or how the incumbent can exploit this interaction. I present a predation model in which incomplete information about the incumbent gives each entrant an incentive to enter after others in order to observe what happens to them upon entry. The incumbent can exploit this incentive to delay entry. Thus the model leads to endogenous delayed entry, rather than entry deterrence only. The interaction of the entrants leads to surprising ambiguities. For example, lowering the incumbent's payoff to predation for all types can increase the probability of predation, slowing entry.
Url:
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-I
Affiliations:
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Le document en format XML
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I present a predation model in which incomplete information about the incumbent gives each entrant an incentive to enter after others in order to observe what happens to them upon entry. The incumbent can exploit this incentive to delay entry. Thus the model leads to endogenous delayed entry, rather than entry deterrence only. The interaction of the entrants leads to surprising ambiguities. For example, lowering the incumbent's payoff to predation for all types can increase the probability of predation, slowing entry.</div></front></TEI><affiliations><list><country><li>États-Unis</li></country><region><li>Pennsylvanie</li></region><settlement><li>Pittsburgh</li></settlement><orgName><li>Université Carnegie-Mellon</li></orgName></list><tree><country name="États-Unis"><region name="Pennsylvanie"><name sortKey="Lipman, Barton L" sort="Lipman, Barton L" uniqKey="Lipman B" first="Barton L." last="Lipman">Barton L. 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