Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis
Identifieur interne : 000963 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000962; suivant : 000964Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis
Auteurs : Barton L. LipmanSource :
- Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control [ 0165-1889 ] ; 1990.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Cauchy sequence, Complete information, Contradictory influences, Convex combination, David kreps, Delay entry, Deterrence, Dynamic limit pricing, Economic theory, Entrant, Entry, Entry date, Entry decisions, Entry deterrence, Entry times, Equilibrium, Equilibrium strategies, Exponential distribution, Externality, Federal trade commission, Greater incentive, Hazard rate, Incomplete information, Incumbent, Incumbent preys, Incumbent shares, Interesting values, John roberts, Kreps, Last restriction, Limit pricing, Lipman, Lipmun, Mass points, Maynard smith, Milgrom, Next section, Nondecreasing, Optimal value function, Other entrants, Other factors, Payoff, Potential entrant, Potential entrants, Predation, Prey, Pure strategies, Pure strategy, Robert wilson, Sequential equilibria, Sequential equilibrium, Single market, Surprising ambiguities, Theoretical biology, Unique equilibrium.
Abstract
Abstract: Few models in the entry literature consider interaction among potential entrants or how the incumbent can exploit this interaction. I present a predation model in which incomplete information about the incumbent gives each entrant an incentive to enter after others in order to observe what happens to them upon entry. The incumbent can exploit this incentive to delay entry. Thus the model leads to endogenous delayed entry, rather than entry deterrence only. The interaction of the entrants leads to surprising ambiguities. For example, lowering the incumbent's payoff to predation for all types can increase the probability of predation, slowing entry.
Url:
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-I
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:180DA1C8414E38ABD8754E0B255846A780EDCE04Le document en format XML
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Lipman</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">DYNCON</title><idno type="ISSN">0165-1889</idno><imprint><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><date type="published" when="1990">1990</date><biblScope unit="volume">14</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3–4</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="685">685</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="708">708</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0165-1889</idno></series></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0165-1889</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="Teeft" xml:lang="en"><term>Cauchy sequence</term><term>Complete information</term><term>Contradictory influences</term><term>Convex combination</term><term>David kreps</term><term>Delay entry</term><term>Deterrence</term><term>Dynamic limit pricing</term><term>Economic theory</term><term>Entrant</term><term>Entry</term><term>Entry date</term><term>Entry decisions</term><term>Entry deterrence</term><term>Entry times</term><term>Equilibrium</term><term>Equilibrium strategies</term><term>Exponential distribution</term><term>Externality</term><term>Federal trade commission</term><term>Greater incentive</term><term>Hazard rate</term><term>Incomplete information</term><term>Incumbent</term><term>Incumbent preys</term><term>Incumbent shares</term><term>Interesting values</term><term>John roberts</term><term>Kreps</term><term>Last restriction</term><term>Limit pricing</term><term>Lipman</term><term>Lipmun</term><term>Mass points</term><term>Maynard smith</term><term>Milgrom</term><term>Next section</term><term>Nondecreasing</term><term>Optimal value function</term><term>Other entrants</term><term>Other factors</term><term>Payoff</term><term>Potential entrant</term><term>Potential entrants</term><term>Predation</term><term>Prey</term><term>Pure strategies</term><term>Pure strategy</term><term>Robert wilson</term><term>Sequential equilibria</term><term>Sequential equilibrium</term><term>Single market</term><term>Surprising ambiguities</term><term>Theoretical biology</term><term>Unique equilibrium</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Abstract: Few models in the entry literature consider interaction among potential entrants or how the incumbent can exploit this interaction. I present a predation model in which incomplete information about the incumbent gives each entrant an incentive to enter after others in order to observe what happens to them upon entry. The incumbent can exploit this incentive to delay entry. Thus the model leads to endogenous delayed entry, rather than entry deterrence only. The interaction of the entrants leads to surprising ambiguities. 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Lipman</name><affiliations><json:string>Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><arkIstex>ark:/67375/6H6-M96R7MSQ-R</arkIstex><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>Full-length article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>Abstract: Few models in the entry literature consider interaction among potential entrants or how the incumbent can exploit this interaction. I present a predation model in which incomplete information about the incumbent gives each entrant an incentive to enter after others in order to observe what happens to them upon entry. The incumbent can exploit this incentive to delay entry. Thus the model leads to endogenous delayed entry, rather than entry deterrence only. The interaction of the entrants leads to surprising ambiguities. For example, lowering the incumbent's payoff to predation for all types can increase the probability of predation, slowing entry.</abstract><qualityIndicators><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractWordCount>101</abstractWordCount><abstractCharCount>665</abstractCharCount><keywordCount>0</keywordCount><score>8.212</score><pdfWordCount>8502</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>48275</pdfCharCount><pdfVersion>1.2</pdfVersion><pdfPageCount>24</pdfPageCount><pdfPageSize>461 x 684 pts</pdfPageSize></qualityIndicators><title>Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis</title><pii><json:string>0165-1889(90)90038-I</json:string></pii><genre><json:string>research-article</json:string></genre><serie><title>Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation</title><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language></serie><host><title>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</title><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><publicationDate>1990</publicationDate><issn><json:string>0165-1889</json:string></issn><pii><json:string>S0165-1889(00)X0079-6</json:string></pii><volume>14</volume><issue>3–4</issue><pages><first>685</first><last>708</last></pages><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre></host><namedEntities><unitex><date><json:string>1988</json:string><json:string>1990</json:string></date><geogName></geogName><orgName></orgName><orgName_funder></orgName_funder><orgName_provider></orgName_provider><persName><json:string>L. 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I would like to thank Larry Blume, Severin Borenstein, Debra Holt, Ted Snyder, Hal Varian, two anonymous referees, and especially Mark Bagnoli for their suggestions and advice. 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I present a predation model in which incomplete information about the incumbent gives each entrant an incentive to enter after others in order to observe what happens to them upon entry. The incumbent can exploit this incentive to delay entry. Thus the model leads to endogenous delayed entry, rather than entry deterrence only. The interaction of the entrants leads to surprising ambiguities. For example, lowering the incumbent's payoff to predation for all types can increase the probability of predation, slowing entry.</p></abstract></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="1990">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/180DA1C8414E38ABD8754E0B255846A780EDCE04/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Elsevier, elements deleted: tail"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//ES//DTD journal article DTD version 4.5.2//EN//XML" URI="art452.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><converted-article version="4.5.2" docsubtype="fla"><item-info><jid>DYNCON</jid><aid>9090038I</aid><ce:pii>0165-1889(90)90038-I</ce:pii><ce:doi>10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-I</ce:doi><ce:copyright type="unknown" year="1990"></ce:copyright></item-info><head><ce:article-footnote><ce:label>☆</ce:label><ce:note-para>This paper is based on Chapter 2 of my dissertation. I would like to thank Larry Blume, Severin Borenstein, Debra Holt, Ted Snyder, Hal Varian, two anonymous referees, and especially Mark Bagnoli for their suggestions and advice. Of course, I alone am responsible for any errors.</ce:note-para></ce:article-footnote><ce:title>Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis</ce:title><ce:author-group><ce:author><ce:given-name>Barton L.</ce:given-name><ce:surname>Lipman</ce:surname></ce:author><ce:affiliation><ce:textfn>Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA</ce:textfn></ce:affiliation></ce:author-group><ce:abstract><ce:section-title>Abstract</ce:section-title><ce:abstract-sec><ce:simple-para>Few models in the entry literature consider interaction among potential entrants or how the incumbent can exploit this interaction. I present a predation model in which incomplete information about the incumbent gives each entrant an incentive to enter after others in order to observe what happens to them upon entry. The incumbent can exploit this incentive to delay entry. Thus the model leads to endogenous delayed entry, rather than entry deterrence only. The interaction of the entrants leads to surprising ambiguities. For example, lowering the incumbent's payoff to predation for all types can increase the probability of predation, slowing entry.</ce:simple-para></ce:abstract-sec></ce:abstract></head></converted-article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Barton L.</namePart><namePart type="family">Lipman</namePart><affiliation>Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="Full-length article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1990</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">1990</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><abstract lang="en">Abstract: Few models in the entry literature consider interaction among potential entrants or how the incumbent can exploit this interaction. I present a predation model in which incomplete information about the incumbent gives each entrant an incentive to enter after others in order to observe what happens to them upon entry. The incumbent can exploit this incentive to delay entry. Thus the model leads to endogenous delayed entry, rather than entry deterrence only. The interaction of the entrants leads to surprising ambiguities. For example, lowering the incumbent's payoff to predation for all types can increase the probability of predation, slowing entry.</abstract><note>This paper is based on Chapter 2 of my dissertation. I would like to thank Larry Blume, Severin Borenstein, Debra Holt, Ted Snyder, Hal Varian, two anonymous referees, and especially Mark Bagnoli for their suggestions and advice. 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