InforLorV4, PascalFrancis, Curation, bibRecord, 000874

DECIDING KNOWLEDGE IN SECURITY PROTOCOLS UNDER SOME E-VOTING THEORIES

Identifieur interne : 000874 ( PascalFrancis/Curation ); précédent : 000873; suivant : 000875

DECIDING KNOWLEDGE IN SECURITY PROTOCOLS UNDER SOME E-VOTING THEORIES

Auteurs : Mouhebeddine Berrima [Tunisie] ; Narjes Ben Rajeb [Tunisie] ; Véronique Cortier [France]

Source :

Informatique théorique et applications : (Imprimé) [ 0988-3754 ] ; 2011.

RBID : Pascal:11-0430408

Descripteurs français

Pascal (Inist)
- Informatique théorique, Connaissance, Méthode formelle, Vote, Primitif, Déduction, Temps polynomial, Modélisation, Décidabilité, Théorie équationnelle, Procédure décision, 68T15, Protocole sécurité, Théorie vote, Protocole cryptographique.
Wicri :
- topic : Vote.

English descriptors

KwdEn :
- Computer theory, Cryptographic protocol, Decidability, Deduction, Equational theory, Formal method, Knowledge, Modeling, Polynomial time, Primitive, Security protocol, Voting, Voting theory.

Abstract

In the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing security protocols. Security protocols require in particular to reason about the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are often considered in formal approaches: deducibility and indistinguishability relations. The first notion states whether an attacker can learn the value of a secret, while the latter states whether an attacker can notice some difference between protocol runs with different values of the secret. Several decision procedures have been developed so far for both notions but none of them can be applied in the context of e-voting protocols, which require dedicated cryptographic primitives. In this work, we show that both deduction and indistinguishability are decidable in polynomial time for two theories modeling the primitives of e-voting protocols.

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C03	`05`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Primitivo @5 20`
C03	`06`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Déduction @5 21`
C03	`06`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Deduction @5 21`
C03	`06`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Deducción @5 21`
C03	`07`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Temps polynomial @5 22`
C03	`07`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Polynomial time @5 22`
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C03	`09`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Decidibilidad @5 24`
C03	`10`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Théorie équationnelle @5 25`
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C03	`10`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Teoría ecuaciónal @5 25`
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C03	`13`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Protocole sécurité @4 CD @5 96`
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Serveur d'exploration sur la recherche en informatique en Lorraine

DECIDING KNOWLEDGE IN SECURITY PROTOCOLS UNDER SOME E-VOTING THEORIES

DECIDING KNOWLEDGE IN SECURITY PROTOCOLS UNDER SOME E-VOTING THEORIES

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