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Computationally sound symbolic secrecy in the presence of hash functions

Identifieur interne : 000401 ( PascalFrancis/Checkpoint ); précédent : 000400; suivant : 000402

Computationally sound symbolic secrecy in the presence of hash functions

Auteurs : Véronique Cortier [France] ; Steve Kremer [France] ; Ralf Kusters [Suisse] ; Bogdan Warinschi [France]

Source :

RBID : Pascal:07-0531787

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English descriptors

Abstract

The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cryptographic point of view, especially in presence of hash functions. In this paper we devise and motivate a more appropriate secrecy criterion which exactly captures a standard cryptographic notion of secrecy for protocols involving public-key enryption and hash functions: protocols that satisfy it are computationally secure while any violation of our criterion directly leads to an attack. Furthermore, we prove that our criterion is decidable via an NP decision procedure. Our results hold for standard security notions for encryption and hash functions modeled as random oracles.


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Pascal:07-0531787

Le document en format XML

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