Computationally sound symbolic secrecy in the presence of hash functions
Identifieur interne :
000382 ( PascalFrancis/Corpus );
précédent :
000381;
suivant :
000383
Computationally sound symbolic secrecy in the presence of hash functions
Auteurs : Véronique Cortier ;
Steve Kremer ;
Ralf Kusters ;
Bogdan WarinschiSource :
-
Lecture notes in computer science [ 0302-9743 ] ; 2006.
RBID : Pascal:07-0531787
Descripteurs français
- Pascal (Inist)
- Informatique théorique,
Hachage,
Cryptographie,
Protocole transmission,
Sécurité,
Décidabilité,
Prise décision,
Cryptage,
Secret,
Clé publique,
Oracle,
Fonction aléatoire,
Modélisation.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Computer theory,
Cryptography,
Decidability,
Decision making,
Encryption,
Hashing,
Modeling,
Oracle,
Public key,
Random function,
Safety,
Secrecy,
Transmission protocol.
Abstract
The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cryptographic point of view, especially in presence of hash functions. In this paper we devise and motivate a more appropriate secrecy criterion which exactly captures a standard cryptographic notion of secrecy for protocols involving public-key enryption and hash functions: protocols that satisfy it are computationally secure while any violation of our criterion directly leads to an attack. Furthermore, we prove that our criterion is decidable via an NP decision procedure. Our results hold for standard security notions for encryption and hash functions modeled as random oracles.
Notice en format standard (ISO 2709)
Pour connaître la documentation sur le format Inist Standard.
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| A11 | 01 | 1 | | @1 CORTIER (Véronique) |
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| A11 | 02 | 1 | | @1 KREMER (Steve) |
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| A11 | 03 | 1 | | @1 KUSTERS (Ralf) |
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| A11 | 04 | 1 | | @1 WARINSCHI (Bogdan) |
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| A12 | 01 | 1 | | @1 ARUN-KUMAR (S.) @9 ed. |
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| A12 | 02 | 1 | | @1 GARG (Naveen) @9 ed. |
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| A14 | 01 | | | @1 Loria, CNRS & INRIA project Cassis @3 FRA @Z 1 aut. |
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| A14 | 02 | | | @1 LSV, CNRS & ENS Cachan & INRIA project Secsi @3 FRA @Z 2 aut. |
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| A14 | 03 | | | @1 ETH Zurich @3 CHE @Z 3 aut. |
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| A26 | 01 | | | @0 3-540-49994-6 |
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| A44 | | | | @0 0000 @1 © 2007 INIST-CNRS. All rights reserved. |
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| A45 | | | | @0 16 ref. |
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| A47 | 01 | 1 | | @0 07-0531787 |
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| A60 | | | | @1 P @2 C |
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| A66 | 01 | | | @0 DEU |
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| C01 | 01 | | ENG | @0 The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cryptographic point of view, especially in presence of hash functions. In this paper we devise and motivate a more appropriate secrecy criterion which exactly captures a standard cryptographic notion of secrecy for protocols involving public-key enryption and hash functions: protocols that satisfy it are computationally secure while any violation of our criterion directly leads to an attack. Furthermore, we prove that our criterion is decidable via an NP decision procedure. Our results hold for standard security notions for encryption and hash functions modeled as random oracles. |
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|
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Format Inist (serveur)
| NO : | PASCAL 07-0531787 INIST |
|---|
| ET : | Computationally sound symbolic secrecy in the presence of hash functions |
|---|
| AU : | CORTIER (Véronique); KREMER (Steve); KUSTERS (Ralf); WARINSCHI (Bogdan); ARUN-KUMAR (S.); GARG (Naveen) |
|---|
| AF : | Loria, CNRS & INRIA project Cassis/France (1 aut.); LSV, CNRS & ENS Cachan & INRIA project Secsi/France (2 aut.); ETH Zurich/Suisse (3 aut.); Loria, Univerité Henri Poincaré & INRIA project Cassis/France (4 aut.) |
|---|
| DT : | Publication en série; Congrès; Niveau analytique |
|---|
| SO : | Lecture notes in computer science; ISSN 0302-9743; Allemagne; Da. 2006; Vol. 4337; Pp. 176-187; Bibl. 16 ref. |
|---|
| LA : | Anglais |
|---|
| EA : | The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cryptographic point of view, especially in presence of hash functions. In this paper we devise and motivate a more appropriate secrecy criterion which exactly captures a standard cryptographic notion of secrecy for protocols involving public-key enryption and hash functions: protocols that satisfy it are computationally secure while any violation of our criterion directly leads to an attack. Furthermore, we prove that our criterion is decidable via an NP decision procedure. Our results hold for standard security notions for encryption and hash functions modeled as random oracles. |
|---|
| CC : | 001D02B07C; 001D02A05 |
|---|
| FD : | Informatique théorique; Hachage; Cryptographie; Protocole transmission; Sécurité; Décidabilité; Prise décision; Cryptage; Secret; Clé publique; Oracle; Fonction aléatoire; Modélisation |
|---|
| ED : | Computer theory; Hashing; Cryptography; Transmission protocol; Safety; Decidability; Decision making; Encryption; Secrecy; Public key; Oracle; Random function; Modeling |
|---|
| SD : | Informática teórica; Hashing; Criptografía; Protocolo transmisión; Seguridad; Decidibilidad; Toma decision; Cifrado; Secreto; Llave pública; Función aleatoria; Modelización |
|---|
| LO : | INIST-16343.354000172801410180 |
|---|
| ID : | 07-0531787 |
|---|
Links to Exploration step
Pascal:07-0531787
Le document en format XML
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</keywords><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cryptographic point of view, especially in presence of hash functions. In this paper we devise and motivate a more appropriate secrecy criterion which exactly captures a standard cryptographic notion of secrecy for protocols involving public-key enryption and hash functions: protocols that satisfy it are computationally secure while any violation of our criterion directly leads to an attack. Furthermore, we prove that our criterion is decidable via an NP decision procedure. Our results hold for standard security notions for encryption and hash functions modeled as random oracles.</div>
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</fA11><fA11 i1="03" i2="1"><s1>KUSTERS (Ralf)</s1>
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</fA14><fA14 i1="03"><s1>ETH Zurich</s1>
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</fA14><fA14 i1="04"><s1>Loria, Univerité Henri Poincaré & INRIA project Cassis</s1>
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<s4>2006</s4>
</fA30><server><NO>PASCAL 07-0531787 INIST</NO>
<ET>Computationally sound symbolic secrecy in the presence of hash functions</ET>
<AU>CORTIER (Véronique); KREMER (Steve); KUSTERS (Ralf); WARINSCHI (Bogdan); ARUN-KUMAR (S.); GARG (Naveen)</AU>
<AF>Loria, CNRS & INRIA project Cassis/France (1 aut.); LSV, CNRS & ENS Cachan & INRIA project Secsi/France (2 aut.); ETH Zurich/Suisse (3 aut.); Loria, Univerité Henri Poincaré & INRIA project Cassis/France (4 aut.)</AF>
<DT>Publication en série; Congrès; Niveau analytique</DT>
<SO>Lecture notes in computer science; ISSN 0302-9743; Allemagne; Da. 2006; Vol. 4337; Pp. 176-187; Bibl. 16 ref.</SO>
<LA>Anglais</LA>
<EA>The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cryptographic point of view, especially in presence of hash functions. In this paper we devise and motivate a more appropriate secrecy criterion which exactly captures a standard cryptographic notion of secrecy for protocols involving public-key enryption and hash functions: protocols that satisfy it are computationally secure while any violation of our criterion directly leads to an attack. Furthermore, we prove that our criterion is decidable via an NP decision procedure. Our results hold for standard security notions for encryption and hash functions modeled as random oracles.</EA>
<CC>001D02B07C; 001D02A05</CC>
<FD>Informatique théorique; Hachage; Cryptographie; Protocole transmission; Sécurité; Décidabilité; Prise décision; Cryptage; Secret; Clé publique; Oracle; Fonction aléatoire; Modélisation</FD>
<ED>Computer theory; Hashing; Cryptography; Transmission protocol; Safety; Decidability; Decision making; Encryption; Secrecy; Public key; Oracle; Random function; Modeling</ED>
<SD>Informática teórica; Hashing; Criptografía; Protocolo transmisión; Seguridad; Decidibilidad; Toma decision; Cifrado; Secreto; Llave pública; Función aleatoria; Modelización</SD>
<LO>INIST-16343.354000172801410180</LO>
<ID>07-0531787</ID>
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