Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?
Identifieur interne : 001755 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 001754; suivant : 001756Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?
Auteurs : Andreas Hackethal [Allemagne] ; Reinhard H. Schmidt [Allemagne] ; Marcel Tyrell [Allemagne]Source :
- Corporate Governance: An International Review [ 0964-8410 ] ; 2005-05.
Descripteurs français
- Wicri :
- topic : Gouvernement d'entreprise.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
Abstract
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider‐controlled and stakeholder‐oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system, the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of big universal banks in governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market‐based system could be in the offing.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00434.x
Affiliations:
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Schmidt</name><name sortKey="Tyrell, Marcel" sort="Tyrell, Marcel" uniqKey="Tyrell M" first="Marcel" last="Tyrell">Marcel Tyrell</name><name sortKey="Tyrell, Marcel" sort="Tyrell, Marcel" uniqKey="Tyrell M" first="Marcel" last="Tyrell">Marcel Tyrell</name></country></tree></affiliations></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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