Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?
Identifieur interne : 001458 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001457; suivant : 001459Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?
Auteurs : Andreas Hackethal ; Reinhard H. Schmidt ; Marcel TyrellSource :
- Corporate Governance: An International Review [ 0964-8410 ] ; 2005-05.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
Abstract
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider‐controlled and stakeholder‐oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system, the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of big universal banks in governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market‐based system could be in the offing.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00434.x
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEFLe document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?</title><author><name sortKey="Hackethal, Andreas" sort="Hackethal, Andreas" uniqKey="Hackethal A" first="Andreas" last="Hackethal">Andreas Hackethal</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>1Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Schmidt, Reinhard H" sort="Schmidt, Reinhard H" uniqKey="Schmidt R" first="Reinhard H." last="Schmidt">Reinhard H. Schmidt</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>2Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Tyrell, Marcel" sort="Tyrell, Marcel" uniqKey="Tyrell M" first="Marcel" last="Tyrell">Marcel Tyrell</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>3Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: tyrell@finance.uni‐frankfurt.de</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF</idno><date when="2005" year="2005">2005</date><idno type="doi">10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00434.x</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">001458</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">001458</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?</title><author><name sortKey="Hackethal, Andreas" sort="Hackethal, Andreas" uniqKey="Hackethal A" first="Andreas" last="Hackethal">Andreas Hackethal</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>1Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Schmidt, Reinhard H" sort="Schmidt, Reinhard H" uniqKey="Schmidt R" first="Reinhard H." last="Schmidt">Reinhard H. Schmidt</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>2Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Tyrell, Marcel" sort="Tyrell, Marcel" uniqKey="Tyrell M" first="Marcel" last="Tyrell">Marcel Tyrell</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>3Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: tyrell@finance.uni‐frankfurt.de</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Corporate Governance: An International Review</title><idno type="ISSN">0964-8410</idno><idno type="eISSN">1467-8683</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd.</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2005-05">2005-05</date><biblScope unit="volume">13</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="397">397</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="407">407</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0964-8410</idno></series><idno type="istex">E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00434.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">CORG434</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0964-8410</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="KwdEn" xml:lang="en"><term>Corporate governance</term><term>banking system</term><term>board of directors</term><term>complementarity</term><term>co‐determination</term><term>financial system</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider‐controlled and stakeholder‐oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system, the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of big universal banks in governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market‐based system could be in the offing.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>wiley</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Andreas Hackethal</name><affiliations><json:string>1Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Reinhard H. Schmidt</name><affiliations><json:string>2Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Marcel Tyrell</name><affiliations><json:string>3Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</json:string><json:string>E-mail: tyrell@finance.uni‐frankfurt.de</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><subject><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>Corporate governance</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>banking system</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>co‐determination</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>board of directors</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>complementarity</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>financial system</value></json:item></subject><articleId><json:string>CORG434</json:string></articleId><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider‐controlled and stakeholder‐oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system, the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of big universal banks in governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market‐based system could be in the offing.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>6.712</score><pdfVersion>1.4</pdfVersion><pdfPageSize>595.278 x 782.365 pts</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractCharCount>667</abstractCharCount><pdfWordCount>5986</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>40057</pdfCharCount><pdfPageCount>11</pdfPageCount><abstractWordCount>101</abstractWordCount></qualityIndicators><title>Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?</title><refBibs><json:item><host><author></author><title>Aoki, M. (2001) Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>German Code of Corporate Governance (GCCG)</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J.E. Bethel</name></json:item><json:item><name>J.P. Liebeskind</name></json:item><json:item><name>T. Opler</name></json:item></author><host><volume>53</volume><pages><last>634</last><first>605</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Finance</title></host><title>Block Share Purchases and Corporate Governance</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>When No Law is Better than a Good Law</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>E. Böhmer</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. Becht</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>55</last><first>21</first></pages><author></author><title>The Control of Corporate Europe</title></host><title>Ownership and Voting Power in Germany</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (2001) Annual Report.</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>DAI (2001) DAI‐Factbook 2000, Frankfurt: Deutsches Aktieninstitut.</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name> </name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>58</last><first>43</first></pages><author></author><title>Monthly Report</title></host><title>Overall Financial Flows in 2003</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name> </name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>73</last><first>5</first></pages><author></author><title>Monthly Report</title></host><title>Report on the Stability of the German Financial System</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Dherment‐Ferere, I., Köke, J. and Renneboog, L. (2001) Corporate Monitoring by Blockholders in Europe: Empirical Evidence of Managerial Discipline in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 01–24. Centre for European Economic Research.</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>O. Ehrhardt</name></json:item><json:item><name>E. Nowak</name></json:item></author><host><volume>47</volume><pages><last>345</last><first>336</first></pages><issue>6</issue><author></author><title>Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG)</title></host><title>Die Durchsetzung von Corporate‐Governance‐Regeln</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. Faccio</name></json:item><json:item><name>L. Lang</name></json:item></author><host><volume>65</volume><pages><last>395</last><first>365</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Financial Economics</title></host><title>The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Corporate Control: A Comparison of Insider and Outsider Systems</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. Franks</name></json:item><json:item><name>C. Mayer</name></json:item><json:item><name>L. Renneboog</name></json:item></author><host><volume>10</volume><pages><last>248</last><first>209</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Financial Intermediation</title></host><title>Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. Frick</name></json:item><json:item><name>E. Lehmann</name></json:item></author><host><author></author><title>Corporate Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison</title></host><title>Corporate Governance in Germany: Ownership, Codetermination and Firm Performance in a Stakeholder Economy</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>German Corporate Governance Code (2002) Düsseldorf, 26.02.2002.</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Government Commission on Corporate Governance (2001) Report.</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Corporate Governance‐Grundsätze (“Code of Best Practice”) für börsennotierte Gesellschaften</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Hackethal, A. and Schmidt, R.H. (2000) Komplementarität und Finanzsystem, Kredit und Kapital, Beiheft 15 “Neue finanzielle Arrangements: Märkte im Umbruch”.</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. Hackethal</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>105</last><first>71</first></pages><author></author><title>The German Financial System</title></host><title>German Banks and Banking Structure</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Financing Patterns: Measurement Concepts and Empirical Results</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Hirschman, A. O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>An Emerging Market for Corporate Control?</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>G Jackson</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. Höpner</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. Kurdelbusch</name></json:item></author><host><author></author><title>Corporate Governance and Labour Management</title></host><title>Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>T. Jenkinson</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. Ljungqvist</name></json:item></author><host><volume>7</volume><pages><last>446</last><first>397</first></pages><issue>4</issue><author></author><title>Journal of Corporate Finance</title></host><title>The Role of Hostile Stakes in German Corporate Control</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Köke, J. (2001) Control Transfers in Corporate Germany: Their Frequency, Causes, and Consequences. Working Paper. Centre for European Economic Research.</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Mitbestimmung und neue Unternehmenskulturen – Bilanz und Perspektiven</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Krahnen, J. P. and Schmidt, R. H. (eds) (2004) The German Financial System. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Kübler, F. (1998) Gesellschaftsrecht, 5th edn. Heidelberg: Müller.</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. La Porta</name></json:item><json:item><name>F. Lopez‐de‐Silanes</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. Sheifer</name></json:item><json:item><name>R. W. Vishny</name></json:item></author><host><volume>106</volume><pages><last>1155</last><first>1113</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Political Economy</title></host><title>Law and Finance</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Corporate Governance-Systeme: Funktion und Entwicklung am Beispiel von Deutschland und Großbritannien</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>E. Nowak</name></json:item></author><host><volume>14</volume><pages><last>21</last><first>8</first></pages><issue>3</issue><author></author><title>Journal of Applied Corporate Finance</title></host><title>Recent Developments in German Capital Markets and Corporate Governance</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>E. Nowak</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>449</last><first>425</first></pages><author></author><title>The German Financial System</title></host><title>Investor Protection and Capital Regulation in Germany</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>O. Rieckers</name></json:item><json:item><name>G. Spindler</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>385</last><first>350</first></pages><author></author><title>The German Financial System</title></host><title>Corporate Governance: Legal Aspects</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. H. Schmidt</name></json:item></author><host><volume>47</volume><pages><last>87</last><first>61</first></pages><author></author><title>Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung</title></host><title>Kontinuität und Wandel bei der Corporate Governance in Deutschland</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. H. Schmidt</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>424</last><first>386</first></pages><author></author><title>The German Financial System</title></host><title>Corporate Governance in Germany</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. H. Schmidt</name></json:item><json:item><name>S. Grohs</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>188</last><first>145</first></pages><author></author><title>Systembildung und Systemlücken in Kerngebieten des Europäischen Privatrechts</title></host><title>Angleichung der Unternehmensverfassung in Europa – ein Forschungsprogramm</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. H. Schmidt</name></json:item><json:item><name>G. Spindler</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>555</last><first>515</first></pages><author></author><title>Wirtschafts‐ und Medienrecht in der offenen Demokratie, Freundesgabe für Friedrich Kübler</title></host><title>Shareholder‐Value zwischen Ökonomie und Recht</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. H. Schmidt</name></json:item><json:item><name>G. Spindler</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>127</last><first>114</first></pages><author></author><title>Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance Systems</title></host><title>Path Dependence, Corporate Governance and Complementarity</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. H. Schmidt</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. Hackethal</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. Tyrell</name></json:item></author><host><volume>8</volume><pages><last>67</last><first>36</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Financial Intermediation</title></host><title>Disintermediation and the Role of Banks in Europe: An International Comparison</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Schneper, W. and Guillen, M. (2002) Stakeholder Rights and Corporate Governance: A Cross‐National Study of Hostile Takeovers. Working Paper. The Wharton School.</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>E. Theissen</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>162</last><first>139</first></pages><author></author><title>The German Financial System</title></host><title>Organized Equity Markets</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Changes in Germany's Bank‐Based Financial System: A Varieties of Capitalism Perspective</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Corporate Governance: The Battle of the Systems</title></host></json:item></refBibs><genre><json:string>article</json:string></genre><host><volume>13</volume><publisherId><json:string>CORG</json:string></publisherId><pages><total>11</total><last>407</last><first>397</first></pages><issn><json:string>0964-8410</json:string></issn><issue>3</issue><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><eissn><json:string>1467-8683</json:string></eissn><title>Corporate Governance: An International Review</title><doi><json:string>10.1111/(ISSN)1467-8683</json:string></doi></host><categories><wos><json:string>social science</json:string><json:string>management</json:string><json:string>business, finance</json:string><json:string>business</json:string></wos><scienceMetrix></scienceMetrix></categories><publicationDate>2005</publicationDate><copyrightDate>2005</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00434.x</json:string></doi><id>E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF</id><score>0.028070036</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?</title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd.</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><availability><p>WILEY</p></availability><date>2005</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?</title><author xml:id="author-1"><persName><forename type="first">Andreas</forename><surname>Hackethal</surname></persName><affiliation>1Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-2"><persName><forename type="first">Reinhard H.</forename><surname>Schmidt</surname></persName><affiliation>2Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-3"><persName><forename type="first">Marcel</forename><surname>Tyrell</surname></persName><email>tyrell@finance.uni‐frankfurt.de</email><affiliation>3Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Corporate Governance: An International Review</title><idno type="pISSN">0964-8410</idno><idno type="eISSN">1467-8683</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1467-8683</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd.</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2005-05"></date><biblScope unit="volume">13</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="397">397</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="407">407</biblScope></imprint></monogr><idno type="istex">E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00434.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">CORG434</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2005</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider‐controlled and stakeholder‐oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system, the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of big universal banks in governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market‐based system could be in the offing.</p></abstract><textClass xml:lang="en"><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>keywords</head><item><term>Corporate governance</term></item><item><term>banking system</term></item><item><term>co‐determination</term></item><item><term>board of directors</term></item><item><term>complementarity</term></item><item><term>financial system</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2005-05">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component version="2.0" type="serialArticle" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><publisherInfo><publisherName>Blackwell Publishing Ltd.</publisherName><publisherLoc>Oxford, UK</publisherLoc></publisherInfo><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1111/(ISSN)1467-8683</doi><issn type="print">0964-8410</issn><issn type="electronic">1467-8683</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="CORG"></id><id type="publisherDivision" value="ST"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title type="main" sort="CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW">Corporate Governance: An International Review</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="05003"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/corg.2005.13.issue-3</doi><numberingGroup><numbering type="journalVolume" number="13">13</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue" number="3">3</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2005-05">May 2005</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" type="article" position="6" status="forIssue"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00434.x</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="CORG434"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count type="pageTotal" number="11"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="tocHeading1">ORIGINAL ARTICLES</title></titleGroup><eventGroup><event type="firstOnline" date="2005-05-19"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2005-05-19"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:BPG_TO_WML3G version:2.3.2 mode:FullText source:HeaderRef result:HeaderRef" date="2010-03-09"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:3.8.8" date="2014-01-16"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.1.7 mode:FullText,remove_FC" date="2014-10-17"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst" number="397">397</numbering><numbering type="pageLast" number="407">407</numbering></numberingGroup><correspondenceTo> *Mertonstr. 17, D‐60487 Frankfurt/Main, Germany. Tel: 0049‐69‐798‐28269; Fax: 0049‐69‐798‐28272; E‐mail: <email normalForm="tyrell@finance.uni-frankfurt.de">tyrell@finance.uni‐frankfurt.de</email></correspondenceTo><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:CORG.CORG434.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="6"></count><count type="tableTotal" number="2"></count><count type="formulaTotal" number="0"></count><count type="referenceTotal" number="38"></count><count type="wordTotal" number="6422"></count><count type="linksPubMed" number="0"></count><count type="linksCrossRef" number="0"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main">Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?</title><title type="shortAuthors">ANDREAS HACKETHAL, REINHARD H. SCHMIDT & MARCEL TYRELL</title><title type="short">BANKS AND GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE</title></titleGroup><creators><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr1" affiliationRef="#a1"><personName><givenNames>Andreas</givenNames><familyName>Hackethal</familyName></personName></creator><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr2" affiliationRef="#a2"><personName><givenNames>Reinhard H.</givenNames><familyName>Schmidt</familyName></personName></creator><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr3" affiliationRef="#a3" corresponding="yes"><personName><givenNames>Marcel</givenNames><familyName>Tyrell</familyName></personName></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="a1" countryCode="DE"><unparsedAffiliation><sup>1</sup>Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation><affiliation xml:id="a2" countryCode="DE"><unparsedAffiliation><sup>2</sup>Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation><affiliation xml:id="a3" countryCode="DE"><unparsedAffiliation><sup>3</sup>Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation></affiliationGroup><keywordGroup xml:lang="en"><keyword xml:id="k1">Corporate governance</keyword><keyword xml:id="k2">banking system</keyword><keyword xml:id="k3">co‐determination</keyword><keyword xml:id="k4">board of directors</keyword><keyword xml:id="k5">complementarity</keyword><keyword xml:id="k6">financial system</keyword></keywordGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><p>The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider‐controlled and stakeholder‐oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system, the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of big universal banks in governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market‐based system could be in the offing.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated" lang="en"><title>BANKS AND GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Andreas</namePart><namePart type="family">Hackethal</namePart><affiliation>1Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Reinhard H.</namePart><namePart type="family">Schmidt</namePart><affiliation>2Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Marcel</namePart><namePart type="family">Tyrell</namePart><affiliation>3Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: tyrell@finance.uni‐frankfurt.de</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd.</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2005-05</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2005</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType><extent unit="figures">6</extent><extent unit="tables">2</extent><extent unit="references">38</extent><extent unit="words">6422</extent></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider‐controlled and stakeholder‐oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system, the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of big universal banks in governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market‐based system could be in the offing.</abstract><subject lang="en"><genre>keywords</genre><topic>Corporate governance</topic><topic>banking system</topic><topic>co‐determination</topic><topic>board of directors</topic><topic>complementarity</topic><topic>financial system</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Corporate Governance: An International Review</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0964-8410</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1467-8683</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1467-8683</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">CORG</identifier><part><date>2005</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>13</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>3</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>397</start><end>407</end><total>11</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00434.x</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">CORG434</identifier><recordInfo><recordContentSource>WILEY</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Blackwell Publishing Ltd.</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Rhénanie/explor/UnivTrevesV1/Data/Istex/Corpus
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 001458 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Istex/Corpus/biblio.hfd -nk 001458 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Wicri/Rhénanie
|area= UnivTrevesV1
|flux= Istex
|étape= Corpus
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:E8A2851D8F950567EEFB97D95C928F8FFD540FEF
|texte= Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market‐based system?
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.31. |  |