Proving Coercion-Resistance of Scantegrity II
Identifieur interne : 001B38 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001B37; suivant : 001B39Proving Coercion-Resistance of Scantegrity II
Auteurs : Ralf Küsters ; Tomasz Truderung ; Andreas VogtSource :
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science [ 0302-9743 ] ; 2010.
Abstract
Abstract: By now, many voting protocols have been proposed that, among others, are designed to achieve coercion-resistance, i.e., resistance to vote buying and voter coercion. Scantegrity II is among the most prominent and successful such protocols in that it has been used in several elections. However, almost none of the modern voting protocols used in practice, including Scantegrity II, has undergone a rigorous cryptographic analysis. In this paper, we prove that Scantegrity II enjoys an optimal level of coercion-resistance, i.e., the same level of coercion-resistance as an ideal voting protocol (which merely reveals the outcome of the election), except for so-called forced abstention attacks. This result is obtained under the (necessary) assumption that the workstation used in the protocol is honest. Our analysis is based on a rigorous cryptographic definition of coercionresistance we recently proposed. We argue that this definition is in fact the only existing cryptographic definition of coercion-resistance suitable for analyzing Scantegrity II. Our case study should encourage and facilitate rigorous cryptographic analysis of coercion-resistance also for other voting protocols used in practice.
Url:
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_20
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Scantegrity II is among the most prominent and successful such protocols in that it has been used in several elections. However, almost none of the modern voting protocols used in practice, including Scantegrity II, has undergone a rigorous cryptographic analysis. In this paper, we prove that Scantegrity II enjoys an optimal level of coercion-resistance, i.e., the same level of coercion-resistance as an ideal voting protocol (which merely reveals the outcome of the election), except for so-called forced abstention attacks. This result is obtained under the (necessary) assumption that the workstation used in the protocol is honest. Our analysis is based on a rigorous cryptographic definition of coercionresistance we recently proposed. We argue that this definition is in fact the only existing cryptographic definition of coercion-resistance suitable for analyzing Scantegrity II. Our case study should encourage and facilitate rigorous cryptographic analysis of coercion-resistance also for other voting protocols used in practice.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>springer</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Ralf Küsters</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Trier,</json:string><json:string>E-mail: kuesters@uni-trier.de</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Tomasz Truderung</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Trier,</json:string><json:string>E-mail: truderun@uni-trier.de</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Andreas Vogt</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Trier,</json:string><json:string>E-mail: vogt@uni-trier.de</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>OriginalPaper</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>Abstract: By now, many voting protocols have been proposed that, among others, are designed to achieve coercion-resistance, i.e., resistance to vote buying and voter coercion. Scantegrity II is among the most prominent and successful such protocols in that it has been used in several elections. However, almost none of the modern voting protocols used in practice, including Scantegrity II, has undergone a rigorous cryptographic analysis. In this paper, we prove that Scantegrity II enjoys an optimal level of coercion-resistance, i.e., the same level of coercion-resistance as an ideal voting protocol (which merely reveals the outcome of the election), except for so-called forced abstention attacks. This result is obtained under the (necessary) assumption that the workstation used in the protocol is honest. Our analysis is based on a rigorous cryptographic definition of coercionresistance we recently proposed. We argue that this definition is in fact the only existing cryptographic definition of coercion-resistance suitable for analyzing Scantegrity II. 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Kleinberg</name><affiliations><json:string>Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Friedemann Mattern</name><affiliations><json:string>ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>John C. Mitchell</name><affiliations><json:string>Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Moni Naor</name><affiliations><json:string>Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Oscar Nierstrasz</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>C. Pandu Rangan</name><affiliations><json:string>Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Bernhard Steffen</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Madhu Sudan</name><affiliations><json:string>Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Demetri Terzopoulos</name><affiliations><json:string>University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Doug Tygar</name><affiliations><json:string>University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Moshe Y. Vardi</name><affiliations><json:string>Rice University, Houston, TX, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Gerhard Weikum</name><affiliations><json:string>Max-Planck Institute of Computer Science, Saarbrücken, Germany</json:string></affiliations></json:item></editor><issn><json:string>0302-9743</json:string></issn><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><eissn><json:string>1611-3349</json:string></eissn><title>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</title><copyrightDate>2010</copyrightDate></serie><host><editor><json:item><name>Miguel Soriano</name><affiliations><json:string>Information Security Group, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Campus Nord, Jordi Girona 1-3, 08034, Barcelona, Spain</json:string><json:string>E-mail: soriano@entel.upc.edu</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Sihan Qing</name><affiliations><json:string>Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 100080, Beijing, China</json:string><json:string>E-mail: qsihan@ss.pku.edu.cn</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Javier López</name><affiliations><json:string>III-LIDI(Instituto de Investigación en Informática LIDI) School of Computer Sciences, National University of La Plata, La Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina</json:string><json:string>E-mail: jlm@lcc.uma.es</json:string></affiliations></json:item></editor><subject><json:item><value>Computer Science</value></json:item><json:item><value>Computer Science</value></json:item><json:item><value>Data Encryption</value></json:item><json:item><value>Data Structures, Cryptology and Information Theory</value></json:item><json:item><value>Coding and Information Theory</value></json:item><json:item><value>Systems and Data Security</value></json:item><json:item><value>Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity</value></json:item><json:item><value>Computer Communication Networks</value></json:item></subject><isbn><json:string>978-3-642-17649-4</json:string></isbn><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><eissn><json:string>1611-3349</json:string></eissn><title>Information and Communications Security</title><bookId><json:string>978-3-642-17650-0</json:string></bookId><volume>6476</volume><pages><last>295</last><first>281</first></pages><issn><json:string>0302-9743</json:string></issn><genre><json:string>book-series</json:string></genre><eisbn><json:string>978-3-642-17650-0</json:string></eisbn><copyrightDate>2010</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0</json:string></doi></host><publicationDate>2010</publicationDate><copyrightDate>2010</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_20</json:string></doi><id>FD2272056B312CF264B2C9CF883676CD43DA2AD6</id><score>1.2322444</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/FD2272056B312CF264B2C9CF883676CD43DA2AD6/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/FD2272056B312CF264B2C9CF883676CD43DA2AD6/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/FD2272056B312CF264B2C9CF883676CD43DA2AD6/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Proving Coercion-Resistance of Scantegrity II</title><respStmt><resp>Références bibliographiques récupérées via GROBID</resp><name resp="ISTEX-API">ISTEX-API (INIST-CNRS)</name></respStmt><respStmt><resp>Références bibliographiques récupérées via GROBID</resp><name resp="ISTEX-API">ISTEX-API (INIST-CNRS)</name></respStmt></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><pubPlace>Berlin, Heidelberg</pubPlace><availability><p>Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010</p></availability><date>2010</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Proving Coercion-Resistance of Scantegrity II</title><author xml:id="author-1"><persName><forename type="first">Ralf</forename><surname>Küsters</surname></persName><email>kuesters@uni-trier.de</email><affiliation>University of Trier,</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-2"><persName><forename type="first">Tomasz</forename><surname>Truderung</surname></persName><email>truderun@uni-trier.de</email><affiliation>University of Trier,</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-3"><persName><forename type="first">Andreas</forename><surname>Vogt</surname></persName><email>vogt@uni-trier.de</email><affiliation>University of Trier,</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="m">Information and Communications Security</title><title level="m" type="sub">12th International Conference, ICICS 2010, Barcelona, Spain, December 15-17, 2010. Proceedings</title><idno type="pISBN">978-3-642-17649-4</idno><idno type="eISBN">978-3-642-17650-0</idno><idno type="pISSN">0302-9743</idno><idno type="eISSN">1611-3349</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0</idno><idno type="book-ID">978-3-642-17650-0</idno><idno type="book-title-ID">215662</idno><idno type="book-sequence-number">6476</idno><idno type="book-volume-number">6476</idno><idno type="book-chapter-count">32</idno><editor><persName><forename type="first">Miguel</forename><surname>Soriano</surname></persName><email>soriano@entel.upc.edu</email><affiliation>Information Security Group, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Campus Nord, Jordi Girona 1-3, 08034, Barcelona, Spain</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Sihan</forename><surname>Qing</surname></persName><email>qsihan@ss.pku.edu.cn</email><affiliation>Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 100080, Beijing, China</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Javier</forename><surname>López</surname></persName><email>jlm@lcc.uma.es</email><affiliation>III-LIDI(Instituto de Investigación en Informática LIDI) School of Computer Sciences, National University of La Plata, La Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina</affiliation></editor><imprint><publisher>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><pubPlace>Berlin, Heidelberg</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2010"></date><biblScope unit="volume">6476</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="281">281</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="295">295</biblScope></imprint></monogr><series><title level="s">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</title><editor><persName><forename type="first">David</forename><surname>Hutchison</surname></persName><affiliation>Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Takeo</forename><surname>Kanade</surname></persName><affiliation>Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Josef</forename><surname>Kittler</surname></persName><affiliation>University of Surrey, Guildford, UK</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Jon</forename><forename type="first">M.</forename><surname>Kleinberg</surname></persName><affiliation>Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Friedemann</forename><surname>Mattern</surname></persName><affiliation>ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">John</forename><forename type="first">C.</forename><surname>Mitchell</surname></persName><affiliation>Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Moni</forename><surname>Naor</surname></persName><affiliation>Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Oscar</forename><surname>Nierstrasz</surname></persName><affiliation>University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">C.</forename><surname>Pandu Rangan</surname></persName><affiliation>Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Bernhard</forename><surname>Steffen</surname></persName><affiliation>University of Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Madhu</forename><surname>Sudan</surname></persName><affiliation>Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Demetri</forename><surname>Terzopoulos</surname></persName><affiliation>University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Doug</forename><surname>Tygar</surname></persName><affiliation>University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Moshe</forename><forename type="first">Y.</forename><surname>Vardi</surname></persName><affiliation>Rice University, Houston, TX, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Gerhard</forename><surname>Weikum</surname></persName><affiliation>Max-Planck Institute of Computer Science, Saarbrücken, Germany</affiliation></editor><biblScope><date>2010</date></biblScope><idno type="pISSN">0302-9743</idno><idno type="eISSN">1611-3349</idno><idno type="series-Id">558</idno></series><idno type="istex">FD2272056B312CF264B2C9CF883676CD43DA2AD6</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_20</idno><idno type="ChapterID">20</idno><idno type="ChapterID">Chap20</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2010</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Abstract: By now, many voting protocols have been proposed that, among others, are designed to achieve coercion-resistance, i.e., resistance to vote buying and voter coercion. Scantegrity II is among the most prominent and successful such protocols in that it has been used in several elections. However, almost none of the modern voting protocols used in practice, including Scantegrity II, has undergone a rigorous cryptographic analysis. In this paper, we prove that Scantegrity II enjoys an optimal level of coercion-resistance, i.e., the same level of coercion-resistance as an ideal voting protocol (which merely reveals the outcome of the election), except for so-called forced abstention attacks. This result is obtained under the (necessary) assumption that the workstation used in the protocol is honest. Our analysis is based on a rigorous cryptographic definition of coercionresistance we recently proposed. We argue that this definition is in fact the only existing cryptographic definition of coercion-resistance suitable for analyzing Scantegrity II. Our case study should encourage and facilitate rigorous cryptographic analysis of coercion-resistance also for other voting protocols used in practice.</p></abstract><textClass><keywords scheme="Book-Subject-Collection"><list><label>SUCO11645</label><item><term>Computer Science</term></item></list></keywords></textClass><textClass><keywords scheme="Book-Subject-Group"><list><label>I</label><label>I15033</label><label>I15009</label><label>I15041</label><label>I14050</label><label>I16021</label><label>I13022</label><item><term>Computer Science</term></item><item><term>Data Encryption</term></item><item><term>Data Structures, Cryptology and Information Theory</term></item><item><term>Coding and Information Theory</term></item><item><term>Systems and Data Security</term></item><item><term>Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity</term></item><item><term>Computer Communication Networks</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2010">Published</change><change xml:id="refBibs-istex" who="#ISTEX-API" when="2016-11-23">References added</change><change xml:id="refBibs-istex" who="#ISTEX-API" when="2017-01-21">References added</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/FD2272056B312CF264B2C9CF883676CD43DA2AD6/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Springer, Publisher found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//Springer-Verlag//DTD A++ V2.4//EN" URI="http://devel.springer.de/A++/V2.4/DTD/A++V2.4.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><Publisher><PublisherInfo><PublisherName>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</PublisherName><PublisherLocation>Berlin, Heidelberg</PublisherLocation></PublisherInfo><Series><SeriesInfo 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University</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Pittsburgh</City><State>PA</State><Country>USA</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff3"><OrgName>University of Surrey</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Guildford</City><Country>UK</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff4"><OrgName>Cornell University</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Ithaca</City><State>NY</State><Country>USA</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff5"><OrgName>ETH Zurich</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Zurich</City><Country>Switzerland</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff6"><OrgName>Stanford University</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Stanford</City><State>CA</State><Country>USA</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff7"><OrgName>Weizmann Institute of Science</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Rehovot</City><Country>Israel</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff8"><OrgName>University of Bern</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Bern</City><Country>Switzerland</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff9"><OrgName>Indian Institute of Technology</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Madras</City><Country>India</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff10"><OrgName>University of Dortmund</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Dortmund</City><Country>Germany</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff11"><OrgName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</OrgName><OrgAddress><State>MA</State><Country>USA</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff12"><OrgName>University of California</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Los Angeles</City><State>CA</State><Country>USA</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff13"><OrgName>University of California</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Berkeley</City><State>CA</State><Country>USA</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff14"><OrgName>Rice University</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Houston</City><State>TX</State><Country>USA</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff15"><OrgName>Max-Planck Institute of Computer Science</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Saarbrücken</City><Country>Germany</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation></EditorGroup></SeriesHeader><Book Language="En"><BookInfo BookProductType="Proceedings" ContainsESM="No" Language="En" MediaType="eBook" NumberingDepth="2" NumberingStyle="ContentOnly" OutputMedium="All" TocLevels="0"><BookID>978-3-642-17650-0</BookID><BookTitle>Information and Communications Security</BookTitle><BookSubTitle>12th International Conference, ICICS 2010, Barcelona, Spain, December 15-17, 2010. Proceedings</BookSubTitle><BookVolumeNumber>6476</BookVolumeNumber><BookSequenceNumber>6476</BookSequenceNumber><BookDOI>10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0</BookDOI><BookTitleID>215662</BookTitleID><BookPrintISBN>978-3-642-17649-4</BookPrintISBN><BookElectronicISBN>978-3-642-17650-0</BookElectronicISBN><BookChapterCount>32</BookChapterCount><BookCopyright><CopyrightHolderName>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</CopyrightHolderName><CopyrightYear>2010</CopyrightYear></BookCopyright><BookSubjectGroup><BookSubject Code="I" Type="Primary">Computer Science</BookSubject><BookSubject Code="I15033" Priority="1" Type="Secondary">Data Encryption</BookSubject><BookSubject Code="I15009" Priority="2" Type="Secondary">Data Structures, Cryptology and Information Theory</BookSubject><BookSubject Code="I15041" Priority="3" Type="Secondary">Coding and Information Theory</BookSubject><BookSubject Code="I14050" Priority="4" Type="Secondary">Systems and Data Security</BookSubject><BookSubject Code="I16021" Priority="5" Type="Secondary">Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity</BookSubject><BookSubject Code="I13022" Priority="6" Type="Secondary">Computer Communication Networks</BookSubject><SubjectCollection Code="SUCO11645">Computer Science</SubjectCollection></BookSubjectGroup><BookContext><SeriesID>558</SeriesID></BookContext></BookInfo><BookHeader><EditorGroup><Editor AffiliationIDS="Aff16"><EditorName DisplayOrder="Western"><GivenName>Miguel</GivenName><FamilyName>Soriano</FamilyName></EditorName><Contact><Email>soriano@entel.upc.edu</Email></Contact></Editor><Editor AffiliationIDS="Aff17"><EditorName DisplayOrder="Western"><GivenName>Sihan</GivenName><FamilyName>Qing</FamilyName></EditorName><Contact><Email>qsihan@ss.pku.edu.cn</Email></Contact></Editor><Editor AffiliationIDS="Aff18"><EditorName DisplayOrder="Western"><GivenName>Javier</GivenName><FamilyName>López</FamilyName></EditorName><Contact><Email>jlm@lcc.uma.es</Email></Contact></Editor><Affiliation ID="Aff16"><OrgDivision>Information Security Group</OrgDivision><OrgName>Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya</OrgName><OrgAddress><Street>Campus Nord, Jordi Girona 1-3</Street><Postcode>08034</Postcode><City>Barcelona</City><Country>Spain</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff17"><OrgDivision>Institute of Software</OrgDivision><OrgName>Chinese Academy of Sciences</OrgName><OrgAddress><Postcode>100080</Postcode><City>Beijing</City><Country>China</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff18"><OrgDivision>III-LIDI(Instituto de Investigación en Informática LIDI) School of Computer Sciences</OrgDivision><OrgName>National University of La Plata</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>La Plata</City><State>Buenos Aires</State><Country>Argentina</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation></EditorGroup></BookHeader><Part ID="Part8"><PartInfo TocLevels="0"><PartID>8</PartID><PartSequenceNumber>8</PartSequenceNumber><PartTitle>Session 2C. Anonymity and Privacy</PartTitle><PartChapterCount>4</PartChapterCount><PartContext><SeriesID>558</SeriesID><BookTitle>Information and Communications Security</BookTitle></PartContext></PartInfo><Chapter ID="Chap20" Language="En"><ChapterInfo ChapterType="OriginalPaper" ContainsESM="No" NumberingDepth="2" NumberingStyle="ContentOnly" TocLevels="0"><ChapterID>20</ChapterID><ChapterDOI>10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_20</ChapterDOI><ChapterSequenceNumber>20</ChapterSequenceNumber><ChapterTitle Language="En">Proving Coercion-Resistance of Scantegrity II</ChapterTitle><ChapterFirstPage>281</ChapterFirstPage><ChapterLastPage>295</ChapterLastPage><ChapterCopyright><CopyrightHolderName>Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg</CopyrightHolderName><CopyrightYear>2010</CopyrightYear></ChapterCopyright><ChapterGrants Type="Regular"><MetadataGrant Grant="OpenAccess"></MetadataGrant><AbstractGrant Grant="OpenAccess"></AbstractGrant><BodyPDFGrant Grant="Restricted"></BodyPDFGrant><BodyHTMLGrant Grant="Restricted"></BodyHTMLGrant><BibliographyGrant Grant="Restricted"></BibliographyGrant><ESMGrant Grant="Restricted"></ESMGrant></ChapterGrants><ChapterContext><SeriesID>558</SeriesID><PartID>8</PartID><BookID>978-3-642-17650-0</BookID><BookTitle>Information and Communications Security</BookTitle></ChapterContext></ChapterInfo><ChapterHeader><AuthorGroup><Author AffiliationIDS="Aff19"><AuthorName DisplayOrder="Western"><GivenName>Ralf</GivenName><FamilyName>Küsters</FamilyName></AuthorName><Contact><Email>kuesters@uni-trier.de</Email></Contact></Author><Author AffiliationIDS="Aff19"><AuthorName DisplayOrder="Western"><GivenName>Tomasz</GivenName><FamilyName>Truderung</FamilyName></AuthorName><Contact><Email>truderun@uni-trier.de</Email></Contact></Author><Author AffiliationIDS="Aff19"><AuthorName DisplayOrder="Western"><GivenName>Andreas</GivenName><FamilyName>Vogt</FamilyName></AuthorName><Contact><Email>vogt@uni-trier.de</Email></Contact></Author><Affiliation ID="Aff19"><OrgName>University of Trier</OrgName><OrgAddress><Country> </Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation></AuthorGroup><Abstract ID="Abs1" Language="En"><Heading>Abstract</Heading><Para>By now, many voting protocols have been proposed that, among others, are designed to achieve coercion-resistance, i.e., resistance to vote buying and voter coercion. Scantegrity II is among the most prominent and successful such protocols in that it has been used in several elections. However, almost none of the modern voting protocols used in practice, including Scantegrity II, has undergone a rigorous cryptographic analysis.</Para><Para>In this paper, we prove that Scantegrity II enjoys an optimal level of coercion-resistance, i.e., the same level of coercion-resistance as an ideal voting protocol (which merely reveals the outcome of the election), except for so-called forced abstention attacks. This result is obtained under the (necessary) assumption that the workstation used in the protocol is honest.</Para><Para>Our analysis is based on a rigorous cryptographic definition of coercionresistance we recently proposed. We argue that this definition is in fact the only existing cryptographic definition of coercion-resistance suitable for analyzing Scantegrity II. Our case study should encourage and facilitate rigorous cryptographic analysis of coercion-resistance also for other voting protocols used in practice.</Para></Abstract><ArticleNote Type="Misc"><SimplePara>This work was partially supported by the DFG under Grant KU 1434/6-1.</SimplePara></ArticleNote></ChapterHeader><NoBody></NoBody></Chapter></Part></Book></Series></Publisher></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Proving Coercion-Resistance of Scantegrity II</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Proving Coercion-Resistance of Scantegrity II</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Ralf</namePart><namePart type="family">Küsters</namePart><affiliation>University of Trier</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: kuesters@uni-trier.de</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Tomasz</namePart><namePart type="family">Truderung</namePart><affiliation>University of Trier</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: truderun@uni-trier.de</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Andreas</namePart><namePart type="family">Vogt</namePart><affiliation>University of Trier</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: vogt@uni-trier.de</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="conference" displayLabel="OriginalPaper"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Berlin, Heidelberg</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2010</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2010</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">Abstract: By now, many voting protocols have been proposed that, among others, are designed to achieve coercion-resistance, i.e., resistance to vote buying and voter coercion. Scantegrity II is among the most prominent and successful such protocols in that it has been used in several elections. However, almost none of the modern voting protocols used in practice, including Scantegrity II, has undergone a rigorous cryptographic analysis. In this paper, we prove that Scantegrity II enjoys an optimal level of coercion-resistance, i.e., the same level of coercion-resistance as an ideal voting protocol (which merely reveals the outcome of the election), except for so-called forced abstention attacks. This result is obtained under the (necessary) assumption that the workstation used in the protocol is honest. Our analysis is based on a rigorous cryptographic definition of coercionresistance we recently proposed. We argue that this definition is in fact the only existing cryptographic definition of coercion-resistance suitable for analyzing Scantegrity II. Our case study should encourage and facilitate rigorous cryptographic analysis of coercion-resistance also for other voting protocols used in practice.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Information and Communications Security</title><subTitle>12th International Conference, ICICS 2010, Barcelona, Spain, December 15-17, 2010. Proceedings</subTitle></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Miguel</namePart><namePart type="family">Soriano</namePart><affiliation>Information Security Group, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Campus Nord, Jordi Girona 1-3, 08034, Barcelona, Spain</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: soriano@entel.upc.edu</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Sihan</namePart><namePart type="family">Qing</namePart><affiliation>Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 100080, Beijing, China</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: qsihan@ss.pku.edu.cn</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Javier</namePart><namePart type="family">López</namePart><affiliation>III-LIDI(Instituto de Investigación en Informática LIDI) School of Computer Sciences, National University of La Plata, La Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: jlm@lcc.uma.es</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><genre type="book-series" displayLabel="Proceedings"></genre><originInfo><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2010</copyrightDate><issuance>monographic</issuance></originInfo><subject><genre>Book-Subject-Collection</genre><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="SUCO11645">Computer Science</topic></subject><subject><genre>Book-Subject-Group</genre><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I">Computer Science</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I15033">Data Encryption</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I15009">Data Structures, Cryptology and Information Theory</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I15041">Coding and Information Theory</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I14050">Systems and Data Security</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I16021">Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I13022">Computer Communication Networks</topic></subject><identifier type="DOI">10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0</identifier><identifier type="ISBN">978-3-642-17649-4</identifier><identifier type="eISBN">978-3-642-17650-0</identifier><identifier type="ISSN">0302-9743</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1611-3349</identifier><identifier type="BookTitleID">215662</identifier><identifier type="BookID">978-3-642-17650-0</identifier><identifier type="BookChapterCount">32</identifier><identifier type="BookVolumeNumber">6476</identifier><identifier type="BookSequenceNumber">6476</identifier><identifier type="PartChapterCount">4</identifier><part><date>2010</date><detail type="part"><title>Session 2C. 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|texte= Proving Coercion-Resistance of Scantegrity II
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.31. |  |