The Use of Performance Appraisal Systems: Evidence from Dutch Establishment Data
Identifieur interne : 001A46 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001A45; suivant : 001A47The Use of Performance Appraisal Systems: Evidence from Dutch Establishment Data
Auteurs : Uwe Jirjahn ; Erik PoutsmaSource :
- Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society [ 0019-8676 ] ; 2013-10.
Abstract
Using Dutch data, we examine the characteristics of establishments that operate performance appraisal systems. Our estimates provide a couple of interesting results: (1) Multitasking and teamwork play a role in the use of performance appraisal systems. (2) While a shared corporate culture, the sharing of information, and a professional personnel management emerge as positive determinants, unions appear to play a negative role. (3) Employers fostering career development and promotion opportunities make greater use of performance appraisal. (4) Public sector affiliation plays a negative role.
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DOI: 10.1111/irel.12036
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Our estimates provide a couple of interesting results: (1) Multitasking and teamwork play a role in the use of performance appraisal systems. (2) While a shared corporate culture, the sharing of information, and a professional personnel management emerge as positive determinants, unions appear to play a negative role. (3) Employers fostering career development and promotion opportunities make greater use of performance appraisal. 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Our estimates provide a couple of interesting results: (1) Multitasking and teamwork play a role in the use of performance appraisal systems. (2) While a shared corporate culture, the sharing of information, and a professional personnel management emerge as positive determinants, unions appear to play a negative role. (3) Employers fostering career development and promotion opportunities make greater use of performance appraisal. (4) Public sector affiliation plays a negative role.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>8.008</score><pdfVersion>1.7</pdfVersion><pdfPageSize>486.142 x 702.142 pts</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractCharCount>597</abstractCharCount><pdfWordCount>10270</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>68875</pdfCharCount><pdfPageCount>28</pdfPageCount><abstractWordCount>84</abstractWordCount></qualityIndicators><title>The Use of Performance Appraisal Systems: Evidence from Dutch Establishment Data</title><refBibs><json:item><author><json:item><name>John T. 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Ubbergen, the Netherlands: Tandem Felix.</title></host></json:item></refBibs><genre><json:string>article</json:string></genre><host><volume>52</volume><publisherId><json:string>IREL</json:string></publisherId><pages><total>28</total><last>828</last><first>801</first></pages><issn><json:string>0019-8676</json:string></issn><issue>4</issue><subject><json:item><value>J33</value></json:item><json:item><value>J50</value></json:item><json:item><value>M52</value></json:item><json:item><value>Article</value></json:item></subject><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><eissn><json:string>1468-232X</json:string></eissn><title>Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society</title><doi><json:string>10.1111/(ISSN)1468-232X</json:string></doi></host><categories><wos><json:string>social science</json:string><json:string>industrial relations & labor</json:string></wos><scienceMetrix><json:string>economic & social sciences</json:string><json:string>economics & business </json:string><json:string>industrial relations</json:string></scienceMetrix></categories><publicationDate>2013</publicationDate><copyrightDate>2013</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1111/irel.12036</json:string></doi><id>9E5A99F9D0D0212E477674AA3949A3A7176F3C8A</id><score>1.098397</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/9E5A99F9D0D0212E477674AA3949A3A7176F3C8A/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/9E5A99F9D0D0212E477674AA3949A3A7176F3C8A/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/9E5A99F9D0D0212E477674AA3949A3A7176F3C8A/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">The Use of Performance Appraisal Systems: Evidence from Dutch Establishment Data</title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><availability><p>Copyright © 2013 The Regents of the University of California.© 2013 Regents of the University of California</p></availability><date>2013-07-08</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">The Use of Performance Appraisal Systems: Evidence from Dutch Establishment Data</title><author xml:id="author-1"><persName><forename type="first">Uwe</forename><surname>Jirjahn</surname></persName><email>Jirjahn@uni-trier.de</email><affiliation>Department of Economics, University of Trier, Trier, Germany</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-2"><persName><forename type="first">Erik</forename><surname>Poutsma</surname></persName><email>e.poutsma@fm.ru.nl</email><affiliation>Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">Ind Relat</title><idno type="pISSN">0019-8676</idno><idno type="eISSN">1468-232X</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-232X</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><date type="published" when="2013-10"></date><biblScope unit="volume">52</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">4</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="801">801</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="828">828</biblScope></imprint></monogr><idno type="istex">9E5A99F9D0D0212E477674AA3949A3A7176F3C8A</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/irel.12036</idno><idno type="ArticleID">IREL12036</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2013-07-08</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract><p>Using Dutch data, we examine the characteristics of establishments that operate performance appraisal systems. Our estimates provide a couple of interesting results: (1) Multitasking and teamwork play a role in the use of performance appraisal systems. (2) While a shared corporate culture, the sharing of information, and a professional personnel management emerge as positive determinants, unions appear to play a negative role. (3) Employers fostering career development and promotion opportunities make greater use of performance appraisal. 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Our estimates provide a couple of interesting results: (1) Multitasking and teamwork play a role in the use of performance appraisal systems. (2) While a shared corporate culture, the sharing of information, and a professional personnel management emerge as positive determinants, unions appear to play a negative role. (3) Employers fostering career development and promotion opportunities make greater use of performance appraisal. (4) Public sector affiliation plays a negative role.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta><noteGroup xml:id="irel12036-ntgp-0101"><note numbered="no" xml:id="irel12036-note-0101"><p>We thank the GBIO for providing the data</p></note></noteGroup></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>The Use of Performance Appraisal Systems: Evidence from Dutch Establishment Data</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>The Use of Performance Appraisal Systems: Evidence from Dutch Establishment Data</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Uwe</namePart><namePart type="family">Jirjahn</namePart><affiliation>Department of Economics, University of Trier, Trier, Germany</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: Jirjahn@uni-trier.de</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Erik</namePart><namePart type="family">Poutsma</namePart><affiliation>Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: e.poutsma@fm.ru.nl</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2013-10</dateIssued><dateCreated encoding="w3cdtf">2013-07-08</dateCreated><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2013</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><abstract>Using Dutch data, we examine the characteristics of establishments that operate performance appraisal systems. 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