Risk distribution and bonding mechanisms in industrial marketing
Identifieur interne : 001658 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001657; suivant : 001659Risk distribution and bonding mechanisms in industrial marketing
Auteurs : Reinhard H. Schmidt ; Gerd R. WagnerSource :
- Journal of Business Research [ 0148-2963 ] ; 1985.
Abstract
This paper models the interactive process of planning, negotiating, selling, and putting into operation a highly complex technical object as a “precarious partnership.” The process consists of several steps or phases. Typically, the participants in such a process are in different relative positions of strength and especially information. For the weaker side, these differences usually bring about the danger of being exploited by the other side. If the interactive process consisted of isolated phases only, this danger could prevent the interaction. However, in the course of the entire process, the relative positions are repeatedly switched. This fact influences incentives, behavior, and expectations of both sides, which in return reduces the potential confilict over time, strengthens the mutual commitment, and limits the risks of cooperation to the extent that cooperation becomes possible and reasonable. Many procedural and institutional characteristics of the marketing of complex technical objects fit into this interpretation. The method of analysis used in this article could help to narrow the gap between marketing science and the economic analysis of market processes.
Url:
DOI: 10.1016/0148-2963(85)90022-0
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ISTEX:FA1C92D0EEE318B7127D4B561081F4B7D513B9F1Le document en format XML
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Schmidt</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>University of Trier, West Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Wagner, Gerd R" sort="Wagner, Gerd R" uniqKey="Wagner G" first="Gerd R." last="Wagner">Gerd R. Wagner</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>University of Essen, West Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Journal of Business Research</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">JBR</title><idno type="ISSN">0148-2963</idno><imprint><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><date type="published" when="1985">1985</date><biblScope unit="volume">13</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">5</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="421">421</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="433">433</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0148-2963</idno></series><idno type="istex">FA1C92D0EEE318B7127D4B561081F4B7D513B9F1</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1016/0148-2963(85)90022-0</idno><idno type="PII">0148-2963(85)90022-0</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0148-2963</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">This paper models the interactive process of planning, negotiating, selling, and putting into operation a highly complex technical object as a “precarious partnership.” The process consists of several steps or phases. Typically, the participants in such a process are in different relative positions of strength and especially information. For the weaker side, these differences usually bring about the danger of being exploited by the other side. If the interactive process consisted of isolated phases only, this danger could prevent the interaction. However, in the course of the entire process, the relative positions are repeatedly switched. This fact influences incentives, behavior, and expectations of both sides, which in return reduces the potential confilict over time, strengthens the mutual commitment, and limits the risks of cooperation to the extent that cooperation becomes possible and reasonable. Many procedural and institutional characteristics of the marketing of complex technical objects fit into this interpretation. The method of analysis used in this article could help to narrow the gap between marketing science and the economic analysis of market processes.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>elsevier</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Reinhard H. Schmidt</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Trier, West Germany</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Gerd R. Wagner</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Essen, West Germany</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>Full-length article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>This paper models the interactive process of planning, negotiating, selling, and putting into operation a highly complex technical object as a “precarious partnership.” The process consists of several steps or phases. Typically, the participants in such a process are in different relative positions of strength and especially information. For the weaker side, these differences usually bring about the danger of being exploited by the other side. If the interactive process consisted of isolated phases only, this danger could prevent the interaction. However, in the course of the entire process, the relative positions are repeatedly switched. This fact influences incentives, behavior, and expectations of both sides, which in return reduces the potential confilict over time, strengthens the mutual commitment, and limits the risks of cooperation to the extent that cooperation becomes possible and reasonable. Many procedural and institutional characteristics of the marketing of complex technical objects fit into this interpretation. 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Wagner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>4</volume><pages><last>133</last><first>124</first></pages><author></author><title>Marketing - Zeitschrift für Forschung und Praxis</title></host><title>Investitionsgütermarketing im Lichte der Beschaffungsentscheidungen der Abnehmer</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Industrial Marketing Strategy</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Organizational Buying Behavior</title></host></json:item></refBibs><genre><json:string>research-article</json:string></genre><host><volume>13</volume><pii><json:string>S0148-2963(00)X0120-8</json:string></pii><pages><last>433</last><first>421</first></pages><issn><json:string>0148-2963</json:string></issn><issue>5</issue><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><title>Journal of Business Research</title><publicationDate>1985</publicationDate></host><categories><wos><json:string>social science</json:string><json:string>business</json:string></wos><scienceMetrix><json:string>economic & social sciences</json:string><json:string>economics & business </json:string><json:string>marketing</json:string></scienceMetrix></categories><publicationDate>1985</publicationDate><copyrightDate>1985</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1016/0148-2963(85)90022-0</json:string></doi><id>FA1C92D0EEE318B7127D4B561081F4B7D513B9F1</id><score>1.4186437</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/FA1C92D0EEE318B7127D4B561081F4B7D513B9F1/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/FA1C92D0EEE318B7127D4B561081F4B7D513B9F1/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/FA1C92D0EEE318B7127D4B561081F4B7D513B9F1/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a">Risk distribution and bonding mechanisms in industrial marketing</title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><availability><p>ELSEVIER</p></availability><date>1985</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a">Risk distribution and bonding mechanisms in industrial marketing</title><author xml:id="author-1"><persName><forename type="first">Reinhard H.</forename><surname>Schmidt</surname></persName><affiliation>Address correspondence to Prof. Dr. Reinhard H. Schmidt, Universität of Trier, FB IV, Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Tarforst, D-55oo Trier, West Germany.</affiliation><affiliation>University of Trier, West Germany</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-2"><persName><forename type="first">Gerd R.</forename><surname>Wagner</surname></persName><affiliation>University of Essen, West Germany</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Journal of Business Research</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">JBR</title><idno type="pISSN">0148-2963</idno><idno type="PII">S0148-2963(00)X0120-8</idno><imprint><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><date type="published" when="1985"></date><biblScope unit="volume">13</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">5</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="421">421</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="433">433</biblScope></imprint></monogr><idno type="istex">FA1C92D0EEE318B7127D4B561081F4B7D513B9F1</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1016/0148-2963(85)90022-0</idno><idno type="PII">0148-2963(85)90022-0</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>1985</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>This paper models the interactive process of planning, negotiating, selling, and putting into operation a highly complex technical object as a “precarious partnership.” The process consists of several steps or phases. Typically, the participants in such a process are in different relative positions of strength and especially information. For the weaker side, these differences usually bring about the danger of being exploited by the other side. If the interactive process consisted of isolated phases only, this danger could prevent the interaction. However, in the course of the entire process, the relative positions are repeatedly switched. This fact influences incentives, behavior, and expectations of both sides, which in return reduces the potential confilict over time, strengthens the mutual commitment, and limits the risks of cooperation to the extent that cooperation becomes possible and reasonable. Many procedural and institutional characteristics of the marketing of complex technical objects fit into this interpretation. The method of analysis used in this article could help to narrow the gap between marketing science and the economic analysis of market processes.</p></abstract></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="1985">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/FA1C92D0EEE318B7127D4B561081F4B7D513B9F1/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Elsevier, elements deleted: tail"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//ES//DTD journal article DTD version 4.5.2//EN//XML" URI="art452.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><converted-article version="4.5.2" docsubtype="fla"><item-info><jid>JBR</jid><aid>85900220</aid><ce:pii>0148-2963(85)90022-0</ce:pii><ce:doi>10.1016/0148-2963(85)90022-0</ce:doi><ce:copyright type="unknown" year="1985"></ce:copyright></item-info><head><ce:title>Risk distribution and bonding mechanisms in industrial marketing</ce:title><ce:author-group><ce:author><ce:given-name>Reinhard H.</ce:given-name><ce:surname>Schmidt</ce:surname><ce:cross-ref refid="COR1"><ce:sup>∗</ce:sup></ce:cross-ref></ce:author><ce:affiliation><ce:textfn>University of Trier, West Germany</ce:textfn></ce:affiliation><ce:correspondence id="COR1"><ce:label>∗</ce:label><ce:text>Address correspondence to Prof. Dr. Reinhard H. Schmidt, Universität of Trier, FB IV, Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Tarforst, D-55oo Trier, West Germany.</ce:text></ce:correspondence></ce:author-group><ce:author-group><ce:author><ce:given-name>Gerd R.</ce:given-name><ce:surname>Wagner</ce:surname></ce:author><ce:affiliation><ce:textfn>University of Essen, West Germany</ce:textfn></ce:affiliation></ce:author-group><ce:abstract><ce:section-title>Abstract</ce:section-title><ce:abstract-sec><ce:simple-para>This paper models the interactive process of planning, negotiating, selling, and putting into operation a highly complex technical object as a “precarious partnership.” The process consists of several steps or phases. Typically, the participants in such a process are in different relative positions of strength and especially information. For the weaker side, these differences usually bring about the danger of being exploited by the other side. If the interactive process consisted of isolated phases only, this danger could prevent the interaction. However, in the course of the entire process, the relative positions are repeatedly switched. This fact influences incentives, behavior, and expectations of both sides, which in return reduces the potential confilict over time, strengthens the mutual commitment, and limits the risks of cooperation to the extent that cooperation becomes possible and reasonable. Many procedural and institutional characteristics of the marketing of complex technical objects fit into this interpretation. The method of analysis used in this article could help to narrow the gap between marketing science and the economic analysis of market processes.</ce:simple-para></ce:abstract-sec></ce:abstract></head></converted-article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>Risk distribution and bonding mechanisms in industrial marketing</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>Risk distribution and bonding mechanisms in industrial marketing</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Reinhard H.</namePart><namePart type="family">Schmidt</namePart><affiliation>University of Trier, West Germany</affiliation><description>Address correspondence to Prof. Dr. Reinhard H. Schmidt, Universität of Trier, FB IV, Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Tarforst, D-55oo Trier, West Germany.</description><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Gerd R.</namePart><namePart type="family">Wagner</namePart><affiliation>University of Essen, West Germany</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="Full-length article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1985</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">1985</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">This paper models the interactive process of planning, negotiating, selling, and putting into operation a highly complex technical object as a “precarious partnership.” The process consists of several steps or phases. Typically, the participants in such a process are in different relative positions of strength and especially information. For the weaker side, these differences usually bring about the danger of being exploited by the other side. If the interactive process consisted of isolated phases only, this danger could prevent the interaction. However, in the course of the entire process, the relative positions are repeatedly switched. This fact influences incentives, behavior, and expectations of both sides, which in return reduces the potential confilict over time, strengthens the mutual commitment, and limits the risks of cooperation to the extent that cooperation becomes possible and reasonable. Many procedural and institutional characteristics of the marketing of complex technical objects fit into this interpretation. The method of analysis used in this article could help to narrow the gap between marketing science and the economic analysis of market processes.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Journal of Business Research</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>JBR</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><originInfo><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">198510</dateIssued></originInfo><identifier type="ISSN">0148-2963</identifier><identifier type="PII">S0148-2963(00)X0120-8</identifier><part><date>198510</date><detail type="volume"><number>13</number><caption>vol.</caption></detail><detail type="issue"><number>5</number><caption>no.</caption></detail><extent unit="issue pages"><start>375</start><end>464</end></extent><extent unit="pages"><start>421</start><end>433</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">FA1C92D0EEE318B7127D4B561081F4B7D513B9F1</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1016/0148-2963(85)90022-0</identifier><identifier type="PII">0148-2963(85)90022-0</identifier><recordInfo><recordContentSource>ELSEVIER</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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