Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S.
Identifieur interne : 001459 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001458; suivant : 001460Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S.
Auteurs : Per G. Fredriksson ; Xenia Matschke ; Jenny MinierSource :
- Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique [ 0008-4085 ] ; 2011-05.
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- KwdEn :
- F13.
Abstract
Abstract We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989–97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01646.x
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The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989–97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>wiley</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Per G. 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le cas des États‐Unis. </title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Inc</publisher><pubPlace>Malden, USA</pubPlace><availability><p>© Canadian Economics Association</p></availability><date>2011</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S.</title><title level="a" type="alt" xml:lang="es">La politique commerciale dans des systèmes électoraux majoritaires; le cas des États‐Unis. </title><author xml:id="author-1"><persName><forename type="first">Per G.</forename><surname>Fredriksson</surname></persName><affiliation>Department of Economics, University of Louisville</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-2"><persName><forename type="first">Xenia</forename><surname>Matschke</surname></persName><affiliation>Professur für Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik, Universität Trier</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-3"><persName><forename type="first">Jenny</forename><surname>Minier</surname></persName><affiliation>Department of Economics, University of Kentucky</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique</title><idno type="pISSN">0008-4085</idno><idno type="eISSN">1540-5982</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5982</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Inc</publisher><pubPlace>Malden, USA</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2011-05"></date><biblScope unit="volume">44</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="607">607</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="626">626</biblScope></imprint></monogr><idno type="istex">E3810AF41D48299FE765D97E9EF00415949CE388</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01646.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">CAJE1646</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2011</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract><p>Abstract We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989–97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.</p></abstract><abstract xml:lang="es"><p>On propose une théorie de la détermination de la politique commerciale qui incorpore le tendence protectionniste inhérent aux systèmes électoraux à scrutin majoritaire selon Grossman et Helpman (2005). La prédiction qui en ressort est que, dans un tel système, le parti de la majorité favorise les industries localisées de façon disproportionnée dans les circonscriptions détenues par la majorité. On évalue cette prédiction à l'aide des données sur les tarifs douaniers aux Etats‐Unis, sur les contributions aux campagnes électorales au Congrès, et sur la localisation des industries dans les circonscriptions représentées par le parti de la majorité pour la période 1989–97. Les résultats révèlent un biais significatif dans la politique commerciale : l'avantage d'être représenté par le parti de la majorité s'avère au moins aussi important que l'avantage du lobbying. If they [politicians] are successful, they claim, as a matter of right, the advantages of success. They see nothing wrong in the rule, that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy. (New York Senator William L. Marcy, referring to the victory of the Jackson Democrats in the election of 1828, in the U.S. Senate, 25 January 1832).1</p></abstract><textClass xml:lang="en"><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>keywords</head><item><term>F13</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2011-05">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/E3810AF41D48299FE765D97E9EF00415949CE388/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component version="2.0" type="serialArticle" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><publisherInfo><publisherName>Blackwell Publishing Inc</publisherName><publisherLoc>Malden, USA</publisherLoc></publisherInfo><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5982</doi><issn type="print">0008-4085</issn><issn type="electronic">1540-5982</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="CAJE"></id><id type="publisherDivision" value="ST"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title type="main" sort="CANADIAN JOURNAL ECONOMICS/REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE">Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="05102"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/caje.2011.44.issue-2</doi><numberingGroup><numbering type="journalVolume" number="44">44</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue" number="2">2</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2011-05">May / mai 2011</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" type="article" position="10" status="forIssue"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01646.x</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="CAJE1646"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count type="pageTotal" number="20"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="tocHeading1">Articles</title></titleGroup><copyright>© Canadian Economics Association</copyright><eventGroup><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:BPG_TO_WML3G version:2.4.8 mode:FullText" date="2011-05-04"></event><event type="firstOnline" date="2011-05-04"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2011-05-04"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:3.8.8" date="2014-01-08"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.1.7 mode:FullText,remove_FC" date="2014-10-15"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst" number="607">607</numbering><numbering type="pageLast" number="626">626</numbering></numberingGroup><objectNameGroup><objectName elementName="appendix">Appendices</objectName></objectNameGroup><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:CAJE.CAJE1646.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="0"></count><count type="tableTotal" number="7"></count><count type="formulaTotal" number="246"></count><count type="referenceTotal" number="23"></count><count type="linksCrossRef" number="85"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main">Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S.</title><title type="shortAuthors">P. Fredriksson, Z. Matschke, and J. Minier</title><title type="short"><i>Trade policy in majoritarian systems</i></title><title xml:lang="es" type="main"><i>La politique commerciale dans des systèmes électoraux majoritaires; le cas des États‐Unis</i>. </title></titleGroup><creators><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr1" affiliationRef="#a1"><personName><givenNames>Per G.</givenNames><familyName>Fredriksson</familyName></personName></creator><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr2" affiliationRef="#a2"><personName><givenNames>Xenia</givenNames><familyName>Matschke</familyName></personName></creator><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr3" affiliationRef="#a3"><personName><givenNames>Jenny</givenNames><familyName>Minier</familyName></personName></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="a1"><unparsedAffiliation>Department of Economics, University of Louisville</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation><affiliation xml:id="a2"><unparsedAffiliation>Professur für Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik, Universität Trier</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation><affiliation xml:id="a3" countryCode="US"><unparsedAffiliation>Department of Economics, University of Kentucky</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation></affiliationGroup><keywordGroup xml:lang="en"><keyword xml:id="k1">F13</keyword></keywordGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><p><b><i>Abstract</i></b> We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by <link href="#b12">Grossman and Helpman (2005)</link>. The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989–97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.</p></abstract><abstract type="main" xml:lang="es"><p>On propose une théorie de la détermination de la politique commerciale qui incorpore le tendence protectionniste inhérent aux systèmes électoraux à scrutin majoritaire selon <link href="#b12">Grossman et Helpman (2005)</link>. La prédiction qui en ressort est que, dans un tel système, le parti de la majorité favorise les industries localisées de façon disproportionnée dans les circonscriptions détenues par la majorité. On évalue cette prédiction à l'aide des données sur les tarifs douaniers aux Etats‐Unis, sur les contributions aux campagnes électorales au Congrès, et sur la localisation des industries dans les circonscriptions représentées par le parti de la majorité pour la période 1989–97. Les résultats révèlent un biais significatif dans la politique commerciale : l'avantage d'être représenté par le parti de la majorité s'avère au moins aussi important que l'avantage du lobbying.</p><p><blockFixed type="quotation"><p>If they [politicians] are successful, they claim, as a matter of right, the advantages of success. They see nothing wrong in the rule, that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy. (New York Senator William L. Marcy, referring to the victory of the Jackson Democrats in the election of 1828, in the U.S. Senate, 25 January 1832).<link href="#fn1"><sup>1</sup></link></p></blockFixed></p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta><noteGroup><note xml:id="n-fnt-1"><p>An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title ‘For sale: trade policy in majoritarian systems’. We would like to thank three anonymous referees, Werner Antweiler, Scott Baier, Matilde Bombardini, Chris Bollinger, Josh Ederington, Jose Fernandez, Martin Gassebner, Noel Gaston, Angeliki Kourelis, Khawaja Mamun, Dani Rodrik, Gautam Tripathi, and participants at the SEA meetings in Charleston for helpful comments and discussion; Alessandro Nicita for providing the import elasticity data; and Jessie Roberts for valuable research assistance. Needless to say, any remaining errors are our own. Email: <email normalForm="matschke@uni-trier.de">matschke@uni‐trier.de</email></p></note></noteGroup></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S.</title></titleInfo><titleInfo lang="es"><title>La politique commerciale dans des systèmes électoraux majoritaires; le cas des États‐Unis. </title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated" lang="en"><title>Trade policy in majoritarian systems</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S.</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="es"><title>La politique commerciale dans des systèmes électoraux majoritaires; le cas des États‐Unis. </title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Per G.</namePart><namePart type="family">Fredriksson</namePart><affiliation>Department of Economics, University of Louisville</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Xenia</namePart><namePart type="family">Matschke</namePart><affiliation>Professur für Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik, Universität Trier</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Jenny</namePart><namePart type="family">Minier</namePart><affiliation>Department of Economics, University of Kentucky</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Inc</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Malden, USA</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2011-05</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2011</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType><extent unit="tables">7</extent><extent unit="formulas">246</extent><extent unit="references">23</extent></physicalDescription><abstract>Abstract We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989–97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.</abstract><abstract lang="es">On propose une théorie de la détermination de la politique commerciale qui incorpore le tendence protectionniste inhérent aux systèmes électoraux à scrutin majoritaire selon Grossman et Helpman (2005). La prédiction qui en ressort est que, dans un tel système, le parti de la majorité favorise les industries localisées de façon disproportionnée dans les circonscriptions détenues par la majorité. On évalue cette prédiction à l'aide des données sur les tarifs douaniers aux Etats‐Unis, sur les contributions aux campagnes électorales au Congrès, et sur la localisation des industries dans les circonscriptions représentées par le parti de la majorité pour la période 1989–97. Les résultats révèlent un biais significatif dans la politique commerciale : l'avantage d'être représenté par le parti de la majorité s'avère au moins aussi important que l'avantage du lobbying. If they [politicians] are successful, they claim, as a matter of right, the advantages of success. They see nothing wrong in the rule, that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy. (New York Senator William L. Marcy, referring to the victory of the Jackson Democrats in the election of 1828, in the U.S. Senate, 25 January 1832).1</abstract><subject lang="en"><genre>keywords</genre><topic>F13</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0008-4085</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1540-5982</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5982</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">CAJE</identifier><part><date>2011</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>44</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>2</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>607</start><end>626</end><total>20</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">E3810AF41D48299FE765D97E9EF00415949CE388</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01646.x</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">CAJE1646</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© Canadian Economics Association</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource>WILEY</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Blackwell Publishing Inc</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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