The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again
Identifieur interne : 001371 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001370; suivant : 001372The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again
Auteurs : Melvin J. LernerSource :
- Personality and Social Psychology Review [ 1088-8683 ] ; 2003-11.
Abstract
Beginning shortly after the 2nd World War, 3 lines of research associated with relative deprivation, equity theory, and just world contributed to the description of the influence of the justice motive in people's lives. By the late 1960s, these converging lines of research had documented the importance of people's desire for justice;nevertheless,contemporary social psychologists typically portray this justice-driven motivation as simplyn a maniftstation of self-interest. The explanation for this failure to recognize a distinct and important justice motive points to the widespread reliance on research methods that elicit the participant's thoughtfully constructed narratives or role-playing responses. According to recent theoretical advances, these methods generate responses that reflect normative expectations of rational self-interest, and fail to capture the important effects of the emotionally generated imperatives of the justice motive.
Url:
DOI: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0704_10
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433CLe document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again</title><author wicri:is="90%"><name sortKey="Lerner, Melvin J" sort="Lerner, Melvin J" uniqKey="Lerner M" first="Melvin J." last="Lerner">Melvin J. Lerner</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>University Of Waterloo and Florida Atlantic University</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C</idno><date when="2003" year="2003">2003</date><idno type="doi">10.1207/S15327957PSPR0704_10</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">001371</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">001371</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again</title><author wicri:is="90%"><name sortKey="Lerner, Melvin J" sort="Lerner, Melvin J" uniqKey="Lerner M" first="Melvin J." last="Lerner">Melvin J. Lerner</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>University Of Waterloo and Florida Atlantic University</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Personality and Social Psychology Review</title><title level="j" type="sub">An Official Journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.</title><idno type="ISSN">1088-8683</idno><idno type="eISSN">1532-7957</idno><imprint><publisher>SAGE Publications</publisher><pubPlace>Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2003-11">2003-11</date><biblScope unit="volume">7</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">4</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="388">388</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="399">399</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">1088-8683</idno></series><idno type="istex">03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1207/S15327957PSPR0704_10</idno><idno type="ArticleID">10.1207_S15327957PSPR0704_10</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">1088-8683</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Beginning shortly after the 2nd World War, 3 lines of research associated with relative deprivation, equity theory, and just world contributed to the description of the influence of the justice motive in people's lives. By the late 1960s, these converging lines of research had documented the importance of people's desire for justice;nevertheless,contemporary social psychologists typically portray this justice-driven motivation as simplyn a maniftstation of self-interest. The explanation for this failure to recognize a distinct and important justice motive points to the widespread reliance on research methods that elicit the participant's thoughtfully constructed narratives or role-playing responses. According to recent theoretical advances, these methods generate responses that reflect normative expectations of rational self-interest, and fail to capture the important effects of the emotionally generated imperatives of the justice motive.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>sage</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Melvin J. Lerner</name><affiliations><json:string>University Of Waterloo and Florida Atlantic University</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><articleId><json:string>10.1207_S15327957PSPR0704_10</json:string></articleId><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>research-article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>Beginning shortly after the 2nd World War, 3 lines of research associated with relative deprivation, equity theory, and just world contributed to the description of the influence of the justice motive in people's lives. By the late 1960s, these converging lines of research had documented the importance of people's desire for justice;nevertheless,contemporary social psychologists typically portray this justice-driven motivation as simplyn a maniftstation of self-interest. The explanation for this failure to recognize a distinct and important justice motive points to the widespread reliance on research methods that elicit the participant's thoughtfully constructed narratives or role-playing responses. According to recent theoretical advances, these methods generate responses that reflect normative expectations of rational self-interest, and fail to capture the important effects of the emotionally generated imperatives of the justice motive.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>6.536</score><pdfVersion>1.3</pdfVersion><pdfPageSize>612 x 792 pts (letter)</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractCharCount>952</abstractCharCount><pdfWordCount>8793</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>55512</pdfCharCount><pdfPageCount>12</pdfPageCount><abstractWordCount>128</abstractWordCount></qualityIndicators><title>The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again</title><refBibs><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. S. Adams</name></json:item></author><host><volume>67</volume><pages><last>436</last><first>422</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology</title></host><title>Toward an understanding of inequity</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. H. Bazerman</name></json:item><json:item><name>S. B. White</name></json:item><json:item><name>G. F. Lowenstein</name></json:item></author><host><volume>4</volume><pages><last>42</last><first>39</first></pages><author></author><title>Current Directions in Psychological Science</title></host><title>Perceptions of fairness in interpersonal and individual choice situations</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D. R. Bobocel</name></json:item><json:item><name>L. S. Son Hing</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. P. Zanna</name></json:item><json:item><name> </name></json:item><json:item><name> </name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>225</last><first>204</first></pages><author></author><title>The justice motive in everyday life</title></host><title>Policies to redress social injustice: Is the concern for justice a cause of both support and opposition?</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Dual process theories in social psychology</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>F. Crosby</name></json:item></author><host><volume>83</volume><pages><last>113</last><first>85</first></pages><author></author><title>Psychological Review</title></host><title>A model of egoistical relative deprivation</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>The justice motive as a personal resource</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>S. Epstein</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. Lipson</name></json:item><json:item><name>C. Holstein</name></json:item><json:item><name>E. Huh</name></json:item></author><host><volume>62</volume><pages><last>339</last><first>328</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: Evidence for two conceptual systems</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. L. Freedman</name></json:item><json:item><name>S. A. Wallington</name></json:item><json:item><name>E. Bless</name></json:item></author><host><volume>7</volume><pages><last>124</last><first>117</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>Compliance without pressure: The effects of guilt</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. H. Goldberg</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. S. Lerner</name></json:item><json:item><name>P. E. Tetlock</name></json:item></author><host><volume>29</volume><pages><last>795</last><first>781</first></pages><author></author><title>European Journal of Social Psychology</title></host><title>Rage and reason: The psychology of the intuitive prosecutor</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Equity and justice in social behavior</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>C. Hafer</name></json:item></author><host><volume>79</volume><pages><last>173</last><first>165</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personalits and Social Psychology</title></host><title>Do innocent victims threaten the belief in a just world? Evidence from a modified Stroop task</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D. J. Hessing</name></json:item><json:item><name>H. Elffers</name></json:item><json:item><name>R. H. Weigel</name></json:item></author><host><volume>54</volume><pages><last>413</last><first>405</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>Exploring the limits of self-reports and reasoned action: An investigation of the psychology of tax evasion behavior</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. G. Holmes</name></json:item><json:item><name>D. T. Miller</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. J. Lerner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>38</volume><pages><last>151</last><first>144</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</title></host><title>Committing altruism under the cloak of self-interest: The exchange fiction</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. S. Lerner</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. Goldberg</name></json:item><json:item><name>P. Tetlock</name></json:item></author><host><volume>24</volume><pages><last>574</last><first>563</first></pages><author></author><title>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin</title></host><title>Sober second thoughts: The effects of accountability, anger, and authoritarianism on attributions of responsibility</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. J. Lerner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>1</volume><pages><last>360</last><first>355</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>Evaluation of performances as a function of performer's reward and attractiveness</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. J. Lerner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>20</volume><pages><last>35</last><first>17</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>Observer's evaluation of a victim: Justice, guilt. and veridical perception</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. J. Lerner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>31</volume><pages><last>20</last><first>1</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Social Issues</title></host><title>The justice motive in social behavior: Introduction</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. J. Lerner</name></json:item><json:item><name> </name></json:item><json:item><name> </name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>277</last><first>249</first></pages><author></author><title>Cooperation and helping behavior</title></host><title>Justice motive in human relations and the economic model of man</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. J. Lerner</name></json:item><json:item><name> </name></json:item><json:item><name> </name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>32</last><first>13</first></pages><author></author><title>Interpersonal justice in social relations</title></host><title>Integrating societal and psychological rules of entitlement: The basic task of each social actor and fundamental problem for the social sciences</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. J. Lerner</name></json:item><json:item><name>C. H. Simmons</name></json:item></author><host><volume>4</volume><pages><last>210</last><first>203</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>The observer's reaction to the “innocent victim”: Compassion or rejection?</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>H. Levinson</name></json:item></author><host><volume>49</volume><pages><last>436</last><first>428</first></pages><author></author><title>American Psychologist</title></host><title>Why the behemoths fell: Psychological roots of corporate failure</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. Meindl</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. J. Lerner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>19</volume><pages><last>20</last><first>1</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</title></host><title>The heroic motive in interpersonal relations</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. R. Meindl</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. J. Lerner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>47</volume><pages><last>84</last><first>71</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>Exacerbation of extreme responses to an outgroup</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>G. Mikula</name></json:item><json:item><name>K. R. Scherer</name></json:item><json:item><name>U. Athenstaedt</name></json:item></author><host><volume>24</volume><pages><last>783</last><first>769</first></pages><author></author><title>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin</title></host><title>The role of injustice in the elicitation of differential emotional reactions</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Miller, D. T. (1975).</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D. T. Miller</name></json:item></author><host><volume>13</volume><pages><last>13</last><first>1</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</title></host><title>Personal deserving and justice for others: An exploration of the justice motive</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D. T. Miller</name></json:item></author><host><volume>54</volume><pages><last>1060</last><first>1053</first></pages><author></author><title>American Psychologist</title></host><title>The norm of self interest</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. K. Ratner</name></json:item><json:item><name>D. T. Miller</name></json:item></author><host><volume>81</volume><pages><last>16</last><first>5</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>The norm of self interest and its effects on social action</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. N. Rivera</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. T. Tedeschi</name></json:item></author><host><volume>34</volume><pages><last>900</last><first>895</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>Public versus private reactions to positive inequity</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>P. Rozin</name></json:item><json:item><name>L. Lowery</name></json:item><json:item><name>S. Imada</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. Haidt</name></json:item></author><host><volume>76</volume><pages><last>586</last><first>574</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity)</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>Z. Rubin</name></json:item><json:item><name>L. A. Peplau</name></json:item></author><host><volume>29</volume><pages><last>93</last><first>73</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Social Issues</title></host><title>Belief in a just world and reactions to another's lot: A study of participants in the national draft lottery</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D. O. Sears</name></json:item><json:item><name>R. R. Lau</name></json:item></author><host><volume>27</volume><pages><last>252</last><first>223</first></pages><author></author><title>American Journal of Political Science</title></host><title>Inducing apparently self-interested political preferences</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. A. Shweder</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. Haidt</name></json:item></author><host><volume>4</volume><pages><last>365</last><first>360</first></pages><author></author><title>Psychological Science</title></host><title>The future of moral psychology: Truth, intuition, and the pluralist way</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>C. Simnons</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. Piliavin</name></json:item></author><host><volume>21</volume><pages><last>60</last><first>56</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Pertsonalitv and Social Psychology</title></host><title>The effect of deception on reactions to a victimn</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>L. Skitka</name></json:item></author><host><volume>28</volume><pages><last>597</last><first>588</first></pages><author></author><title>Personalits and Social Psychology Bulletin</title></host><title>Do the means always justify the ends, or do the ends sometimes justify the means? A value protection model of justice reasoning</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>L. J. Skitka</name></json:item><json:item><name>P. E. Tetlock</name></json:item></author><host><volume>29</volume><pages><last>409</last><first>397</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</title></host><title>Allocating aid: The roles of scarcity, ideology, causal attributions, and distributive norms</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>L. J. Skitka</name></json:item><json:item><name>P. E. Tetlock</name></json:item></author><host><volume>65</volume><pages><last>1223</last><first>1205</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</title></host><title>Providing public assistance: Cognitive and motivational processes underlying liberal and conservative policy preferences</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name> </name></json:item></author><host><volume>130</volume><pages><last>52</last><first>44</first></pages><author></author><title>Fortune</title></host><title>Burned-out bosses</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Social justice in human relations: Societal and psychological consequences of justice and injustice</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>The American soldier; adjustment during army life</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>T. R. Tlyler</name></json:item></author><host><volume>67</volume><pages><last>863</last><first>850</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Personality, and Social Psyscholog</title></host><title>Psychological models of the justice motive: Anteeedents of distributive and procedural Justice</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Social justice in humnan relations: Societal and psychological origins of justice</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Equits. Theory and research</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. Weiner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>48</volume><pages><last>965</last><first>957</first></pages><author></author><title>American Psychologist</title></host><title>On sin versus sickness: A theory of perceived responsibility and social motivation</title></json:item></refBibs><genre><json:string>research-article</json:string></genre><host><volume>7</volume><publisherId><json:string>PSR</json:string></publisherId><pages><last>399</last><first>388</first></pages><issn><json:string>1088-8683</json:string></issn><issue>4</issue><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><eissn><json:string>1532-7957</json:string></eissn><title>Personality and Social Psychology Review</title></host><categories><wos><json:string>social science</json:string><json:string>psychology, social</json:string></wos><scienceMetrix><json:string>health sciences</json:string><json:string>psychology & cognitive sciences</json:string><json:string>social psychology</json:string></scienceMetrix></categories><publicationDate>2003</publicationDate><copyrightDate>2003</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1207/S15327957PSPR0704_10</json:string></doi><id>03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C</id><score>0.015351256</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again</title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>SAGE Publications</publisher><pubPlace>Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA</pubPlace><availability><p>SAGE</p></availability><date>2003</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again</title><author xml:id="author-1"><persName><forename type="first">Melvin J.</forename><surname>Lerner</surname></persName><affiliation>University Of Waterloo and Florida Atlantic University</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Personality and Social Psychology Review</title><title level="j" type="sub">An Official Journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.</title><idno type="pISSN">1088-8683</idno><idno type="eISSN">1532-7957</idno><imprint><publisher>SAGE Publications</publisher><pubPlace>Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2003-11"></date><biblScope unit="volume">7</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">4</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="388">388</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="399">399</biblScope></imprint></monogr><idno type="istex">03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1207/S15327957PSPR0704_10</idno><idno type="ArticleID">10.1207_S15327957PSPR0704_10</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2003</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Beginning shortly after the 2nd World War, 3 lines of research associated with relative deprivation, equity theory, and just world contributed to the description of the influence of the justice motive in people's lives. By the late 1960s, these converging lines of research had documented the importance of people's desire for justice;nevertheless,contemporary social psychologists typically portray this justice-driven motivation as simplyn a maniftstation of self-interest. The explanation for this failure to recognize a distinct and important justice motive points to the widespread reliance on research methods that elicit the participant's thoughtfully constructed narratives or role-playing responses. According to recent theoretical advances, these methods generate responses that reflect normative expectations of rational self-interest, and fail to capture the important effects of the emotionally generated imperatives of the justice motive.</p></abstract></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2003-11">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="corpus sage not found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v2.3 20070202//EN" URI="journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="2.3" xml:lang="EN"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="hwp">sppsr</journal-id><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">PSR</journal-id><journal-title>Personality and Social Psychology Review</journal-title><journal-subtitle>An Official Journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.</journal-subtitle><issn pub-type="ppub">1088-8683</issn><publisher><publisher-name>SAGE Publications</publisher-name><publisher-loc>Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA</publisher-loc></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1207/S15327957PSPR0704_10</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">10.1207_S15327957PSPR0704_10</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again</article-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner</surname><given-names>Melvin J.</given-names></name><aff>University Of Waterloo and Florida Atlantic University</aff></contrib></contrib-group><pub-date pub-type="ppub"><month>11</month><year>2003</year></pub-date><volume>7</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>388</fpage><lpage>399</lpage><abstract><p>Beginning shortly after the 2nd World War, 3 lines of research associated with relative deprivation, equity theory, and just world contributed to the description of the influence of the justice motive in people's lives. By the late 1960s, these converging lines of research had documented the importance of people's desire for justice;nevertheless,contemporary social psychologists typically portray this justice-driven motivation as simplyn a maniftstation of self-interest. The explanation for this failure to recognize a distinct and important justice motive points to the widespread reliance on research methods that elicit the participant's thoughtfully constructed narratives or role-playing responses. According to recent theoretical advances, these methods generate responses that reflect normative expectations of rational self-interest, and fail to capture the important effects of the emotionally generated imperatives of the justice motive.</p></abstract><custom-meta-wrap><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>sagemeta-type</meta-name><meta-value>Journal Article</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>search-text</meta-name><meta-value> Personality and Social Psychology Review 2003, Vol. 7. No. 4, 388-399 Copyright © 2003 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Inc. The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again Melvin J. Lerner Univ'ersit, vOf Waterloo and Florida Atlantic University Beginning shortly after the 2nd World Wat; 3 lines of research associated with relative deprivation, equity theorv; andjust world contributed to the desc ription of the influence a/fthe justice motive in people's lives. By the late 1960s, these converging lines of re- ,searchhaddocumentedtheimportanceoqfpeople'sdesire fbrjustice;nevertheless,con- temporary social psychologists typically portray this justice-driven motivation as sim- plyn a maniftstation of self interest. The explanation for this failure to recognize a distinct and important justice motive points to the widespread reliance on research methods that elicit the participant's thoughtfullv constructed narratives or role-play- ing responses. According to recent theoretical advances, these methods generate re- sponses that reflect normative expectations of rational self interest, andfail to capture the important effects of the emotionally generated imperatives of the justice motive. It seems to be stating the obvious to assert that peo- ple prefer more rather than less pay for their work, and their satisfaction would be the direct result of the size of their rewards: The more pay the greater their satis- faction. Moreover, of course, sane, decent people would not condemn suffering innocent victims. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, how- ever, three lines of research began reporting evidence that seemed to contradict these mundane truths. Re- search associated with the concept of "relative depriva- tion" revealed that people's satisfaction depended on their receiving no less than they thought they deserved, rather than the objective value of their outcomes (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Starr, & Williams, 1949; see also Crosby, 1976). "Equity theory" experi- ments (Adams, 1963) demonstrated that employees, at times, would voluntarily avoid getting more pay than they deserved, and the "just world" research (Lerner, 1965, 1971; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) indicated that the desire to believe that people get what they deserve influences both restorative actions and social judg- The substantive material and line of argument presented in this article were greatly influenced by the comments of many good friends and colleagues, including John Ellard, Carolyn Hafer, Larry Heuer, Robin Vallacher, and the members of the audiences where I presented earlier versions of this article, including the 2002 Confer- ence on the Justice Motive at the Sea Frolic, and several meetings of the International Society for Justice Research (Potsdam, FRG; Reno, Nevada; and Skdvde, Sweden), as well as from at colleagues ISCTE in Lisbon, University of Trier, FRG, Autonomous University of Ma- drid, University of Paris, and the University of Waterloo. I am espe- cially indebted to the Faye Crosby and Linda Skitka, and their re- viewers for their stimulating and challenging comments. Requests for reprints should be sent to Melvin J. Lerner, 4460 NW 27th Avenue, Boca Raton, FL 33434. E-mail: milerner- 14 compuservecom ments, including the possible derogation of innocent victims by sane, decent, observers. By the 1970s, considerable evidence pointed to a "justice motive" as a distinct source of motivation and influence in people's lives. Approximately 30 years later, however, in spite of the rather auspicious begin- ning, and after a considerable amount of published re- search, the general consensus is that people's desire for justice is neither distinct from self-interest nor of great motivational importance. Most contemporary social psychologists assume that people employ justice as a personal and social device to promote their acquisition of commonly desired resources. The authors of "equity theory," Walster, Walster, and Berscheid (1978), antici- pated that conclusion when they proposed: " So long as individuals perceive that they can maximize their out- comes by behaving equitably, they will do so. Should they perceive that they can maximize their outcomes by behaving inequitably, they will do so"(p. 5). More recently, Tyler (1994) concluded: The traditional explanation for why people care about Justice can perhaps best be described as an effort tem- pered with realism to pursue self interest ... This tem- pering is an effort to maximize their long term self-in- terest in acquiring desired resources, which benefits from ongoing social relationships. (p. 858) Given the early research identifying the importance and unique aspects of justice motivation, it is reason- able to ask how most contemporary social psycholo- gists could portray justice as simply a tool of people's self-interest. The most obvious answer is surprisingly simple: The vast majority of the research published over the past 25 years reported that their participants 388 JUSTICE MOTIVE FOUND AND LOST employed justice principles to gain other commonly desired resources money, power, status and the participants ignored or distorted those principles when it was to their profit to do so (e.g., Greenberg & Cohen, 1982; Steensma & Vermunt, 1991; Vermunt & Steen- sma, 1991). What remains to be explained, then, is this dramatic discrepancy between the promising findings of the early research and those reported by the majority of subsequent investigators. The remainder of this arti- cle will be devoted to examining the sources and impli- cations of those contradictory findings. Two Forms of Justice in High and Low Impact Situations The Appearance of Justice in Heuristic and Systematic Judgments To begin with, it is important to recognize two rather distinct ways in which people react to justice re- lated events. In one of these reactions, the awareness of an obvious injustice happens automatically in response to familiar cues in the situation. That rather immediate response includes the appraisal of who or what is to blame and the imperative to reestablish justice with virtually no consideration of the circumstances. In ef- fect, the cognitive, evaluative, and the justice-based emotional imperatives appear as a scripted package typically involving anger and punishment (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998). On other occasions, however, all of the elements in the justice scenario follow from thoughtful consideration of the relevant circumstances. These include the assessments of what someone de- serves, the extent to which the person's outcomes fail to meet what he or she deserves, the attributions of re- sponsibility and culpability to possible agents of the in- justice, and various courses of action (e.g., Weiner, 1993). Borrowing from the several dual process theo- ries in social psychology (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999), the term heuristics will be used to stand for the more automatic, intuitive, scripted reactions, and sy's- tematic for the more thoughtful processes based on purposive assessments of available information. These two forms of justice reactions differ in ways that are particularly relevant here. First, as suggested by the dual process theorists, the heuristic-based jus- tice appraisals often take the rather primitive form of simple univalent associations of outcomes, personal characteristics, emotions, and restorative acts for ex- ample, bad things happen to bad people, bad outcomes are caused by bad people, similar people deserve simi- lar outcomes whereas, the systematic appraisals and subsequent responses reflect conventional rules of thought, including the normatively appropriate rule for determining deserving, blame, and the reestablishment of justice, for example, merit, equality, and norm-based entitlements (M. J. Lerner, 1975, 1991). Second, although the heuristic responses occur auto- matically, the person must have an incentive with suffi- cient time and cognitive resources to engage in system- atic thought processes. The Appearance of Justice Reactions in High and Low Impact Situations In addition to identifying the distinction between justice heuristics and thoughtfully generated judg- ments of (in)justice, it is important to consider the dif- ferent dynamics involved in people's reactions in high versus low impact situations. The investigators whose research led to the initial evidence for the justice mo- tive constructed emotionally compelling and person- ally engaging situations for their participants. These included the highly arousing and rather upsetting expe- rience of witnessing the agonies of a suffering victim, and confronting participants who had been hired as employees with the disturbing realization that they were to be paid much more, or less, than they deserved for their work. Over time, social psychologists increas- ingly relied less on confronting their participants with highly arousing and personally engaging events to study justice. Instead, investigators had their partici- pants role-play reactions in experimental simulations with minimal incentives, or respond to hypothetical vi- gnettes, questionnaires, and interviews, that is, "low impact" situations. Extrapolating from the available theories, it is pos- sible to suggest theoretically relevant consequences of this shift from high to low impact situations to study the justice motive. Consider, first, what can occur in low impact situations. When people are asked to play a role, recall a past event, or give their opinions and be- liefs about a hypothetical or real event, they may pro- vide a direct response based on the heuristics elicited by the salient cues. However, with minimal motivation and emotional involvement, rather than responding di- rectly with the first thoughts that automatically come to mind, they will often have the tine and coenitive re- sources to reflect on and thoughtfully frame their reac- tion within conventional norms. With little at stake to be gained or lost, the participants' main incentives are not to reestablish justice, or maximize their outcomes. for that matter, but rather to manage their impressions. For the most part, they try to be cooperative partici- pants, and, of course, not do anything that would threaten their self or public esteem by appearing fool- ish or embarrassing. As a cooperative participant, impression manage- ment might mean expressing or following the norma- tively appropriate rules of deserving and fairness in a particular context. However, after time to thoughtfully consider their responses, they would probably not be 389 LERNER willing to represent the often counternormative auto- matically elicited justice heuristics in their reactions. Alternatively, there is also good reason to believe that the societal norms and lay theories that are most likely to appear in participants' thoughtful responses portray justice considerations as an enlightened form of self-interest. As described by Walster et al. (1978), it is commonly assumed that people comply with rules of fairness and deserving if and when they believe that is the most profitable way to act, given the immediate or ultimately available costs and benefits. In essence, it is possible to elicit reactions based on the heuristic forms of justice in low impact contexts if the participants are asked to give a direct response and there is no inducement or time to engage in a more thoughtful response. Otherwise, if justice consider- ations appear after thoughtful considerations, they will be framed within appropriate norms, including the pro- motion of self-interested goals (Miller, 1999). Alterna- tively, when confronted with a compelling and emotion arousing appraisal of an actual or threatened injustice, whether elicited by a heuristic or systematic appraisal, the subsequent response is more likely to be guided by the emotion directed efforts to reestablish or protect justice and less influenced by impression management concerns. While acting on the imperative to reestablish justice, the fully engaged participant will be less likely to have the cognitive resources, time, or incentive to engage in thoughtful pursuit of the normatively appro- priate response, including enlightened self-interest (Meindl & Lerner, 1983; Miller, 1975, 1977). In addi- tion, to the extent that the strong emotions follow from an initial heuristic appraisal, the subsequent reactions, less influenced by normative constraints, may appear as rather primitive anger-punishment scripted reac- tions (Goldberg et al., 1999; J. S. Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Mikula et al., 1998). Integrating Propositions According to this analysis, by employing low impact procedures, investigators inadvertently created the con- ditions that would produce evidence generally consis- tent with lay theories of how justice appears in people's lives, that is, people follow conventional rules for deter- mining blame and deserving, if and when that appears to be the normatively appropriate and the most profitable response. To be sure, on those occasions when partici- pants have little time or incentive to generate a thought- ful response, more immediate appraisals of rather sim- ple forms of justice may appear in their reactions. However, low impact situations will consistently fail to elicit sufficient justice-based emotion-directed judg- ments and efforts to protect or reestablish justice, espe- cially those that involve counternormative reactions. The next task, of course, is to consider some of the evi- dence underlying this analysis. The research describing how people react to innocent victims highlights several of these theoretically significant methodological issues. The Justice Motive and Societal Norms: Reactions to Victims and Harm-Doers Emotionally Detached Versus Fully Engaged Observers' Reactions to Innocent Victims M. J. Lerner (1971) and M. J. Lerner and Simmons (1966) confronted their participants with the vividly moving experience of watching someone who had been essentially trapped into receiving a series of un- avoidable electric shocks as part of her participation in a psychological experiment. Of course, when given the opportunity, these observers elected to rescue and compensate the victim, but when unable to do that, many of them tended to derogate the victim's charac- ter. However, why would observers attempt to compen- sate an innocent victim, whereas similar others, unable to do that, denigrate her personal worth? One possible answer pointed to a motivational com- ponent: The observers cared so much about believing that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get, that if they cannot restore justice by their actions, they will try to do so by other means, such as persuading themselves that the victim actually deserved to suffer, or would be compensated later, possibly in the next life. Another possibility is that the cues in the situation, par- ticularly the vivid signs of the victim's suffering, elic- ited a heuristic-based automatic response, "bad things happen to bad people," that led to the victim derogation. In either case, additional findings also revealed that if the observers believed that the victim was not actu- ally suffering, but merely playing a part for the pur- poses of the experiment, they did not portray her in a negative light, and they did not predict that other naive observers would derogate her (M. J. Lerner, 1971; Simons & Piliavin, 1972). Apparently, the emotional arousal elicited by the victim's suffering was an essen- tial component in the observers' derogation. In addi- tion, thoughtful consideration of the relevant societal norms prevented victim derogation by the observers. If, for example, the experimenter explicitly informed, and then later reminded, the observers that the victim was truly an innocent victim of circumstances, as in a natural disaster, then victim derogation did not occur (Simons & Piliavin, 1972). Apparently, the experi- menter had made the observers highly aware that ac- cording to societal norms, people are not supposed to condemn innocent victims, only those that are blame- worthy and culpable. These normative rules concerning how one is sup- posed to react to victims became even more evident 390 JUSTICE MOTIVE FOUND AND LOST in subsequent low impact contexts. For example, in- vestigators often asked their participants to play a role in which they were to evaluate and allocate re- sources to various briefly-described victims. In these contexts, the participants' reactions followed their thoughtful assessments using normatively appropriate rules of blame and culpability to discern which vic- tims were responsible for their fates or were truly in- nocent. And, of course, confirming conventional rules of morality, their evaluations and allocations revealed compassion for the innocent victims and rejection of the culpable ones (see e.g., Skitka & Tetlock, 1992, 1993; Weiner, 1993). It appears, then, that emotionally aroused observers of suffering victims respond quite differently than those who generate a thoughtful response in relatively dispassionate circumstances. The detached observers typically adhere to conventionally accepted rules of deserving and culpability: Of course, innocent victims are to be treated with compassion. Recent research (Hafer, 2000), however, documented the role of justice motivation in the derogation of innocent victims. In that research, witnessing a vivid and moving injustice elicited clear evidence of the observers' preconscious concerns with issues of justice, and the greater the ob- servers' preoccupation with justice the greater the like- lihood of their derogating the innocent victim. Self-Derogation by Innocent Victims and Harm-Doers Obviously, the condemnation of innocent victims is counternormative and is thus unlikely to be found in participants' thoughtful responses in low impact situa- tions. However, it does help explain a recognized and tragically familiar phenomenon in people's lives. One can even find evidence of victims blaming and derogat- ing themselves in spite of ample objective evidence at- testing to their innocence. Although some investigators have attributed this self-derogation to the need for con- trol among victims of criminal assaults, Rubin and Peplau (1973), as described in more detail later, found lowered self-esteem among innocent victims of an ex- plicitly random event. Of course, many factors can intervene or preclude such irrational condemnation. However, the tendency to automatically blame and derogate does not only ap- pear in reactions to victims. Investigators have repeat- edly demonstrated that people who accidentally cause harm to others often blame themselves in ways that are both painful and completely unjustified by conven- tional rule for assigning blame (Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; Meindl & Lerner, 1984). It is as if they automatically apply the heuristic "bad outcomes are caused by bad people" to themselves although that can have painful and costly consequences. A rather dramatic example of the failure of conven- tional norms to prevent the personally painful effects of this heuristic was reported by consultants to corpo- rations that had engaged in downsizing (Levinson, 1994; Smith, 1994). According to these consultants, after employees are discharged, managers often expe- rience serious amounts of guilt in response to compel- ling signs of the discharged employees' suffering. Al- though the managers believed their decisions to downsize their work forces were entirely appropriate and justifiable in response to market demands, their au- tomatic self-blaming reactions to subsequent cues of suffering were not prevented or eliminated by refer- ence to conventional norms for assigning culpability. Apparently, for many of them, the heuristic "bad out- comes are caused by bad people" prevailed, although it made no sense, rationally. This research, describing the way people react to victims and victimization, clearly suggests important differences between the reactions of people who are emotionally aroused by compelling awareness of un- deserved suffering and the relatively detached re- sponses of people who have the time and incentive to generate a thoughtful response. Fully engaged people often reveal relatively simple scripted evaluations and judgments, such as "bad outcomes happen to bad people" and "bad outcomes are caused by bad peo- ple." In this manner, observers may derogate innocent victims, and the innocent victims, as well as morally innocent accidental harm-doers, may even condemn themselves. This scripted derogation, however, absent compelling cues of suffering, may be prevented or re- placed by conventional rules for assigning blame and culpability. When observers are relatively unaroused and have the time to generate a response, then they will often reveal the compassion and caring for inno- cent victims according to societal norms. The remaining discussion focuses on further illus- trations of how justice, conventional norms, and self-interest appear in low impact situations. The main thrust of these examples is to illustrate how social psy- chologists may have inadvertently generated evidence that relegated justice to the status of an instrumental form of self-interest. Preferences for Justice Replaced by Maximizing Self-Interest in Thoughtful Decisions Bazerman, White, and Lowenstein (1995) de- scribed several experiments in which participants re- acted more favorably to a hypothetical situation in which they would have fair but lesser outcomes than one in which their outcomes would be larger but unfair. For example, when judged independently and sepa- rately, the possibility of having "$400 for yourself and $400 for the other party" elicited more favorable rat- 391 LERNER ings among the participants than having "$500 for yourself and $700 for the other party." The respon- dents' reactions indicated they valued fairness more than an additional $100. Similarly, when it came to a hypothetical job offer, the participants had a more posi- tive reaction to an offer where they would be paid the same as similar others then to one where they would be getting $10,000 more per year, but others would be paid an additional $10,000 more than they. Simply stated, in these hypothetical situations, fairness-un- fairness mattered more than greater amounts of money, and fairness appeared to be defined as "similar people deserve similar outcomes." It is important to remember that the preference for fair rather than the most economically profitable out- come appeared in situations constructed to elicit and assess separate evaluative reactions to each of the two possibilities. That is important because, contrary to the preferences for fairness described earlier, Bazerman et al. (1995) also discovered that when asked to make comparative judgments between the two alternatives, the participants typically opted for the alternative that offered them the most money rather than the one that was more fair. That is, they chose the $500 for them- selves and $700 for the other, rather than $400 for them both. Clearly, in their several experiments, the compar- ative judgments led to economically self-interested choices instead of fair ones. What accounts for the systematic difference, actu- ally preference reversals, between the separate ratings of each alternative and choosing between the two sets of outcomes? The authors' conclusion fits the hypoth- eses generated here. When they engage in thoughtful decision making " ... it is easier (for people) to jus- tify maximizing one's own payoff than to justify maximizing fairness" (Bazerman et al., 1995, p. 42). Having to choose between two alternatives required the participants to forego their initial impulses for fairness and engage in systematic thought comparing the two alternatives. Because of the thoughtful com- parisons in this low impact context, their choices were shaped by the norm of self-interest. Similarly, Sears and Lau (1983) reported that survey respon- dents revealed little evidence of self-interested evalu- ations of political figures and their economic policies, unless prior questions specifically alerted them to their own economic stake in those policies. Once their own economic investment in those policies be- came salient, they felt constrained to respond in a self-interested manner. That conjecture was supported by several experi- ments that provided compelling documentation of both the importance and prevalence of this norm of self-in- terest. Apparently, the norm of self-interest is suffi- ciently ubiquitous that people reliably overestimate the extent to which others will adhere to it, for example, smokers voting against legislation to limit smoking (Miller, 1999). In addition, Ratner and Miller (2001) found that people often adhere to the norm or portray themselves as acting out of self-interested motives be- cause they recognize that to appear to do otherwise puts them at clear risk of being viewed with mistrust, as a deviant, a not "normal" person. Recognizing this re- luctance to appear to be a deviant, Holmes, Miller, and Lerner (2002) demonstrated that allowing people to portray their efforts to help innocent victims as a self-interested economic exchange was considerably more effective in eliciting financial help for suffering victims than simply providing the person with the op- portunity to altruistically donate money. In addition to appearing in the form of heuristic re- sponses, in low impact situations the themes of justice and self-interest often appear in the participants' ef- forts to respond according to the appropriate societal norms. When the participants' justice motive is not strongly engaged, then norm-based rules of fairness and justice may appear in their thoughtful responses as good role-playing participants. As a result, investiga- tors may then conclude they are assessing people's mo- tivation for justice. However, those role-playing based concerns with fairness are easily set aside as other norms, especially as those eliciting self-interest be- come salient. Confusing Norm Enactment With the Justice Motive: Do People Care About Fairness? The research by Rivera and Tedeschi (1976) high- lights the importance of recognizing the difference be- tween participants role-playing justice norms and em- ployees actually experiencing a threat to their sense of justice. Adams and his colleagues (see Adams, 1963) found that participants, functioning as part-time em- ployees, altered their efforts, increasing either the qual- ity or the extent of their work, to avoid receiving more pay than they believed they deserved. Those findings, revealed in several experiments, were offered as evi- dence that, in some circumstances, people prefer fair- ness to maximizing their outcomes. However, do they really prefer fairness in these settings? Rivera and Tedeschi (1976) doubted that people genuinely cared about fairness. They designed an ex- periment to demonstrate that people only give public "lip service" to norms of fairness, but privately they prefer to maximize their outcomes: the greater their pay the more pleased they are. To test their hypotheses, rather than hiring employees as their participants, they had university students play the role of employees in an experimental simulation of an industrial task. To create the various experimental conditions, they had their par- ticipants work at a simple task for a few moments. They then told them that a supervisor participant had allocated shares of a $1 payment between them and an 392 JUSTICE MOTIVE FOUND AND LOST equally productive coworker. The participant then re- ceived fair pay (50 cents), or 75 cents, or 90 cents, rep- resenting two levels of overpayment. Rivera and Tedeschi (1976) demonstrated that if the participants made public ratings of their reactions to their pay, they reported being most pleased with the fair pay and less happy with the greater but unfair overpayments. However, when the participants re- sponded to their payment while connected to a "lie detector," the more money they received the happier they were. Based on those findings, Rivera and Ted- eschi (1976) concluded that people only adhere to rules of fairness in public situations because it is a so- cietal norm, whereas privately, everyone is motivated to maximize their outcomes. Subsequent research (M. J. Lerner, 1982) however, indicated that virtually all the participants in the Rivera and Tedeschi (1976) experiment were actually role playing what they believed were the normatively ap- propriate responses. When role playing the part of em- ployees, they reported being upset with receiving more pay than they deserved. However, if they had been in- structed to play the role of highly competitive workers, their public reactions revealed greater satisfaction with greater pay. In addition, as good cooperative partici- pants, that meant producing a counternormative re- sponse when the experimenter hooked them up to a lie detector. It appeared that the lie detector forced these competition-instructed employees to "confess" being more pleased with the lesser but more fair pay. In retro- spect, it seems safe to conclude that the participants did not care much about their payments. After all, how much pleasure or guilt could have been elicited among these university students by receiving 75 cents rather than 50 cents? They probably cared very little about whether they received a "fair" payment or were "over- paid." They were simply trying to be cooperative par- ticipants and do the right thing by playing the roles they were assigned. Mainly, what can be learned from these experi- ments is that, of course, people know and can behave according to normative rules of fairness. However, that can and often does happen in the service of mo- tives other than justice. The participants in these ex- periments were simply trying to be good participants, and unlike Adams's employees (Adams, 1963), their behavior had virtually nothing to do with how much they actually cared about justice or the desire to max- imize their outcomes. Obviously, investigators can study people's understanding of societal norms in low impact situations. However, they should not try to draw inferences about how much people care about justice from the way they play their parts in experi- mental simulations with minimal outcomes. Studying justice norms in these low impact contexts can lead to misleading inferences about the relative importance of justice and self-interest. Impression Management in Surveys: Reactions to Procedures or Attitude-Consistent Responses Experimental simulations with minimal incentives are not the only commonly used form of low impact re- search. Much of the procedural justice research has employed survey methodologies, including structured interviews. In these situations, the motivation for re- spondents to present themselves in a favorable, or at least, acceptable, light can influence the findings and confuse their meaning. This is illustrated in the re- search reported by Tyler (1994) where the participants tried to present a coherent story of their encounters with authorities to someone interviewing them over the telephone. The purpose of this research was to assess the relative importance people attached to various as- pects of their treatment, "procedural justice," versus their outcomes, "distributive justice." However, how reliable were the participants' reports of their reactions to being treated fairly or getting what they deserved? To test their hypotheses, the investigators conducted telephone interviews with people whom they asked to recall a recent encounter with a legal authority (police, judge) in Study 1, or a work supervisor in Study 2. The respondents then answered a series of questions about the recalled event, focusing on their memories of how they felt about the treatment and the outcomes they re- ceived in terms of satisfaction and fairness, as well as their present feelings (e.g., how angry, pleased, or frus- trated they now felt) about their experiences with the authority figure. As is common in survey research, the investigators used the respondents' answers to those questions to create several measures that they treated as independ- ent, mediating, and dependent variables. For example, some of the independent variables were based on the respondents' reports of how they felt about their treat- ment and the outcomes they received. The mediating variables, judgments of how fairly they felt the proce- dures were and fairness of the outcomes, and the de- pendent variable, were derived from by their reactions to questions asking how angry or pleased they felt. The investigators employed sophisticated analyses to arrive at their conclusions about probable causes, in terms of prior treatment, of the participants' present feelings about the authorities. As it happened, however, the interviewers made the respondents acutely aware of their attitudes toward the authorities just prior to asking them to recall and re- spond to questions about a specific encounter. Addi- tional analyses strongly suggest that the respondents shaped their answers to the subsequent questions to be consistent with their salient attitudes. For example, treating all 26 variables, those designated as independ- ent, mediating, and dependent, as items comprising one attitude scale, yields a Cronbach Alpha of .87 for 393 LERNER Study 1, legal authorities; and .89 for Study 2, supervi- sors. Similarly, a principal component factor analysis indicates that in both Study 1 and Study 2, all variables load .54 or higher on the first unrotated principal com- ponent. These findings suggest that this study may be best understood as an assessment of the respondents' coherent portrayal of an event that was selected and colored by their salient attitudes toward that authority. In essence, as the additional analyses indicated, knowing the respondents' attitudes toward the police or courts was sufficient to predict virtually all of their re- sponses to the subsequent questions concerning their treatment in a specific encounter. Of course, one can- not completely rule out the possibility that how the re- spondents were treated by the authorities, and what outcomes occurred to each of them and their subse- quent feelings, were actually all consistently more or less positive or negative. That is not very plausible. Surveys and telephone interviews enable respon- dents to express their attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and describe their memories of past events, as well as fu- ture expectations and intentions to act. Typically, how- ever, they are low impact events and, in the absence of other compelling motivation, the participants' re- sponses are amenable to being influenced by their de- sire to provide normatively appropriate, or at least ac- ceptable, responses to the questions they are asked. In the example presented here, (Tyler, 1994), as in previ- ously published research (see e.g., Hessing, Elffers, & Weigel, 1988), the respondents' reports of what had transpired during their encounter with the authorities were significantly influenced by their desire to provide attitudinally coherent and consistent responses. Inves- tigators must recognize and control for the possible in- fluence of impression management motives to infer to what extent, or in what ways, justice considerations matter to their respondents. The Justice Motive and Self-Interest in High Impact Situations Thus far, the discussion has considered justice-re- lated heuristics as automatic reactions that may be elic- ited in minimal-impact situations, and, the various nor- mative expectations, including those related to justice and rational self-interest that appear in the participants' more thoughtful efforts to be good participants. How- ever, what happens to justice and self-interest motives in high impact contexts: those situations involving seri- ous deprivation, suffering, loss of esteem, humiliation, or significant amounts of desired resources? There is evidence suggesting that the awareness of an injustice can elicit several emotions: anger, guilt, shame, dis- gust, contempt, and sadness (Goldberg et al., 1999; Mikula et al., 1998; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). People feel impelled to act on those emotions and are motivated to eliminate or rectify the injustice. Justice heuristics are often involved in this process as the initial intuitive appraisal and response. More thoughtful considerations in the form of moral reason- ing may appear, as well, both in the initial appraisal of the injustice and the formation of a response to main- tain or reestablish justice. No consensus has converged on how justice and self-interested motives interact in people's lives. Is one more important than the other? If more than one is elic- ited, do they blend, somehow'? Alternatively, if they are elicited in sequence, will the former, or maybe the latter, prevail? One can easily conjecture that in circumstances where one is weakly elicited whereas the other seems to be more strongly engaged, then either self-interested or justice-based reactions may appear. And, of course, there are variants of the familiar "rational choice" model that assume some form of more or less conscious and more or less rational search for and processing of the available information to arrive at a self-benefiting re- sponse. However, before settling for any set of assump- tions, it is probably wise to consider some of the avail- able evidence of how people behave in personally meaningful and engaging contexts. Examples of Justice Motivation Precluding the Appearance of Self-Interested Desires People's behavior and judgments in three person- ally engaging, high impact, situations provide in- stances when justice motivation appears to have pre- cluded or overcome self-interest. In the first, the participants were either the recipient or the observer of a vicious verbal assault. Meindl and Lerner (1983) enlisted their participants to earn money, ostensibly, to test parlor games for a commercial firm. The experimenter arranged for them to believe they and three other participants were in separate rooms. As a preparation exercise, they were each to describe in turn to the others the strategy they would employ to play the game they were given. The last participant, having listened to the others, instead of describing his strategy, launched into a vicious verbal assault of either the participant, another participant who had been des- ignated his partner, or the perpetrator's own partner. Subsequently, the experimenter, who was unaware of what had transpired, offered the participant the oppor- tunity to either test a game that would earn him consid- erable additional pay or confront the perpetrator in a game that would be costly to both of them. Overall, the vast majority of participants in three related experi- ments elected the costly opportunity to punish the per- petrator when their partner was the victim, although their actually fictitious partner would have no way of knowing their choice. This effect appeared in a less strong form when the participant was the target. 394 JUSTICE MOTIVE FOUND AND LOST In the second set of experiments, Miller (1977) varied the incentives presented in a communication that offered his participants the opportunity to work for up to 20 sessions. In some cases, the participants were offered $2 per hr and in others, $3, amounts that pretesting had established as within the limits of fair pay. He also varied whether $1 per hr would be de- ducted from their pay to provide support for a com- pellingly portrayed needy family. The results of the experiments revealed that deducting $1 from the $2 reliably reduced their desire to work as revealed in the number of sessions they elected. However, de- ducting the same amount for the family from $3 led to considerably greater willingness to work than if they were allowed to keep the entire amount for themselves. The reasoning confirmed by the data was that deducting $1 from $2 would lead to unfair pay- ment for them, but deducting $1 from $3 would leave them with the fair pay of $2 and also allow them to reduce the unjust suffering of the family. Apparently, the participants cared not only about their own de- serving, but also about justice for the suffering fam- ily. The latter was considerably more motivating than the opportunity to maximize their own pay. Those findings gain added significance when one considers that similar participants, given descriptions of one of the alternatives, predicted that they and their friends would be most motivated by the opportunity to keep the money for themselves and any money given to the families would be a distinct disincentive (Miller, 1975). Apparently, the participants knew and em- ployed the norm of self-interest in their honest predic- tions of what would motivate them and other people. In fact, although, when placed in the situation where one's behavior could make a real difference, they were more highly motivated by both their own deserving and the injustice to others. The third experiment provided a dramatic example of the powerful influence of the justice heuristic, "bad things happen to bad people." Rubin and Peplau (1973) studied the reactions of young men who were vulnerable to the outcome of the draft lottery instituted at the height of the Vietnam War. They arranged for groups of these young men to complete a series of scales and measures just prior to and just after learning their fates in the lot- tery. In this manner, Rubin and Peplau were able to show that a third of their participants who learned they were certain to be drafted and sent to Vietnam reliably low- ered their self-esteem, whereas the other more fortunate participants did not. Their results also indicated that the victims did not generally lower their evaluations of ev- eryone as a function of a depressed mood. Why would these most unfortunate young men also inflict addi- tional pain on themselves? That would appear to be completely contrary to their self-interest. It seems that these victims of the draft lottery were secondarily vic- timized by their own automatic reactions to learning that 'chance" had determined they would be drafted and go to Vietnam. In two of these high impact experiments, the re- search participants willingly gave up the opportunity to earn more money for themselves to follow the dictates of justice: in one case to punish a perpetrator, and in the other to help innocent victims. In the third, the partici- pants denigrated their self-worth in response to a "chance" determined assignment to a terrible fate. One can find evidence of both heuristic and systematic pro- cesses in these three examples. In at least one example, the initial heuristic reaction and attendant emotions seemed to preclude the participants' attention to and systematic processing of other information to arrive at a more self serving response. What Happens When People Become Aware of a Serious Injustice? The previously described findings naturally lead to the question of what occurs, psychologically, in high impact rather than low impact situations. To begin with, if the injustice is vivid and compelling, then the automatic intuitive response, if not altered by subse- quent appraisals, will be accompanied by strong emo- tions, typically, but not exclusively, anger (Mikula et al., 1998). Given, also, the possibility of relatively great potential losses and gains to the person, why would people not be additionally motivated to engage in systematic thought processes guided by direct or en- lightened self-interest? Apparently, that did not happen among the participants in the experiments by Meindl and Lerner (1983), Miller (1977), and Rubin and Peplau (1973), although their reactions were obviously quite costly. Why not? One reason, suggested by recent evidence, is that the awareness of the suffering of an innocent victim may sensitize the person to explicitly justice-related cues and a preconscious occupation with justice-re- lated cognitions rather than those associated with goal acquisition or defensive concerns. For example, Hafer (2000) found that witnesses of a serious injus- tice required longer recognition times in a subsequent "Stroop" color identification task when the stimulus words, although not consciously recognizable, con- tained explicit justice-related content. Moreover, the extent of this interference, indicating preoccupation and concern, was predictive of the witnesses derogat- ing the victim, presumably as an attempt to restore justice. An important and relevant effect of that preoccupa- tion is that there would be correspondingly less cogni- tive resources available for attending to and engaging in more systematic thought processes or the influence of other motives. Consequently, the initial intuitive ap- praisal of the injustice and accompanying emotional arousal generate the prevailing modes of response. As 395 LERNER a result, the person would not have the cognitive re- sources or the incentive needed to consider self-inter- est, enlightened or otherwise. To be sure, it seems plau- sible that vivid attention-gaining cues might be sufficient to interrupt this justice-dominated process. How this might occur requires more exploration, espe- cially if the initial emotions were strongly felt or might be easily reinstigated, as in the often seemingly intrac- table and implacable pursuit of retribution and revenge (Meindl & Lerner, 1983). Typically, however, in the absence of reinstigation, the strength of the emotions can be expected to weaken over time with increasing opportunity, then, for the person to arrive at reactions that are more thoughtful. As the emotional arousal dissipates, the person be- comes more receptive to incentives that elicit thought- ful reactions. This is illustrated in experiments that em- ployed a vivid bullying situation to arouse the emotion of anger in the participants (J. S. Lerner et al., 1998). The film portrayal was sufficiently effective so that even in the next situation the participants exhibited measurable degrees of punitive reactions to someone who was described as having negligently caused harm to others. The amount of punishment the participants assigned to the negligent character in the vignette was a direct function of the extent of their injustice-induced anger elicited in the initial situation. However, the sub- sequent effects of this justice heuristic, "bad outcomes are caused by bad people," was interrupted if the par- ticipants anticipated subsequently meeting a graduate student interested in discussing their reactions to the film clip. In this case, the participants' emotion-elicited punitive responses did not appear in their reactions to the perpetrator in the next situation. Rather than di- rectly related to the extent of their anger, their punitive responses were mediated by conventional rules for as- signing blame: their ratings of how avoidable was the harm, and how negligently responsible was the negli- gent person. A set of similar, but additionally illuminating, find- ings appeared in a second study employing the same ex- perimental situation (Goldberg et al., 1999). In this ex- periment, some of the participants were led to believe the bullies in the initial situation were caught and pun- ished. Those participants manifested somewhat differ- ent emotional and punitive reactions than the partici- pants who believed the bullies were not apprehended. When the participants believed the bullies were not ap- prehended and punished, their anger was the dominant emotion. The extent of that anger was directly related to the amount of punishment they assigned to the negligent perpetrator in the next situation: the greater their anger, the greater their subsequent tendency to be punitive. However, when the participants believed the bullies were punished, they remained as upset as the other par- ticipants did but their anger was no greater than other re- lated emotions. More importantly, their punitive reac- tions to the perpetrator in the second situation were me- diated by their more normatively appropriate assess- ments of the perpetrators' negligence. Knowing that justice had been done to the bullies, the participants' automatic reaction of anger leading to punishment was replaced by a more complex emo- tional response and more conventional assignments of blame and punishment to subsequent harm-doers. Ap- parently, when less preoccupied with past injustices, people can devote more attention and systematic thought to generating conventionally appropriate re- sponses to subsequent events. In high impact situations, when confronted with se- rious, emotion-arousing issues of justice-injustice, people focus their attention and actions toward reestab- lishing justice. If the justice motivation and emotional arousal are sufficiently strong, the imperative to act may narrow the focus of attention and thought. As a re- sult, people will be less responsive to other motiva- tional considerations, including self-interested goal ac- quisition and impression management. They may then give up considerable economic incentives to punish a harm-doer, work to help an innocent victim rather than increase their own profit, and they may even derogate their own self-worth after "chance" inflicted a terrible fate on them. Obviously, in these contexts, justice ap- pears as an important source of motivation distinct from the self-interested desires to maintain self-esteem and maximize profits. Summary and Conclusions The research and theory presented here offered an explanation for why the research literature of the past 30 years does not consistently confirm the distinctive importance of the justice motive in people's lives. The argument, in essence, pointed to the predominant use of research situations that did not arouse or motivationally engage their participants. In those con- texts, it was argued, people are primarily concerned with impression management and that means playing their parts as good cooperative participants while maintaining their public image and self-esteem. Justice can appear in the participants' reactions in those situa- tions as automatic intuitive judgments, or as the result of thoughtful efforts to do that which is most appropri- ate, given what the experimenter seems to expect of them. Participants understand that most people try to do whatever is least costly and most profitable for them unless required to do otherwise. In most cases, being sensible means putting one's own profit ahead of fair- ness for either oneself or others, as long as it is not ex- pressly forbidden. As Bazerman, et al. (1995) ob- served, for most people "it is easier to justify maximizing one's own payoff than to justify maximiz- ing fairness." 396 JUS TICE MOTIVE FOUND AND LOST In contrast to these norm-determined reactions, in- vestigators have shown that when research participants are emotionally aroused and motivated by instances of actual or threatened injustice, they will focus their at- tention and act in ways to maintain or restore justice, even when that is costly in terms of generally-desired resources. In those instances, as often occurs in peo- ple's lives, their desire for justice may become the dominant motive guiding their thoughts and behavior. Examining the processes involved may highlight the similarities and important differences between how justice appears in high and low impact situations. In both contexts, the initial appraisals of the event will be primarily determined by the relatively immediate and automatic heuristics that are elicited by the salient cues. Of course, those cues may elicit self-interest as well as justice heuristics. However, what distinguishes high versus low impact situations involving the justice motive is the extent of actual or threatened undeserved suffering and deprivation elicited by the initial ap- praisal. The greater and more vivid is the perceived in- justice, the greater will be the emotional arousal and motivation to restore justice. Over time, more thoughtfully generated systematic appraisals and responses may occur. Those directed by the elicited justice motivation may facilitate the restor- ing of justice or, in the form of moral reasoning (Shweder & Haidt, 1993), modify the extent of arousal and justice motivation and mode of restoring justice (see e.g., Goldberg et al., 1999; J. S. Lerner et al., 1998; M. J. Lerner, 1971; Simons & Piliavin, 1972). That subsequent systematic processing, however, requires time and cognitive resources (Epstein, Lipson, Hol- stein, & Huh, 1992; Shweder & Haidt, 1993) and those resources may not be sufficiently available in high im- pact situations if the initial heuristic-generated moral intuition elicited strong emotions and the imperative to restore justice. The effects of the initial appraisal may persist over time because of social evaluations and judgments formed by the initial appraisal, as well as memory or cue-based restimulation of the initial arousal. Evidence of this persistence can be found in initially highly aroused observers' relatively enduring "irrational" blaming of innocent victims, innocent vic- tim's self-blame, and self-blame by clearly accidental harm-doers. To be sure, moral systematic reasoning can also eventuate in emotional arousal and motivation to re- store justice. The differences between heuristic- and systematic-based justice reactions (moral intuition vs. moral reasoning) are most evident in the extent to which moral reasoning involves the systematic appli- cation of conventional rules for assessing deserving, the assignment of blame and culpability, and the resto- ration of justice. In low impact situations, for example when partici- pants' role-play in explicit simulations, responding to vignettes and interviews, they are minimally aroused and motivated by the initial heuristic-based appraisal. In the absence of compelling motives, the participants will be concerned, primarily, with impression manage- ment. That is, they will try to play their parts as cooper- ative participants while ensuring that they do nothing to embarrass themselves. As in high impact situations, issues of justice may appear in both heuristic and sys- tematic appraisals. However, in the absence of strong arousal and justice-based motivation, the participants will have sufficient time and cognitive resources to en- gage in systematic processing of information when that is appropriate to the task. Recently available evi- dence (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1995; Miller, 1999; Ratner & Miller, 2001) reveals that impression man- agement concerns may impel participants to publicly adhere to norms of rational self-interest rather than ex- press relatively costly preferences for fairness. Of course, there are contexts in which it is norma- tively appropriate to express allegiance to rules of fair- ness, but the evidence (Miller, 1999; Ratner & Miller, 2001) suggests that participants recognize that if they act fairly or helpfully when that would explicitly con- tradict their self-interest, they run the risk of being viewed as a deviant. To avoid that stigma, people may portray their relatively costly prosocial acts as arising from self-benefiting motives (Holmes et al., 2002). Es- sentially, then, the reason investigators have generally confirmed that justice appears in the service of self-in- terest is that the low impact situations they have em- ployed do not sufficiently elicit the justice motive and in its place they have elicited normatively appropriate rational or enlightened self-interest based on impres- sion management concerns. To summarize, the evidence presented here sug- gests the following propositions as the explanation for why the vast majority of research employing minimal situations did not discover a central and important jus- tice motive: I. The justice motive appears to have two forms: an automatically elicited relatively simple heuristic, that is, a moral intuition; and a set of moral judgments based on the application of conventionally accepted norms concerning fairness and deserving: "who" is en- titled to "what" from "whom." 2. Either of these forms ofjustice, as well as self-inl- terested heuristics and thoughtful efforts to promote self-interest, can be elicited by the salient cues available in situations. 3. In minimal situations, self-presentation is often the primary source of motivation and, consequently. consistency and enlightened self-interest as the domi- nant societal norms typically guide people's behavior and decisions. 4. In situations where people are confronted with matters of serious consequence, the emotions and re- 397 LERNER lated cognitions elicited by the initial justice heuristic may dominate the person's attention and shape the sub- sequent reactions to restore justice. Why may thejustice motive not be found again? This analysis suggests that the justice motive will remain "lost" as long as investigators continue to employ low impact situations, and fail to distinguish between norm enactment and justice-motivated behavior. Fortunately, a significant number of investigators have recently rec- ognized the need for a more complete understanding of what happens when the justice motive is fully engaged. For example, as described earlier, Hafer (2000), J. S. Lerner et al. (1998), and Goldberg et al. (1999) em- ployed very moving portrayals of innocent victims in their important research. In addition, several investiga- tors have conducted valuable research describing how justice-related attitudes (Bobocel, Son Hing, & Zanna, 2002), worldviews (Dalbert, 2001; Montada & Lerner, 1998), ideologies (Skitka & Tetlock, 1992, 1993), and strongly held moral convictions (Skitka, 2002) may ap- pear in the dialogues involving political and social is- sues. I hope that these valuable efforts arejust the begin- ning of a renewed interest in understanding how the theme of justice, including the motivation to maintain and reestablish justice, appears in people's lives. References Adams, J. S., (1963). Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 422-436. Bazerman, M. H., White, S. B., & Lowenstein, G. F. (1995). Percep- tions of fairness in interpersonal and individual choice situa- tions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 4, 39-42. Bobocel, D. R., Son Hing, L. S., & Zanna, M. P. (2002). Policies to redress social injustice: Is the concern forjustice a cause of both support and opposition? In M. Ross & D. Miller (Eds.), The jus- tice motive in everyday life (pp. 204-225). New York: Cam- bridge University Press. Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. ( 1999). Dual process theories in social psy- chology. New York: Guilford. Crosby, F. (1976). A model of egoistical relative deprivation. Psy- chological Review, 83, 85-113. Dalbert, C. (2001). The justice motive as a personal resource. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum. Epstein, S., Lipson, A., Holstein, C., & Huh, E. (1992). Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: Evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 328-339. Freedman, J. L., Wallington, S. A., & Bless, E. (1967). Compliance without pressure: The effects of guilt. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 117-124. Goldberg, J. H., Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (I1999). Rage and rea- son: The psychology of the intuitive prosecutor. European Journal oJ Social Psychology, 29, 781-795. Greenberg, J., & Cohen, R. L. (Eds.). (1982). Equity and justice in social behavior New York: Academic. Hafer, C. (2000). Do innocent victims threaten the belief in a just world? Evidence from a modified Stroop task. Journal of Per- sonalits and Social P.sRvchology, 79, 165-173. Hessing, D. J., Elffers, H., & Weigel, R. H. (1988). Exploring the limits of self-reports and reasoned action: An investigation of the psychology of tax evasion behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 405-413. Holmes, J. G., Miller, D. T.. & Lerner, M. J. (2002). Committing al- truism under the cloak of self-interest: The exchange fiction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 144-151. Lerner, J. S., Goldberg, J., & Tetlock, P. (1998). Sober second thoughts: The effects of accountability, anger, and authoritari- anism on attributions of responsibility. Personality and Social Psvchology Bulletin, 24, 563-574. Lerner, M. J. (1965). Evaluation of performances as a function of performer's reward and attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 355-360. Lerner, M. J. (1971). Observer's evaluation of a victim: Justice, guilt. and veridical perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chology, 20, 17-35. Lerner, M. J. ( 1975). The justice motive in social behavior: Introduc- tion. Journal of Social Issues, 31, 1-20. Lerner, M. J. (1982). Justice motive in human relations and the eco- nomic model of man. In V. Derlega & J. Grzelak (Eds.), Coop- eration and helping behavior (pp. 249-277). New York: Acade Press. Lerner, M. J. ( 1991). Integrating societal and psychological rules of entitlement: The basic task of each social actor and fundamen- tal problem for the social sciences. In R. Vermunt & H. Steensma (Eds.), Interpersonal justice in social relations (Vol. 1) (pp. 13-32). New York: Plenum. Lerner, M. J., & Simmons, C. H. (1966). The observer's reaction to the "innocent victim": Compassion or rejection? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 203-210. Levinson, H. (1994). Why the behemoths fell: Psychological roots of corporate failure. American Psychologist, 49, 428-436. Meindl, J., & Lerner, M. J. (I1983). The heroic motive in interpersonal relations.Journal of Experimental SocialPsychology, 19, 1-20. Meindl, J. R., & Lerner, M. J. (1984). Exacerbation of extreme re- sponses to an outgroup. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chology, 47, 7 1-84. Mikula, G., Scherer, K. R., & Athenstaedt, U. (1998). The role of in- justice in the elicitation of differential emotional reactions. Per- sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 769-783. Miller, D. T. (1975). Personal deserving vs. justicefor others: An ex- ploration of the justice motive. Unpublished doctoral disserta- tion, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada. Miller, D. T., (1977). Personal deserving and justice for others: An exploration of the justice motive. Journal of Experimental So- cial Psychology, 13, 1-13. Miller, D. T. (1999). The norm of self interest. American Psycholo- gist, 54, 1053-1060. Montada, L., & Lerner, M. J. (1998). Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world. New York: Plenum. Ratner, R. K., & Miller, D. T. (2001). The norm of self interest and its effects on social action. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chologv. 81, 5-16. Rivera, A. N., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1976). Public versus private reac- tions to positive inequity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 895-900. Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (con- tempt, anger, disgust) and three moral codes (community, au- tonomy, divinity). Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- ogy, 76, 574-586. Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. A. (1973). Belief in a just world and reac- tions to another's lot: A study of participants in the national draft lottery. Journal of Social Issues, 29, 73-93. Sears, D. O., & Lau, R. R. (1983). Inducing apparently self-inter- ested political preferences. American Journal of Political Sci- ence, 27. 223-252. 398 JUSTICE MOTIVE FOUND AND l OST Shweder, R. A., & Haidt, J., ( 1993) The lutuie of moral psychology: Truth, intuition, and the pluralist way. Psvchological Science. 4, 360-365. Simnons, C., & Piliavin, J. (1972). The effect of deception on reac- tions to a victimn. Journal of Pertsonalitv asnd Social Ptslchologs, 21, 56-60. Skitka, L. (2002). Do the means always justify the ends, or do the ends sometimes justify the means? A value protection model of justice reasoning. Per.sonalits and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 588-597. Skitka, L. J_. & Tetlock, P. E. (1992). Allocating aid: The roles of scarcity, ideology, causal attributions, and distributive norms. Journal o LExperinmental Social P.sychology, 29, 397-409. Skitka, L. J., & Tetlock, P. E. (1993). Providing public assistance: Cognitive and motivational processes underlying liberal and conservative policy preferences. Journal of Personality and So- cial P.sxchology, 65, 1205- 1223. Smith. L. (1994). Burned-out bosses. Fortune, 130, 44-52. Steensnma, H., & Vernmunt. R. ( 1991 ). So( ail jostice in luonan cla- tio0.1. Societal a1111 I/sy (chological (co0.sei qinciic of ju1sticc a(iil io/iisti( e (Vol 2). New York: Plenum. Stouller, S. A., Suchman, E. A., DeVinney, L. C.. Starr, S. A., & Wil- liarns. R. M. Jr. ( 1949). The Alericant.soldie; ,atljisilteit ii- ing arms life. Vol. 1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tlyler, T. R. ( 1994). Psychological models of the justice motive: An- tecedents of distributive and procedural Justice. Journal ot Per- SoIialitN, anld Social Pslschologx, 67, 850-863. Vermunt, R., & Steensma. H. (1991). Social justice in humnan rela- tions: Societal and ptsscliological otriginsl of justice (Vol. 1). New York: Plenum. Walster, E., Walster, G. W., & Berscheid, E. (1978). Equits. Tieots\ (lad i-eseacli-. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Weiner, B. ( 1993). On sin versus sickness: A theory of perceived re- sponsibility and social motivation. Alerican Psyvchologist, 48, 957-965. 399 </meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-wrap></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Adams, J. S.</surname></name>, (<year>1963</year>). <article-title>Toward an understanding of inequity</article-title>. <source>Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>67</volume>, <fpage>422</fpage>-<lpage>436</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Bazerman, M. H.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>White, S. B.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Lowenstein, G. F.</surname></name> (<year>1995</year>). <article-title>Perceptions of fairness in interpersonal and individual choice situations</article-title>. <source>Current Directions in Psychological Science</source>, <volume>4</volume>, <fpage>39</fpage>-<lpage>42</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Bobocel, D. R.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Son Hing, L. S.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Zanna, M. P.</surname></name> (<year>2002</year>). <article-title>Policies to redress social injustice: Is the concern for justice a cause of both support and opposition?</article-title> In <name name-style="western"><surname>M. Ross</surname></name> & <name name-style="western"><surname>D. Miller</surname></name> (Eds.), <source>The justice motive in everyday life</source> (pp. <fpage>204</fpage>-<lpage>225</lpage>). <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Cambridge University Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Chaiken, S.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Trope, Y.</surname></name> (<year>1999</year>). <source>Dual process theories in social psychology</source>. <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Guilford</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Crosby, F.</surname></name> (<year>1976</year>). <article-title>A model of egoistical relative deprivation</article-title>. <source>Psychological Review</source>, <volume>83</volume>, <fpage>85</fpage>-<lpage>113</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Dalbert, C.</surname></name> (<year>2001</year>). <source>The justice motive as a personal resource</source>. <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Kluwer Academic/Plenum</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Epstein, S.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Lipson, A.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Holstein, C.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Huh, E.</surname></name> (<year>1992</year>). <article-title>Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: Evidence for two conceptual systems</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>62</volume>, <fpage>328</fpage>-<lpage>339</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Freedman, J. L.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Wallington, S. A.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Bless, E.</surname></name> (<year>1967</year>). <article-title>Compliance without pressure: The effects of guilt</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>7</volume>, <fpage>117</fpage>-<lpage>124</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Goldberg, J. H.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, J. S.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Tetlock, P. E.</surname></name> (<year>1999</year>). <article-title>Rage and reason: The psychology of the intuitive prosecutor</article-title>. <source>European Journal of Social Psychology</source>, <volume>29</volume>, <fpage>781</fpage>-<lpage>795</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Greenberg, J.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Cohen, R. L.</surname></name> (Eds.). (<year>1982</year>). <source>Equity and justice in social behavior</source><publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Academic</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Hafer, C.</surname></name> (<year>2000</year>). <article-title>Do innocent victims threaten the belief in a just world? Evidence from a modified Stroop task</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personalits and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>79</volume>, <fpage>165</fpage>-<lpage>173</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Hessing, D. J.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Elffers, H.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Weigel, R. H.</surname></name> (<year>1988</year>). <article-title>Exploring the limits of self-reports and reasoned action: An investigation of the psychology of tax evasion behavior</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>54</volume>, <fpage>405</fpage>-<lpage>413</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Holmes, J. G.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Miller, D. T.</surname></name>. & <name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, M. J.</surname></name> (<year>2002</year>). <article-title>Committing altruism under the cloak of self-interest: The exchange fiction</article-title>. <source>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</source>, <volume>38</volume>, <fpage>144</fpage>-<lpage>151</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, J. S.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Goldberg, J.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Tetlock, P.</surname></name> (<year>1998</year>). <article-title>Sober second thoughts: The effects of accountability, anger, and authoritarianism on attributions of responsibility</article-title>. <source>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin</source>, <volume>24</volume>, <fpage>563</fpage>-<lpage>574</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, M. J.</surname></name> (<year>1965</year>). <article-title>Evaluation of performances as a function of performer's reward and attractiveness</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>1</volume>, <fpage>355</fpage>-<lpage>360</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, M. J.</surname></name> (<year>1971</year>). <article-title>Observer's evaluation of a victim: Justice, guilt. and veridical perception</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>20</volume>, <fpage>17</fpage>-<lpage>35</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, M. J.</surname></name> (<year>1975</year>). <article-title>The justice motive in social behavior: Introduction</article-title>. <source>Journal of Social Issues</source>, <volume>31</volume>, <fpage>1</fpage>-<lpage>20</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, M. J.</surname></name> (<year>1982</year>). <article-title>Justice motive in human relations and the economic model of man</article-title>. In <name name-style="western"><surname>V. Derlega</surname></name> & <name name-style="western"><surname>J. Grzelak</surname></name> (Eds.), <source>Cooperation and helping behavior</source> (pp. <fpage>249</fpage>-<lpage>277</lpage>). <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Acade Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, M. J.</surname></name> (<year>1991</year>). <article-title>Integrating societal and psychological rules of entitlement: The basic task of each social actor and fundamental problem for the social sciences</article-title>. In <name name-style="western"><surname>R. Vermunt</surname></name> & <name name-style="western"><surname>H. Steensma</surname></name> (Eds.), <source>Interpersonal justice in social relations</source> (Vol. 1) (pp. <fpage>13</fpage>-<lpage>32</lpage>). <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Plenum</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, M. J.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Simmons, C. H.</surname></name> (<year>1966</year>). <article-title>The observer's reaction to the “innocent victim”: Compassion or rejection?</article-title><source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>4</volume>, <fpage>203</fpage>-<lpage>210</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Levinson, H.</surname></name> (<year>1994</year>). <article-title>Why the behemoths fell: Psychological roots of corporate failure</article-title>. <source>American Psychologist</source>, <volume>49</volume>, <fpage>428</fpage>-<lpage>436</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Meindl, J.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, M. J.</surname></name> (<year>1983</year>). <article-title>The heroic motive in interpersonal relations</article-title>. <source>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</source>, <volume>19</volume>, <fpage>1</fpage>-<lpage>20</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Meindl, J. R.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, M. J.</surname></name> (<year>1984</year>). <article-title>Exacerbation of extreme responses to an outgroup</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>47</volume>, <fpage>71</fpage>-<lpage>84</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Mikula, G.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Scherer, K. R.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Athenstaedt, U.</surname></name> (<year>1998</year>). <article-title>The role of injustice in the elicitation of differential emotional reactions</article-title>. <source>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin</source>, <volume>24</volume>, <fpage>769</fpage>-<lpage>783</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Miller, D. T. (1975). <italic>Personal deserving vs. justice for others: An exploration of the justice motive</italic>. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Miller, D. T.</surname></name>, (<year>1977</year>). <article-title>Personal deserving and justice for others: An exploration of the justice motive</article-title>. <source>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</source>, <volume>13</volume>, <fpage>1</fpage>-<lpage>13</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Miller, D. T.</surname></name> (<year>1999</year>). <article-title>The norm of self interest</article-title>. <source>American Psychologist</source>, <volume>54</volume>, <fpage>1053</fpage>-<lpage>1060</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Montada, L.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Lerner, M. J.</surname></name> (<year>1998</year>). <source>Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world</source>. <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Plenum</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Ratner, R. K.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Miller, D. T.</surname></name> (<year>2001</year>). <article-title>The norm of self interest and its effects on social action</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>. <volume>81</volume>, <fpage>5</fpage>-<lpage>16</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Rivera, A. N.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Tedeschi, J. T.</surname></name> (<year>1976</year>). <article-title>Public versus private reactions to positive inequity</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>34</volume>, <fpage>895</fpage>-<lpage>900</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Rozin, P.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Lowery, L.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Imada, S.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Haidt, J.</surname></name> (<year>1999</year>). <article-title>The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity)</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>76</volume>, <fpage>574</fpage>-<lpage>586</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Rubin, Z.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Peplau, L. A.</surname></name> (<year>1973</year>). <article-title>Belief in a just world and reactions to another's lot: A study of participants in the national draft lottery</article-title>. <source>Journal of Social Issues</source>, <volume>29</volume>, <fpage>73</fpage>-<lpage>93</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Sears, D. O.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Lau, R. R.</surname></name> (<year>1983</year>). <article-title>Inducing apparently self-interested political preferences</article-title>. <source>American Journal of Political Science</source>, <volume>27</volume>. <fpage>223</fpage>-<lpage>252</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Shweder, R. A.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Haidt, J.</surname></name>, (<year>1993</year>) <article-title>The future of moral psychology: Truth, intuition, and the pluralist way</article-title>. <source>Psychological Science</source>. <volume>4</volume>, <fpage>360</fpage>-<lpage>365</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Simnons, C.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Piliavin, J.</surname></name> (<year>1972</year>). <article-title>The effect of deception on reactions to a victimn</article-title>. <source>Journal of Pertsonalitv and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>21</volume>, <fpage>56</fpage>-<lpage>60</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Skitka, L.</surname></name> (<year>2002</year>). <article-title>Do the means always justify the ends, or do the ends sometimes justify the means? A value protection model of justice reasoning</article-title>. <source>Personalits and Social Psychology Bulletin</source>, <volume>28</volume>, <fpage>588</fpage>-<lpage>597</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Skitka, L. J.</surname></name> & <name name-style="western"><surname>Tetlock, P. E.</surname></name> (<year>1992</year>). <article-title>Allocating aid: The roles of scarcity, ideology, causal attributions, and distributive norms</article-title>. <source>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</source>, <volume>29</volume>, <fpage>397</fpage>-<lpage>409</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Skitka, L. J.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Tetlock, P. E.</surname></name> (<year>1993</year>). <article-title>Providing public assistance: Cognitive and motivational processes underlying liberal and conservative policy preferences</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</source>, <volume>65</volume>, <fpage>1205</fpage>-<lpage>1223</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Smith. L.</surname></name> (<year>1994</year>). <article-title>Burned-out bosses</article-title>. <source>Fortune</source>, <volume>130</volume>, <fpage>44</fpage>-<lpage>52</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Steensnma, H.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Vernmunt. R.</surname></name> (<year>1991</year>). <source>Social justice in human relations: Societal and psychological consequences of justice and injustice</source> (Vol. 2). <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Plenum</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Stouffer, S. A.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Suchman, E. A.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>DeVinney, L. C.</surname></name>. <name name-style="western"><surname>Starr, S. A.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Williams. R. M. Jr.</surname></name> (<year>1949</year>). <source>The American soldier; adjustment during army life</source>. Vol. 1. <publisher-loc>Princeton, NJ</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Princeton University Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Tlyler, T. R.</surname></name> (<year>1994</year>). <article-title>Psychological models of the justice motive: Anteeedents of distributive and procedural Justice</article-title>. <source>Journal of Personality, and Social Psyscholog</source>, <volume>67</volume>, <fpage>850</fpage>-<lpage>863</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Vermunt, R.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Steensma. H.</surname></name> (<year>1991</year>). <source>Social justice in humnan relations: Societal and psychological origins of justice</source> (Vol. 1). <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Plenum</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Walster, E.</surname></name>, <name name-style="western"><surname>Walster, G. W.</surname></name>, & <name name-style="western"><surname>Berscheid, E.</surname></name> (<year>1978</year>). <source>Equits. Theory and research</source>. <publisher-loc>Boston</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Allyn & Bacon</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Weiner, B.</surname></name> (<year>1993</year>). <article-title>On sin versus sickness: A theory of perceived responsibility and social motivation</article-title>. <source>American Psychologist</source>, <volume>48</volume>, <fpage>957</fpage>-<lpage>965</lpage>.</citation></ref></ref-list></back></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" lang="en" contentType="CDATA"><title>The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Melvin J.</namePart><namePart type="family">Lerner</namePart><affiliation>University Of Waterloo and Florida Atlantic University</affiliation></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>SAGE Publications</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2003-11</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2003</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">Beginning shortly after the 2nd World War, 3 lines of research associated with relative deprivation, equity theory, and just world contributed to the description of the influence of the justice motive in people's lives. By the late 1960s, these converging lines of research had documented the importance of people's desire for justice;nevertheless,contemporary social psychologists typically portray this justice-driven motivation as simplyn a maniftstation of self-interest. The explanation for this failure to recognize a distinct and important justice motive points to the widespread reliance on research methods that elicit the participant's thoughtfully constructed narratives or role-playing responses. According to recent theoretical advances, these methods generate responses that reflect normative expectations of rational self-interest, and fail to capture the important effects of the emotionally generated imperatives of the justice motive.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Personality and Social Psychology Review</title><subTitle>An Official Journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.</subTitle></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">1088-8683</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1532-7957</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">PSR</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID-hwp">sppsr</identifier><part><date>2003</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>7</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>4</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>388</start><end>399</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1207/S15327957PSPR0704_10</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">10.1207_S15327957PSPR0704_10</identifier><recordInfo><recordContentSource>SAGE</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Rhénanie/explor/UnivTrevesV1/Data/Istex/Corpus
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 001371 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Istex/Corpus/biblio.hfd -nk 001371 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Wicri/Rhénanie
|area= UnivTrevesV1
|flux= Istex
|étape= Corpus
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:03B658EF4F1F2D489315D9EDDDFB645EED94433C
|texte= The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How they Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It Again
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.31. |  |