Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany
Identifieur interne : 001268 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001267; suivant : 001269Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany
Auteurs : Laszlo Goerke ; Markus PannenbergSource :
- LABOUR [ 1121-7081 ] ; 2012-06.
English descriptors
Abstract
We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9914.2011.00536.x
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1BLe document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany</title><author><name sortKey="Goerke, Laszlo" sort="Goerke, Laszlo" uniqKey="Goerke L" first="Laszlo" last="Goerke">Laszlo Goerke</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>IAAEG, University of Trier — Campus II, D‐54286 Trier, Germany, IZA, Bonn, Germany and CESifo, Munich, Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: goerke@iaaeg.de</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Pannenberg, Markus" sort="Pannenberg, Markus" uniqKey="Pannenberg M" first="Markus" last="Pannenberg">Markus Pannenberg</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>University of Applied Sciences Bielefeld, DIW, Berlin, Germany and IZA, Bonn, Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: goerke@iaaeg.de</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B</idno><date when="2012" year="2012">2012</date><idno type="doi">10.1111/j.1467-9914.2011.00536.x</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">001268</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">001268</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany</title><author><name sortKey="Goerke, Laszlo" sort="Goerke, Laszlo" uniqKey="Goerke L" first="Laszlo" last="Goerke">Laszlo Goerke</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>IAAEG, University of Trier — Campus II, D‐54286 Trier, Germany, IZA, Bonn, Germany and CESifo, Munich, Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: goerke@iaaeg.de</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Pannenberg, Markus" sort="Pannenberg, Markus" uniqKey="Pannenberg M" first="Markus" last="Pannenberg">Markus Pannenberg</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>University of Applied Sciences Bielefeld, DIW, Berlin, Germany and IZA, Bonn, Germany</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: goerke@iaaeg.de</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">LABOUR</title><idno type="ISSN">1121-7081</idno><idno type="eISSN">1467-9914</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2012-06">2012-06</date><biblScope unit="volume">26</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="156">156</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="173">173</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">1121-7081</idno></series><idno type="istex">F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-9914.2011.00536.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">LABR536</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">1121-7081</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="KwdEn" xml:lang="en"><term>J51</term><term>J52</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>wiley</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Laszlo Goerke</name><affiliations><json:string>IAAEG, University of Trier — Campus II, D‐54286 Trier, Germany, IZA, Bonn, Germany and CESifo, Munich, Germany</json:string><json:string>E-mail: goerke@iaaeg.de</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Markus Pannenberg</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Applied Sciences Bielefeld, DIW, Berlin, Germany and IZA, Bonn, Germany</json:string><json:string>E-mail: goerke@iaaeg.de</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><subject><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>J51</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>J52</value></json:item></subject><articleId><json:string>LABR536</json:string></articleId><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>6.356</score><pdfVersion>1.3</pdfVersion><pdfPageSize>484.7 x 697.3 pts</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractCharCount>741</abstractCharCount><pdfWordCount>8742</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>51000</pdfCharCount><pdfPageCount>18</pdfPageCount><abstractWordCount>113</abstractWordCount></qualityIndicators><title>Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany</title><refBibs><json:item><author><json:item><name>S. Andersen</name></json:item><json:item><name>G. W. Harrison</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. I. Lau</name></json:item><json:item><name>E. E. Rutström</name></json:item></author><host><volume>49</volume><pages><last>1112</last><first>1091</first></pages><author></author><title>International Economic Review</title></host><title>‘Lost in State Space: Are Preferences Stable?’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>V. Antcliff</name></json:item><json:item><name>R. Saundry</name></json:item></author><host><volume>47</volume><pages><last>121</last><first>100</first></pages><issue>1</issue><author></author><title>British Journal of Industrial Relations</title></host><title>‘Accompaniment, Workplace Representation and Disciplinary Outcomes in British Workplaces — Just a Formality?’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. B. Barsky</name></json:item><json:item><name>F. T. Juster</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. S. Kimball</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. D. Shapiro</name></json:item></author><host><volume>112</volume><pages><last>579</last><first>537</first></pages><author></author><title>Quarterly Journal of Economics</title></host><title>‘Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Study’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D. H. Blair</name></json:item><json:item><name>D. L. Crawford</name></json:item></author><host><volume>99</volume><pages><last>566</last><first>547</first></pages><author></author><title>Quarterly Journal of Economics</title></host><title>‘Labor Union Objectives and Collective Bargaining’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D. G. Blanchflower</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. Bryson</name></json:item></author><host><volume>77</volume><pages><last>109</last><first>92</first></pages><issue>305</issue><author></author><title>Economica</title></host><title>‘The Wage Impact of Trade Unions in the UK Public and Private Sectors’</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>‘Unemployment and Demand for Unions’</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. Blanden</name></json:item><json:item><name>S. Machin</name></json:item></author><host><volume>41</volume><pages><last>415</last><first>391</first></pages><issue>3</issue><author></author><title>British Journal of Industrial Relations</title></host><title>‘Cross‐generation Correlations of Union Status for Young People in Britain’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>H. Bonin</name></json:item></author><host><volume>38</volume><pages><last>164</last><first>147</first></pages><issue>2–3</issue><author></author><title>Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktforschung/Journal for Labor Market Research</title></host><title>‘Tarifpolitik, Entgeltflexibilität und Beschäftigung in Ostdeutschland’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>H. Bonin</name></json:item><json:item><name>T. Dohmen</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. Falk</name></json:item><json:item><name>D. Huffman</name></json:item><json:item><name>U. Sunde</name></json:item></author><host><volume>14</volume><pages><last>937</last><first>926</first></pages><issue>6</issue><author></author><title>Labour Economics</title></host><title>‘Cross‐sectional Earnings Risk and Occupational Sorting: The Role of Risk Attitudes’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. L. Booth</name></json:item></author><host><volume>94</volume><pages><last>898</last><first>883</first></pages><author></author><title>Economic Journal</title></host><title>‘A Public Choice Model of Trade Union Behaviour and Membership’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. L. Booth</name></json:item></author><host><volume>100</volume><pages><last>261</last><first>253</first></pages><author></author><title>Quarterly Journal of Economics</title></host><title>‘The Free Rider Problem and a Social Custom Model of Trade Union Membership’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. L. Booth</name></json:item></author><host><volume>16</volume><pages><last>64</last><first>50</first></pages><author></author><title>Labor Studies Journal</title></host><title>‘What Do Unions Do Now? A Study of the Provision by British Trade Unions of Benefits and Services to Their Members’</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Booth A. L. (1995) Economics of the Trade Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. L. Booth</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. L. Bryan</name></json:item></author><host><volume>57</volume><pages><last>421</last><first>402</first></pages><issue>3</issue><author></author><title>Industrial and Labor Relations Review</title></host><title>‘The Union Membership Wage–Premium Puzzle: Is There a Free‐rider Problem?’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. L. Booth</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. Chatterji</name></json:item></author><host><volume>45</volume><pages><last>41</last><first>23</first></pages><author></author><title>Oxford Economic Papers</title></host><title>‘Reputation, Membership and Wages in an Open Shop Trade Union’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. L. Booth</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. Chatterji</name></json:item></author><host><volume>105</volume><pages><last>360</last><first>345</first></pages><author></author><title>Economic Journal</title></host><title>‘Union Membership and Wage Bargaining When Membership Is Not Compulsory’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. W. Budd</name></json:item><json:item><name>I.‐G. Na</name></json:item></author><host><volume>18</volume><pages><last>807</last><first>783</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Labor Economics</title></host><title>‘The Union Membership Wage Premium for Employees Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. Caliendo</name></json:item><json:item><name>F. M. Fossen</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. S. Kritikos</name></json:item></author><host><volume>32</volume><pages><last>167</last><first>153</first></pages><author></author><title>Small Business Economics</title></host><title>‘Risk Attitudes of Nascent Entrepreneurs — New Evidence from an Experimentally Validated Survey’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. Caliendo</name></json:item><json:item><name>F. M. Fossen</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. S. Kritikos</name></json:item></author><host><volume>76</volume><pages><last>63</last><first>45</first></pages><issue>1</issue><author></author><title>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</title></host><title>‘The Impact of Risk Attitudes on Entrepreneurial Survival’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>O. Chouikhi</name></json:item><json:item><name>S. V. Ramani</name></json:item></author><host><volume>18</volume><pages><last>73</last><first>53</first></pages><issue>1</issue><author></author><title>Labour</title></host><title>‘Risk Aversion and the Efficiency Wage Contract’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>G. Corneo</name></json:item></author><host><volume>39</volume><pages><last>292</last><first>275</first></pages><author></author><title>European Economic Review</title></host><title>‘Social Custom, Management Opposition, and Trade Union Membership’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. Croson</name></json:item><json:item><name>U. Gneezy</name></json:item></author><host><volume>47</volume><pages><last>27</last><first>1</first></pages><issue>2</issue><author></author><title>Journal of Economic Literature</title></host><title>‘Gender Differences in Preferences’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. DiNardo</name></json:item><json:item><name>D. S. Lee</name></json:item></author><host><volume>119</volume><pages><last>1441</last><first>1383</first></pages><issue>4</issue><author></author><title>Quarterly Journal of Economics</title></host><title>‘Economic Impacts of New Unionization on Private Sector Employees: 1984–2001’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>T. Dohmen</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. Falk</name></json:item><json:item><name>D. Huffman</name></json:item><json:item><name>U. Sunde</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. Schupp</name></json:item><json:item><name>G. G. Wagner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>9</volume><pages><last>550</last><first>522</first></pages><issue>3</issue><author></author><title>Journal of the European Economic Association</title></host><title>‘Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants and Behavioral Consequences’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>C. Dustmann</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. Ludsteck</name></json:item><json:item><name>U. Schönberg</name></json:item></author><host><volume>124</volume><pages><last>881</last><first>843</first></pages><issue>2</issue><author></author><title>Quarterly Journal of Economics</title></host><title>‘Revisiting the German Wage Structure’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>P. Ellguth</name></json:item><json:item><name>S. Kohaut</name></json:item></author><host><volume>7/2005</volume><pages><last>406</last><first>398</first></pages><author></author><title>WSI-Mitteilungen</title></host><title>‘Tarifbindung und betriebliche Interessenvertretung: Aktuelle Ergebnisse aus dem IAB‐Betriebspanel’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>O. Eren</name></json:item></author><host><volume>62</volume><pages><last>380</last><first>367</first></pages><issue>3</issue><author></author><title>Industrial and Labor Relations Review</title></host><title>‘Does Membership Pay Off for Covered Workers? A Distributional Analysis of the Free Rider Problem’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. Fitzenberger</name></json:item><json:item><name>K. Kohn</name></json:item></author><host><volume>38</volume><pages><last>146</last><first>125</first></pages><issue>2–3</issue><author></author><title>Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktforschung/Journal for Labor Market Research</title></host><title>‘Gleicher Lohn für gleiche Arbeit? Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft und Lohnstruktur in Westdeutschland 1985–1997’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. Fitzenberger</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. Ernst</name></json:item><json:item><name>I. Haggeney</name></json:item></author><host><volume>119</volume><pages><last>263</last><first>223</first></pages><author></author><title>Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften</title></host><title>‘Wer ist noch Mitglied in Gewerkschaften?’</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>‘Union Density and Varieties of Coverage: The Anatomy of Union Wage Effects in Germany’</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. Freeman</name></json:item></author><host><volume>94</volume><pages><last>673</last><first>643</first></pages><issue>4</issue><author></author><title>Quarterly Journal of Economics</title></host><title>‘The Exit–Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure, Quits, and Separations’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. Frick</name></json:item></author><host><volume>10</volume><pages><last>430</last><first>407</first></pages><issue>2</issue><author></author><title>Labour</title></host><title>‘Co‐determination and Personnel Turnover: The German Experience’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>L. Goerke</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. Pannenberg</name></json:item></author><host><volume>5</volume><pages><last>504</last><first>481</first></pages><author></author><title>German Economic Review</title></host><title>‘Norm‐based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>L. Goerke</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. Pannenberg</name></json:item></author><host><author></author><title>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</title></host><title>‘Risk Aversion and Trade Union Membership’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>L. Goerke</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. Pannenberg</name></json:item></author><host><author></author><title>Labour Economics</title></host><title>‘Trade Union Membership and Dismissals’</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>‘PanelWhiz: A Menu‐Driven Stata/SE Interface for Accessing Panel Data’</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. K. G. Hildreth</name></json:item></author><host><volume>21</volume><pages><last>147</last><first>133</first></pages><issue>1</issue><author></author><title>Journal of Labor Research</title></host><title>‘Union Wage Differentials for Covered Members and Nonmembers in Great Britain’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>C. K. Hsee</name></json:item><json:item><name>E. U. Weber</name></json:item></author><host><volume>12</volume><pages><last>179</last><first>165</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Behavioral Decision Making</title></host><title>‘Cross‐national Differences in Risk Preferences and Lay Predictions’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. Ingham</name></json:item></author><host><volume>2</volume><pages><last>247</last><first>245</first></pages><author></author><title>Applied Economics Letters</title></host><title>‘Union Joining: An Empirical Test of the Social Custom Model’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>S. R. G. Jones</name></json:item><json:item><name>C. J. McKenna</name></json:item></author><host><volume>61</volume><pages><last>189</last><first>179</first></pages><author></author><title>Economica</title></host><title>‘A Dynamic Model of Union Membership and Employment’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. E. Kihlstrom</name></json:item><json:item><name>J.‐J. Laffont</name></json:item></author><host><volume>87</volume><pages><last>748</last><first>719</first></pages><issue>4</issue><author></author><title>Journal of Political Economy</title></host><title>‘A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>K. G. Knight</name></json:item><json:item><name>P. L. Latreille</name></json:item></author><host><volume>38</volume><pages><last>555</last><first>533</first></pages><issue>4</issue><author></author><title>British Journal of Industrial Relations</title></host><title>‘Discipline, Dismissals and Complaints to Employment Tribunals’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>W. Koevoets</name></json:item></author><host><volume>14</volume><pages><last>71</last><first>53</first></pages><author></author><title>Labour Economics</title></host><title>‘Union Wage Premiums in Great Britain: Coverage or Membership?’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>K. Kraft</name></json:item></author><host><volume>126</volume><pages><last>305</last><first>287</first></pages><issue>2</issue><author></author><title>Schmollers Jahrbuch</title></host><title>‘On Estimating the Effect of Co‐determination on Personnel Turnover’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>C. Lucifora</name></json:item></author><host><volume>16</volume><pages><last>376</last><first>353</first></pages><author></author><title>International Journal of Industrial Organization</title></host><title>‘The Impact of Unions on Labour Turnover in Italy: Evidence from Establishment Level Data’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. Marimon</name></json:item><json:item><name>F. Zillibotti</name></json:item></author><host><volume>44</volume><pages><last>1326</last><first>1291</first></pages><author></author><title>European Economic Review</title></host><title>‘Employment and Distributional Effects of Restricting Working Time’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>I. M. McDonald</name></json:item></author><host><volume>59</volume><pages><last>407</last><first>395</first></pages><author></author><title>Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies</title></host><title>‘Insiders and Trade Union Wage Bargaining’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. L. Medoff</name></json:item></author><host><volume>69</volume><pages><last>395</last><first>380</first></pages><issue>3</issue><author></author><title>American Economic Review</title></host><title>‘Layoffs under Trade Unions in U.S. Manufacturing’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D. R. Moreton</name></json:item></author><host><volume>14</volume><pages><last>527</last><first>511</first></pages><author></author><title>European Journal of Political Economy</title></host><title>‘An Open Trade Union Model of Wages, Effort and Membership’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D. R. Moreton</name></json:item></author><host><volume>51</volume><pages><last>344</last><first>322</first></pages><author></author><title>Oxford Economic Papers</title></host><title>‘A Model of Labour Productivity and Union Density in British Private Sector Unionised Establishments’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>R. Naylor</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. Cripps</name></json:item></author><host><volume>37</volume><pages><last>1620</last><first>1599</first></pages><author></author><title>European Economic Review</title></host><title>‘An Economic Theory of the Open Shop Trade Union’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>S. Nickell</name></json:item></author><host><volume>100</volume><pages><last>439</last><first>391</first></pages><author></author><title>Economic Journal</title></host><title>‘Unemployment: A Survey’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. J. Oswald</name></json:item></author><host><volume>92</volume><pages><last>595</last><first>576</first></pages><author></author><title>Economic Journal</title></host><title>‘The Microeconomic Theory of Trade Unions’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. Pannenberg</name></json:item></author><host><volume>106</volume><pages><last>226</last><first>223</first></pages><issue>3</issue><author></author><title>Economics Letters</title></host><title>‘Risk Attitudes and Reservation Wages of Unemployed Workers: Evidence from Panel Data’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>C. A. Pissarides</name></json:item></author><host><volume>82</volume><pages><last>1267</last><first>1255</first></pages><issue>6</issue><author></author><title>Journal of Political Economy</title></host><title>‘Risk, Job Search, and Income Distribution’</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>‘How Much Does Risk Tolerance Change?’</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. A. Sampson</name></json:item></author><host><volume>93</volume><pages><last>311</last><first>297</first></pages><author></author><title>Economic Journal</title></host><title>‘Employment Policy with a Rational Trade Union’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>C. Schnabel</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. Wagner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>38</volume><pages><last>32</last><first>5</first></pages><issue>1</issue><author></author><title>Industrial Relations Journal</title></host><title>‘Union Density and Determinants of Union Membership in 18 EU Countries: Evidence from Micro Data, 2002/03’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>E. J. Schumacher</name></json:item></author><host><volume>65</volume><pages><last>512</last><first>493</first></pages><issue>3</issue><author></author><title>Southern Economic Journal</title></host><title>‘What Explains Wage Differences Between Union Members and Covered Nonmembers?’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>K. L. Shaw</name></json:item></author><host><volume>14</volume><pages><last>653</last><first>626</first></pages><issue>4</issue><author></author><title>Journal of Labor Economics</title></host><title>‘An Empirical Analysis of Risk Aversion and Income Growth’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>W. K. Viscusi</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. E. Aldy</name></json:item></author><host><volume>27</volume><pages><last>76</last><first>5</first></pages><issue>1</issue><author></author><title>Journal of Risk and Uncertainty</title></host><title>‘The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates around the World’</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>‘The ICTWSS Database’</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>G. G. Wagner</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. R. Frick</name></json:item><json:item><name>J. Schupp</name></json:item></author><host><volume>127</volume><pages><last>169</last><first>139</first></pages><author></author><title>Schmollers Jahrbuch</title></host><title>‘The German Socio‐Economic Panel Study (SOEP) — Scope, Evolution, and Enhancements’</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. Wagner</name></json:item></author><host><volume>37</volume><pages><last>140</last><first>109</first></pages><author></author><title>Ifo-Studien</title></host><title>‘Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft und Arbeitseinkommen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’</title></json:item></refBibs><genre><json:string>article</json:string></genre><host><volume>26</volume><publisherId><json:string>LABR</json:string></publisherId><pages><total>18</total><last>173</last><first>156</first></pages><issn><json:string>1121-7081</json:string></issn><issue>2</issue><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><eissn><json:string>1467-9914</json:string></eissn><title>LABOUR</title><doi><json:string>10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9914</json:string></doi></host><categories><wos></wos><scienceMetrix><json:string>economic & social sciences</json:string><json:string>economics & business </json:string><json:string>economics</json:string></scienceMetrix></categories><publicationDate>2012</publicationDate><copyrightDate>2012</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1111/j.1467-9914.2011.00536.x</json:string></doi><id>F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B</id><score>0.94978905</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany</title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><availability><p>© 2011 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd</p></availability><date>2012</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany</title><author xml:id="author-1"><persName><forename type="first">Laszlo</forename><surname>Goerke</surname></persName><email>goerke@iaaeg.de</email><affiliation>IAAEG, University of Trier — Campus II, D‐54286 Trier, Germany, IZA, Bonn, Germany and CESifo, Munich, Germany</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-2"><persName><forename type="first">Markus</forename><surname>Pannenberg</surname></persName><email>goerke@iaaeg.de</email><affiliation>University of Applied Sciences Bielefeld, DIW, Berlin, Germany and IZA, Bonn, Germany</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="j">LABOUR</title><idno type="pISSN">1121-7081</idno><idno type="eISSN">1467-9914</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9914</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2012-06"></date><biblScope unit="volume">26</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="156">156</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="173">173</biblScope></imprint></monogr><idno type="istex">F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-9914.2011.00536.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">LABR536</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2012</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.</p></abstract><textClass xml:lang="en"><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>keywords</head><item><term>J51</term></item><item><term>J52</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2012-06">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component version="2.0" type="serialArticle" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><publisherInfo><publisherName>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisherName><publisherLoc>Oxford, UK</publisherLoc></publisherInfo><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9914</doi><issn type="print">1121-7081</issn><issn type="electronic">1467-9914</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="LABR"></id><id type="publisherDivision" value="ST"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title type="main" sort="LABOUR">LABOUR</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="06102"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/labr.2012.26.issue-2</doi><numberingGroup><numbering type="journalVolume" number="26">26</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue" number="2">2</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2012-06">June 2012</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" type="article" position="2" status="forIssue"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/j.1467-9914.2011.00536.x</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="LABR536"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count type="pageTotal" number="18"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="tocHeading1">Original Articles</title></titleGroup><copyright>© 2011 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd</copyright><eventGroup><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:BPG_TO_WML3G version:3.1.5 mode:FullText" date="2012-05-21"></event><event type="publishedOnlineEarlyUnpaginated" date="2011-12-12"></event><event type="firstOnline" date="2011-12-12"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2012-05-21"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:3.8.8" date="2014-02-06"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.3.4 mode:FullText" date="2015-02-25"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst" number="156">156</numbering><numbering type="pageLast" number="173">173</numbering></numberingGroup><correspondenceTo>Laszlo Goerke (author for correspondence), IAAEG, University of Trier — Campus II, D‐54286 Trier, Germany, IZA, Bonn, Germany and CESifo, Munich, Germany. E‐mail: <email>goerke@iaaeg.de</email>— Markus Pannenberg (University of Applied Sciences Bielefeld, DIW, Berlin, Germany and IZA, Bonn, Germany).</correspondenceTo><objectNameGroup><objectName elementName="appendix">Appendix</objectName></objectNameGroup><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:LABR.LABR536.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="1"></count><count type="tableTotal" number="3"></count><count type="formulaTotal" number="10"></count><count type="referenceTotal" number="64"></count><count type="wordTotal" number="9083"></count><count type="linksPubMed" number="0"></count><count type="linksCrossRef" number="0"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main">Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany</title><title type="shortAuthors">Laszlo Goerke — Markus Pannenberg</title><title type="short">Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany</title></titleGroup><creators><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr1" affiliationRef="#a1" corresponding="yes"><personName><givenNames>Laszlo</givenNames><familyName>Goerke</familyName></personName></creator><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr2" affiliationRef="#a2" corresponding="yes"><personName><givenNames>Markus</givenNames><familyName>Pannenberg</familyName></personName></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="a1" countryCode="DE"><unparsedAffiliation>IAAEG, University of Trier — Campus II, D‐54286 Trier, Germany, IZA, Bonn, Germany and CESifo, Munich, Germany</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation><affiliation xml:id="a2" countryCode="DE"><unparsedAffiliation>University of Applied Sciences Bielefeld, DIW, Berlin, Germany and IZA, Bonn, Germany</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation></affiliationGroup><keywordGroup xml:lang="en"><keyword xml:id="k1">J51</keyword><keyword xml:id="k2">J52</keyword></keywordGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><title type="main">Abstract</title><p>We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta><noteGroup><note xml:id="fn1"><p>We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful advice and take the blame for any remaining inadequacies of the paper.</p></note></noteGroup></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated" lang="en"><title>Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Laszlo</namePart><namePart type="family">Goerke</namePart><affiliation>IAAEG, University of Trier — Campus II, D‐54286 Trier, Germany, IZA, Bonn, Germany and CESifo, Munich, Germany</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: goerke@iaaeg.de</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Markus</namePart><namePart type="family">Pannenberg</namePart><affiliation>University of Applied Sciences Bielefeld, DIW, Berlin, Germany and IZA, Bonn, Germany</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: goerke@iaaeg.de</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2012-06</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2012</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType><extent unit="figures">1</extent><extent unit="tables">3</extent><extent unit="formulas">10</extent><extent unit="references">64</extent><extent unit="words">9083</extent></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.</abstract><subject lang="en"><genre>keywords</genre><topic>J51</topic><topic>J52</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>LABOUR</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">1121-7081</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1467-9914</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9914</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">LABR</identifier><part><date>2012</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>26</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>2</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>156</start><end>173</end><total>18</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-9914.2011.00536.x</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">LABR536</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© 2011 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource>WILEY</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Rhénanie/explor/UnivTrevesV1/Data/Istex/Corpus
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 001268 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Istex/Corpus/biblio.hfd -nk 001268 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Wicri/Rhénanie
|area= UnivTrevesV1
|flux= Istex
|étape= Corpus
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:F2E7060D1A28E77967368584FB9503F1D6679F1B
|texte= Risk Aversion, Collective Bargaining, and Wages in Germany
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.31. |  |