On the Complex Definition of Risk: A Systems‐Based Approach
Identifieur interne : 000407 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000406; suivant : 000408On the Complex Definition of Risk: A Systems‐Based Approach
Auteurs : Yacov Y. HaimesSource :
- Risk Analysis [ 0272-4332 ] ; 2009-12.
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Abstract
The premise of this article is that risk to a system, as well as its vulnerability and resilience, can be understood, defined, and quantified most effectively through a systems‐based philosophical and methodological approach, and by recognizing the central role of the system states in this process. A universally agreed‐upon definition of risk has been difficult to develop; one reason is that the concept is multidimensional and nuanced. It requires an understanding that risk to a system is inherently and fundamentally a function of the initiating event, the states of the system and of its environment, and the time frame. In defining risk, this article posits that: (a) the performance capabilities of a system are a function of its state vector; (b) a system's vulnerability and resilience vectors are each a function of the input (e.g., initiating event), its time of occurrence, and the states of the system; (c) the consequences are a function of the specificity and time of the event, the vector of the states, the vulnerability, and the resilience of the system; (d) the states of a system are time‐dependent and commonly fraught with variability uncertainties and knowledge uncertainties; and (e) risk is a measure of the probability and severity of consequences. The above implies that modeling must evaluate consequences for each risk scenario as functions of the threat (initiating event), the vulnerability and resilience of the system, and the time of the event. This fundamentally complex modeling and analysis process cannot be performed correctly and effectively without relying on the states of the system being studied.
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01310.x
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A universally agreed‐upon definition of risk has been difficult to develop; one reason is that the concept is multidimensional and nuanced. It requires an understanding that risk to a system is inherently and fundamentally a function of the initiating event, the states of the system and of its environment, and the time frame. In defining risk, this article posits that: (a) the performance capabilities of a system are a function of its state vector; (b) a system's vulnerability and resilience vectors are each a function of the input (e.g., initiating event), its time of occurrence, and the states of the system; (c) the consequences are a function of the specificity and time of the event, the vector of the states, the vulnerability, and the resilience of the system; (d) the states of a system are time‐dependent and commonly fraught with variability uncertainties and knowledge uncertainties; and (e) risk is a measure of the probability and severity of consequences. The above implies that modeling must evaluate consequences for each risk scenario as functions of the threat (initiating event), the vulnerability and resilience of the system, and the time of the event. This fundamentally complex modeling and analysis process cannot be performed correctly and effectively without relying on the states of the system being studied.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>wiley</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Yacov Y. 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Haimes, Quarles Professor of Systems and Information Engineering, and Founding Director, Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems, University of Virginia, PO Box 400736, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA; tel: 434‐924‐3803; fax: 434‐924‐0865; .</p></note></author></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Risk Analysis</title><title level="j" type="sub">An International Journal</title><idno type="pISSN">0272-4332</idno><idno type="eISSN">1539-6924</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1539-6924</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Inc</publisher><pubPlace>Malden, USA</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2009-12"></date><biblScope unit="volume">29</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">12</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="1647">1647</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="1654">1654</biblScope></imprint></monogr><idno type="istex">9DC31A5B666222023EF75F31BE1347E6CF48C571</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01310.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">RISA1310</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2009</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The premise of this article is that risk to a system, as well as its vulnerability and resilience, can be understood, defined, and quantified most effectively through a systems‐based philosophical and methodological approach, and by recognizing the central role of the system states in this process. A universally agreed‐upon definition of risk has been difficult to develop; one reason is that the concept is multidimensional and nuanced. It requires an understanding that risk to a system is inherently and fundamentally a function of the initiating event, the states of the system and of its environment, and the time frame. In defining risk, this article posits that: (a) the performance capabilities of a system are a function of its state vector; (b) a system's vulnerability and resilience vectors are each a function of the input (e.g., initiating event), its time of occurrence, and the states of the system; (c) the consequences are a function of the specificity and time of the event, the vector of the states, the vulnerability, and the resilience of the system; (d) the states of a system are time‐dependent and commonly fraught with variability uncertainties and knowledge uncertainties; and (e) risk is a measure of the probability and severity of consequences. The above implies that modeling must evaluate consequences for each risk scenario as functions of the threat (initiating event), the vulnerability and resilience of the system, and the time of the event. This fundamentally complex modeling and analysis process cannot be performed correctly and effectively without relying on the states of the system being studied.</p></abstract><textClass xml:lang="en"><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>keywords</head><item><term>Definition of risk</term></item><item><term>resilience</term></item><item><term>state variables</term></item><item><term>systems approach</term></item><item><term>threat</term></item><item><term>time frame</term></item><item><term>vulnerability</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2009-12">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><extension>txt</extension><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/9DC31A5B666222023EF75F31BE1347E6CF48C571/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component version="2.0" type="serialArticle" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><publisherInfo><publisherName>Blackwell Publishing Inc</publisherName><publisherLoc>Malden, USA</publisherLoc></publisherInfo><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1111/(ISSN)1539-6924</doi><issn type="print">0272-4332</issn><issn type="electronic">1539-6924</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="RISA"></id><id type="publisherDivision" value="ST"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title type="main" sort="RISK ANALYSIS">Risk Analysis</title><title type="subtitle">An International Journal</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="12012"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/risk.2009.29.issue-12</doi><numberingGroup><numbering type="journalVolume" number="29">29</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue" number="12">12</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2009-12">December 2009</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" type="article" position="2" status="forIssue"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01310.x</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="RISA1310"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count type="pageTotal" number="8"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="tocHeading1"><i>Original Research Articles</i></title></titleGroup><copyright>© 2009 Society for Risk Analysis</copyright><eventGroup><event type="firstOnline" date="2009-11-23"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2009-12-02"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:BPG_TO_WML3G version:2.3.5 mode:FullText source:FullText result:FullText" date="2010-04-07"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:4.0.1" date="2014-03-20"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.1.7 mode:FullText,remove_FC" date="2014-11-03"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst" number="1647">1647</numbering><numbering type="pageLast" number="1654">1654</numbering></numberingGroup><correspondenceTo> *Address correspondence to Yacov Y. Haimes, Quarles Professor of Systems and Information Engineering, and Founding Director, Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems, University of Virginia, PO Box 400736, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA; tel: 434‐924‐3803; fax: 434‐924‐0865; <email>haimes@virginia.edu</email>.</correspondenceTo><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:RISA.RISA1310.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="0"></count><count type="tableTotal" number="0"></count><count type="formulaTotal" number="2"></count><count type="referenceTotal" number="26"></count><count type="linksCrossRef" number="30"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main">On the Complex Definition of Risk: A Systems‐Based Approach</title><title type="shortAuthors"><b>Haimes</b></title><title type="short"><b>On the Complex Definition of Risk</b></title></titleGroup><creators><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr1" corresponding="yes"><personName><givenNames>Yacov Y.</givenNames><familyName>Haimes</familyName></personName></creator></creators><keywordGroup xml:lang="en"><keyword xml:id="k1">Definition of risk</keyword><keyword xml:id="k2">resilience</keyword><keyword xml:id="k3">state variables</keyword><keyword xml:id="k4">systems approach</keyword><keyword xml:id="k5">threat</keyword><keyword xml:id="k6">time frame</keyword><keyword xml:id="k7">vulnerability</keyword></keywordGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><p>The premise of this article is that risk to a system, as well as its vulnerability and resilience, can be understood, defined, and quantified most effectively through a systems‐based philosophical and methodological approach, and by recognizing the central role of the system states in this process. A universally agreed‐upon definition of risk has been difficult to develop; one reason is that the concept is multidimensional and nuanced. It requires an understanding that risk to a system is inherently and fundamentally a function of the initiating event, the states of the system and of its environment, and the time frame. In defining risk, this article posits that: (a) the <i>performance capabilities</i> of a system are a function of its state vector; (b) a system's <i>vulnerability</i> and <i>resilience vectors</i> are each a function of the input (e.g., initiating event), its time of occurrence, and the states of the system; (c) the <i>consequences</i> are a function of the specificity and time of the event, the vector of the states, the vulnerability, and the resilience of the system; (d) the <i>states</i> of a system are time‐dependent and commonly fraught with variability uncertainties and knowledge uncertainties; and (e) <i>risk</i> is a measure of the probability and severity of consequences. The above implies that modeling must evaluate consequences for each risk scenario as functions of the threat (initiating event), the vulnerability and resilience of the system, and the time of the event. This fundamentally complex modeling and analysis process cannot be performed correctly and effectively without relying on the states of the system being studied.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>On the Complex Definition of Risk: A Systems‐Based Approach</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated" lang="en"><title>On the Complex Definition of Risk</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>On the Complex Definition of Risk: A Systems‐Based Approach</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Yacov Y.</namePart><namePart type="family">Haimes</namePart><description>Correspondence: *Address correspondence to Yacov Y. Haimes, Quarles Professor of Systems and Information Engineering, and Founding Director, Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems, University of Virginia, PO Box 400736, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA; tel: 434‐924‐3803; fax: 434‐924‐0865; .</description><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Inc</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Malden, USA</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2009-12</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2009</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType><extent unit="formulas">2</extent><extent unit="references">26</extent></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">The premise of this article is that risk to a system, as well as its vulnerability and resilience, can be understood, defined, and quantified most effectively through a systems‐based philosophical and methodological approach, and by recognizing the central role of the system states in this process. A universally agreed‐upon definition of risk has been difficult to develop; one reason is that the concept is multidimensional and nuanced. It requires an understanding that risk to a system is inherently and fundamentally a function of the initiating event, the states of the system and of its environment, and the time frame. In defining risk, this article posits that: (a) the performance capabilities of a system are a function of its state vector; (b) a system's vulnerability and resilience vectors are each a function of the input (e.g., initiating event), its time of occurrence, and the states of the system; (c) the consequences are a function of the specificity and time of the event, the vector of the states, the vulnerability, and the resilience of the system; (d) the states of a system are time‐dependent and commonly fraught with variability uncertainties and knowledge uncertainties; and (e) risk is a measure of the probability and severity of consequences. The above implies that modeling must evaluate consequences for each risk scenario as functions of the threat (initiating event), the vulnerability and resilience of the system, and the time of the event. This fundamentally complex modeling and analysis process cannot be performed correctly and effectively without relying on the states of the system being studied.</abstract><subject lang="en"><genre>keywords</genre><topic>Definition of risk</topic><topic>resilience</topic><topic>state variables</topic><topic>systems approach</topic><topic>threat</topic><topic>time frame</topic><topic>vulnerability</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Risk Analysis</title><subTitle>An International Journal</subTitle></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0272-4332</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1539-6924</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1539-6924</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">RISA</identifier><part><date>2009</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>29</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>12</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>1647</start><end>1654</end><total>8</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">9DC31A5B666222023EF75F31BE1347E6CF48C571</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01310.x</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">RISA1310</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© 2009 Society for Risk Analysis</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource>WILEY</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Blackwell Publishing Inc</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods></metadata><enrichments><json:item><type>multicat</type><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/9DC31A5B666222023EF75F31BE1347E6CF48C571/enrichments/multicat</uri></json:item></enrichments><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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