Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability
Identifieur interne : 000E52 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000E51; suivant : 000E53Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability
Auteurs : Lucie Langer [Allemagne] ; Hugo Jonker [Luxembourg (pays)] ; Wolter Pieters [Pays-Bas]Source :
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science [ 0302-9743 ] ; 2010.
Abstract
Abstract: Anonymity and verifiability are crucial security requirements for voting. Still, they seem to be contradictory, and confusion exists about their precise meanings and compatibility. In this paper, we resolve the confusion by showing that both can be expressed in terms of (un)linkability: while anonymity requires unlinkability of voter and vote, verifiability requires linkability of voters and election result. We first provide a conceptual model which captures anonymity as well as verifiability. Second, we express the semantics of (un)linkability in terms of (in)distinguishability. Third, we provide an adversary model that describes which capabilities the attacker has for establishing links. These components form a comprehensive model for describing and analyzing voting system security. In a case study we use our model to analyze the security of the voting scheme Prêt à Voter. Our work contributes to a deeper understanding of anonymity and verifiability and their correlation in voting.
Url:
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_21
Affiliations:
- Allemagne, Luxembourg (pays), Pays-Bas
- District de Darmstadt, Hesse (Land), Overijssel
- Darmstadt, Enschede, Luxembourg
- Université de Twente, Université du Luxembourg
Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)
- to stream Istex, to step Corpus: 001033
- to stream Istex, to step Curation: 001033
- to stream Istex, to step Checkpoint: 000673
- to stream Main, to step Merge: 000E55
- to stream Main, to step Curation: 000E52
Le document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability</title>
<author><name sortKey="Langer, Lucie" sort="Langer, Lucie" uniqKey="Langer L" first="Lucie" last="Langer">Lucie Langer</name>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Jonker, Hugo" sort="Jonker, Hugo" uniqKey="Jonker H" first="Hugo" last="Jonker">Hugo Jonker</name>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Pieters, Wolter" sort="Pieters, Wolter" uniqKey="Pieters W" first="Wolter" last="Pieters">Wolter Pieters</name>
</author>
</titleStmt>
<publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno>
<idno type="RBID">ISTEX:75E2EB5E83478B3D62400111B79CCCBB5AB85C53</idno>
<date when="2010" year="2010">2010</date>
<idno type="doi">10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_21</idno>
<idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/75E2EB5E83478B3D62400111B79CCCBB5AB85C53/fulltext/pdf</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">001033</idno>
<idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">001033</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Curation">001033</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Checkpoint">000673</idno>
<idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Checkpoint">000673</idno>
<idno type="wicri:doubleKey">0302-9743:2010:Langer L:anonymity:and:verifiability</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Merge">000E55</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Curation">000E52</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Exploration">000E52</idno>
</publicationStmt>
<sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability</title>
<author><name sortKey="Langer, Lucie" sort="Langer, Lucie" uniqKey="Langer L" first="Lucie" last="Langer">Lucie Langer</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="3"><country>Allemagne</country>
<placeName><settlement type="city">Darmstadt</settlement>
<region type="land" nuts="1">Hesse (Land)</region>
<region type="district" nuts="2">District de Darmstadt</region>
</placeName>
<wicri:orgArea>Cryptography and Computer Algebra Group</wicri:orgArea>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><country wicri:rule="url">Allemagne</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Jonker, Hugo" sort="Jonker, Hugo" uniqKey="Jonker H" first="Hugo" last="Jonker">Hugo Jonker</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="4"><country>Luxembourg (pays)</country>
<placeName><settlement type="city">Luxembourg</settlement>
</placeName>
<orgName type="university">Université du Luxembourg</orgName>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><country wicri:rule="url">Luxembourg (pays)</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Pieters, Wolter" sort="Pieters, Wolter" uniqKey="Pieters W" first="Wolter" last="Pieters">Wolter Pieters</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="4"><country>Pays-Bas</country>
<placeName><settlement type="city">Enschede</settlement>
<region nuts="2">Overijssel</region>
</placeName>
<orgName type="university">Université de Twente</orgName>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><country wicri:rule="url">Pays-Bas</country>
</affiliation>
</author>
</analytic>
<monogr></monogr>
<series><title level="s">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</title>
<imprint><date>2010</date>
</imprint>
<idno type="ISSN">0302-9743</idno>
<idno type="eISSN">1611-3349</idno>
<idno type="ISSN">0302-9743</idno>
</series>
<idno type="istex">75E2EB5E83478B3D62400111B79CCCBB5AB85C53</idno>
<idno type="DOI">10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_21</idno>
<idno type="ChapterID">21</idno>
<idno type="ChapterID">Chap21</idno>
</biblStruct>
</sourceDesc>
<seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0302-9743</idno>
</seriesStmt>
</fileDesc>
<profileDesc><textClass></textClass>
<langUsage><language ident="en">en</language>
</langUsage>
</profileDesc>
</teiHeader>
<front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Abstract: Anonymity and verifiability are crucial security requirements for voting. Still, they seem to be contradictory, and confusion exists about their precise meanings and compatibility. In this paper, we resolve the confusion by showing that both can be expressed in terms of (un)linkability: while anonymity requires unlinkability of voter and vote, verifiability requires linkability of voters and election result. We first provide a conceptual model which captures anonymity as well as verifiability. Second, we express the semantics of (un)linkability in terms of (in)distinguishability. Third, we provide an adversary model that describes which capabilities the attacker has for establishing links. These components form a comprehensive model for describing and analyzing voting system security. In a case study we use our model to analyze the security of the voting scheme Prêt à Voter. Our work contributes to a deeper understanding of anonymity and verifiability and their correlation in voting.</div>
</front>
</TEI>
<affiliations><list><country><li>Allemagne</li>
<li>Luxembourg (pays)</li>
<li>Pays-Bas</li>
</country>
<region><li>District de Darmstadt</li>
<li>Hesse (Land)</li>
<li>Overijssel</li>
</region>
<settlement><li>Darmstadt</li>
<li>Enschede</li>
<li>Luxembourg</li>
</settlement>
<orgName><li>Université de Twente</li>
<li>Université du Luxembourg</li>
</orgName>
</list>
<tree><country name="Allemagne"><region name="Hesse (Land)"><name sortKey="Langer, Lucie" sort="Langer, Lucie" uniqKey="Langer L" first="Lucie" last="Langer">Lucie Langer</name>
</region>
<name sortKey="Langer, Lucie" sort="Langer, Lucie" uniqKey="Langer L" first="Lucie" last="Langer">Lucie Langer</name>
</country>
<country name="Luxembourg (pays)"><noRegion><name sortKey="Jonker, Hugo" sort="Jonker, Hugo" uniqKey="Jonker H" first="Hugo" last="Jonker">Hugo Jonker</name>
</noRegion>
<name sortKey="Jonker, Hugo" sort="Jonker, Hugo" uniqKey="Jonker H" first="Hugo" last="Jonker">Hugo Jonker</name>
</country>
<country name="Pays-Bas"><region name="Overijssel"><name sortKey="Pieters, Wolter" sort="Pieters, Wolter" uniqKey="Pieters W" first="Wolter" last="Pieters">Wolter Pieters</name>
</region>
<name sortKey="Pieters, Wolter" sort="Pieters, Wolter" uniqKey="Pieters W" first="Wolter" last="Pieters">Wolter Pieters</name>
</country>
</tree>
</affiliations>
</record>
Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Ticri/CIDE/explor/TelematiV1/Data/Main/Exploration
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 000E52 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Main/Exploration/biblio.hfd -nk 000E52 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien |wiki= Ticri/CIDE |area= TelematiV1 |flux= Main |étape= Exploration |type= RBID |clé= ISTEX:75E2EB5E83478B3D62400111B79CCCBB5AB85C53 |texte= Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability }}
This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.31. |