OpenAccessBelV2, PascalFrancis, Curation, bibRecord, 000052

The EU regulation on cross-border trade of electricity : A two-stage equilibrium model : A further step in decision support models for energy markets

Identifieur interne : 000052 ( PascalFrancis/Curation ); précédent : 000051; suivant : 000053

The EU regulation on cross-border trade of electricity : A two-stage equilibrium model : A further step in decision support models for energy markets

Auteurs : O. Daxhelet [Belgique] ; Y. Smeers [Belgique]

Source :

European journal of operational research [ 0377-2217 ] ; 2007.

RBID : Pascal:07-0203683

Descripteurs français

Pascal (Inist)
- Réglementation, Union européenne, Contrôle accès, Réseau accès, Réseau communication, Gestion réseau, Bien être économique, Régime hors équilibre, Equilibre Nash, Equilibre jeu, Défaut, Compétitivité, Marché concurrentiel, Equilibre marché, Fixation prix, Méthode numérique, Coordination, Modélisation, Enchère.
Wicri :
- topic : Compétitivité.

English descriptors

KwdEn :
- Access control, Access network, Bidding, Communication network, Competitiveness, Coordination, Defect, European Union, Game equilibrium, Market equilibrium, Modeling, Nash equilibrium, Network management, Non equilibrium conditions, Numerical method, Open market, Pricing, Regulation, Welfare.

Abstract

The regulation on cross-border exchanges of electricity in the European Union is meant to enhance the trade of electricity between Member States, by facilitating access to the network and improving the management of congestion at the interconnections. This paper presents a computational model that embeds these two features. The problem is cast in the form of a two-stage equilibrium between regional Regulators. In the first stage, they decide on the allocation of their regional network costs between generators and customers. Either they maximise their regional welfare non-cooperatively (Nash equilibrium), or they centralise the decision as a super-regulator (leading to a cooperative equilibrium). In the second-stage equilibrium, the consequences of first-stage's decisions are assessed by modelling the energy market as the result of imperfect competition equilibrium on competitive market, coupled with regulated pricing on the domestic less competitive markets. The "rules" that come out of the first-stage game largely influence the final equilibrium. We illustrate this on an extensive numerical example, showing that the model behaves properly and identifying policy issues worth of further investigations.

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A03		`1`		`@0 Eur. j. oper. res.`
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C01	`01`		`ENG`	@0 The regulation on cross-border exchanges of electricity in the European Union is meant to enhance the trade of electricity between Member States, by facilitating access to the network and improving the management of congestion at the interconnections. This paper presents a computational model that embeds these two features. The problem is cast in the form of a two-stage equilibrium between regional Regulators. In the first stage, they decide on the allocation of their regional network costs between generators and customers. Either they maximise their regional welfare non-cooperatively (Nash equilibrium), or they centralise the decision as a super-regulator (leading to a cooperative equilibrium). In the second-stage equilibrium, the consequences of first-stage's decisions are assessed by modelling the energy market as the result of imperfect competition equilibrium on competitive market, coupled with regulated pricing on the domestic less competitive markets. The "rules" that come out of the first-stage game largely influence the final equilibrium. We illustrate this on an extensive numerical example, showing that the model behaves properly and identifying policy issues worth of further investigations.
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C03	`04`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Réseau accès @5 09`
C03	`04`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Access network @5 09`
C03	`04`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Red acceso @5 09`
C03	`05`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Réseau communication @5 10`
C03	`05`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Communication network @5 10`
C03	`05`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Red de comunicación @5 10`
C03	`06`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Gestion réseau @5 11`
C03	`06`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Network management @5 11`
C03	`06`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Gestión red @5 11`
C03	`07`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Bien être économique @5 12`
C03	`07`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Welfare @5 12`
C03	`07`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Bienestar económico @5 12`
C03	`08`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Régime hors équilibre @5 13`
C03	`08`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Non equilibrium conditions @5 13`
C03	`08`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Régimen fuera equilibrio @5 13`
C03	`09`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Equilibre Nash @5 14`
C03	`09`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Nash equilibrium @5 14`
C03	`09`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Equilibrio Nash @5 14`
C03	`10`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Equilibre jeu @5 15`
C03	`10`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Game equilibrium @5 15`
C03	`10`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Equilibrio juego @5 15`
C03	`11`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Défaut @5 16`
C03	`11`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Defect @5 16`
C03	`11`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Defecto @5 16`
C03	`12`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Compétitivité @5 17`
C03	`12`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Competitiveness @5 17`
C03	`12`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Competitividad @5 17`
C03	`13`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Marché concurrentiel @5 18`
C03	`13`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Open market @5 18`
C03	`13`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Libre mercado @5 18`
C03	`14`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Equilibre marché @5 19`
C03	`14`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Market equilibrium @5 19`
C03	`14`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Equilibrio mercado @5 19`
C03	`15`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Fixation prix @5 20`
C03	`15`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Pricing @5 20`
C03	`15`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Fijación precios @5 20`
C03	`16`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Méthode numérique @5 21`
C03	`16`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Numerical method @5 21`
C03	`16`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Método numérico @5 21`
C03	`17`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Coordination @5 22`
C03	`17`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Coordination @5 22`
C03	`17`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Coordinación @5 22`
C03	`18`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Modélisation @5 23`
C03	`18`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Modeling @5 23`
C03	`18`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Modelización @5 23`
C03	`19`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Enchère @5 24`
C03	`19`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Bidding @5 24`
C03	`19`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Subasta @5 24`
N21				`@1 141`
N44	`01`			`@1 OTO`
N82				`@1 OTO`

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Le document en format XML

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<s5>17</s5>
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<s5>17</s5>
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<s5>19</s5>
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<s5>21</s5>
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<s5>21</s5>
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<fC03 i1="17" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Coordination</s0>
<s5>22</s5>
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<s5>24</s5>
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<fN21><s1>141</s1>
</fN21>
<fN44 i1="01"><s1>OTO</s1>
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   |texte=   The EU regulation on cross-border trade of electricity : A two-stage equilibrium model : A further step in decision support models for energy markets
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The EU regulation on cross-border trade of electricity : A two-stage equilibrium model : A further step in decision support models for energy markets

The EU regulation on cross-border trade of electricity : A two-stage equilibrium model : A further step in decision support models for energy markets

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