Property Enforcement as Organized Consent
Identifieur interne : 001928 ( Main/Curation ); précédent : 001927; suivant : 001929Property Enforcement as Organized Consent
Auteurs : Benito Arrun Ada [Espagne]Source :
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization [ 8756-6222 ] ; 2003-10.
Abstract
This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that make property rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing the collateral value of assets, and promoting growth. In contrast to contractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affected only with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement but is costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in the same asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consents to overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs: recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights, and even a regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionally similar services, but their relative performance varies with the number of transactions, the risk of political opportunism, and regulatory consistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowing competition in the preparation and support of private contracts while requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registration activities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.
Url:
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewg016
Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)
- to stream Istex, to step Corpus: Pour aller vers cette notice dans l'étape Curation :001B51
- to stream Istex, to step Curation: Pour aller vers cette notice dans l'étape Curation :001A41
- to stream Istex, to step Checkpoint: Pour aller vers cette notice dans l'étape Curation :001344
- to stream Main, to step Merge: Pour aller vers cette notice dans l'étape Curation :001937
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:6AC0A60C6AC9EE0791199811089EE5DC3567D244Le document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">Property Enforcement as Organized Consent</title><author wicri:is="90%"><name sortKey="Arrun Ada, Benito" sort="Arrun Ada, Benito" uniqKey="Arrun Ada B" first="Benito" last="Arrun Ada">Benito Arrun Ada</name></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:6AC0A60C6AC9EE0791199811089EE5DC3567D244</idno><date when="2003" year="2003">2003</date><idno type="doi">10.1093/jleo/ewg016</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/6AC0A60C6AC9EE0791199811089EE5DC3567D244/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">001B51</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Curation">001A41</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Checkpoint">001344</idno><idno type="wicri:doubleKey">8756-6222:2003:Arrun Ada B:property:enforcement:as</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Merge">001937</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Curation">001928</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Property Enforcement as Organized Consent</title><author wicri:is="90%"><name sortKey="Arrun Ada, Benito" sort="Arrun Ada, Benito" uniqKey="Arrun Ada B" first="Benito" last="Arrun Ada">Benito Arrun Ada</name><affiliation wicri:level="4"><country>Espagne</country><placeName><settlement type="city">Barcelone</settlement><region nuts="2" type="region">Catalogne</region></placeName><orgName type="university">Université Pompeu Fabra</orgName></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">JLEO</title><idno type="ISSN">8756-6222</idno><idno type="eISSN">1465-7341</idno><imprint><publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher><date type="published" when="2003-10">2003-10</date><biblScope unit="volume">19</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="401">401</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="444">444</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">8756-6222</idno></series><idno type="istex">6AC0A60C6AC9EE0791199811089EE5DC3567D244</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1093/jleo/ewg016</idno><idno type="local">ewg016</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">8756-6222</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that make property rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing the collateral value of assets, and promoting growth. In contrast to contractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affected only with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement but is costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in the same asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consents to overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs: recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights, and even a regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionally similar services, but their relative performance varies with the number of transactions, the risk of political opportunism, and regulatory consistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowing competition in the preparation and support of private contracts while requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registration activities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.</div></front></TEI></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Belgique/explor/OpenAccessBelV2/Data/Main/Curation
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 001928 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Main/Curation/biblio.hfd -nk 001928 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Wicri/Belgique
|area= OpenAccessBelV2
|flux= Main
|étape= Curation
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:6AC0A60C6AC9EE0791199811089EE5DC3567D244
|texte= Property Enforcement as Organized Consent
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.25. |  |