Looking for zero-sum or win-win outcomes: A game-theoretical analysis of the fair use debate
Identifieur interne : 001838 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001837; suivant : 001839Looking for zero-sum or win-win outcomes: A game-theoretical analysis of the fair use debate
Auteurs : Yu-Lin ChangSource :
- International Journal of Law and Information Technology [ 0967-0769 ] ; 2007-09-28.
Abstract
DRM (Digital Rights Management) affects the traditional doctrine of fair use. Currently the fair use debate in essence involves an interest conflict between the information industries and the individual user. That is, industry prefers fared use while the users preference is for traditional free use. In order to make the fair use solution feasible, it depends heavily on the industry and users willingness to obey the final outcome. This paper argues that the key point required to accommodate the fair use debate is the coordination concept which is important but long ignored because we have been used to treating fair use debates as an all-or-nothing problem. Hence, this paper recommends that the battle of the sexes game, long accepted as useful for dealing with the coordination problem involving interest conflict between the parties and also Schellings focal point concept (exploring expectation convergence of all affected parties) can provide useful game-theoretic insight for lawyers to think about how to avoid zero-sum solutions to the fair use debate.
Url:
DOI: 10.1093/ijlit/eam009
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Currently the fair use debate in essence involves an interest conflict between the information industries and the individual user. That is, industry prefers fared use while the users preference is for traditional free use. In order to make the fair use solution feasible, it depends heavily on the industry and users willingness to obey the final outcome. This paper argues that the key point required to accommodate the fair use debate is the coordination concept which is important but long ignored because we have been used to treating fair use debates as an all-or-nothing problem. Hence, this paper recommends that the battle of the sexes game, long accepted as useful for dealing with the coordination problem involving interest conflict between the parties and also Schellings focal point concept (exploring expectation convergence of all affected parties) can provide useful game-theoretic insight for lawyers to think about how to avoid zero-sum solutions to the fair use debate.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>oup</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Yu-Lin Chang</name><affiliations><json:string>E-mail: ychang03@qub.ac.uk</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><subject><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>Articles</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>fair use</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>game theory</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>battle of the sexes</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>focal point</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>common knowledge</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>coordinated game</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>DRM</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>the developing world</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>the developed world</value></json:item></subject><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>research-article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>DRM (Digital Rights Management) affects the traditional doctrine of fair use. 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Currently the fair use debate in essence involves an ‘interest conflict’ between the information industries and the individual user. That is, industry prefers fared use while the user’s preference is for traditional free use. In order to make the fair use solution feasible, it depends heavily on the industry and user’s willingness to obey the final outcome. This paper argues that the key point required to accommodate the fair use debate is the coordination concept which is important but long ignored because we have been used to treating fair use debates as an all-or-nothing problem. Hence, this paper recommends that the ‘battle of the sexes’ game, long accepted as useful for dealing with the coordination problem involving interest conflict between the parties and also Schelling’s ‘focal point’ concept (exploring expectation convergence of all affected parties) can provide useful game-theoretic insight for lawyers to think about how to avoid zero-sum solutions to the fair use debate.</p></abstract><kwd-group><kwd>fair use</kwd><kwd>game theory</kwd><kwd>battle of the sexes</kwd><kwd>focal point</kwd><kwd>common knowledge</kwd><kwd>coordinated game</kwd><kwd>DRM</kwd><kwd>the developing world</kwd><kwd>the developed world</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>Looking for zero-sum or win-win outcomes: A game-theoretical analysis of the fair use debate</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>Looking for zero-sum or win-win outcomes: A game-theoretical analysis of the fair use debate</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Yu-Lin</namePart><namePart type="family">Chang</namePart><affiliation>E-mail: ychang03@qub.ac.uk</affiliation></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article"></genre><subject><topic>Articles</topic></subject><originInfo><publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2007-09-28</dateIssued><dateCreated encoding="w3cdtf">2007-09-28</dateCreated><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2008</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><abstract>DRM (Digital Rights Management) affects the traditional doctrine of fair use. Currently the fair use debate in essence involves an interest conflict between the information industries and the individual user. That is, industry prefers fared use while the users preference is for traditional free use. In order to make the fair use solution feasible, it depends heavily on the industry and users willingness to obey the final outcome. This paper argues that the key point required to accommodate the fair use debate is the coordination concept which is important but long ignored because we have been used to treating fair use debates as an all-or-nothing problem. Hence, this paper recommends that the battle of the sexes game, long accepted as useful for dealing with the coordination problem involving interest conflict between the parties and also Schellings focal point concept (exploring expectation convergence of all affected parties) can provide useful game-theoretic insight for lawyers to think about how to avoid zero-sum solutions to the fair use debate.</abstract><note type="footnotes">PhD, Queens University of Belfast; ychang03@qub.ac.uk</note><subject><genre>keywords</genre><topic>fair use</topic><topic>game theory</topic><topic>battle of the sexes</topic><topic>focal point</topic><topic>common knowledge</topic><topic>coordinated game</topic><topic>DRM</topic><topic>the developing world</topic><topic>the developed world</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>International Journal of Law and Information Technology</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0967-0769</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1464-3693</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">inttec</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID-hwp">inttec</identifier><part><date>2007</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>16</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>2</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>176</start><end>204</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">6CA3A43797E942F9A24A7F903CFF9B663FAECA9E</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1093/ijlit/eam009</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">International Journal of Law and Information Technology Vol. 16 No. 2 Oxford University Press 2007; all rights reserved</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource>OUP</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods></metadata><covers><json:item><original>true</original><mimetype>image/tiff</mimetype><extension>tiff</extension><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/6CA3A43797E942F9A24A7F903CFF9B663FAECA9E/covers/tiff</uri></json:item></covers><annexes><json:item><original>true</original><mimetype>image/jpeg</mimetype><extension>jpeg</extension><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/6CA3A43797E942F9A24A7F903CFF9B663FAECA9E/annexes/jpeg</uri></json:item><json:item><original>true</original><mimetype>image/gif</mimetype><extension>gif</extension><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/6CA3A43797E942F9A24A7F903CFF9B663FAECA9E/annexes/gif</uri></json:item><json:item><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><extension>pdf</extension><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/6CA3A43797E942F9A24A7F903CFF9B663FAECA9E/annexes/pdf</uri></json:item></annexes><enrichments><istex:catWosTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/6CA3A43797E942F9A24A7F903CFF9B663FAECA9E/enrichments/catWos"><teiHeader><profileDesc><textClass><classCode scheme="WOS">LAW</classCode><classCode scheme="WOS">INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS</classCode></textClass></profileDesc></teiHeader></istex:catWosTEI><json:item><type>refBibs</type><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/6CA3A43797E942F9A24A7F903CFF9B663FAECA9E/enrichments/refBibs</uri></json:item></enrichments><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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