Fast Software-Based Attacks on SecurID
Identifieur interne : 001533 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 001532; suivant : 001534Fast Software-Based Attacks on SecurID
Auteurs : Scott Contini [Australie] ; Lisa Yin [États-Unis]Source :
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science [ 0302-9743 ] ; 2004.
Abstract
Abstract: SecurID is a widely used hardware token for strengthening authentication in a corporate environment. Recently, Biryukov, Lano, and Preneel presented an attack on the alleged SecurID hash function [1]. They showed that vanishing differentials – collisions of the hash function – occur quite frequently, and that such differentials allow an attacker to recover the secret key in the token much faster than exhaustive search. Based on simulation results, they estimated that the running time of their attack would be about 248 full hash operations when using only a single 2-bit vanishing differential. In this paper, we present techniques to improve the [1] attack. Our theoretical analysis and implementation experiments show that the running time of our improved attack is about 245 hash operations. We then investigate into the use of extra information that an attacker would typically have: multiple vanishing differentials or knowledge that other vanishing differentials do not occur in a nearby time period. When using the extra information, we believe that key recovery can always be accomplished within about 240 hash operations.
Url:
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-25937-4_29
Affiliations:
Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)
- to stream Istex, to step Corpus: 002B66
- to stream Istex, to step Curation: 002954
- to stream Istex, to step Checkpoint: 000D68
- to stream Main, to step Merge: 001584
- to stream Main, to step Curation: 001533
Le document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">Fast Software-Based Attacks on SecurID</title><author><name sortKey="Contini, Scott" sort="Contini, Scott" uniqKey="Contini S" first="Scott" last="Contini">Scott Contini</name></author><author><name sortKey="Yin, Lisa" sort="Yin, Lisa" uniqKey="Yin L" first="Lisa" last="Yin">Lisa Yin</name></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:A0AA0B0F2954DA406F25A61FD642A46ECD7561D4</idno><date when="2004" year="2004">2004</date><idno type="doi">10.1007/978-3-540-25937-4_29</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/A0AA0B0F2954DA406F25A61FD642A46ECD7561D4/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">002B66</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Curation">002954</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Checkpoint">000D68</idno><idno type="wicri:doubleKey">0302-9743:2004:Contini S:fast:software:based</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Merge">001584</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Curation">001533</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Exploration">001533</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Fast Software-Based Attacks on SecurID</title><author><name sortKey="Contini, Scott" sort="Contini, Scott" uniqKey="Contini S" first="Scott" last="Contini">Scott Contini</name><affiliation wicri:level="1"><country xml:lang="fr">Australie</country><wicri:regionArea>Computing Department, Macquarie University, NSW 2109</wicri:regionArea><wicri:noRegion>NSW 2109</wicri:noRegion></affiliation><affiliation wicri:level="1"><country wicri:rule="url">Australie</country></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Yin, Lisa" sort="Yin, Lisa" uniqKey="Yin L" first="Lisa" last="Yin">Lisa Yin</name><affiliation wicri:level="4"><country xml:lang="fr">États-Unis</country><wicri:regionArea>EE Department, Princeton University, 08540, Princeton, NJ</wicri:regionArea><placeName><region type="state">New Jersey</region><settlement type="city">Princeton (New Jersey)</settlement></placeName><orgName type="university">Université de Princeton</orgName></affiliation><affiliation wicri:level="1"><country wicri:rule="url">États-Unis</country></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="s">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</title><imprint><date>2004</date></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0302-9743</idno><idno type="eISSN">1611-3349</idno><idno type="ISSN">0302-9743</idno></series><idno type="istex">A0AA0B0F2954DA406F25A61FD642A46ECD7561D4</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1007/978-3-540-25937-4_29</idno><idno type="ChapterID">29</idno><idno type="ChapterID">Chap29</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0302-9743</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Abstract: SecurID is a widely used hardware token for strengthening authentication in a corporate environment. Recently, Biryukov, Lano, and Preneel presented an attack on the alleged SecurID hash function [1]. They showed that vanishing differentials – collisions of the hash function – occur quite frequently, and that such differentials allow an attacker to recover the secret key in the token much faster than exhaustive search. Based on simulation results, they estimated that the running time of their attack would be about 248 full hash operations when using only a single 2-bit vanishing differential. In this paper, we present techniques to improve the [1] attack. Our theoretical analysis and implementation experiments show that the running time of our improved attack is about 245 hash operations. We then investigate into the use of extra information that an attacker would typically have: multiple vanishing differentials or knowledge that other vanishing differentials do not occur in a nearby time period. When using the extra information, we believe that key recovery can always be accomplished within about 240 hash operations.</div></front></TEI><affiliations><list><country><li>Australie</li><li>États-Unis</li></country><region><li>New Jersey</li></region><settlement><li>Princeton (New Jersey)</li></settlement><orgName><li>Université de Princeton</li></orgName></list><tree><country name="Australie"><noRegion><name sortKey="Contini, Scott" sort="Contini, Scott" uniqKey="Contini S" first="Scott" last="Contini">Scott Contini</name></noRegion><name sortKey="Contini, Scott" sort="Contini, Scott" uniqKey="Contini S" first="Scott" last="Contini">Scott Contini</name></country><country name="États-Unis"><region name="New Jersey"><name sortKey="Yin, Lisa" sort="Yin, Lisa" uniqKey="Yin L" first="Lisa" last="Yin">Lisa Yin</name></region><name sortKey="Yin, Lisa" sort="Yin, Lisa" uniqKey="Yin L" first="Lisa" last="Yin">Lisa Yin</name></country></tree></affiliations></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Ticri/CIDE/explor/OcrV1/Data/Main/Exploration
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 001533 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Main/Exploration/biblio.hfd -nk 001533 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Ticri/CIDE
|area= OcrV1
|flux= Main
|étape= Exploration
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:A0AA0B0F2954DA406F25A61FD642A46ECD7561D4
|texte= Fast Software-Based Attacks on SecurID
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.32. |  |