ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC ANTI‐INDIVIDUALISM
Identifieur interne : 000332 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000331; suivant : 000333ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC ANTI‐INDIVIDUALISM
Auteurs : Jesper Kallestrup [Royaume-Uni] ; Duncan Pritchard [Royaume-Uni]Source :
- Pacific Philosophical Quarterly [ 0279-0750 ] ; 2012-03.
Abstract
According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as agents epistemically depend on third‐party members of their epistemic community as many social epistemologists contend, then there will be cases where two agents differ epistemically despite being virtue‐theoretic duplicates. This means that robust virtue epistemology, at least insofar as it is understood along standard lines such that it endorses epistemic individualism, is also in tension with a central commitment of contemporary social epistemology.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01417.x
Affiliations:
Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)
- to stream Istex, to step Corpus: 001458
- to stream Istex, to step Curation: 001458
- to stream Istex, to step Checkpoint: 000170
- to stream Main, to step Merge: 000327
- to stream Main, to step Curation: 000332
Le document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC ANTI‐INDIVIDUALISM</title><author><name sortKey="Kallestrup, Jesper" sort="Kallestrup, Jesper" uniqKey="Kallestrup J" first="Jesper" last="Kallestrup">Jesper Kallestrup</name></author><author><name sortKey="Pritchard, Duncan" sort="Pritchard, Duncan" uniqKey="Pritchard D" first="Duncan" last="Pritchard">Duncan Pritchard</name></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:8CBFAC4B45B8D50AD3007E5C4A8EAA0BED62CBCC</idno><date when="2012" year="2012">2012</date><idno type="doi">10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01417.x</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/8CBFAC4B45B8D50AD3007E5C4A8EAA0BED62CBCC/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">001458</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">001458</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Curation">001458</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Checkpoint">000170</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Checkpoint">000170</idno><idno type="wicri:doubleKey">0279-0750:2012:Kallestrup J:robust:virtue:epistemology</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Merge">000327</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Curation">000332</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Exploration">000332</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC ANTI‐INDIVIDUALISM</title><author><name sortKey="Kallestrup, Jesper" sort="Kallestrup, Jesper" uniqKey="Kallestrup J" first="Jesper" last="Kallestrup">Jesper Kallestrup</name><affiliation wicri:level="4"><country>Royaume-Uni</country><placeName><settlement type="city">Édimbourg</settlement><region type="country">Écosse</region></placeName><orgName type="university">Université d'Édimbourg</orgName></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Pritchard, Duncan" sort="Pritchard, Duncan" uniqKey="Pritchard D" first="Duncan" last="Pritchard">Duncan Pritchard</name><affiliation wicri:level="4"><country>Royaume-Uni</country><placeName><settlement type="city">Édimbourg</settlement><region type="country">Écosse</region></placeName><orgName type="university">Université d'Édimbourg</orgName></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</title><idno type="ISSN">0279-0750</idno><idno type="eISSN">1468-0114</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2012-03">2012-03</date><biblScope unit="volume">93</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">1</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="84">84</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="103">103</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0279-0750</idno></series><idno type="istex">8CBFAC4B45B8D50AD3007E5C4A8EAA0BED62CBCC</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01417.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">PAPQ1417</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0279-0750</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as agents epistemically depend on third‐party members of their epistemic community as many social epistemologists contend, then there will be cases where two agents differ epistemically despite being virtue‐theoretic duplicates. This means that robust virtue epistemology, at least insofar as it is understood along standard lines such that it endorses epistemic individualism, is also in tension with a central commitment of contemporary social epistemology.</div></front></TEI><affiliations><list><country><li>Royaume-Uni</li></country><region><li>Écosse</li></region><settlement><li>Édimbourg</li></settlement><orgName><li>Université d'Édimbourg</li></orgName></list><tree><country name="Royaume-Uni"><region name="Écosse"><name sortKey="Kallestrup, Jesper" sort="Kallestrup, Jesper" uniqKey="Kallestrup J" first="Jesper" last="Kallestrup">Jesper Kallestrup</name></region><name sortKey="Pritchard, Duncan" sort="Pritchard, Duncan" uniqKey="Pritchard D" first="Duncan" last="Pritchard">Duncan Pritchard</name></country></tree></affiliations></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Ticri/CIDE/explor/EpistemeV1/Data/Main/Exploration
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 000332 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Main/Exploration/biblio.hfd -nk 000332 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Ticri/CIDE
|area= EpistemeV1
|flux= Main
|étape= Exploration
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:8CBFAC4B45B8D50AD3007E5C4A8EAA0BED62CBCC
|texte= ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC ANTI‐INDIVIDUALISM
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.31. |  |