The Paradox of China’s Policy in Africa
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- African and Asian Studies [ 1569-2094 ] ; 2010.
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<p>© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI: 10.1163/156921010X515996 African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 brill.nl/aas A F R I C A N A N D A S I A N S T U D I E S The Paradox of China’s Policy in Africa Seifudein Adem Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University PO Box 6000 LNG-100, Binghamton, NY 13902, USA Email: adems@binghamton.edu Abstract In many cases it was China’s longstanding solidarity with several liberation movements in Africa in the colonial period which was later upgraded to bilateral and state-level diplomatic relations in the postcolonial era. However, the twenty-first century has also brought about quantitative and potentially qualitative changes in Sino-African relations which are more complex than what the advocates of stronger Sino-African relations (Sino-optimists) and proponents of disengagement (Sino-pessimists) seem to suggest. The defining patterns of China’s influence in Africa are either not yet fully crystallized or they come in paradoxical pairs. The essay spells out the manifestations of these paradoxes and what can be done under the circumstances to improve the African condi- tion. The divergent schools of thought about the possible impacts of China’s increased activities in Africa seem not to be totally unrelated to their underlying assumptions about the causes of Africa’s unsuccessful modernization. The essay also explores these intellectual issues by focusing on the contradictory dimensions of Afro-Chinese relations. Keywords Political Economy; Africa; China; Afro-Chinese Relations; Afro-Asianism Introduction Chinese intermittent contacts with Africans go back to earlier centuries, but large-scale encounters between the two peoples took place only after the advent of the colonial era, with Chinese labor used extensively by the British, the French, and even the Germans in places ranging from Mauritius and Tang- anyika to Madagascar and Reunion. Chinese laborers were also brought to South Africa early in the 20th century to work for Europeans in the mines. During the struggle for independence in much of Africa, it can be also recalled that China stood firmly with several African liberation movements. It was against such a backdrop that China arrived in Africa in the opening years of the twenty-first century as a would-be major power in the international scene.</p>
<p>S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 335 Three strands of thought dominate the contemporary discourse about the long-term impacts of China’s increased involvement in Africa: Sino-opti- mism, Sino-skepticism, and Sino-pessimism. The optimistic school maintains that China’s emphatic re-entry into Africa is to be celebrated. Africa stands to gain much from a closer partnership with the new China. Sino-skeptics are less sanguine and view China’s renewed interest and greater involvement in Africa as neo-colonial both in intent and consequence. They maintain that China is another neo-colonial power in the making because the logic of capi- tal is the same whether those in the driving seat are the Europeans, the Amer- icans or the Chinese. Sino-pessimists go further and claim that Africa’s engagement with China would not only perpetuate the structure of depen- dency and underdevelopment which is already in place, but it would also inhibit or block Africa’s efforts to overcome them. It should be also noted from the outset that a degree of correspondence seems also to exist between an analysts’ perception of the cause of Africa’s underdevelopment and the presumed consequences arising from Chinese massive penetration of the con- tinent, with those linking Africa’s underdevelopment to external factors view- ing the consequences of China’s arrival more favorably. Middle-of-the-road theories are also reflected in the ongoing debate, but this essay would concern itself primarily with the above “ideal” types. In terms of the long-standing theoretical traditions, the above schools of thought roughly correspond to variants of the three “ideologies” of international political economy; namely – realism, liberalism and Marxism. For Sino-opti- mists liberalism provides the theoretical justification for a deeper engagement between Africa and China. Liberals assume that both China and Africa would be better off from a greater Chinese involvement in Africa even though China, as the stronger party in the partnership, would gain more. But if the “right” pol- icies are adopted by African states, Africa would benefit from such international exchange, with trade serving as the “engine of economic growth.” Marxists, like Sino-skeptics, do not completely dismiss the benefits Africa could gain from sustained investment and international trade. However, they maintain that Afro-Chinese economic interaction is not vastly different from the one in which Africa is already engaged with North America and Europe. They are all economic exchanges between unequal partners which perpetuate existing international division of labor that is detrimental to the economic development of Africa. Believing that whatever benefit is gained from such exchanges goes primarily to the ruling groups, Marxists and neo-Marxists question the view that sustained Sino-African relations would meaningfully contribute to socio-economic transformation of African societies and regard</p>
<p>336 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 disengagement rather than engagement as the ultimate panacea for Africa’s developmental problems. The existing system simply cannot be reformed. Sino-pessimists seem to accept the basic premise of political realism about international relations and international political economy that the interac- tion between China and African states is a zero-sum game in which the stron- ger party gains at the expense of the weaker. But, they also concede, this is a fact of international life and should be accepted as such. Neither reform nor revolution could change this structure. The underlying premise of the generalizations which have been formulated by Sino-optimists, Sino-skeptics and Sino-pessimists about the impacts China is having or would have in Africa is that there is already a discernible pattern in China’s policy toward Africa. This essay argues that if there is a pattern in China’s policy in Africa, it can only be expressed in terms of sets of paradoxes. The reality on the ground is as much a confirmation of the above divergent theses as it is their disconfirmation. As Chris Alden et al. (2008, 14) remind us, the fluctuations in Afro-Chinese relations [and their outcomes] in recent years alone have been profound. This means that the shape Sino-African relations would ultimately take is unknown for now and that, therefore, the situation poses a great challenge for Africa, even as it also opens up a new window of opportunity for chan- neling the relationship in a desirable direction. I will review below the major assumptions about China in Africa in order to demonstrate how China’s behavior sometimes defies these assumptions, driving home the point that simple generalizations about the nature and consequences of Chinese behav- ior in Africa may be premature. Economic Foundations of Afro-Chinese Relations Although China’s capital and investment follows Africa’s natural resources, they do not fit into a predictable pattern. China’s re-entry into Africa in the last decade and a half was driven by the country’s growing demand for Afri- ca’s natural resources, so goes the master-narrative, a narrative which is also supported both by official rhetoric on both sides. The value of Africa’s export of its natural resources to China has grown substantially in recent years with cobalt, chromium, manganese and timber constituting major non-oil items. Another critical resource for which China significantly relies on Africa is oil. China’s oil imports from world regions in 2001-2006 in percentage was as follows: from Middle East & North Africa 46; from Sub-Saharan Africa 27; from Europe & Central Asia 10; from East Asia & the Pacific 8; and from Latin America & the Caribbean 3. And here are China’s oil imports for the same period in percentage by African country: from Angola 51; from</p>
<p>S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 337 Sudan 18; from Congo Republic 13; from Equatorial Guinea 11, from Nige- ria 3; from Chad 1; and from Gabon 1(see Foster et al. 2008, 32; for data in earlier period see Broadman 2007, 82-83). If it is a common postulate that Chinese increased activities in Africa were linked to China’s growing demand for Africa’s natural resources, empirical data also lends support to this claim (Maswana 2009, 91-105). But, even in this regard, China’s behaviors are not without some curious contradictions. Why, for instance, is China investing relatively heavily in some African coun- tries with little or no proven natural resources critical for China? Why is China investing fairly heavily in sectors which have no direct relevance for China’s economic needs? Ethiopia, for instance, exports neither oil nor other minerals critical for China and is not also a major exporter of timber – another important commodity China imports from Africa. And yet, Ethiopia has become one of the top four countries in which China has committed large-scale infrastructure projects in recent years (Foster et al. 2008, 21). But Ethiopia is not the only country in this regard. A broadly similar “anomaly” can be seen in China’s interest in Central African Republic, Libe- ria, Madagascar and Somalia. In short, the interest of China in Africa is not limited to resource-rich countries. China has intensified its activities in resource-poor countries, too. But it would be missing the point to suggest, as Sino-optimists do, that China’s Africa policy is therefore driven purely by China’s desire to help Africa. China’s trade with Africa has grown exponentially over the past several years. The Chinese two-way trade with Africa was about US$10.5 billion in 2000, and this figure changed in the ensuing years as follows: US$29.5 billion in 2004; US$40 billion in 2005; US$55.5 billion in 2006; US$73 billion in 2007; pro- jected US$117 billion in 2008 (Alden et al. 2008, 6). But, again, China’s trade with Africa is still relatively small compared to other regions. The table below shows the breakdown of China’s trade by world regions for selected years. Table 1 China’s trade with selected partners (in percentage) Year EU US Japan Africa 1990 11.1 8.5 14.7 2.0 2000 16.5 20.9 16.7 2.7 2006 19.6 21.0 9.5 2.7 Source: UNCTAD (2008, 54). More than the comparative value of international trade, what carries more signif- icant implication for Africa’s future is the general structure of economic relations.</p>
<p>338 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 The bulk of Chinese exports to Africa has been processed products, but more than a quarter of Africa’s imports from China in 2005 were composed of tele- communications equipment, transportation vehicles, electrical appliances and industrial equipment (Atlas, 2006). In 2005-2006, 11.97 percent of electrical machinery, approximately 29 percent of computer equipments and 18.85 per- cent of telecommunications equipment sold around the world were made in China (UNCTAD 2008, 159). As shown below, China’s trade structure is acquiring more and more features of the industrialized powers of the past. Table 2 China’s trade structure by product group (value of exports in percentage) food items fuels machinery & transport equipment 1995 8.3 3.6 21.1 2000 5.4 3.2 33.1 2006 2.9 1.8 47.1 Source: UNCTAD (2008, 123). On the other hand, the exports of African countries have remained primary commodities. In 2005-06, for instance, Ethiopia’s exports constituted coffee and coffee substitutes (38.7 percent), oil seeds (17.4 percent) crude vegetable materials 11.9 percent (UNCTAD 2008, 159). Similarly, if we look respec- tively at Angola and the Sudan in the same period, crude petroleum & bitu- minous oil constituted 95.2 percent and 85.4 percent of the values of their exports (UNCTAD 2008, 156 & 170). Table 3 Africa’s level of reliance on the export of mono-commodities Share of non-oil commodities in total exports of select African countries 2003-2005 Country Share % Important Focus Commodity Burundi 93.76 coffee Mali 89.32 cotton Tanzania 85.18 gold, cotton, coffee, tobacco Malawi 85.00 tobacco Burkina Faso 84.24 cotton Ghana 83.22 gold, cocoa Rwanda 82.01 coffee Benin 81.40 cotton Source: Spero and Hart (2010, 269).</p>
<p>S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 339 Africa’s share of world exports and the terms of trade for primary commodi- ties have been steadily declining over the past fifty years. And the arrival of China seems so far to have had no major effect on the overall trend. The new Sino-African relations have in any case ushered in an entirely new concept in the political economy of South-South relations: the formula of “resources for infrastructure” or the so-called the Angola mode. To be sure, the idea itself is not new, but the concept is. The “Angola mode” facilitates the exploitation of natural resources, which Africa has in abundance. The for- mula also allows Africa to import needed resources from China, which it could not have done so if financial repayment should be required. More sig- nificantly, the “Angola mode” ties the exploitation of natural resources or infrastructure development to Chinese imports of Africa’s resources. In addi- tion to Angola, this formula is being heavily relied upon in Sudan, Demo- cratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea, Zimbabwe, Gabon and Botswana. China’s focus on infrastructure development in Africa in recent years has drawn special attention. This is not surprising because the level of Chinese investment in this sector is not only high but is increasing rapidly. Chinese investment in Africa jumped from US$500 million in early 2000s to US$7 billion in 2006 (Foster et al. 2008, 13). Partly it was this “flood” of Chinese investment which has led Sino-optimists to view China’s intentions in Africa as profoundly different from those of the major Western powers. Olopade Dayo (2008) recent remark reflects such a sentiment. Dayo writes: “China is the only global power laying the tracks for an Africa-wide economic renais- sance.” Sino-optimists indicate that the size and quality of China’s investment in Africa could propel Africa towards a self-sustaining economic development (B. Sautman and Y. Hairong 2008, 87-133; Broadman 2007, 97). However, the empirical data again paints a mixed picture. Although Chi- na’s investment in the continent is substantial and growing, it is still modest compared to China’s investment elsewhere. From China’s total overseas FDI in 2006, for instance, the share of Africa was relatively small, 4%, compared to Latin America’s 26 % and Asia’s 64% (Alden et al. 2008, 4; also see Guer- rero and Manji 2008, 1-2). Even though China has paid considerable atten- tion to the African oil sector in recent years, its investment even in this sector also pales in comparison to what other international oil companies have already invested in the continent. And much of Africa’s oil exports have, in any case, continued to go to OECD countries. In 2006, 40 percent of Africa’s oil production was exported to the United States while 15 percent went to China (Foster et al. 2008, ix). China’s investment in Africa is also far less outstanding in comparison to the “infrastructure deficit” in the continent, which is estimated to require</p>
<p>340 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 about US $ 22 billion annually (Foster et al. 2008, 23). Indeed, it may be because of this huge deficit that China’s relatively modest infrastructural investment seems to be leaving larger footprint in the continent, thereby making it recently the focus of much attention. Between Selective Multilateralism and Bilateralism In the context of Afro-Chinese relations, a distinction can be made between two forms of diplomatic multilateralism. One form of multilateralism repre- sents, for instance, a relationship between China on the one hand and the African Union (AU) or other regional organizations within Africa on the other. Multilateralism could also take a form in which China joins ranks with other “development partners,” or donor countries and multilateral institu- tions in the North such as the World Bank and the IMF. This form of multi- lateralism is at work when China cooperates with OECD countries. In this vein, China signed the 2004 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and it ratified the UN convention against corruption. The China-Africa Forum, inaugurated in 2000, can be viewed also as a form of multilateralism. Chinese interest in some form of multilateral frame- work in its dealings with Africa is therefore clear. But it is a gross exaggera- tion to assert: “unlike Western countries, China prefers to act with Africa as a whole” (Baregu 2008, 163). This may, in fact, be Sino-optimism at its extreme. China can be multilateralist about one aspect of an issue and bilateralist about another. A good example of this formulation was evident when China supported the international effort on Darfur without relinquishing its bilat- eralist approach in relations with the Sudan (Srinivasan 2008, 76). Recently, China pursued a broadly similar policy with respect to the conflict in the Congo (Curtis 2008, 94-95). China has thus not completely shunned multilateralism, but it clearly prefers bilateralism in its relations with African countries. China’s conducts relations with individual African countries on a one-on-one basis and its emphasis on “non-intervention” in the internal affairs of these countries underscore the value it attaches to bilateralism in its foreign policy toward Africa. Theoretically, China has also rejected the view that the institution of state has weakened as the result of the forces of globalization (Keith 2004, 507). It must be noted that bilateral relationship is more beneficial for China than for Africa simply because African countries could win more favorable concessions from China collectively than they could do so individually. This</p>
<p>S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 341 was, in fact, what China has learned from its interactions with South East Asian countries (Acharya 2008, 324). For instance, China’s exclusively relies upon Africa for such strategic raw materials as cobalt (Foster et al. 2008, 31). Among the major industrial uses of cobalt are the preparation of high-speed cutting tools and the high-energy radiation – both of which are very critical in modern industry. It is not hard therefore to imagine what a collective bar- gaining approach by Africa could do in this instance. For one thing, it could forestall the competition between South Africa, DRC and Republic of Congo for markets for selling their cobalt to China. But an effective multilateralist approach for Africa eschews what Broadman (2007, 18) called ‘the spaghetti bowl of Africa regional trade agreements.’ Broadman was referring to the more than fourteen overlapping regional economic groupings on the African continent. A multilateral engagement between Africa and China is also bound to con- tribute to the effort toward some sort of integration of the continent. There is thus a school of thought in Africa, the Sino-pessimist school, which con- ceives the long-term consequences of China’s Africa policy that is primarily centered on bilateralism as undesirable since it would deepen Africa’s under- development by producing uneven effects in different economic sectors and in different countries, ultimately impeding economic and political integra- tion of the continent. The Myth of Non-Intervention In a tone typical to Sino-optimism, Le Pere (2008, 32) has observed: “China supports principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries in contrast to what it sees as the ‘hegemonism’ of the West.” A World Bank publication also declares how China “eschews any interference in domestic affairs” (Foster et al. 2008, vii; also see Zafar 2007, 126). It is safe to say that a general consensus has now emerged that China loathes interference in the internal affairs of African countries. But it is all too easy to overstate China’s “non-interference” in the internal affairs of African states. Part of the problem is that analysts sometimes lose sight of the different levels of interference. Although China has continually espoused the principle of non-interference, it has never remained a passive on-looker when its interests were at stake. With regard to Darfur, for instance, President Hu indicated in 2007 in Khartoum that China’s policy would con- tinue to be guided by the principle of non-interference, but it also recognizes “the imperative to improve the situation in Darfur and living conditions of</p>
<p>342 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 local people” (Quoted in Srinivasan 2008, 78). The issue thus becomes not whether China interferes in the domestic affairs of African states or not, but when it does, what forms interference takes and with what consequences. Interference can be direct or indirect. Ideologically and militarily, China has historically aligned itself with Africa’s liberation movements during the struggle for decolonization in the continent. Since the 1960s, the Chinese have supported one or another group of African liberation fighters in one way or another in, among other countries, Algeria, Niger, Portuguese Guinea, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cameron, Zaire, Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa. China itself does not deny that these were interventions – but only that they were generally good interven- tions so long as the goal was to end colonialism. This is from Africa’s vantage point the least controversial form of China’s intervention in contemporary Africa – notwithstanding the fact that China sometimes sided with the wrong “nationalist movement,” as was the case in Angola when it supported the a movement that was also allied with the West. Perhaps the most direct Chinese interference in the domestic affairs of an African country in recent years took place in Zambia in the context of the 2006 national Presidential election. Here is how Muna Ndulo (2008, 146) related the issue: One opposition leader, Michael Sata, of the Patriotic Front Party, campaigned on anti-China platform and promised to expel the Chinese if elected to office and to break diplomatic relations with China and instead establish relations with Taiwan… During the general election, China, ill advisedly, reacted to Sata’s public attacks on Chinese investors and threatened to halt all investments if Sata was elected president. It may be important to note, however, that Chinese diplomats in Zambia sought to put a spin on the incident by presenting it as a case of confirmation of China’s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country rather than its repudiation. Because the Zambian opposition leader, Mr. Sata, had threatened to recognize Taiwan, the Chinese diplomats in Zambia said that that was tantamount to his interference in the internal affairs of China (Alden et al. 2008, 5). It was perhaps an observation such as this which led Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo (2007, 15) to warn that: “Chi- na’s involvement in the local/domestic politics in terms of supporting some political groups or parties in order to have access to the market, cheap labor and raw materials can undermine its commitment to social progress programs.” A distinction should also be made between the notion of peaceful co- existence and the principle of non-intervention. China has never claimed that</p>
<p>S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 343 it was the messenger of peace in Africa. It has also never been such. China has supplied arms to conflicting parties in Africa. China’s record in the conti- nent when it comes to peace and stability is problematic, on balance, if we discount for the moment the case of China’s military assistance to various lib- eration struggles in Africa. China’s arms have contributed to the perpetuation of violent conflicts in places ranging from the Congo to the Sudan and the Horn of Africa (Srinivasan 2008, 60, Le Pere 2008, 29, Curtis 2008, 94). “In 1995”, writes Chung-lian Jiang (2008) “when Nigeria was isolated and sanc- tioned by the international community for the execution of nine Ogni politi- cal dissidents, Peking continued to supply it with weapons, in spite of strong Western pressure”. China has been involved in supplying military equipment to the Sudan and Zimbabwe, too, among others. There are, of course, cases where it is hard to determine the extent of Chi- nese involvement in African conflicts even if the arms used were made in China. Indirect interference occurs when China extends military assistance on the basis of the principle that the enemy of my friend is my enemy. This was the scenario which unfolded when Robert Mugabe militarily intervened in the Congo, using Chinese-supplied arms, in support of Laurent Kabila (Curtis 2008, 94). Again, it is true that an arms supplier could not always have the ultimate say on how the arms are used. When China’s activities in one area or at one time produce domestic polit- ical consequences in another area or at another time, whether desirable/fore- seeable or not, these consequences are from the vantage point of China and/ or the host government, the interference also becomes indirect. One example of such indirect interference, the consequence of which would perhaps take time to fathom, relates to China’s pattern of investment in Africa in recent years. Admittedly, the economic sector is where China’s principle of “non-in- tervention” is most easy to identify and enforce since China does not gener- ally attach specific policy conditions in its lending and investment practices in Africa. China has also invested significantly in some African countries in the non- extractive sectors. Angola is one example where China investment in the tele- communications sector is heavy (Corkin 2008, 115). Another example is Ethiopia. The share of telecommunications infrastructure in China’s invest- ment in Ethiopia in 2006 was US $1.5 billion, and this is the largest ICT project in Africa. When the project is completed, it is expected that it would: “double the country’s optical fiber deployment, more than triple mobile net- work expansion capacity, double rural telecom coverage, and quadruple the length of the fixed telephone network” (Foster et al. 2008, 18). According to</p>
<p>344 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 the same authors (2008, viii), “[i]n total in 2001-07, Chinese telecom firms supplied almost US $3 billion worth of ICT equipment, mainly in Ethiopia, Sudan and Ghana.” Such a heavy Chinese investment in this sector in Ethio- pia, potentially enhancing more interactivity and interconnectivity among the populace and with the outside world, could not be thought of as having no long-term domestic political implications to the civil society and the future of the authoritarian rule in the country. In the long run, in other words, China’s investment may pose greater danger to the authoritarian regime in Ethiopia than any direct Chinese interference in the domestic affairs of the country. The potent power of ICT has proven to be profound in countries ranging from the Philippines to Thailand, and most recently Iran, in stimulating and enabling mass political actions. It is true that China pro- vides African governments not only with the technology for mass dissemina- tion of information but also with the tools for suppressing them if necessary (in the form, for instance, of electronic jamming equipments). This was pre- cisely what China has done in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye 2008, 134). But enhancing the government’s power to suppress information is an interference as well. As a rising power actively involved in Africa, China could hardly practice the principle of non-intervention even if it wishes to do so. No interference, no influence. Both the power and the desire of a major actor to interfere, in fact, increase proportionally to its aspirations and its status in the interna- tional system. But intervention is not always externally-induced. National and sub-na- tional actors in Africa, especially the ruling governments, too, would some- times seek and even encourage certain types of Chinese intervention for their own benefit. What has been seen by the Angolan government as China’s “inef- fective” intervention has, for instance, led to the relative deterioration in the bilateral relations of the two countries (Corkin 2008, 120-121). The Angolan government sought more “effective” Chinese intervention in relation to the 2009 Presidential election in the country. With the above provision, it can be argued that Chinese non-intervention is more evident in regard to human rights and governance. China often looks away when African dictators violate the human rights of their compatriots. Although China has pursued this policy for many decades since it began dip- lomatic relations with African countries, the policy has come under greater scrutiny in recent years. As indicated already, China is not considered as a messenger of peace in Africa. But China’s contribution toward peace-making or peace-keeping operations in the continent cannot be also totally overlooked. “Between 2001</p>
<p>S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 345 and 2006, Chinese personnel contribution to PKO activities in Africa increased by ten-fold” (Huang and Morrison 2007, 5). Paradoxically, one of the countries in Africa to which China contributed hundreds of peace-keep- ing officers is also the Congo. The paradox is that China or Chinese arms had contributed in fueling the same conflict. Only time would tell about the implications of fueling a conflict and trying to extinguish it later. While such contradictory behaviors are not unique to China, they do add up to the com- plex and confounding nature of Sino-African relations at the present time. Soft Power and Hard Realities We have highlighted the emphasis in China’s foreign policy on bilateral rela- tions with African states. Parallel to bilateralism is the focus on elite-to-elite diplomacy. These policy orientations are also reflected in the minimum role NGOs have come to play in China’s policy toward Africa. It must be admit- ted that this pattern of foreign policy was not one-sidedly imposed upon Africa; it is partly a response to the realities of African politics and society. Although Chinese policy toward Africa is elite-centered, however, there is also a sense in which Afro-Chinese relations can be viewed as people-cen- tered. Chinese investment in Africa has often a Chinese labor component. There are already significant numbers of Chinese health workers who assist and interact with ordinary Africans. But a large portion of Chinese nationals come to Africa not only as managers and entrepreneurs, technicians and doc- tors, but also as small-scale traders and construction workers. The number of Chinese is increasing in Africa, and in this, China is unlike other major pow- ers of the past. Olopade Dayo (2008) has noted recently: “There are already more Chinese living in Nigeria than there were Britons during the height of the empire.” By 2006, there were sizable Chinese expatriates in the following African countries: Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana, Sudan, Algeria, Ethiopia, Cameron, Côte D’Ivoire, Zambia and Mozambique (Atlas 2006). An American diplomat has also predicted that these Chinese may never return to China (Shinn 2006, 7). Of course, it remains to be seen whether the situation would turn out as predicted. The major consideration of Chinese entrepreneurs in bringing large num- ber of Chinese workers to Africa has, of course, nothing to do with any pre- occupation, on the part of China, with people-to-people diplomacy. Instead, it is primarily a result of cost-benefit considerations of the legal, economic and technical consequences of doing otherwise. In any case, an opportunity has been created for ordinary Chinese to interact with ordinary Africans – for better or for worse. This unique feature of China’s engagement with Africa is</p>
<p>346 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 bound also to become a source of tension, with some signs to this effect already visible (Askouri 2008, 151-156). There is a view in some African countries that “burgeoning Chinese communities in Africa have become closed enclaves, insensitive to local customs, norms and social practices” (Le Pere 2008, 32). Lumumba-Kasongo (2007, 15) also observes that: “Chinese investments in Africa tend to create more jobs for both Chinese technicians and small trader Chinese who migrate to Africa than for the Africans who badly need those jobs.” Allegations have surfaced that some Chinese were even engaged in com- mitting petty crimes in Ethiopia. If true, the story should not be surprising. Similar cases have been reported in other countries, such as in Botswana, where the Chinese embassy in the country was prompted to urge “all Chinese citizens in Botswana to observe the laws of Botswana . . .” (Bolaane 2007, 163 & 168). It is not a mischaracterization of recent history to say that the latest phase of Afro-Chinese relations began full of optimism – on both sides. That is to say that the wind has been blowing in favor of Sino-optimism. We have dis- cussed in the previous sections the contending paradigms about why China is attracted to Africa. Let us conclude this section by identifying the diver- gent approaches about major elements of China’s soft power in Africa on the issue of why Africans are generally attracted to China. Africa’s attraction toward China has in part to do with the long and positive history of Afro- Chinese relations and China’s unique identity in comparison to other major powers. China not only sees itself as integral part of Greater Asia, it even goes fur- ther in asserting that it is part of the Third World. It is this perception of “self ” and the “other” which Sino-optimists view as underpinning the atti- tudes and diplomatic orientations of China toward Africa. Even when seem- ingly new approaches are adopted – as in the post Cold War period – the tenets of the foreign policies of China have basically remained the same. The truth of the matter is, according to Sino-Skeptics, that China is no longer a “developing” country. In terms of its external economic relations and by related measures, China is in fact more “developed” than such countries as Canada, France and Italy (UNCTAD 2008, 123-126). Sino-Skeptics also see China’s considerable interest in investing in infrastructures tied to natural resources as a proof that China is merely pursuing its own narrow self-interest at the expense of Africa’s long-term interest. If China was also interested in Africa’s long-term development, they ask, why is it that China would not help enhance Africa’s own capacity to process and add value to these resources? They conclude that China is a neo-colonial power in the making in the mold of former colonial powers.</p>
<p>S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 347 Sino-optimists see Chinese model of socio-economic development as more suitable for African development. China is regarded as a country which has successfully resisted the neo-liberal model of political modernization but now boasts one of the fastest growing economies on the planet. The Prime Minis- ter of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, also added his voice to Sino-optimism when he said: “it has now been proved the development paradigm in China has its own specific advantages…Chinese transformation disproved the pessimistic attitude that was, ‘if you are poor once, you are likely to be poor forever’ ” ( The Ethiopian Herald , December 23, 2008). A related perspective maintains that Africa has been attracted to China partly because of the pressure on Africa from the West. As Ian Taylor (2006, 4) put it: “China’s renewed interest in Africa coincided with the new-found attention of the West in promoting liberal democracy and human rights.” Added to this is the claim that not only has the Western model in Africa failed to produce positive result but also the relationship between Africa and the West has been one-sided, exploitative and even responsible for Africa’s underdevelopment (Campbell 2008, 102). Chinese active, one could even say creative, diplomacy in Africa has also reinforced its attractions to Africa. The fact that China cooperated with Nige- ria in the launching of the first African commercial satellite – Nig-Sat – falls into this category ( Washington Post May 13, 2007 online accessed August 19, 2008). Irrespective of whether or not such ambitious project would have had any meaningful impact, the message China was trying to send to Africa was interpreted by Sino-optimists such that China would treat its relations with Africa seriously, with respect and dignity. China’s grand gesture was viewed by Sino-optimists as an affirmation of its genuine desire for a meaningful partnership with Africa. Sino-optimists are not sure, on the other hand, about the commitment of the West to a genuine partnership with Africa. A Nigerian diplomat was recently quoted as saying: “China combines aid and investment in a compel- ling fashion, versus the West’s notion of how to ‘help’ Africa, in which mos- quito nets and vaccinations still dominate the dialogue” (Dayo 2008). It is in this context that Sino-optimists have welcomed what they regard as the Chi- nese fresh approach which “eschews any interference in domestic affairs, emphasizes partnership and solidarity among developing nations, and offers an alternative development model based on a more central role of for the state” (Foster et al. 2008, viii). Another dimension of China’s diplomacy which is relevant to its soft power is culture, or more specifically, language. The Chinese have already built in Africa several Chinese language schools (We Ping 2007, 28). The primary motivation for teaching Chinese language (mandarin) to Africans is</p>
<p>348 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 not the Chinese desire to “internationalize” Africans or themselves. Here again economic considerations are paramount. China also believes, it is fair to add, that Afro-Chinese relations would be long-lasting. Africa, China and World Order The first decade of the twenty-first century will perhaps be remembered as a period when China made its emergence as a potential hegemon felt around the world. It is also in this decade that the West began to seriously grapple with the implications of the rise of China and the imminent end of a five hundred year Western dominance in global affairs. Will China integrate itself into the prevailing international system? Or, would it challenge the system to create a new one which is more suitable to it? Will the West welcome a re-in- vigorated China on equal footing? These are some of the major questions scholars are already wrestling with in relation to the rise of China. What does the record show thus far? Is China challenging world order, a world order which was created and largely maintained by the West, or is it adapting itself to it? As on many other issues, analysts are divided on this one. On the one hand, there are for instance those who see in Chinese accel- erated activities in Africa an outright challenge to the global hegemony of the West (Ampiah and Naidu 2008, 3-19; Campbell, 2008). Others see China as (capable of ) being co-opted by the West (Ikenburry 2008). Chinese behav- iors in Africa so far suggest China is both a challenger of the Western hege- mony, when its interests are perceived to be at stake, and a supporter when its interests sufficiently converge with that of the West. But neither scenario has yet fully crystallized and there are forces which are pulling China in both directions. That there will be increasing rivalry between China and the West is now a foregone conclusion – a rivalry for markets and raw materials, particularly oil. Sub-Saharan Africa will be one of the battlefields if oil continues to be the major source of energy – as it is now. Fareed Zakaria (2008, 117) observes in his Post-American World : “…as China moves into Africa, it is taking up political, economic and military space that was occupied by Britain, France or the United States. This will necessarily mean friction as each great power struggles to promote its own interests and its own conception of doing the right thing in Africa.” The rivalry and potential conflict between the United States (or the West) and China will not be ideological – as Francis Fukuyama (1992) had suggested in his The End of History . Neither would it be primarily cultural –</p>
<p>S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 349 as Samuel Huntington’s (1997) The Clash of Civilizations predicts. Instead it would be a conflict over raw materials, particularly oil and markets. Whichever future scenario is fulfilled, Africa cannot be a significant player in the new international system and have a say in it in a way beneficial to its own interest unless the continent strengthen its collective bargaining position and speak in one voice. Not many years ago African political scientist Ali Mazrui (2000, 275-283) grappled with the issue of how to restore justice to the international system and how Africa could squeeze out concessions from the liberal international economic order. He identified two types of solidarity in the Global South. Strategic solidarity refers to the joining of hands between Africa and the rest of the developing world in order to gain leverage over the economic transaction with the countries in the North. Organic soli- darity signifies African unity, the quest for Africans to speak in one voice vis-à-vis the rest of the world. As matters now stand, however, strategic solidarity has become a less realis- tic approach. Firstly, the developmental gap within the global South is not only wide but is widening by the day. Secondly, strategic solidarity approach is in part premised not only on the idea that what is good for one part of the global South is also necessarily good for the other part, a notion based on the presupposition of commonality of interest and unity of purpose engendered by shared historical experience and common pigmentational identity. But widening economic gaps within the global South are also creating divergent interests. From the Bandung Conference to the non-Aligned movement, the strategic solidarity approach has not produced the result many had expected, and there are not compelling reasons which would suggest the result would be different this time. Under the circumstances, a more realistic approach would probably be one which centers on organic solidarity. Less ambitious in its goals, this approach requires that Africa create some form of integration, a way of coordinating its foreign economic policies, based on the recognition that not doing so would not only marginalize Africa further, it would also reward others at Africa’s expense. If Africa could manage to speak in one voice, it could play off different powers for its own benefit. In addition, the same approach could be pursued with respect to a united Europe which, as Patrick Bond and Richard Kamidza (2008, 2) put it, continues to underdevelop Africa by dealing with “individ- ual African countries in an especially pernicious way…” Africa has at its dis- posal resources and potential market which are indispensable for fueling the economies of major powers. African unity will also enhance the continent’s relative power position in the international system. The stronger an actor’s</p>
<p>350 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 relative power position is in a system, history of international politics teaches us, the less important would become the preferences of the stronger actors. The emerging structure of the international system in some ways resembles the one which prevailed in the immediate aftermath of Africa’s decoloniza- tion in the1960s when the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, competed for friendship with the newly independent African states, when, for instance, Kwame Nkrumah (1957, 164) could go to Washington and say: “. . . I was appealing to the democracies of Britain and the United States for their assistance in the first place but if this should not be forthcoming, I would be forced to turn elsewhere.” Because Africa is a region which has least benefited from the current world order, the rivalry between the West and China would benefit the continent, and the outcome would also significantly influence the African condition, an outcome which will in turn be deter- mined by, among other things, the extent of the rising state’s dissatisfaction with the status quo , its level of risk-taking or its assumptions about the expected costs of war. Informed opinion is divided about whether China would challenge the prevailing system in the future or adapt itself to it. On this, some analysts are non-committal, suggesting it is too early to say whether the transition from Euro-centric to Sino-centric world would be peaceful. Others, of whom many are neo-liberal scholars of international relations, see a great incentive as well as imperative for China to join the system (see, for instance, Iken- burry 2008, 23-37). The same scholars stress that it is in the interest of the West to accommodate rising China. And still others with realist theoretical orientations speculate that not only is China unwilling to fit in the old sys- tem but also it is unable to do so (Khanna 2008, 439-456). Table 4 Current and Projected Military and Economic Powers of China and the United States in the 21st Century GDP in USD $ Trillion China US Military Expenditure in USD $Billion China US 2005 9 12 2003 60 417 2010 14 17 2010 88 482 2015 21 22 2015 121 554 2020 30 28 2020 152 628 2025 44 37 2025 190 711 2030 63 49 2030 238 808 Source: Adapted from Ikenburry (2008)</p>
<p>S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 351 One of the major incentives for China to integrate itself into the capitalist world system would probably be its desire for peaceful change. Such a peace- ful transition is a possibility with China gradually transforming itself into a global hegemon. Another scenario is that the US would negatively react to the rising China and this would lead to conflict and war. The dynamic of international relations and the global ambitions of the US and China suggest a probability of conflict between the two countries. Parag Khanna (2008, 337) captures this dynamic as follows: “As the relative levels of power of the three superpowers [US, China and EU] draw closer, the temptation of the number two to preemptively knock out the king on the hill grows, as does the lead power’s incentive to preventively attack and weaken its ascending rival before being eclipsed.” Khanna (2008, 337) adds, quoting David Hume: “It is not a great disproportion between ourselves and others which produces envy, but on the contrary, the proximity.” Another factor which makes less than peaceful transition likely is the fact that historically there never was a time in the so-called modern period when two countries so powerful and so culturally different have confronted each other. The modern world so far only saw alternations among “Western” pow- ers for global hegemony. The lack of transparency of the Chinese political system accompanied with the vast cultural differences between the two would further compound the possibility of peaceful power transition. In addition, there is also a significant difference in the American and Chi- nese conceptualization of world order. Chinese openly advocate multi-polar- ity; the US seeks to preserve or at least prolong “the unipolar moment” (Keith 2004; Wenping 2007b). The strategic importance of power positions of two states is great if they do not share similar preferences. In situations where there is such a vast cultural difference, it is next to impossible to forge a shared notion of legitimate process and outcome. Realist and liberal theories of power transition therefore strongly suggest the inevitability of major conflict between the US and China. A factor which may mitigate the historical tendency toward violent international change is that today’s world is more interdependent and globalized than at any time before. The realization of this plain fact may impose greater constraint on great power behavior. Furthermore the presence of nuclear weapons which has made major war most costly and destructive would create incentives both for the rising hegemon and other powers to work out a peaceful means of transition. But then human history also teaches that rationality fails some- time when it is most needed. One helpful step by China toward diffusing potential tension with other powers has been its introduction of market principles – the absence of which would have become a major source of friction and conflict with Western powers. Free market economy removes one of the sources of conflict over raw</p>
<p>352 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 materials and markets by leaving these issues to the “invisible hand”. While the free market approach has for now minimized the risk of a major conflict between China and the U.S. over raw materials and markets, the fact that the two countries belong and subscribe to different “moral values” could still pro- vide a fertile soil for conflict. Nobody should pray for disaster. But if China is co-opted into the prevailing system, Africa’s place would probably not be much different from what has always been the case in the current system. If China continues to challenge the system, Africa would probably benefit by not only playing one power off against the other but also by actively participating in the creation of a new and more just international system. In either case Africa needs first to get it acts together, speak in one voice and strengthen its collective bargaining position. Conclusion Any generalization about China’s policy in Africa, whether it is optimistic, skeptical or pessimistic, can be truly misleading. The very notion of China in Africa is inaccurate to some extent for China does not deal with Africa per se , but with individual African countries. And the sum total of China’s relations with African countries is not the same as China’s relations with Africa. What this also means is that both the nature and effect of China’s activities in Africa would vary from country to country. China could become a force for good in one country and not in another. Secondly, the fact that China is a relative new-comer to Africa as an aspir- ing major power means that it is too early to assess the wider impacts. In other words, the dominant pattern of Chinese activities, as far as long-term consequences are concerned, is that it does not have a pattern yet. Factors internal to China, Africa and the global political economy could all affect the current trajectories of Chinese activities in Africa and their effects. But Afro- Chinese relations are sufficiently fluid at the moment for both Africa and China to be able to re-organize the guiding principles. China is distinct in important ways from Western powers. Yet, it is also behaviorally similar to emerging global powers of the past. What lies ahead in the context of Afro-Chinese relationship may therefore be neither the best of all worlds, which is seen by Sino-optimists, nor just another era which is suspiciously similar to the past, which is dreadfully envisaged by Sino-skep- tics and Sino-pessimists. Every era has its own dynamics; and it combines a little bit of both.</p>
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