Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining
Identifieur interne : 001849 ( Istex/Curation ); précédent : 001848; suivant : 001850Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining
Auteurs : Alvin E. Roth [États-Unis] ; Michael W. K. Malouf [États-Unis] ; J. Keith Murnighan [États-Unis]Source :
- Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization [ 0167-2681 ] ; 1981.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Bargainer, Bargaining game, Bargaining games, Bargaining process, Binary lottery games, Chips, Current study, Different prizes, Equal probability, Equilibrium strategy pair, Equivalent games, Experimental study, Feasible utility payoffs, Full information condition, High information condition, Higher probability, Information condition, Intermediate condition, Intermediate information condition, Lottery, Lottery tickets, Malouf, Monetary payoffs, Monetary value, Next section, Outcome function, Partial information condition, Payoff, Player choice, Potential prize, Previous experiments, Previous study, Random order, Roth, Smaller number, Social conventions, Sociological hypothesis, Strategic equivalence, Strategic form, Strategy choices, Strategy sets, Structural information, Utility function, Utility functions, Utility payoffs.
Abstract
Abstract: Most game-theoretic models of strategic interaction, indeed most economic models of any sort, specify potential outcomes entirely in terms of the preferences of the agents, as captured in their (possibly cardinal) utility functions. The underlying assumption is that the outcome of such interactions is determined entirely by these preferences, together with the strategic possibilities available to the agents. The purpose of this paper is to challenge the adequacy of this assumption in general, by investigating it in the specific context of two-person bargaining. In particular, we consider whether certain experimental results reported earlier can be accounted for strictly in terms of players' preferences and strategic possibilities, and we report a new experimental study designed to answer this question. The results strongly support the conclusion that sociological factors, unrelated to what we normally consider to be the ‘economic’ parameters of a game, can decisively influence the outcome of bargaining, in a systematic manner.
Url:
DOI: 10.1016/0167-2681(81)90003-2
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Keith Murnighan</name><affiliation wicri:level="1"><mods:affiliation>University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801, USA</mods:affiliation><country xml:lang="fr">États-Unis</country><wicri:regionArea>University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801</wicri:regionArea></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">JEBO</title><idno type="ISSN">0167-2681</idno><imprint><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><date type="published" when="1981">1981</date><biblScope unit="volume">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="153">153</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="177">177</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0167-2681</idno></series></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0167-2681</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="Teeft" xml:lang="en"><term>Bargainer</term><term>Bargaining game</term><term>Bargaining games</term><term>Bargaining process</term><term>Binary lottery games</term><term>Chips</term><term>Current study</term><term>Different prizes</term><term>Equal probability</term><term>Equilibrium strategy pair</term><term>Equivalent games</term><term>Experimental study</term><term>Feasible utility payoffs</term><term>Full information condition</term><term>High information condition</term><term>Higher probability</term><term>Information condition</term><term>Intermediate condition</term><term>Intermediate information condition</term><term>Lottery</term><term>Lottery tickets</term><term>Malouf</term><term>Monetary payoffs</term><term>Monetary value</term><term>Next section</term><term>Outcome function</term><term>Partial information condition</term><term>Payoff</term><term>Player choice</term><term>Potential prize</term><term>Previous experiments</term><term>Previous study</term><term>Random order</term><term>Roth</term><term>Smaller number</term><term>Social conventions</term><term>Sociological hypothesis</term><term>Strategic equivalence</term><term>Strategic form</term><term>Strategy choices</term><term>Strategy sets</term><term>Structural information</term><term>Utility function</term><term>Utility functions</term><term>Utility payoffs</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Abstract: Most game-theoretic models of strategic interaction, indeed most economic models of any sort, specify potential outcomes entirely in terms of the preferences of the agents, as captured in their (possibly cardinal) utility functions. The underlying assumption is that the outcome of such interactions is determined entirely by these preferences, together with the strategic possibilities available to the agents. The purpose of this paper is to challenge the adequacy of this assumption in general, by investigating it in the specific context of two-person bargaining. In particular, we consider whether certain experimental results reported earlier can be accounted for strictly in terms of players' preferences and strategic possibilities, and we report a new experimental study designed to answer this question. The results strongly support the conclusion that sociological factors, unrelated to what we normally consider to be the ‘economic’ parameters of a game, can decisively influence the outcome of bargaining, in a systematic manner.</div></front></TEI></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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