Several large scale P2P networks operating on the Internet are based on a Distributed Hash Table. These networks offer valuable services, but they all suffer from a critical issue allowing malicious nodes to be inserted in specific places on the DHT for undesirable purposes (monitoring, distributed denial of service, pollution, etc.). While several attacks and attack scenarios have been documented, few studies have measured the actual deployment of such attacks and none of the documented countermeasures have been tested for compatibility with an already deployed network. In this article, we focus on the KAD network. Based on large scale monitoring campaigns, we show that the world-wide deployed KAD network suffers large number of suspicious insertions around shared contents and we quantify them. To cope with these peers, we propose a new efficient protection algorithm based on analyzing the distribution of the peers' ID found around an entry after a DHT lookup. We evaluate our solution and show that it detects the most efficient configurations of inserted peers with a very small false-negative rate, and that the countermeasures successfully filter almost all the suspicious peers. We demonstrate the direct applicability of our approach by implementing and testing our solution in real P2P networks.

EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Lorraine/explor/InforLorV4/Data/Hal/Corpus

HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 001C14 | SxmlIndent | more

HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Hal/Corpus/biblio.hfd -nk 001C14 | SxmlIndent | more

{{Explor lien
   |wiki=    Wicri/Lorraine
   |area=    InforLorV4
   |flux=    Hal
   |étape=   Corpus
   |type=    RBID
   |clé=     Hal:hal-00786438
   |texte=   Detection and mitigation of localized attacks in a widely deployed P2P network
}}