Object representation, identity, and the paradox of early permanence: Steps toward a new framework
Identifieur interne : 001318 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001317; suivant : 001319Object representation, identity, and the paradox of early permanence: Steps toward a new framework
Auteurs : Andrew N. Meltzoff ; M. Keith MooreSource :
- Infant Behavior and Development [ 0163-6383 ] ; 1998.
Abstract
The sensorimotor theory of infancy has been overthrown, but there is little consensus on a replacement. We hypothesize that a capacity for representation is the starting point for infant development, not its culmination. Logical distinctions are drawn between object representation, identity, and permanence. Modern experiments on early object permanance and deferred imitation suggest: (a) even for young infants, representations persist over breaks in sensory contact, (b) numerical identity of objects (Os) is initially specified by spatiotemporal criteria (place and trajectory), (c) featural and functional identity criteria develop, (d) events are analyzed by comparing representations to current perception, and (e) representation operates both prospectively, anticipating future contacts with an O, and retrospectively, reidentifying an O as the “same one again”. A model of the architecture and functioning of the early representational system is proposed. It accounts for young infants' behavior toward absent people and things in terms of their efforts to determine the identity of objects. Our proposal is developmental without denying innate structure and elevates the power of perception and representation while being cautious about attributing complex concepts to young infants.
Url:
DOI: 10.1016/S0163-6383(98)90003-0
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We hypothesize that a capacity for representation is the starting point for infant development, not its culmination. Logical distinctions are drawn between object representation, identity, and permanence. Modern experiments on early object permanance and deferred imitation suggest: (a) even for young infants, representations persist over breaks in sensory contact, (b) numerical identity of objects (Os) is initially specified by spatiotemporal criteria (place and trajectory), (c) featural and functional identity criteria develop, (d) events are analyzed by comparing representations to current perception, and (e) representation operates both prospectively, anticipating future contacts with an O, and retrospectively, reidentifying an O as the “same one again”. A model of the architecture and functioning of the early representational system is proposed. It accounts for young infants' behavior toward absent people and things in terms of their efforts to determine the identity of objects. Our proposal is developmental without denying innate structure and elevates the power of perception and representation while being cautious about attributing complex concepts to young infants.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>elsevier</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Andrew N. Meltzoff</name><affiliations><json:string>Andrew N. Meltzoff, Department of Psychology, Box 357920 University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>M.Keith Moore</name><affiliations><json:string>Andrew N. 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Our proposal is developmental without denying innate structure and elevates the power of perception and representation while being cautious about attributing complex concepts to young infants.</ce:simple-para></ce:abstract-sec></ce:abstract><ce:keywords><ce:section-title>Keywords</ce:section-title><ce:keyword><ce:text>representation</ce:text></ce:keyword><ce:keyword><ce:text>object identity</ce:text></ce:keyword><ce:keyword><ce:text>object permanence</ce:text></ce:keyword><ce:keyword><ce:text>imitation</ce:text></ce:keyword><ce:keyword><ce:text>cognitive development</ce:text></ce:keyword><ce:keyword><ce:text>memory</ce:text></ce:keyword></ce:keywords></head></converted-article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>Object representation, identity, and the paradox of early permanence: Steps toward a new framework</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>Object representation, identity, and the paradox of early permanence: Steps toward a new framework</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Andrew N.</namePart><namePart type="family">Meltzoff</namePart><affiliation>Andrew N. 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Our proposal is developmental without denying innate structure and elevates the power of perception and representation while being cautious about attributing complex concepts to young infants.</abstract><note type="content">Section title: Invited article</note><subject><genre>Keywords</genre><topic>representation</topic><topic>object identity</topic><topic>object permanence</topic><topic>imitation</topic><topic>cognitive development</topic><topic>memory</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Infant Behavior and Development</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>INFBEH</title></titleInfo><genre type="Journal">journal</genre><originInfo><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1998</dateIssued></originInfo><identifier type="ISSN">0163-6383</identifier><identifier type="PII">S0163-6383(00)X0018-5</identifier><part><date>1998</date><detail type="volume"><number>21</number><caption>vol.</caption></detail><detail type="issue"><number>2</number><caption>no.</caption></detail><extent unit="issue pages"><start>167</start><end>377</end></extent><extent unit="pages"><start>201</start><end>235</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">2A05963B53D281FC1355964CCC5221D2E7985451</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1016/S0163-6383(98)90003-0</identifier><identifier type="PII">S0163-6383(98)90003-0</identifier><recordInfo><recordContentSource>ELSEVIER</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods></metadata><enrichments><istex:catWosTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/2A05963B53D281FC1355964CCC5221D2E7985451/enrichments/catWos"><teiHeader><profileDesc><textClass><classCode scheme="WOS">PSYCHOLOGY, DEVELOPMENTAL</classCode></textClass></profileDesc></teiHeader></istex:catWosTEI></enrichments></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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