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Pandemics and Dual-Use Research

Identifieur interne : 000F64 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000F63; suivant : 000F65

Pandemics and Dual-Use Research

Auteurs :

Source :

RBID : PMC:7122325

Abstract

Biological risks and threats come in many forms which can contribute to the globalisation of insecurity. The end of the twentieth century saw increased momentum to reframe infectious diseases from purely health issues to those of security concern. HIV/AIDS, SARS, bird flu, and swine flu pandemics in the twenty-first century have challenged nation-states and international institutions. Added to this challenge are the developments and breakthroughs in scientific experiments. While such progress has the potential to eradicate disease and improve human well-being, it also has the potential to present new risks and possible threats to society if the knowledge is used inappropriately.

Biological dual-use research can inherently have both beneficial and dangerous consequences. Several incidents have highlighted the potential dangers associated with scientific experiments such as the accidental creation of the highly virulent mousepox, the reconstruction of the 1918 influenza virus, and the manipulation of the H5N1 bird flu virus. Almost all items necessary to produce lethal biological agents are dual-use and can be readily found in pharmaceutical laboratories. The ability to obtain a pathogen, weaponise the agent, and employ or disperse it, needs to be considered in terms of capability and intent and the increasing franchisation of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The availability of open-source information and material, developments in biotechnology sciences, and inexpensive equipment make the production of bioweapons an attractive option for non-state actors. For example, in recent times individuals and non-state actors have developed or obtained ricin and anthrax with the intention of using it for either personal or political harm.

Biological agents are not constrained by sovereign borders and can have a devastating effect either in the form of an infectious disease pandemic or as a result of scientific experimentation. This chapter analyses key issues and problems associated with biological security issues and dual-use research including governance arrangements to address those concerns.


Url:
DOI: 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_13
PubMed: NONE
PubMed Central: 7122325


Affiliations:


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<p>Biological risks and threats come in many forms which can contribute to the globalisation of insecurity. The end of the twentieth century saw increased momentum to reframe infectious diseases from purely health issues to those of security concern. HIV/AIDS, SARS, bird flu, and swine flu pandemics in the twenty-first century have challenged nation-states and international institutions. Added to this challenge are the developments and breakthroughs in scientific experiments. While such progress has the potential to eradicate disease and improve human well-being, it also has the potential to present new risks and possible threats to society if the knowledge is used inappropriately.</p>
<p>Biological dual-use research can inherently have both beneficial and dangerous consequences. Several incidents have highlighted the potential dangers associated with scientific experiments such as the accidental creation of the highly virulent mousepox, the reconstruction of the 1918 influenza virus, and the manipulation of the H5N1 bird flu virus. Almost all items necessary to produce lethal biological agents are dual-use and can be readily found in pharmaceutical laboratories. The ability to obtain a pathogen, weaponise the agent, and employ or disperse it, needs to be considered in terms of capability and intent and the increasing franchisation of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The availability of open-source information and material, developments in biotechnology sciences, and inexpensive equipment make the production of bioweapons an attractive option for non-state actors. For example, in recent times individuals and non-state actors have developed or obtained ricin and anthrax with the intention of using it for either personal or political harm.</p>
<p>Biological agents are not constrained by sovereign borders and can have a devastating effect either in the form of an infectious disease pandemic or as a result of scientific experimentation. This chapter analyses key issues and problems associated with biological security issues and dual-use research including governance arrangements to address those concerns.</p>
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