A TALE OF TWO STUDIES: Ethics, Bioterrorism, and the Censorship of Science
Identifieur interne : 001939 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001938; suivant : 001940A TALE OF TWO STUDIES: Ethics, Bioterrorism, and the Censorship of Science
Auteurs : Michael J. SelgedidSource :
- Hastings Center Report [ 0093-0334 ] ; 2007-05-06.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Authors group, Available strands, Benefit humanity, Biological weapons, Biological weapons development, Biotechnology, Biotechnology research, Censorship, Curity experts, Darker bioweapons future, Dissemination, Genetics, Genome, Hastings center report, Infectious disease, Journal editors, June, Life sciences, Methods sections, Mousepox, Mousepox study, National academy, National research council, National science, National security, Nsabb, Nuclear weapons, Other hand, Oxford university press, Personal communication, Polio, Polio genome, Polio studies, Polio virus, Potential bioterrorists, Problematic cases, Regulatory authority, Science editors, Scientific community, Scientific information, Scientific publication, Scientific research, Scientific results, Security experts, Security risks, Smallpox, Smallpox virus, Special expertise, Specific details, Tangible link, Twentieth century, Unclassifiable research, Voluntary selfgovernance, Weapons implications.
Abstract
Some scientific research should not be published The risks to national security and public health override the social benefits of disseminating scientific results openly. Unfortunately, scientists themselves are not in a position to know which studies to withhold from public view, as the National Research Council has proposed. Yet neither can government alone be trusted to balance the competing interests at stake.
Url:
DOI: 10.1353/hcr.2007.0046
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:21C7A91C5C2F2FA4354D04AF9180DC6E63ECF61FLe document en format XML
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Unfortunately, scientists themselves are not in a position to know which studies to withhold from public view, as the National Research Council has proposed. Yet neither can government alone be trusted to balance the competing interests at stake.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta><noteGroup><note xml:id="fn1"><p>Michael J. Selgedid, “A Takle of Two Studies: Ethics, Bioterrorism, and the Censorship of Science,” <i>Hastings Center Report 37</i>, no.3 (2007): 35–43</p></note></noteGroup></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>A TALE OF TWO STUDIES: Ethics, Bioterrorism, and the Censorship of Science</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>A TALE OF TWO STUDIES: Ethics, Bioterrorism, and the Censorship of Science</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">MICHAEL J.</namePart><namePart type="family">SELGEDID</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-6N5SZHKN-D">article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2007-05-06</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2007</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><extent unit="figures">0</extent><extent unit="tables">0</extent><extent unit="formulas">0</extent><extent unit="references">38</extent><extent unit="linksCrossRef">39</extent></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">Some scientific research should not be published The risks to national security and public health override the social benefits of disseminating scientific results openly. Unfortunately, scientists themselves are not in a position to know which studies to withhold from public view, as the National Research Council has proposed. Yet neither can government alone be trusted to balance the competing interests at stake.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Hastings Center Report</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0093-0334</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1552-146X</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1002/(ISSN)1552-146X</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">HAST</identifier><part><date>2007</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>37</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>3</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>35</start><end>43</end><total>9</total></extent></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit1"><titleInfo><title>In M. White, Leonardo: The First Scientist (London: Abacus, 2000), 206. I thank John Weckert for directing me to this quotation.</title></titleInfo><note type="citation/reference">In M. White, Leonardo: The First Scientist (London: Abacus, 2000), 206. I thank John Weckert for directing me to this quotation.</note><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">M.</namePart><namePart type="family">White</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>book</genre><originInfo><publisher>Abacus</publisher></originInfo><part><date>2000</date><extent unit="pages"><start>206</start></extent></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit2"><titleInfo><title>P. Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).</title></titleInfo><note type="citation/reference">P. Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).</note><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">P.</namePart><namePart type="family">Kitcher</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>book</genre><originInfo><publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher></originInfo><part><date>2001</date></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit3"><titleInfo><title>S. Schweber, In the Shadow of the Bomb: Bethe, Oppenheimer, and the Moral Responsibility ofthe Scientist (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 18.</title></titleInfo><note type="citation/reference">S. Schweber, In the Shadow of the Bomb: Bethe, Oppenheimer, and the Moral Responsibility ofthe Scientist (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 18.</note><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">S.</namePart><namePart type="family">Schweber</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>book</genre><originInfo><publisher>Princeton University Press</publisher></originInfo><part><date>2000</date><extent unit="pages"><start>18</start></extent></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit4"><titleInfo><title>Ibid.</title></titleInfo><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit5"><titleInfo><title>Ibid., 64.</title></titleInfo><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit6"><titleInfo><title>“Smallpox Revisited?“</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">M.J.</namePart><namePart type="family">Selgelid</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>journal-article</genre><note type="citation/reference">M.J. Selgelid, “Smallpox Revisited?“ American Journal of Bioethics 3, no. 1 (2003): W5–W11.</note><part><date>2003</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>3</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>1</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>W5</start><end>W11</end></extent></part><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>American Journal of Bioethics</title></titleInfo><part><date>2003</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>3</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>1</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>W5</start><end>W11</end></extent></part></relatedItem></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit7"><titleInfo><title>The Darker Bioweapons Future</title></titleInfo><name type="corporate"><namePart>Central Intelligence Agency</namePart></name><genre>other</genre><part><date>2003-11-03</date></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit8"><titleInfo><title>J. 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Pollack, “Scientists Create a Live Polio Virus,“ New York Times, July 12, 2002, at http:www.nytimes.com20020712science10POLI.htmlex102750869&ei1&en9c90f7f35631fbcd.</note><part><date>2002-07-12</date></part><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>New York Times</title></titleInfo><part><date>2002-07-12</date></part></relatedItem></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit14"><titleInfo><title>M.B. Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues, and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).</title></titleInfo><note type="citation/reference">M.B. Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues, and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).</note><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">M.B.</namePart><namePart type="family">Oldstone</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>book</genre><originInfo><publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher></originInfo><part><date>1998</date></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit15"><titleInfo><title>The official Russian samples have since been moved to a facility called VECTOR.</title></titleInfo><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit16"><titleInfo><title>Scientists Create a Live Polio Virus</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="family">Pollack</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit17"><titleInfo><title>“Virus Synthesized in a Fortnight,“</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">S.P.</namePart><namePart type="family">Westphal</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>journal-article</genre><note type="citation/reference">S.P. Westphal, “Virus Synthesized in a Fortnight,“ New Scientist Online News, November 14, 2003, at http:www.newscien‐tist.comhottopicsbioterrorism.jspidns99994383.</note><part><date>2003-11-14</date></part><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>New Scientist Online News</title></titleInfo><part><date>2003-11-14</date></part></relatedItem></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit18"><titleInfo><title>“Revealed: The Lax Laws That Could Allow Assembly of Deadly Virus DNA,“</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">J.</namePart><namePart type="family">Randerson</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>journal-article</genre><note type="citation/reference">J. Randerson, “Revealed: The Lax Laws That Could Allow Assembly of Deadly Virus DNA,“ The Guardian, June 14, 2006, at http:www.guardian.co.ukprint0,329504239‐111274,00.html.</note><part><date>2006-06-14</date></part><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>The Guardian</title></titleInfo><part><date>2006-06-14</date></part></relatedItem></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit19"><titleInfo><title>“Resurrected Influenza Virus Yields Secrets of Deadly 1918 Pandemic,“</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">J.</namePart><namePart type="family">Kaiser</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>journal-article</genre><note type="citation/reference">J. Kaiser, “Resurrected Influenza Virus Yields Secrets of Deadly 1918 Pandemic,“ Science 310 (2005): 28–29. For the range of estimates of deaths caused by the 1918 flu, see G. Kolata, Flu (New York: Pan Books, 1999); J.M. Barry, The Great Influenza (New York: Viking, 2004).</note><part><date>2005</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>310</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>28</start><end>29</end></extent></part><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Science</title></titleInfo><part><date>2005</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>310</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>28</start><end>29</end></extent></part></relatedItem></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit20"><titleInfo><title>K. Alibeck and S. Handelman, Bio‐hazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World—Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Delta, 1999).</title></titleInfo><note type="citation/reference">K. Alibeck and S. Handelman, Bio‐hazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World—Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Delta, 1999).</note><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">K.</namePart><namePart type="family">Alibeck</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">S.</namePart><namePart type="family">Handelman</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>book</genre><originInfo><publisher>Delta</publisher></originInfo><part><date>1999</date></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit21"><titleInfo><title>Only a very small number of health care workers volunteered to be vaccinated.</title></titleInfo><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit22"><titleInfo><title>“Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus Polymerase Genes,“</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">J.K.</namePart><namePart type="family">Taubenberger</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">A.H.</namePart><namePart type="family">Reid</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">R.M.</namePart><namePart type="family">Lourens</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">T.M.</namePart><namePart type="family">Tumpey</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">C.F.</namePart><namePart type="family">Basler</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">P.V.</namePart><namePart type="family">Aguilar</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>journal-article</genre><note type="citation/reference">J.K. Taubenberger, A.H. Reid, R.M. Lourens, et al., “Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus Polymerase Genes,“ Nature 437 (2005): 889–93; T.M. Tumpey, C.F. Basler, P.V. Aguilar,et al., “Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus,” Science 310 (2005): 77–80.</note><part><date>2005</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>437</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>889</start><end>93</end></extent></part><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Nature</title></titleInfo><part><date>2005</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>437</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>889</start><end>93</end></extent></part></relatedItem></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit23"><titleInfo><title>Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism</title></titleInfo><name type="corporate"><namePart>National Research Council</namePart></name><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit24"><titleInfo><title>Board of Science and Education, British Medical Association, Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity II (London: British Medical Association, 2004). ANU scientist Peter Kerr nonetheless claims that vaccine resistance in the case of the mousepox study was a real surprise. Personal communication.</title></titleInfo><name type="corporate"><namePart>Board of Science and Education, British Medical Association</namePart></name><note type="citation/reference">Board of Science and Education, British Medical Association, Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity II (London: British Medical Association, 2004). ANU scientist Peter Kerr nonetheless claims that vaccine resistance in the case of the mousepox study was a real surprise. Personal communication.</note><genre>book</genre><originInfo><publisher>British Medical Association</publisher></originInfo><part><date>2004</date></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit25"><titleInfo><title>Personal communication.</title></titleInfo><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit26"><titleInfo><title>“Uncensored Exchange of Scientific Results,“</title></titleInfo><name type="corporate"><namePart>Journal Editors and Authors Group</namePart></name><genre>journal-article</genre><note type="citation/reference">Journal Editors and Authors Group, “Uncensored Exchange of Scientific Results,“ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100, no. 4 (February 18, 2003): 1464, at http:www.pnas.orgcgidoi10.1073pnas.0630491100.</note><part><date>2003-02-18</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>100</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>4</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>1464</start></extent></part><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</title></titleInfo><part><date>2003-02-18</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>100</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>4</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>1464</start></extent></part></relatedItem></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit27"><titleInfo><title>“‘Statement on Scientific Publication and Security’ Fails to Provide Necessary Guidelines,“</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Stanley</namePart><namePart type="family">Falkow</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>journal-article</genre><note type="citation/reference">Stanley Falkow, “‘Statement on Scientific Publication and Security’ Fails to Provide Necessary Guidelines,“ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Online 100, no. 10 (preprint), May 12, 2003, at http:www.pnas.orgcgicontentfull100105575.</note><part><date>2003-05-12</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>100</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>10</number></detail></part><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Online</title></titleInfo><part><date>2003-05-12</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>100</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>10</number></detail></part></relatedItem></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit28"><titleInfo><title>The Individual and Collective Roles Scientists Can Play in Strengthening International Treaties</title></titleInfo><name type="corporate"><namePart>The Royal Society, United Nations Foundation</namePart></name><genre>other</genre><part><date>2004-04</date></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit29"><titleInfo><title>“Preventing Test‐Tube Terrorism,“</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">J.</namePart><namePart type="family">Wilson</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>journal-article</genre><note type="citation/reference">J. Wilson, “Preventing Test‐Tube Terrorism,“ The Guardian, April 22, 2004, at http:education.guardian.co.ukprint0,3858,4906769‐110865,00.html. The emphasis is mine.</note><part><date>2004-04-22</date></part><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>The Guardian</title></titleInfo><part><date>2004-04-22</date></part></relatedItem></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit30"><titleInfo><title>Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism</title></titleInfo><name type="corporate"><namePart>National Research Council</namePart></name><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit31"><titleInfo><title>Ibid., 93.</title></titleInfo><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit32"><titleInfo><title>Ibid., 117.</title></titleInfo><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit33"><titleInfo><title>Ibid, 8–9.</title></titleInfo><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit34"><titleInfo><title>G.J. Annas, American Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15.</title></titleInfo><note type="citation/reference">G.J. Annas, American Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15.</note><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">G.J.</namePart><namePart type="family">Annas</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>book</genre><originInfo><publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher></originInfo><part><date>2005</date><extent unit="pages"><start>15</start></extent></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit35"><titleInfo><title>For further discussion of policy options for dealing with the dual‐use dilemma, see S. Miller and M.J. Selgelid, Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual‐Use Dilemma (Canberra, Australia: Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Australian National University, and Charles Stuart University, 2006).</title></titleInfo><note type="citation/reference">For further discussion of policy options for dealing with the dual‐use dilemma, see S. Miller and M.J. Selgelid, Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual‐Use Dilemma (Canberra, Australia: Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Australian National University, and Charles Stuart University, 2006).</note><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">S.</namePart><namePart type="family">Miller</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">M.J.</namePart><namePart type="family">Selgelid</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>book</genre><originInfo><publisher>Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Australian National University, and Charles Stuart University</publisher></originInfo><part><date>2006</date></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit36"><titleInfo><title>Though the dual‐use dilemma is inherently international, my analysis here is limited to the domestic context. Though I do not offer an international solution, I aim to show that the status quo with regard to the U.S. domestic solution is unacceptable at present. The general idea of a diversely constituted decision‐making body could, in any case, in principle be applied to the international arena. Whether that would be politically feasible (and whether there is any good or feasible international solution) is a separate matter.</title></titleInfo><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit37"><titleInfo><title>National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. See http:www.biosecurity‐board.gov.</title></titleInfo><name type="corporate"><namePart>National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity</namePart></name><genre>other</genre></relatedItem><relatedItem type="references" displayLabel="cit38"><titleInfo><title>“Better Never Than Late,“</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">D.</namePart><namePart type="family">Kennedy</namePart><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><genre>journal-article</genre><note type="citation/reference">D. Kennedy, “Better Never Than Late,“ Science 310 (2005): 195.</note><part><date>2005</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>310</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>195</start></extent></part><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Science</title></titleInfo><part><date>2005</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>310</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>195</start></extent></part></relatedItem></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">21C7A91C5C2F2FA4354D04AF9180DC6E63ECF61F</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/WNG-3TD554WS-H</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1353/hcr.2007.0046</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">HAST536</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">2007 The Hastings Center</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-L0C46X92-X">wiley</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Converted from (version ) to MODS version 3.6.</recordOrigin><recordCreationDate encoding="w3cdtf">2019-11-14</recordCreationDate></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/ark:/67375/WNG-3TD554WS-H/record.json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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