Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus.
Identifieur interne : 000138 ( PubMed/Corpus ); précédent : 000137; suivant : 000139Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus.
Auteurs : Chantal M. Morel ; Olof Lindahl ; Stephan Harbarth ; Marlieke E A. De Kraker ; Suzanne Edwards ; Aidan HollisSource :
- The Journal of antibiotics [ 1881-1469 ] ; 2020.
Abstract
The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. However, there is little focus on how to sustain the efficacy of new, promising antibiotics reaching the market. Currently, inappropriate use of antibiotics is commonplace, which has accelerated resistance development. In an attempt to halt this trend, antibiotic stewardship policies are being implemented in many resource-rich settings. Unfortunately, this has not yet had an impact on the amount of antibiotics being prescribed globally. One important hurdle is misalignment of incentives. While governments and health services are incentivized to promote prudent use of this common good, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to increase volume of sales to maximize profits. This problem must be addressed or else the major efforts going into developing new antibiotics will be in vain. In this paper we outline an approach to realign the incentives of pharmaceutical companies with wider antibiotic conservation efforts by making a staged bonus a component of an MER for antibiotic developers when resistance to their drug remains low over time. This bonus could address the lack of stewardship focus in any innovation-geared incentive.
DOI: 10.1038/s41429-020-0300-y
PubMed: 32203126
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Chantal.Morel@unige.ch.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Lindahl, Olof" sort="Lindahl, Olof" uniqKey="Lindahl O" first="Olof" last="Lindahl">Olof Lindahl</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University, Kyrkogårdsgatan 10C Box 513, 751 20, Uppsala, Sweden.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Harbarth, Stephan" sort="Harbarth, Stephan" uniqKey="Harbarth S" first="Stephan" last="Harbarth">Stephan Harbarth</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>Infection Control Programme and Division of Infectious Diseases, University of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, Rue Gabrielle-Perret-Gentil, 41205, Geneva, Switzerland.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="De Kraker, Marlieke E A" sort="De Kraker, Marlieke E A" uniqKey="De Kraker M" first="Marlieke E A" last="De Kraker">Marlieke E A. De Kraker</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>University of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, Rue Gabrielle-Perret-Gentil 4, 1205, Geneva, Switzerland.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Edwards, Suzanne" sort="Edwards, Suzanne" uniqKey="Edwards S" first="Suzanne" last="Edwards">Suzanne Edwards</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>Department of Health Care Management, Berlin University of Technology, Berlin, Germany.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Hollis, Aidan" sort="Hollis, Aidan" uniqKey="Hollis A" first="Aidan" last="Hollis">Aidan Hollis</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>Department of Economics, University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr NW, Calgary, AB, T2N1N4, Canada.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">PubMed</idno><date when="2020">2020</date><idno type="RBID">pubmed:32203126</idno><idno type="pmid">32203126</idno><idno type="doi">10.1038/s41429-020-0300-y</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/PubMed/Corpus">000138</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="PubMed" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="PubMed">000138</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title xml:lang="en">Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus.</title><author><name sortKey="Morel, Chantal M" sort="Morel, Chantal M" uniqKey="Morel C" first="Chantal M" last="Morel">Chantal M. Morel</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>University of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, Rue Gabrielle-Perret-Gentil 4, 1205, Geneva, Switzerland. Chantal.Morel@unige.ch.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Lindahl, Olof" sort="Lindahl, Olof" uniqKey="Lindahl O" first="Olof" last="Lindahl">Olof Lindahl</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University, Kyrkogårdsgatan 10C Box 513, 751 20, Uppsala, Sweden.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Harbarth, Stephan" sort="Harbarth, Stephan" uniqKey="Harbarth S" first="Stephan" last="Harbarth">Stephan Harbarth</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>Infection Control Programme and Division of Infectious Diseases, University of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, Rue Gabrielle-Perret-Gentil, 41205, Geneva, Switzerland.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="De Kraker, Marlieke E A" sort="De Kraker, Marlieke E A" uniqKey="De Kraker M" first="Marlieke E A" last="De Kraker">Marlieke E A. De Kraker</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>University of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, Rue Gabrielle-Perret-Gentil 4, 1205, Geneva, Switzerland.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Edwards, Suzanne" sort="Edwards, Suzanne" uniqKey="Edwards S" first="Suzanne" last="Edwards">Suzanne Edwards</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>Department of Health Care Management, Berlin University of Technology, Berlin, Germany.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Hollis, Aidan" sort="Hollis, Aidan" uniqKey="Hollis A" first="Aidan" last="Hollis">Aidan Hollis</name><affiliation><nlm:affiliation>Department of Economics, University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr NW, Calgary, AB, T2N1N4, Canada.</nlm:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><series><title level="j">The Journal of antibiotics</title><idno type="eISSN">1881-1469</idno><imprint><date when="2020" type="published">2020</date></imprint></series></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. However, there is little focus on how to sustain the efficacy of new, promising antibiotics reaching the market. Currently, inappropriate use of antibiotics is commonplace, which has accelerated resistance development. In an attempt to halt this trend, antibiotic stewardship policies are being implemented in many resource-rich settings. Unfortunately, this has not yet had an impact on the amount of antibiotics being prescribed globally. One important hurdle is misalignment of incentives. While governments and health services are incentivized to promote prudent use of this common good, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to increase volume of sales to maximize profits. This problem must be addressed or else the major efforts going into developing new antibiotics will be in vain. In this paper we outline an approach to realign the incentives of pharmaceutical companies with wider antibiotic conservation efforts by making a staged bonus a component of an MER for antibiotic developers when resistance to their drug remains low over time. This bonus could address the lack of stewardship focus in any innovation-geared incentive.</div></front></TEI><pubmed><MedlineCitation Status="Publisher" Owner="NLM"><PMID Version="1">32203126</PMID><DateRevised><Year>2020</Year><Month>03</Month><Day>23</Day></DateRevised><Article PubModel="Print-Electronic"><Journal><ISSN IssnType="Electronic">1881-1469</ISSN><JournalIssue CitedMedium="Internet"><PubDate><Year>2020</Year><Month>Mar</Month><Day>19</Day></PubDate></JournalIssue><Title>The Journal of antibiotics</Title><ISOAbbreviation>J. Antibiot.</ISOAbbreviation></Journal><ArticleTitle>Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus.</ArticleTitle><ELocationID EIdType="doi" ValidYN="Y">10.1038/s41429-020-0300-y</ELocationID><Abstract><AbstractText>The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. However, there is little focus on how to sustain the efficacy of new, promising antibiotics reaching the market. Currently, inappropriate use of antibiotics is commonplace, which has accelerated resistance development. In an attempt to halt this trend, antibiotic stewardship policies are being implemented in many resource-rich settings. Unfortunately, this has not yet had an impact on the amount of antibiotics being prescribed globally. One important hurdle is misalignment of incentives. While governments and health services are incentivized to promote prudent use of this common good, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to increase volume of sales to maximize profits. This problem must be addressed or else the major efforts going into developing new antibiotics will be in vain. In this paper we outline an approach to realign the incentives of pharmaceutical companies with wider antibiotic conservation efforts by making a staged bonus a component of an MER for antibiotic developers when resistance to their drug remains low over time. This bonus could address the lack of stewardship focus in any innovation-geared incentive.</AbstractText></Abstract><AuthorList CompleteYN="Y"><Author ValidYN="Y"><LastName>Morel</LastName><ForeName>Chantal M</ForeName><Initials>CM</Initials><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>University of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, Rue Gabrielle-Perret-Gentil 4, 1205, Geneva, Switzerland. Chantal.Morel@unige.ch.</Affiliation></AffiliationInfo><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>Global Studies Institute, Rue des Vieux-Grenadiers 10, 1205, Geneva, Switzerland. Chantal.Morel@unige.ch.</Affiliation></AffiliationInfo><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University, Kyrkogårdsgatan 10C Box 513, 751 20, Uppsala, Sweden. Chantal.Morel@unige.ch.</Affiliation></AffiliationInfo></Author><Author ValidYN="Y"><LastName>Lindahl</LastName><ForeName>Olof</ForeName><Initials>O</Initials><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University, Kyrkogårdsgatan 10C Box 513, 751 20, Uppsala, Sweden.</Affiliation></AffiliationInfo></Author><Author ValidYN="Y"><LastName>Harbarth</LastName><ForeName>Stephan</ForeName><Initials>S</Initials><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>Infection Control Programme and Division of Infectious Diseases, University of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, Rue Gabrielle-Perret-Gentil, 41205, Geneva, Switzerland.</Affiliation></AffiliationInfo><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>WHO Collaborating Centre on Patient Safety, University of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, Rue Gabrielle-Perret-Gentil, 41205, Geneva, Switzerland.</Affiliation></AffiliationInfo></Author><Author ValidYN="Y"><LastName>de Kraker</LastName><ForeName>Marlieke E A</ForeName><Initials>MEA</Initials><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>University of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, Rue Gabrielle-Perret-Gentil 4, 1205, Geneva, Switzerland.</Affiliation></AffiliationInfo></Author><Author ValidYN="Y"><LastName>Edwards</LastName><ForeName>Suzanne</ForeName><Initials>S</Initials><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>Department of Health Care Management, Berlin University of Technology, Berlin, Germany.</Affiliation></AffiliationInfo></Author><Author ValidYN="Y"><LastName>Hollis</LastName><ForeName>Aidan</ForeName><Initials>A</Initials><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>Department of Economics, University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr NW, Calgary, AB, T2N1N4, Canada.</Affiliation></AffiliationInfo></Author></AuthorList><Language>eng</Language><PublicationTypeList><PublicationType UI="D016428">Journal Article</PublicationType><PublicationType UI="D016454">Review</PublicationType></PublicationTypeList><ArticleDate DateType="Electronic"><Year>2020</Year><Month>03</Month><Day>19</Day></ArticleDate></Article><MedlineJournalInfo><Country>Japan</Country><MedlineTA>J Antibiot (Tokyo)</MedlineTA><NlmUniqueID>0151115</NlmUniqueID><ISSNLinking>0021-8820</ISSNLinking></MedlineJournalInfo><CitationSubset>IM</CitationSubset></MedlineCitation><PubmedData><History><PubMedPubDate PubStatus="received"><Year>2020</Year><Month>02</Month><Day>17</Day></PubMedPubDate><PubMedPubDate PubStatus="accepted"><Year>2020</Year><Month>02</Month><Day>22</Day></PubMedPubDate><PubMedPubDate PubStatus="entrez"><Year>2020</Year><Month>3</Month><Day>24</Day><Hour>6</Hour><Minute>0</Minute></PubMedPubDate><PubMedPubDate PubStatus="pubmed"><Year>2020</Year><Month>3</Month><Day>24</Day><Hour>6</Hour><Minute>0</Minute></PubMedPubDate><PubMedPubDate PubStatus="medline"><Year>2020</Year><Month>3</Month><Day>24</Day><Hour>6</Hour><Minute>0</Minute></PubMedPubDate></History><PublicationStatus>aheadofprint</PublicationStatus><ArticleIdList><ArticleId IdType="pubmed">32203126</ArticleId><ArticleId IdType="doi">10.1038/s41429-020-0300-y</ArticleId><ArticleId IdType="pii">10.1038/s41429-020-0300-y</ArticleId></ArticleIdList></PubmedData></pubmed></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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