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The discrepant epidemiology of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)

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The discrepant epidemiology of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)

Auteurs : C. Raina Macintyre

Source :

RBID : PMC:7104603

Abstract

The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a newly emerged infection in humans affecting the Arabian Peninsula, Europe, and North Africa. The source and persistence of the infection in humans remains unknown. The aim of this paper was to apply a risk analysis approach to the epidemiology of MERS-CoV and to understand the source of ongoing infections. The epidemiology of MERS-CoV was reviewed and compared to SARS. Each observed feature of MERS-CoV epidemiology was summarized and fitted to either an epidemic or one of two sporadic scenarios (either animal or deliberate release). As of May 2014, MERS-CoV has infected over 681 people and killed a further 204 over 2 years. In contrast, there were 8,273 cases and 775 deaths from SARS within 8 months. MERS-CoV has a more sporadic pattern unlike the clear epidemic pattern seen with SARS, and an unusual concentration of cases in the Middle East, without epidemics in other countries to which it has spread. SARS, with a higher reproductive number (R0), was eliminated from humans within 8 months of emerging, yet MERS-CoV, with a low R0 has persisted in humans over a far more prolonged period. This is at odds with the expected behavior of a virus with a low R0, which theoretically should not persist unless there are ongoing introductions of infection into humans, and poses the question “what is the source of continuing infections in humans?” A hospital outbreak in Al Ahsa, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), had a classic epidemic pattern with some human-to-human transmission. However, 3 different strains were identified in that outbreak, an unexpected and unexplained finding for what appears to be a single source outbreak. Since this outbreak in April 2013, there has been a large increase in new cases, mainly in KSA in April and May 2014, with no corresponding epidemics in other countries. Yet MERS-CoV was present in KSA over several mass gatherings (which predispose to epidemics), including the Hajj pilgrimage, without an epidemic arising. Furthermore, although the virus has been identified in bats and camels, the mode of ongoing transmission to humans remains uncertain. Although some cases appear to be transmitted from human to human, and a few have animal or camel exposure, many cases have no history of contact with either animals or human cases. A high proportion of asymptomatic or otherwise undetected cases have been postulated as an explanation for the unusual epidemiology, yet active surveillance does not support this. When the observed data were fitted to different disease patterns, the features of MERS-CoV fit better with a sporadic pattern, with evidence for either deliberate release or an animal source. There are many discrepancies in the observed epidemiology of MERS-CoV, which better fits a sporadic than an epidemic pattern. Possible explanations of the unusual features of the epidemiology include human-to-human transmission with a large proportion of undetected cases; or sporadic ongoing infections from a non-human source; or a combination of both. Possible sources of ongoing sporadic infection in humans include animals (camels appear the most likely source), or deliberate release. The latter could explain 3 strains being present in a single hospital outbreak. Genetic testing should be conducted to determine whether the virus is evolving to be more transmissible. Better ascertainment of mild or asymptomatic cases is also needed. Finally, the discrepant epidemiology warrants critical analysis of all possible explanations, and involvement of all stakeholders in biosecurity, and deliberate release must be seriously considered and at least acknowledged as a possibility.


Url:
DOI: 10.1007/s10669-014-9506-5
PubMed: 32288979
PubMed Central: 7104603


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PMC:7104603

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<p>The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a newly emerged infection in humans affecting the Arabian Peninsula, Europe, and North Africa. The source and persistence of the infection in humans remains unknown. The aim of this paper was to apply a risk analysis approach to the epidemiology of MERS-CoV and to understand the source of ongoing infections. The epidemiology of MERS-CoV was reviewed and compared to SARS. Each observed feature of MERS-CoV epidemiology was summarized and fitted to either an epidemic or one of two sporadic scenarios (either animal or deliberate release). As of May 2014, MERS-CoV has infected over 681 people and killed a further 204 over 2 years. In contrast, there were 8,273 cases and 775 deaths from SARS within 8 months. MERS-CoV has a more sporadic pattern unlike the clear epidemic pattern seen with SARS, and an unusual concentration of cases in the Middle East, without epidemics in other countries to which it has spread. SARS, with a higher reproductive number (R0), was eliminated from humans within 8 months of emerging, yet MERS-CoV, with a low R0 has persisted in humans over a far more prolonged period. This is at odds with the expected behavior of a virus with a low R0, which theoretically should not persist unless there are ongoing introductions of infection into humans, and poses the question
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A hospital outbreak in Al Ahsa, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), had a classic epidemic pattern with some human-to-human transmission. However, 3 different strains were identified in that outbreak, an unexpected and unexplained finding for what appears to be a single source outbreak. Since this outbreak in April 2013, there has been a large increase in new cases, mainly in KSA in April and May 2014, with no corresponding epidemics in other countries. Yet MERS-CoV was present in KSA over several mass gatherings (which predispose to epidemics), including the Hajj pilgrimage, without an epidemic arising. Furthermore, although the virus has been identified in bats and camels, the mode of ongoing transmission to humans remains uncertain. Although some cases appear to be transmitted from human to human, and a few have animal or camel exposure, many cases have no history of contact with either animals or human cases. A high proportion of asymptomatic or otherwise undetected cases have been postulated as an explanation for the unusual epidemiology, yet active surveillance does not support this. When the observed data were fitted to different disease patterns, the features of MERS-CoV fit better with a sporadic pattern, with evidence for either deliberate release or an animal source. There are many discrepancies in the observed epidemiology of MERS-CoV, which better fits a sporadic than an epidemic pattern. Possible explanations of the unusual features of the epidemiology include human-to-human transmission with a large proportion of undetected cases; or sporadic ongoing infections from a non-human source; or a combination of both. Possible sources of ongoing sporadic infection in humans include animals (camels appear the most likely source), or deliberate release. The latter could explain 3 strains being present in a single hospital outbreak. Genetic testing should be conducted to determine whether the virus is evolving to be more transmissible. Better ascertainment of mild or asymptomatic cases is also needed. Finally, the discrepant epidemiology warrants critical analysis of all possible explanations, and involvement of all stakeholders in biosecurity, and deliberate release must be seriously considered and at least acknowledged as a possibility.</p>
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<p>The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a newly emerged infection in humans affecting the Arabian Peninsula, Europe, and North Africa. The source and persistence of the infection in humans remains unknown. The aim of this paper was to apply a risk analysis approach to the epidemiology of MERS-CoV and to understand the source of ongoing infections. The epidemiology of MERS-CoV was reviewed and compared to SARS. Each observed feature of MERS-CoV epidemiology was summarized and fitted to either an epidemic or one of two sporadic scenarios (either animal or deliberate release). As of May 2014, MERS-CoV has infected over 681 people and killed a further 204 over 2 years. In contrast, there were 8,273 cases and 775 deaths from SARS within 8 months. MERS-CoV has a more sporadic pattern unlike the clear epidemic pattern seen with SARS, and an unusual concentration of cases in the Middle East, without epidemics in other countries to which it has spread. SARS, with a higher reproductive number (R0), was eliminated from humans within 8 months of emerging, yet MERS-CoV, with a low R0 has persisted in humans over a far more prolonged period. This is at odds with the expected behavior of a virus with a low R0, which theoretically should not persist unless there are ongoing introductions of infection into humans, and poses the question
<italic>“what is the source of continuing infections in humans?”</italic>
A hospital outbreak in Al Ahsa, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), had a classic epidemic pattern with some human-to-human transmission. However, 3 different strains were identified in that outbreak, an unexpected and unexplained finding for what appears to be a single source outbreak. Since this outbreak in April 2013, there has been a large increase in new cases, mainly in KSA in April and May 2014, with no corresponding epidemics in other countries. Yet MERS-CoV was present in KSA over several mass gatherings (which predispose to epidemics), including the Hajj pilgrimage, without an epidemic arising. Furthermore, although the virus has been identified in bats and camels, the mode of ongoing transmission to humans remains uncertain. Although some cases appear to be transmitted from human to human, and a few have animal or camel exposure, many cases have no history of contact with either animals or human cases. A high proportion of asymptomatic or otherwise undetected cases have been postulated as an explanation for the unusual epidemiology, yet active surveillance does not support this. When the observed data were fitted to different disease patterns, the features of MERS-CoV fit better with a sporadic pattern, with evidence for either deliberate release or an animal source. There are many discrepancies in the observed epidemiology of MERS-CoV, which better fits a sporadic than an epidemic pattern. Possible explanations of the unusual features of the epidemiology include human-to-human transmission with a large proportion of undetected cases; or sporadic ongoing infections from a non-human source; or a combination of both. Possible sources of ongoing sporadic infection in humans include animals (camels appear the most likely source), or deliberate release. The latter could explain 3 strains being present in a single hospital outbreak. Genetic testing should be conducted to determine whether the virus is evolving to be more transmissible. Better ascertainment of mild or asymptomatic cases is also needed. Finally, the discrepant epidemiology warrants critical analysis of all possible explanations, and involvement of all stakeholders in biosecurity, and deliberate release must be seriously considered and at least acknowledged as a possibility.</p>
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