Public and private incentives for self-protection.
Identifieur interne : 001176 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 001175; suivant : 001177Public and private incentives for self-protection.
Auteurs : François Salanié [France] ; Nicolas Treich [France]Source :
- The Geneva risk and insurance review [ 1554-964X ] ; 2020.
Abstract
Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a "collective offsetting effect", since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.
DOI: 10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3
PubMed: 32837395
PubMed Central: PMC7371964
Affiliations:
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However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a "collective offsetting effect", since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.</div></front></TEI><pubmed><MedlineCitation Status="Publisher" Owner="NLM"><PMID Version="1">32837395</PMID><DateRevised><Year>2020</Year><Month>09</Month><Day>28</Day></DateRevised><Article PubModel="Print-Electronic"><Journal><ISSN IssnType="Print">1554-964X</ISSN><JournalIssue CitedMedium="Print"><PubDate><Year>2020</Year><Month>Jul</Month><Day>21</Day></PubDate></JournalIssue><Title>The Geneva risk and insurance review</Title><ISOAbbreviation>Geneva Risk Insur Rev</ISOAbbreviation></Journal><ArticleTitle>Public and private incentives for self-protection.</ArticleTitle><Pagination><MedlinePgn>1-10</MedlinePgn></Pagination><ELocationID EIdType="doi" ValidYN="Y">10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3</ELocationID><Abstract><AbstractText>Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a "collective offsetting effect", since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.</AbstractText><CopyrightInformation>© International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics 2020.</CopyrightInformation></Abstract><AuthorList CompleteYN="Y"><Author ValidYN="Y"><LastName>Salanié</LastName><ForeName>François</ForeName><Initials>F</Initials><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>Toulouse School of Economics, INRAE, Université Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France.</Affiliation><Identifier Source="GRID">grid.11417.32</Identifier><Identifier Source="ISNI">0000 0001 2353 1689</Identifier></AffiliationInfo></Author><Author ValidYN="Y"><LastName>Treich</LastName><ForeName>Nicolas</ForeName><Initials>N</Initials><Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0001-5840-4735</Identifier><AffiliationInfo><Affiliation>Toulouse School of Economics, INRAE, Université Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France.</Affiliation><Identifier Source="GRID">grid.11417.32</Identifier><Identifier Source="ISNI">0000 0001 2353 1689</Identifier></AffiliationInfo></Author></AuthorList><Language>eng</Language><PublicationTypeList><PublicationType UI="D016428">Journal Article</PublicationType></PublicationTypeList><ArticleDate DateType="Electronic"><Year>2020</Year><Month>07</Month><Day>21</Day></ArticleDate></Article><MedlineJournalInfo><Country>United States</Country><MedlineTA>Geneva Risk Insur Rev</MedlineTA><NlmUniqueID>101694970</NlmUniqueID><ISSNLinking>1554-964X</ISSNLinking></MedlineJournalInfo></MedlineCitation><PubmedData><History><PubMedPubDate PubStatus="received"><Year>2020</Year><Month>04</Month><Day>19</Day></PubMedPubDate><PubMedPubDate PubStatus="accepted"><Year>2020</Year><Month>07</Month><Day>07</Day></PubMedPubDate><PubMedPubDate PubStatus="entrez"><Year>2020</Year><Month>8</Month><Day>25</Day><Hour>6</Hour><Minute>0</Minute></PubMedPubDate><PubMedPubDate PubStatus="pubmed"><Year>2020</Year><Month>8</Month><Day>25</Day><Hour>6</Hour><Minute>0</Minute></PubMedPubDate><PubMedPubDate PubStatus="medline"><Year>2020</Year><Month>8</Month><Day>25</Day><Hour>6</Hour><Minute>0</Minute></PubMedPubDate></History><PublicationStatus>aheadofprint</PublicationStatus><ArticleIdList><ArticleId IdType="pubmed">32837395</ArticleId><ArticleId IdType="doi">10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3</ArticleId><ArticleId IdType="pii">50</ArticleId><ArticleId IdType="pmc">PMC7371964</ArticleId></ArticleIdList><pmc-dir>pmcsd</pmc-dir>
<ReferenceList><Reference><Citation>Am Econ Rev. 1984;74(2):324-7</Citation><ArticleIdList><ArticleId IdType="pubmed">11616492</ArticleId></ArticleIdList></Reference></ReferenceList></PubmedData></pubmed><affiliations><list><country><li>France</li></country><region><li>Midi-Pyrénées</li><li>Occitanie (région administrative)</li></region><settlement><li>Toulouse</li></settlement></list><tree><country name="France"><region name="Occitanie (région administrative)"><name sortKey="Salanie, Francois" sort="Salanie, Francois" uniqKey="Salanie F" first="François" last="Salanié">François Salanié</name></region><name sortKey="Treich, Nicolas" sort="Treich, Nicolas" uniqKey="Treich N" first="Nicolas" last="Treich">Nicolas Treich</name></country></tree></affiliations></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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