Individual Vaccination as Nash Equilibrium in a SIR Model with Application to the 2009-2010 Influenza A (H1N1) Epidemic in France.
Identifieur interne : 000196 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000195; suivant : 000197Individual Vaccination as Nash Equilibrium in a SIR Model with Application to the 2009-2010 Influenza A (H1N1) Epidemic in France.
Auteurs : Laetitia Laguzet [France] ; Gabriel Turinici [France]Source :
- Bulletin of mathematical biology [ 1522-9602 ] ; 2015.
Descripteurs français
- KwdFr :
- Concepts mathématiques (MeSH), France (épidémiologie), Grippe humaine (prévention et contrôle), Grippe humaine (épidémiologie), Humains (MeSH), Modèles biologiques (MeSH), Sous-type H1N1 du virus de la grippe A (MeSH), Vaccins antigrippaux (pharmacologie), Épidémies (prévention et contrôle), Épidémies (statistiques et données numériques).
- MESH :
- pharmacologie : Vaccins antigrippaux.
- prévention et contrôle : Grippe humaine, Épidémies.
- statistiques et données numériques : Épidémies.
- épidémiologie : France, Grippe humaine.
- Concepts mathématiques, Humains, Modèles biologiques, Sous-type H1N1 du virus de la grippe A.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Epidemics (prevention & control), Epidemics (statistics & numerical data), France (epidemiology), Humans (MeSH), Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype (MeSH), Influenza Vaccines (pharmacology), Influenza, Human (epidemiology), Influenza, Human (prevention & control), Mathematical Concepts (MeSH), Models, Biological (MeSH).
- MESH :
- chemical , pharmacology : Influenza Vaccines.
- epidemiology : France, Influenza, Human.
- prevention & control : Epidemics, Influenza, Human.
- statistics & numerical data : Epidemics.
- Humans, Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype, Mathematical Concepts, Models, Biological.
Abstract
The vaccination against ongoing epidemics is seldom compulsory but remains one of the most classical means to fight epidemic propagation. However, recent debates concerning the innocuity of vaccines and their risk with respect to the risk of the epidemic itself lead to severe vaccination campaign failures, and new mass behaviors appeared driven by individual self-interest. Prompted by this context, we analyze, in a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model, whether egocentric individuals can reach an equilibrium with the rest of the society. Using techniques from the "Mean Field Games" theory, we extend previous results and show that an equilibrium exists and characterizes completely the individual best vaccination strategy (with or without discounting). We also compare with a strategy based only on overall societal optimization and exhibit a situation with nonnegative price of anarchy. Finally, we apply the theory to the 2009-2010 Influenza A (H1N1) vaccination campaign in France and hint that a group of individuals stopped vaccinating at levels that indicated a pessimistic perception of the risk of the vaccine.
DOI: 10.1007/s11538-015-0111-7
PubMed: 26443437
Affiliations:
Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)
Le document en format XML
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However, recent debates concerning the innocuity of vaccines and their risk with respect to the risk of the epidemic itself lead to severe vaccination campaign failures, and new mass behaviors appeared driven by individual self-interest. Prompted by this context, we analyze, in a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model, whether egocentric individuals can reach an equilibrium with the rest of the society. Using techniques from the "Mean Field Games" theory, we extend previous results and show that an equilibrium exists and characterizes completely the individual best vaccination strategy (with or without discounting). We also compare with a strategy based only on overall societal optimization and exhibit a situation with nonnegative price of anarchy. Finally, we apply the theory to the 2009-2010 Influenza A (H1N1) vaccination campaign in France and hint that a group of individuals stopped vaccinating at levels that indicated a pessimistic perception of the risk of the vaccine. </div></front></TEI><pubmed><MedlineCitation Status="MEDLINE" Owner="NLM"><PMID Version="1">26443437</PMID><DateCompleted><Year>2016</Year><Month>12</Month><Day>13</Day></DateCompleted><DateRevised><Year>2016</Year><Month>12</Month><Day>30</Day></DateRevised><Article PubModel="Print-Electronic"><Journal><ISSN IssnType="Electronic">1522-9602</ISSN><JournalIssue CitedMedium="Internet"><Volume>77</Volume><Issue>10</Issue><PubDate><Year>2015</Year><Month>Oct</Month></PubDate></JournalIssue><Title>Bulletin of mathematical biology</Title><ISOAbbreviation>Bull. Math. 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Using techniques from the "Mean Field Games" theory, we extend previous results and show that an equilibrium exists and characterizes completely the individual best vaccination strategy (with or without discounting). We also compare with a strategy based only on overall societal optimization and exhibit a situation with nonnegative price of anarchy. 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