More power to the European Parliament?
Identifieur interne : 008450 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 008449; suivant : 008451More power to the European Parliament?
Auteurs : Abdul G. Noury ; Gérard RolandSource :
- Economic Policy [ 0266-4658 ] ; 2002-10.
Descripteurs français
- Wicri :
- geographic : Belgique.
- topic : Procédure de consultation, Base de données, Intégration européenne, Politique extérieure, Parlement, Régime parlementaire, Groupe politique.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Abbreviation, Abdul, Assent procedure, Average cohesion index, Average frequency, Behaviour, Belgian parliament, Belgium, Career incentives, Central europe, Coalition formation, Cohesion, Cohesion index, Cohesiveness, Consultation procedure, Council votes, Country cohesion, Country delegations, Country dimension, Country discipline, Country group, Country interests, Country lines, Country loyalty, Country votes, Database, Discipline index, Eldr, Empirical analysis, Enlargement, European institutions, European integration, European parliament, Foreign policy, Fourth parliament, French meps, Future enlargement, Gaul, Greater cohesion, Group cohesion, Important votes, Individual meps, Large number, Legislative process, Linear probability model, Majority size, Member states, Meps, Meps vote, More power, National delegation, National groups, National legislatures, National lines, National parliaments, National parties, Ndings, Nordic countries, Noury, Other countries, Other words, Parliament, Parliamentary system, Parliamentary systems, Party abbreviations, Party cohesion, Party discipline, Party families, Party group, Party groups, Party lines, Party loyalty, Policy implications, Policy preferences, Political group, Political groups, Positive effect, Previous enlargement, Real power, Regression analysis, Roland, Roland table, Same party, Science review, Spatial analysis, Spatial model, Standard deviations, Standard errors, Structural funds, Thierry verdier, Third parliament, Thomas piketty, Time trend, Unique database, Voting behavior, Voting behaviour, Voting pattern, Voting patterns.
- Teeft :
- Abbreviation, Abdul, Assent procedure, Average cohesion index, Average frequency, Behaviour, Belgian parliament, Belgium, Career incentives, Central europe, Coalition formation, Cohesion, Cohesion index, Cohesiveness, Consultation procedure, Council votes, Country cohesion, Country delegations, Country dimension, Country discipline, Country group, Country interests, Country lines, Country loyalty, Country votes, Database, Discipline index, Eldr, Empirical analysis, Enlargement, European institutions, European integration, European parliament, Foreign policy, Fourth parliament, French meps, Future enlargement, Gaul, Greater cohesion, Group cohesion, Important votes, Individual meps, Large number, Legislative process, Linear probability model, Majority size, Member states, Meps, Meps vote, More power, National delegation, National groups, National legislatures, National lines, National parliaments, National parties, Ndings, Nordic countries, Noury, Other countries, Other words, Parliament, Parliamentary system, Parliamentary systems, Party abbreviations, Party cohesion, Party discipline, Party families, Party group, Party groups, Party lines, Party loyalty, Policy implications, Policy preferences, Political group, Political groups, Positive effect, Previous enlargement, Real power, Regression analysis, Roland, Roland table, Same party, Science review, Spatial analysis, Spatial model, Standard deviations, Standard errors, Structural funds, Thierry verdier, Third parliament, Thomas piketty, Time trend, Unique database, Voting behavior, Voting behaviour, Voting pattern, Voting patterns.
Abstract
Many observers have expressed scepticism about granting more power to the European Parliament. The sceptics believe that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) do not vote in a disciplined way and that they vote more often with their country group than with their European Party. Using a unique database consisting of all roll call votes by each individual MEP between 1989 and 1999 (over 6000 votes by over 1000 different MEPs), we show that the sceptics are wrong. Our data shows clearly that MEPs vote more along party lines than along country lines. Party cohesion is comparable to that of the US Congress and is increasing over time whereas country cohesion is low and declining. In short, politics in the European Parliament generally follows the traditional left–right divide that one finds in all European nations. These findings are valid across issues, even on issues like the structural and cohesion funds where one would expect country rather than party cohesion. In votes where the EP has the most power – those held under the so‐called co‐decision procedure – MEPs participate more and are more party‐cohesive. In our opinion, this unique empirical analysis provides grounds for justifying a generalization of the co‐decision procedure.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0327.t01-1-00090
Affiliations:
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families</term><term>Party group</term><term>Party groups</term><term>Party lines</term><term>Party loyalty</term><term>Policy implications</term><term>Policy preferences</term><term>Political group</term><term>Political groups</term><term>Positive effect</term><term>Previous enlargement</term><term>Real power</term><term>Regression analysis</term><term>Roland</term><term>Roland table</term><term>Same party</term><term>Science review</term><term>Spatial analysis</term><term>Spatial model</term><term>Standard deviations</term><term>Standard errors</term><term>Structural funds</term><term>Thierry verdier</term><term>Third parliament</term><term>Thomas piketty</term><term>Time trend</term><term>Unique database</term><term>Voting behavior</term><term>Voting behaviour</term><term>Voting pattern</term><term>Voting patterns</term></keywords><keywords scheme="Teeft" xml:lang="en"><term>Abbreviation</term><term>Abdul</term><term>Assent procedure</term><term>Average cohesion index</term><term>Average frequency</term><term>Behaviour</term><term>Belgian parliament</term><term>Belgium</term><term>Career incentives</term><term>Central europe</term><term>Coalition formation</term><term>Cohesion</term><term>Cohesion index</term><term>Cohesiveness</term><term>Consultation procedure</term><term>Council votes</term><term>Country cohesion</term><term>Country delegations</term><term>Country dimension</term><term>Country discipline</term><term>Country group</term><term>Country interests</term><term>Country lines</term><term>Country loyalty</term><term>Country votes</term><term>Database</term><term>Discipline index</term><term>Eldr</term><term>Empirical analysis</term><term>Enlargement</term><term>European institutions</term><term>European integration</term><term>European parliament</term><term>Foreign policy</term><term>Fourth parliament</term><term>French meps</term><term>Future enlargement</term><term>Gaul</term><term>Greater cohesion</term><term>Group 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politique</term></keywords></textClass></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Many observers have expressed scepticism about granting more power to the European Parliament. The sceptics believe that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) do not vote in a disciplined way and that they vote more often with their country group than with their European Party. Using a unique database consisting of all roll call votes by each individual MEP between 1989 and 1999 (over 6000 votes by over 1000 different MEPs), we show that the sceptics are wrong. Our data shows clearly that MEPs vote more along party lines than along country lines. Party cohesion is comparable to that of the US Congress and is increasing over time whereas country cohesion is low and declining. In short, politics in the European Parliament generally follows the traditional left–right divide that one finds in all European nations. These findings are valid across issues, even on issues like the structural and cohesion funds where one would expect country rather than party cohesion. In votes where the EP has the most power – those held under the so‐called co‐decision procedure – MEPs participate more and are more party‐cohesive. In our opinion, this unique empirical analysis provides grounds for justifying a generalization of the co‐decision procedure.</div></front></TEI><affiliations><list></list><tree><noCountry><name sortKey="Noury, Abdul G" sort="Noury, Abdul G" uniqKey="Noury A" first="Abdul G." last="Noury">Abdul G. Noury</name><name sortKey="Roland, Gerard" sort="Roland, Gerard" uniqKey="Roland G" first="Gérard" last="Roland">Gérard Roland</name></noCountry></tree></affiliations></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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