The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making
Identifieur interne : 006875 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 006874; suivant : 006876The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making
Auteurs : Jelmer Schalk [Pays-Bas] ; René Torenvlied [Pays-Bas] ; Jeroen Weesie [Pays-Bas] ; Frans Stokman [Pays-Bas]Source :
- European Union politics [ 1465-1165 ] ; 2007-06.
Descripteurs français
- Wicri :
- topic : Intégration européenne, Majorité de vote, Utrecht.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Additional leverage, Additional power, Adoption stage, Adoption stage presidencies, Adoption stage presidency hypothesis, Agenda exclusion, Agenda management, Associate professor, Bargaining power, Bargaining process, Baseline, Baseline model, Cambridge university press, Centralized bargaining, Christopher achen, Commission proposal, Commission proposals, Consultation procedures, Cooperative bargaining, Cooperative bargaining model, Council meetings, Council presidency, Decision outcomes, Dichotomous issues, Different bargaining stages, Different stages, Distance distance distance, Domestic interests, European commission, European integration, European journal, European parliament, European union, European union politics, Expert judgements, Explanatory variables, Formal power, Formal voting power, Frans, Inclusive voting rules, Interaction effect, Interaction effects, Intermediate stage, Internal market, Limited amount, Majority voting, Manchester university press, Member state, Member state level, Member states, Model comparison, Months maximally, Multiple presidencies, Other member states, Policy alternative, Policy alternatives, Policy issues, Policy outcome, Policy outcomes, Policy position, Policy positions, Policy proposals, Policy scale, Policy space, Political economy, Political research, Power indices, Power score, Powerful member states, Preference loss, Preferred policy positions, Preferred position, Presidency, Presidency effect hypothesis, Presidency effects, Presidency involvement, Presidency model, Presidency power, Presidency stage model, Presidency table, Presidency term, Presidency terms, Robert thomson, Salience, Sandwich estimates, Scale factor, Schalk, Stage model, Stage presidencies, Standard error, Standard errors, Stokman, Tallberg, Thomson, Threat point, Toothless presidency, Torenvlied, Unknown parameter, Utrecht, Utrecht university, Various policy areas, Voter, Voter model, Voter prediction, Voting stage, Voting stage presidencies, Voting stage presidency hypothesis, Weesie.
- Teeft :
- Additional leverage, Additional power, Adoption stage, Adoption stage presidencies, Adoption stage presidency hypothesis, Agenda exclusion, Agenda management, Associate professor, Bargaining power, Bargaining process, Baseline, Baseline model, Cambridge university press, Centralized bargaining, Christopher achen, Commission proposal, Commission proposals, Consultation procedures, Cooperative bargaining, Cooperative bargaining model, Council meetings, Council presidency, Decision outcomes, Dichotomous issues, Different bargaining stages, Different stages, Distance distance distance, Domestic interests, European commission, European integration, European journal, European parliament, European union, European union politics, Expert judgements, Explanatory variables, Formal power, Formal voting power, Frans, Inclusive voting rules, Interaction effect, Interaction effects, Intermediate stage, Internal market, Limited amount, Majority voting, Manchester university press, Member state, Member state level, Member states, Model comparison, Months maximally, Multiple presidencies, Other member states, Policy alternative, Policy alternatives, Policy issues, Policy outcome, Policy outcomes, Policy position, Policy positions, Policy proposals, Policy scale, Policy space, Political economy, Political research, Power indices, Power score, Powerful member states, Preference loss, Preferred policy positions, Preferred position, Presidency, Presidency effect hypothesis, Presidency effects, Presidency involvement, Presidency model, Presidency power, Presidency stage model, Presidency table, Presidency term, Presidency terms, Robert thomson, Salience, Sandwich estimates, Scale factor, Schalk, Stage model, Stage presidencies, Standard error, Standard errors, Stokman, Tallberg, Thomson, Threat point, Toothless presidency, Torenvlied, Unknown parameter, Utrecht, Utrecht university, Various policy areas, Voter, Voter model, Voter prediction, Voting stage, Voting stage presidencies, Voting stage presidency hypothesis, Weesie.
Abstract
Research on the presidency of the EU shows mixed results. Although most scholars agree that the EU presidency is not able to advance its domestic interests in the European forum, Tallberg (2006) provides evidence for presidency effects. In the present paper, we empirically estimate presidency-based power in the Council of the European Union on the DEU data — a large-scale data set containing EU policy issues from various policy areas. We show that holding the presidency does significantly and positively contribute to the bargaining power of member states, but only in the final stages of decision-making.
Url:
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507076431
Affiliations:
- Pays-Bas
- Groningue (province), Utrecht (province)
- Groningue (ville), Utrecht
- Université d'Utrecht, Université de Groningue
Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)
- to stream Istex, to step Corpus: 007939
- to stream Istex, to step Curation: 007939
- to stream Istex, to step Checkpoint: 002825
- to stream Main, to step Merge: 006983
- to stream Main, to step Curation: 006875
Le document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making</title>
<author><name sortKey="Schalk, Jelmer" sort="Schalk, Jelmer" uniqKey="Schalk J" first="Jelmer" last="Schalk">Jelmer Schalk</name>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Torenvlied, Rene" sort="Torenvlied, Rene" uniqKey="Torenvlied R" first="René" last="Torenvlied">René Torenvlied</name>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Weesie, Jeroen" sort="Weesie, Jeroen" uniqKey="Weesie J" first="Jeroen" last="Weesie">Jeroen Weesie</name>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Stokman, Frans" sort="Stokman, Frans" uniqKey="Stokman F" first="Frans" last="Stokman">Frans Stokman</name>
</author>
</titleStmt>
<publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno>
<idno type="RBID">ISTEX:F5000B83E4468BEFBFA0C216456CE905413B007E</idno>
<date when="2007" year="2007">2007</date>
<idno type="doi">10.1177/1465116507076431</idno>
<idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/F5000B83E4468BEFBFA0C216456CE905413B007E/fulltext/pdf</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">007939</idno>
<idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">007939</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Curation">007939</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Checkpoint">002825</idno>
<idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Checkpoint">002825</idno>
<idno type="wicri:doubleKey">1465-1165:2007:Schalk J:the:power:of</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Merge">006983</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Curation">006875</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Exploration">006875</idno>
</publicationStmt>
<sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making</title>
<author><name sortKey="Schalk, Jelmer" sort="Schalk, Jelmer" uniqKey="Schalk J" first="Jelmer" last="Schalk">Jelmer Schalk</name>
<affiliation><wicri:noCountry code="syntax">???</wicri:noCountry>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><country wicri:rule="url">Pays-Bas</country>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="4"><country wicri:rule="url">Pays-Bas</country>
<wicri:regionArea>Utrecht University, The Netherlands</wicri:regionArea>
<orgName type="university">Université d'Utrecht</orgName>
<placeName><settlement type="city">Utrecht</settlement>
<region nuts="2">Utrecht (province)</region>
</placeName>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Torenvlied, Rene" sort="Torenvlied, Rene" uniqKey="Torenvlied R" first="René" last="Torenvlied">René Torenvlied</name>
<affiliation><wicri:noCountry code="syntax">???</wicri:noCountry>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><country wicri:rule="url">Pays-Bas</country>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="4"><country wicri:rule="url">Pays-Bas</country>
<wicri:regionArea>Utrecht University, The Netherlands</wicri:regionArea>
<orgName type="university">Université d'Utrecht</orgName>
<placeName><settlement type="city">Utrecht</settlement>
<region nuts="2">Utrecht (province)</region>
</placeName>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Weesie, Jeroen" sort="Weesie, Jeroen" uniqKey="Weesie J" first="Jeroen" last="Weesie">Jeroen Weesie</name>
<affiliation><wicri:noCountry code="syntax">???</wicri:noCountry>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><country wicri:rule="url">Pays-Bas</country>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="4"><country wicri:rule="url">Pays-Bas</country>
<wicri:regionArea>Utrecht University, The Netherlands</wicri:regionArea>
<orgName type="university">Université d'Utrecht</orgName>
<placeName><settlement type="city">Utrecht</settlement>
<region nuts="2">Utrecht (province)</region>
</placeName>
</affiliation>
</author>
<author><name sortKey="Stokman, Frans" sort="Stokman, Frans" uniqKey="Stokman F" first="Frans" last="Stokman">Frans Stokman</name>
<affiliation><wicri:noCountry code="syntax">???</wicri:noCountry>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><country wicri:rule="url">Pays-Bas</country>
</affiliation>
<affiliation wicri:level="4"><country wicri:rule="url">Pays-Bas</country>
<wicri:regionArea>University of Groningen, The Netherlands</wicri:regionArea>
<orgName type="university">Université de Groningue</orgName>
<placeName><settlement type="city">Groningue (ville)</settlement>
<region>Groningue (province)</region>
</placeName>
</affiliation>
</author>
</analytic>
<monogr></monogr>
<series><title level="j">European Union politics</title>
<idno type="ISSN">1465-1165</idno>
<idno type="eISSN">1741-2757</idno>
<imprint><publisher>Sage Publications</publisher>
<pubPlace>Sage UK: London, England</pubPlace>
<date type="published" when="2007-06">2007-06</date>
<biblScope unit="volume">8</biblScope>
<biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope>
<biblScope unit="page" from="229">229</biblScope>
<biblScope unit="page" to="250">250</biblScope>
</imprint>
<idno type="ISSN">1465-1165</idno>
</series>
</biblStruct>
</sourceDesc>
<seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">1465-1165</idno>
</seriesStmt>
</fileDesc>
<profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="KwdEn" xml:lang="en"><term>Additional leverage</term>
<term>Additional power</term>
<term>Adoption stage</term>
<term>Adoption stage presidencies</term>
<term>Adoption stage presidency hypothesis</term>
<term>Agenda exclusion</term>
<term>Agenda management</term>
<term>Associate professor</term>
<term>Bargaining power</term>
<term>Bargaining process</term>
<term>Baseline</term>
<term>Baseline model</term>
<term>Cambridge university press</term>
<term>Centralized bargaining</term>
<term>Christopher achen</term>
<term>Commission proposal</term>
<term>Commission proposals</term>
<term>Consultation procedures</term>
<term>Cooperative bargaining</term>
<term>Cooperative bargaining model</term>
<term>Council meetings</term>
<term>Council presidency</term>
<term>Decision outcomes</term>
<term>Dichotomous issues</term>
<term>Different bargaining stages</term>
<term>Different stages</term>
<term>Distance distance distance</term>
<term>Domestic interests</term>
<term>European commission</term>
<term>European integration</term>
<term>European journal</term>
<term>European parliament</term>
<term>European union</term>
<term>European union politics</term>
<term>Expert judgements</term>
<term>Explanatory variables</term>
<term>Formal power</term>
<term>Formal voting power</term>
<term>Frans</term>
<term>Inclusive voting rules</term>
<term>Interaction effect</term>
<term>Interaction effects</term>
<term>Intermediate stage</term>
<term>Internal market</term>
<term>Limited amount</term>
<term>Majority voting</term>
<term>Manchester university press</term>
<term>Member state</term>
<term>Member state level</term>
<term>Member states</term>
<term>Model comparison</term>
<term>Months maximally</term>
<term>Multiple presidencies</term>
<term>Other member states</term>
<term>Policy alternative</term>
<term>Policy alternatives</term>
<term>Policy issues</term>
<term>Policy outcome</term>
<term>Policy outcomes</term>
<term>Policy position</term>
<term>Policy positions</term>
<term>Policy proposals</term>
<term>Policy scale</term>
<term>Policy space</term>
<term>Political economy</term>
<term>Political research</term>
<term>Power indices</term>
<term>Power score</term>
<term>Powerful member states</term>
<term>Preference loss</term>
<term>Preferred policy positions</term>
<term>Preferred position</term>
<term>Presidency</term>
<term>Presidency effect hypothesis</term>
<term>Presidency effects</term>
<term>Presidency involvement</term>
<term>Presidency model</term>
<term>Presidency power</term>
<term>Presidency stage model</term>
<term>Presidency table</term>
<term>Presidency term</term>
<term>Presidency terms</term>
<term>Robert thomson</term>
<term>Salience</term>
<term>Sandwich estimates</term>
<term>Scale factor</term>
<term>Schalk</term>
<term>Stage model</term>
<term>Stage presidencies</term>
<term>Standard error</term>
<term>Standard errors</term>
<term>Stokman</term>
<term>Tallberg</term>
<term>Thomson</term>
<term>Threat point</term>
<term>Toothless presidency</term>
<term>Torenvlied</term>
<term>Unknown parameter</term>
<term>Utrecht</term>
<term>Utrecht university</term>
<term>Various policy areas</term>
<term>Voter</term>
<term>Voter model</term>
<term>Voter prediction</term>
<term>Voting stage</term>
<term>Voting stage presidencies</term>
<term>Voting stage presidency hypothesis</term>
<term>Weesie</term>
</keywords>
<keywords scheme="Teeft" xml:lang="en"><term>Additional leverage</term>
<term>Additional power</term>
<term>Adoption stage</term>
<term>Adoption stage presidencies</term>
<term>Adoption stage presidency hypothesis</term>
<term>Agenda exclusion</term>
<term>Agenda management</term>
<term>Associate professor</term>
<term>Bargaining power</term>
<term>Bargaining process</term>
<term>Baseline</term>
<term>Baseline model</term>
<term>Cambridge university press</term>
<term>Centralized bargaining</term>
<term>Christopher achen</term>
<term>Commission proposal</term>
<term>Commission proposals</term>
<term>Consultation procedures</term>
<term>Cooperative bargaining</term>
<term>Cooperative bargaining model</term>
<term>Council meetings</term>
<term>Council presidency</term>
<term>Decision outcomes</term>
<term>Dichotomous issues</term>
<term>Different bargaining stages</term>
<term>Different stages</term>
<term>Distance distance distance</term>
<term>Domestic interests</term>
<term>European commission</term>
<term>European integration</term>
<term>European journal</term>
<term>European parliament</term>
<term>European union</term>
<term>European union politics</term>
<term>Expert judgements</term>
<term>Explanatory variables</term>
<term>Formal power</term>
<term>Formal voting power</term>
<term>Frans</term>
<term>Inclusive voting rules</term>
<term>Interaction effect</term>
<term>Interaction effects</term>
<term>Intermediate stage</term>
<term>Internal market</term>
<term>Limited amount</term>
<term>Majority voting</term>
<term>Manchester university press</term>
<term>Member state</term>
<term>Member state level</term>
<term>Member states</term>
<term>Model comparison</term>
<term>Months maximally</term>
<term>Multiple presidencies</term>
<term>Other member states</term>
<term>Policy alternative</term>
<term>Policy alternatives</term>
<term>Policy issues</term>
<term>Policy outcome</term>
<term>Policy outcomes</term>
<term>Policy position</term>
<term>Policy positions</term>
<term>Policy proposals</term>
<term>Policy scale</term>
<term>Policy space</term>
<term>Political economy</term>
<term>Political research</term>
<term>Power indices</term>
<term>Power score</term>
<term>Powerful member states</term>
<term>Preference loss</term>
<term>Preferred policy positions</term>
<term>Preferred position</term>
<term>Presidency</term>
<term>Presidency effect hypothesis</term>
<term>Presidency effects</term>
<term>Presidency involvement</term>
<term>Presidency model</term>
<term>Presidency power</term>
<term>Presidency stage model</term>
<term>Presidency table</term>
<term>Presidency term</term>
<term>Presidency terms</term>
<term>Robert thomson</term>
<term>Salience</term>
<term>Sandwich estimates</term>
<term>Scale factor</term>
<term>Schalk</term>
<term>Stage model</term>
<term>Stage presidencies</term>
<term>Standard error</term>
<term>Standard errors</term>
<term>Stokman</term>
<term>Tallberg</term>
<term>Thomson</term>
<term>Threat point</term>
<term>Toothless presidency</term>
<term>Torenvlied</term>
<term>Unknown parameter</term>
<term>Utrecht</term>
<term>Utrecht university</term>
<term>Various policy areas</term>
<term>Voter</term>
<term>Voter model</term>
<term>Voter prediction</term>
<term>Voting stage</term>
<term>Voting stage presidencies</term>
<term>Voting stage presidency hypothesis</term>
<term>Weesie</term>
</keywords>
<keywords scheme="Wicri" type="topic" xml:lang="fr"><term>Intégration européenne</term>
<term>Majorité de vote</term>
<term>Utrecht</term>
</keywords>
</textClass>
<langUsage><language ident="en">en</language>
</langUsage>
</profileDesc>
</teiHeader>
<front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Research on the presidency of the EU shows mixed results. Although most scholars agree that the EU presidency is not able to advance its domestic interests in the European forum, Tallberg (2006) provides evidence for presidency effects. In the present paper, we empirically estimate presidency-based power in the Council of the European Union on the DEU data — a large-scale data set containing EU policy issues from various policy areas. We show that holding the presidency does significantly and positively contribute to the bargaining power of member states, but only in the final stages of decision-making.</div>
</front>
</TEI>
<affiliations><list><country><li>Pays-Bas</li>
</country>
<region><li>Groningue (province)</li>
<li>Utrecht (province)</li>
</region>
<settlement><li>Groningue (ville)</li>
<li>Utrecht</li>
</settlement>
<orgName><li>Université d'Utrecht</li>
<li>Université de Groningue</li>
</orgName>
</list>
<tree><country name="Pays-Bas"><noRegion><name sortKey="Schalk, Jelmer" sort="Schalk, Jelmer" uniqKey="Schalk J" first="Jelmer" last="Schalk">Jelmer Schalk</name>
</noRegion>
<name sortKey="Schalk, Jelmer" sort="Schalk, Jelmer" uniqKey="Schalk J" first="Jelmer" last="Schalk">Jelmer Schalk</name>
<name sortKey="Stokman, Frans" sort="Stokman, Frans" uniqKey="Stokman F" first="Frans" last="Stokman">Frans Stokman</name>
<name sortKey="Stokman, Frans" sort="Stokman, Frans" uniqKey="Stokman F" first="Frans" last="Stokman">Frans Stokman</name>
<name sortKey="Torenvlied, Rene" sort="Torenvlied, Rene" uniqKey="Torenvlied R" first="René" last="Torenvlied">René Torenvlied</name>
<name sortKey="Torenvlied, Rene" sort="Torenvlied, Rene" uniqKey="Torenvlied R" first="René" last="Torenvlied">René Torenvlied</name>
<name sortKey="Weesie, Jeroen" sort="Weesie, Jeroen" uniqKey="Weesie J" first="Jeroen" last="Weesie">Jeroen Weesie</name>
<name sortKey="Weesie, Jeroen" sort="Weesie, Jeroen" uniqKey="Weesie J" first="Jeroen" last="Weesie">Jeroen Weesie</name>
</country>
</tree>
</affiliations>
</record>
Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Santé/explor/EdenteV2/Data/Main/Exploration
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 006875 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Main/Exploration/biblio.hfd -nk 006875 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien |wiki= Wicri/Santé |area= EdenteV2 |flux= Main |étape= Exploration |type= RBID |clé= ISTEX:F5000B83E4468BEFBFA0C216456CE905413B007E |texte= The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making }}
This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.32. |