DETERRENCE AND MORAL PERSUASION EFFECTS ON CORPORATE TAX COMPLIANCE: FINDINGS FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL

DETERRENCE AND MORAL PERSUASION EFFECTS ON CORPORATE TAX COMPLIANCE: FINDINGS FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL

Source :

• Criminology [ 0011-1384 ] ; 2012-02.

Descripteurs français

• Wicri :
  • topic : Audit, Criminologie, Contribuable.

English descriptors

• KwdEn :
  • Allowable expenses, Alternative approaches, American academy, American society, Annual income, Ariel, Audit, Authority percent, Average effect size, Blumenthal, Braithwaite, Cambridge university press, Chicago press, Compliance, Compliance behavior, Compliance context, Compliance experiment, Compliance experiments, Compliance literature, Compliance theories, Control conditions, Control group, Corporate compliance, Corporate crime, Corporate taxpayers, Counterproductive, Counterproductive effect, Criminal increase, Criminal justice system, Criminological research, Criminological theories, Criminology, Deduction, Deduction claims, Denise gottfredson, Deterrence, Deterrence approach, Deterrence model, Deterrence theory, Deterrent letter, Difference deterrence, Difference persuasion, Different outcomes, Dollar values, Doris mackenzie, Economic psychology, Effect size, Effect sizes, Empirical analysis, Erard, Evaluation period, Evaluation research, Evasion, Experimental criminology, Experimental group, Experimental groups, Extreme outliers, Fairness matters, February january, Federal income, Figures april march, Future research, General population, General theory, Gross income, Gross revenues, Gross sales, Gross sales values, Gures, Hasseldine, Important element, Income level, Income taxes, Increase compliance, Individual taxpayers, Israel bureau, John braithwaite, John paul wright, Jonathan feinstein, Keith hawkins, Largest effect, Legal sanctions, Less compliance, Limited liability, Michael mckee, Minnesota income, Moral appeals, Moral persuasion, Moral persuasion approach, Moral persuasion approaches, Moral persuasion letter, Moral persuasion model, Moral suasion, More claims, More compliance, More taxes, Nagin, National institute, Nding, Ndings, Neal shover, Noncompliance, Nonindividual taxpayers, Normative, Normative appeals, Null hypothesis, Null line, Other studies, Other words, Outcome measurement, Outcome variables, Oxford university press, Participant, Paternoster, Persuasion, Persuasive, Persuasive letter, Persuasive strategies, Plausible explanation, Point estimate, Point estimates, Policy weisburd, Previous experiments, Procedural justice, Public economics, Punitive damages, Random allocation, Randomized, Rational taxpayers, Regulatory approaches, Relative effectiveness, Reminder letters, Rental properties, Research evidence, Responsive regulation, Right thing, Safety torts, Sales control, Same time, Sample size, Sample sizes, Sanction threats, Scal year, Scholz, Similar methodology, Slemrod, Slippery slope framework, Small effect sizes, Social control, Social norms, Social psychology, Sole proprietors, Sqrt trans, Standard deviation, Standard deviations, Statistical analyses, Statistical power, Study group, Study groups, System integrity research, Target population, Taxpayer, Theoretical analysis, Torgler, Treatment differences, Treatment effect, Treatment groups, Tyler, Weisburd, Wenzel.
• Teeft :
  • Allowable expenses, Alternative approaches, American academy, American society, Annual income, Ariel, Audit, Authority percent, Average effect size, Blumenthal, Braithwaite, Cambridge university press, Chicago press, Compliance, Compliance behavior, Compliance context, Compliance experiment, Compliance experiments, Compliance literature, Compliance theories, Control conditions, Control group, Corporate compliance, Corporate crime, Corporate taxpayers, Counterproductive, Counterproductive effect, Criminal increase, Criminal justice system, Criminological research, Criminological theories, Criminology, Deduction, Deduction claims, Denise gottfredson, Deterrence, Deterrence approach, Deterrence model, Deterrence theory, Deterrent letter, Difference deterrence, Difference persuasion, Different outcomes, Dollar values, Doris mackenzie, Economic psychology, Effect size, Effect sizes, Empirical analysis, Erard, Evaluation period, Evaluation research, Evasion, Experimental criminology, Experimental group, Experimental groups, Extreme outliers, Fairness matters, February january, Federal income, Figures april march, Future research, General population, General theory, Gross income, Gross revenues, Gross sales, Gross sales values, Gures, Hasseldine, Important element, Income level, Income taxes, Increase compliance, Individual taxpayers, Israel bureau, John braithwaite, John paul wright, Jonathan feinstein, Keith hawkins, Largest effect, Legal sanctions, Less compliance, Limited liability, Michael mckee, Minnesota income, Moral appeals, Moral persuasion, Moral persuasion approach, Moral persuasion approaches, Moral persuasion letter, Moral persuasion model, Moral suasion, More claims, More compliance, More taxes, Nagin, National institute, Nding, Ndings, Neal shover, Noncompliance, Nonindividual taxpayers, Normative, Normative appeals, Null hypothesis, Null line, Other studies, Other words, Outcome measurement, Outcome variables, Oxford university press, Participant, Paternoster, Persuasion, Persuasive, Persuasive letter, Persuasive strategies, Plausible explanation, Point estimate, Point estimates, Policy weisburd, Previous experiments, Procedural justice, Public economics, Punitive damages, Random allocation, Randomized, Rational taxpayers, Regulatory approaches, Relative effectiveness, Reminder letters, Rental properties, Research evidence, Responsive regulation, Right thing, Safety torts, Sales control, Same time, Sample size, Sample sizes, Sanction threats, Scal year, Scholz, Similar methodology, Slemrod, Slippery slope framework, Small effect sizes, Social control, Social norms, Social psychology, Sole proprietors, Sqrt trans, Standard deviation, Standard deviations, Statistical analyses, Statistical power, Study group, Study groups, System integrity research, Target population, Taxpayer, Theoretical analysis, Torgler, Treatment differences, Treatment effect, Treatment groups, Tyler, Weisburd, Wenzel.

Abstract

• https://api.istex.fr/document/50C14F11406E9EF327F72AB9D74CC663B96B5104/fulltext/pdf

Affiliations:

• Royaume-Uni
• Angleterre, Angleterre de l'Est
• Cambridge
• Université de Cambridge

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