Elections in Western European parliaments
Identifieur interne : 002C37 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 002C36; suivant : 002C38Elections in Western European parliaments
Auteurs : Ulrich Sieberer [Allemagne]Source :
- European Journal of Political Research [ 0304-4130 ] ; 2013-06.
Descripteurs français
- Wicri :
- topic : Audit, Analyse comparative, Consortium, Parlement, Partis politiques.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Absolute distance, Actor behaviour, Additional elections, Aggregate election outcome, Aggregate level, Aggregate support, American context, American journal, Ample support, Approximate size, Audit, Audit institution, Audit institution ombudsman, Audit institutions, Author european journal, Behaviour, Binomial error distribution, Cabinet parties, Cabinet seat share, Cameron, Coalition bargaining, Collegial body, Comparative analysis, Comparative manifestos project, Competitive considerations, Competitive context, Competitive dynamics, Competitive elections, Consortium, Constitutional courts, Constitutional crisis, Constitutional judges, Data availability, Dataset, Democratic life cycle, Descriptive statistics, Dummy variables, Election outcome, Electoral behaviour, Electoral competition, Electoral success, Empirical analysis, European consortium, European journal, European parliaments, Expertise, Explanatory factors, Explanatory variables, Fractional logit model, Full model, Future research, High polarisation, High positions, Ideological congruence, Ideological distance, Ideological incongruence, Ideological polarisation, Ideological polarization, Ideological positions, Ideological proximity, Incongruence, Incumbency, Incumbent, Independent variables, Individual behaviour, Individual parties, Information criteria, Institutional variables, Laver, Legal expertise, Legislative studies, Logit, Major implications, Minority cabinets, More candidates, More votes, Ndings, Ndings support, Next subsection, Nonpartisan, Nonpartisan dini cabinet, Nonspatial, Nonspatial candidate characteristics, Nonspatial candidate characteristics emphasised, Nonspatial characteristics, Ombudsman, Opposition parties, Original data, Other hand, Oxford university press, Papke wooldridge, Parliament, Parliamentary, Parliamentary activities, Parliamentary actors, Parliamentary behaviour, Parliamentary democracies, Parliamentary parties, Parliamentary party system, Parliamentary protocols, Party strength, Party system, Party unity, Personal communication, Polarisation, Policy decisions, Policy preferences, Political competition, Political exposure, Political parties, Political research, Political research elections, Positive effect, Reversion point, Robust, Seat share, Segal, Senate voting, Sieberer, Small number, Spatial characteristics, Spatial considerations, Spatial factors, Spatial model, Spatial perspective, Spatial proximity, States senate, Such candidates, Such elections, Supreme court, Supreme court justices, Supreme court nominees, Theoretical arguments, Theoretical framework, Time period, Ulrich, Ulrich sieberer, Ulrich sieberer table, Unanimous elections, Unanimous votes, Unit homogeneity, Unit interval, Upper graph, Vote share, Voting behaviour, Western europe, Western european parliaments.
- Teeft :
- Absolute distance, Actor behaviour, Additional elections, Aggregate election outcome, Aggregate level, Aggregate support, American context, American journal, Ample support, Approximate size, Audit, Audit institution, Audit institution ombudsman, Audit institutions, Author european journal, Behaviour, Binomial error distribution, Cabinet parties, Cabinet seat share, Cameron, Coalition bargaining, Collegial body, Comparative analysis, Comparative manifestos project, Competitive considerations, Competitive context, Competitive dynamics, Competitive elections, Consortium, Constitutional courts, Constitutional crisis, Constitutional judges, Data availability, Dataset, Democratic life cycle, Descriptive statistics, Dummy variables, Election outcome, Electoral behaviour, Electoral competition, Electoral success, Empirical analysis, European consortium, European journal, European parliaments, Expertise, Explanatory factors, Explanatory variables, Fractional logit model, Full model, Future research, High polarisation, High positions, Ideological congruence, Ideological distance, Ideological incongruence, Ideological polarisation, Ideological polarization, Ideological positions, Ideological proximity, Incongruence, Incumbency, Incumbent, Independent variables, Individual behaviour, Individual parties, Information criteria, Institutional variables, Laver, Legal expertise, Legislative studies, Logit, Major implications, Minority cabinets, More candidates, More votes, Ndings, Ndings support, Next subsection, Nonpartisan, Nonpartisan dini cabinet, Nonspatial, Nonspatial candidate characteristics, Nonspatial candidate characteristics emphasised, Nonspatial characteristics, Ombudsman, Opposition parties, Original data, Other hand, Oxford university press, Papke wooldridge, Parliament, Parliamentary, Parliamentary activities, Parliamentary actors, Parliamentary behaviour, Parliamentary democracies, Parliamentary parties, Parliamentary party system, Parliamentary protocols, Party strength, Party system, Party unity, Personal communication, Polarisation, Policy decisions, Policy preferences, Political competition, Political exposure, Political parties, Political research, Political research elections, Positive effect, Reversion point, Robust, Seat share, Segal, Senate voting, Sieberer, Small number, Spatial characteristics, Spatial considerations, Spatial factors, Spatial model, Spatial perspective, Spatial proximity, States senate, Such candidates, Such elections, Supreme court, Supreme court justices, Supreme court nominees, Theoretical arguments, Theoretical framework, Time period, Ulrich, Ulrich sieberer, Ulrich sieberer table, Unanimous elections, Unanimous votes, Unit homogeneity, Unit interval, Upper graph, Vote share, Voting behaviour, Western europe, Western european parliaments.
Abstract
Parliaments often elect holders of important extra‐parliamentary offices such as heads of state, constitutional judges, heads of audit institutions and ombudsmen. What drives the behaviour of parliamentary actors and the outcome of such elections? This article explains actor behaviour theoretically, drawing on spatial factors, principal‐agent arguments about the importance of nonspatial candidate characteristics and signaling arguments about competitive considerations beyond the specific election. Empirically, it provides the first comparative analysis of such elections outside the United States Senate using original data on 100 elections for four external offices in 14 Western European parliaments. The findings show that spatial variables, nonspatial candidate characteristics and features of the competitive context systematically affect the election outcome. The article contributes to comparative parliamentary research in general by demonstrating how parliamentary activities, other than lawmaking, can be analysed using established theories and by showing that consensual aggregate outcomes can be explained within a competition‐based rational choice model.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12007
Affiliations:
- Allemagne
- Bade-Wurtemberg, District de Fribourg-en-Brisgau
- Constance (Allemagne)
- Université de Constance
Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)
- to stream Istex, to step Corpus: 006163
- to stream Istex, to step Curation: 006163
- to stream Istex, to step Checkpoint: 000790
- to stream Main, to step Merge: 002C49
- to stream Main, to step Curation: 002C37
Le document en format XML
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<term>Actor behaviour</term>
<term>Additional elections</term>
<term>Aggregate election outcome</term>
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<term>Aggregate support</term>
<term>American context</term>
<term>American journal</term>
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<term>Audit institution</term>
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<term>Author european journal</term>
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<term>Binomial error distribution</term>
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<term>Cabinet seat share</term>
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<term>Coalition bargaining</term>
<term>Collegial body</term>
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<term>Comparative manifestos project</term>
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<term>Consortium</term>
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<term>Constitutional crisis</term>
<term>Constitutional judges</term>
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<term>Dataset</term>
<term>Democratic life cycle</term>
<term>Descriptive statistics</term>
<term>Dummy variables</term>
<term>Election outcome</term>
<term>Electoral behaviour</term>
<term>Electoral competition</term>
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<term>European consortium</term>
<term>European journal</term>
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<term>Individual parties</term>
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<term>Legal expertise</term>
<term>Legislative studies</term>
<term>Logit</term>
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<term>Minority cabinets</term>
<term>More candidates</term>
<term>More votes</term>
<term>Ndings</term>
<term>Ndings support</term>
<term>Next subsection</term>
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<term>Nonspatial candidate characteristics emphasised</term>
<term>Nonspatial characteristics</term>
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<term>Opposition parties</term>
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<term>Parliamentary activities</term>
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<term>Parliamentary behaviour</term>
<term>Parliamentary democracies</term>
<term>Parliamentary parties</term>
<term>Parliamentary party system</term>
<term>Parliamentary protocols</term>
<term>Party strength</term>
<term>Party system</term>
<term>Party unity</term>
<term>Personal communication</term>
<term>Polarisation</term>
<term>Policy decisions</term>
<term>Policy preferences</term>
<term>Political competition</term>
<term>Political exposure</term>
<term>Political parties</term>
<term>Political research</term>
<term>Political research elections</term>
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<term>Reversion point</term>
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<term>Seat share</term>
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<term>Spatial considerations</term>
<term>Spatial factors</term>
<term>Spatial model</term>
<term>Spatial perspective</term>
<term>Spatial proximity</term>
<term>States senate</term>
<term>Such candidates</term>
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<term>Supreme court</term>
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<term>Supreme court nominees</term>
<term>Theoretical arguments</term>
<term>Theoretical framework</term>
<term>Time period</term>
<term>Ulrich</term>
<term>Ulrich sieberer</term>
<term>Ulrich sieberer table</term>
<term>Unanimous elections</term>
<term>Unanimous votes</term>
<term>Unit homogeneity</term>
<term>Unit interval</term>
<term>Upper graph</term>
<term>Vote share</term>
<term>Voting behaviour</term>
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<term>Western european parliaments</term>
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<term>Actor behaviour</term>
<term>Additional elections</term>
<term>Aggregate election outcome</term>
<term>Aggregate level</term>
<term>Aggregate support</term>
<term>American context</term>
<term>American journal</term>
<term>Ample support</term>
<term>Approximate size</term>
<term>Audit</term>
<term>Audit institution</term>
<term>Audit institution ombudsman</term>
<term>Audit institutions</term>
<term>Author european journal</term>
<term>Behaviour</term>
<term>Binomial error distribution</term>
<term>Cabinet parties</term>
<term>Cabinet seat share</term>
<term>Cameron</term>
<term>Coalition bargaining</term>
<term>Collegial body</term>
<term>Comparative analysis</term>
<term>Comparative manifestos project</term>
<term>Competitive considerations</term>
<term>Competitive context</term>
<term>Competitive dynamics</term>
<term>Competitive elections</term>
<term>Consortium</term>
<term>Constitutional courts</term>
<term>Constitutional crisis</term>
<term>Constitutional judges</term>
<term>Data availability</term>
<term>Dataset</term>
<term>Democratic life cycle</term>
<term>Descriptive statistics</term>
<term>Dummy variables</term>
<term>Election outcome</term>
<term>Electoral behaviour</term>
<term>Electoral competition</term>
<term>Electoral success</term>
<term>Empirical analysis</term>
<term>European consortium</term>
<term>European journal</term>
<term>European parliaments</term>
<term>Expertise</term>
<term>Explanatory factors</term>
<term>Explanatory variables</term>
<term>Fractional logit model</term>
<term>Full model</term>
<term>Future research</term>
<term>High polarisation</term>
<term>High positions</term>
<term>Ideological congruence</term>
<term>Ideological distance</term>
<term>Ideological incongruence</term>
<term>Ideological polarisation</term>
<term>Ideological polarization</term>
<term>Ideological positions</term>
<term>Ideological proximity</term>
<term>Incongruence</term>
<term>Incumbency</term>
<term>Incumbent</term>
<term>Independent variables</term>
<term>Individual behaviour</term>
<term>Individual parties</term>
<term>Information criteria</term>
<term>Institutional variables</term>
<term>Laver</term>
<term>Legal expertise</term>
<term>Legislative studies</term>
<term>Logit</term>
<term>Major implications</term>
<term>Minority cabinets</term>
<term>More candidates</term>
<term>More votes</term>
<term>Ndings</term>
<term>Ndings support</term>
<term>Next subsection</term>
<term>Nonpartisan</term>
<term>Nonpartisan dini cabinet</term>
<term>Nonspatial</term>
<term>Nonspatial candidate characteristics</term>
<term>Nonspatial candidate characteristics emphasised</term>
<term>Nonspatial characteristics</term>
<term>Ombudsman</term>
<term>Opposition parties</term>
<term>Original data</term>
<term>Other hand</term>
<term>Oxford university press</term>
<term>Papke wooldridge</term>
<term>Parliament</term>
<term>Parliamentary</term>
<term>Parliamentary activities</term>
<term>Parliamentary actors</term>
<term>Parliamentary behaviour</term>
<term>Parliamentary democracies</term>
<term>Parliamentary parties</term>
<term>Parliamentary party system</term>
<term>Parliamentary protocols</term>
<term>Party strength</term>
<term>Party system</term>
<term>Party unity</term>
<term>Personal communication</term>
<term>Polarisation</term>
<term>Policy decisions</term>
<term>Policy preferences</term>
<term>Political competition</term>
<term>Political exposure</term>
<term>Political parties</term>
<term>Political research</term>
<term>Political research elections</term>
<term>Positive effect</term>
<term>Reversion point</term>
<term>Robust</term>
<term>Seat share</term>
<term>Segal</term>
<term>Senate voting</term>
<term>Sieberer</term>
<term>Small number</term>
<term>Spatial characteristics</term>
<term>Spatial considerations</term>
<term>Spatial factors</term>
<term>Spatial model</term>
<term>Spatial perspective</term>
<term>Spatial proximity</term>
<term>States senate</term>
<term>Such candidates</term>
<term>Such elections</term>
<term>Supreme court</term>
<term>Supreme court justices</term>
<term>Supreme court nominees</term>
<term>Theoretical arguments</term>
<term>Theoretical framework</term>
<term>Time period</term>
<term>Ulrich</term>
<term>Ulrich sieberer</term>
<term>Ulrich sieberer table</term>
<term>Unanimous elections</term>
<term>Unanimous votes</term>
<term>Unit homogeneity</term>
<term>Unit interval</term>
<term>Upper graph</term>
<term>Vote share</term>
<term>Voting behaviour</term>
<term>Western europe</term>
<term>Western european parliaments</term>
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<front><div type="abstract">Parliaments often elect holders of important extra‐parliamentary offices such as heads of state, constitutional judges, heads of audit institutions and ombudsmen. What drives the behaviour of parliamentary actors and the outcome of such elections? This article explains actor behaviour theoretically, drawing on spatial factors, principal‐agent arguments about the importance of nonspatial candidate characteristics and signaling arguments about competitive considerations beyond the specific election. Empirically, it provides the first comparative analysis of such elections outside the United States Senate using original data on 100 elections for four external offices in 14 Western European parliaments. The findings show that spatial variables, nonspatial candidate characteristics and features of the competitive context systematically affect the election outcome. The article contributes to comparative parliamentary research in general by demonstrating how parliamentary activities, other than lawmaking, can be analysed using established theories and by showing that consensual aggregate outcomes can be explained within a competition‐based rational choice model.</div>
</front>
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