The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?
Identifieur interne : 007692 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 007691; suivant : 007693The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?
Auteurs : Robert Holzmann ; Yves Hervé ; Roland DemmelSource :
- Empirica [ 0340-8744 ] ; 1996-02-01.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Additional indicators, Adjustment instrument, Alternative measures, Alternative sanctions, Asset position, Automatic stabilisers, Balancing item, Bayoumi, Belgium, Better assessment, Broader measurement concept, Budget deficits, Budgetary resources, Capital mobility, Capital transfers, Central government transfers, Cepr discussion paper, Common currency, Comparable basis, Consolidation efforts, Contingency claims, Contingency liabilities, Convergence, Convergence criteria, Credit supply curve, Criterion, Cyclical, Debt, Debt consolidation, Debt criterion, Debt default, Debt definition, Debt expansion, Debt level, Debt ratio, Default, Default risk, Deficit, Deficit criteria, Deficit criterion, Deficit level, Deficit ratio, Delors report, Demand curve, Demand curves, Devaluation, Devaluation risk, Eastern europe, Eastern european reform countries, Economic benefits, Economic environment, Economic framework, Economic growth, Effective sanctions, Efficient risk premia, Empirical evidence, Enforcement costs, Enterprises shares, Entry conditions, Estimation techniques, European commission, European countries, European economy, European integration, European union, Excessive deficit, Excessive deficit procedure, Excessive deficits, Excessive externalities, Exchange rate, Exchange rate effects, Externality, Financial account, Financial assets, Financial debt, Financial intermediation, Financial market integration, Financial markets, Fiscal consolidation, Fiscal constitution, Fiscal criteria, Fiscal deficit, Fiscal deficit concept, Fiscal expansion, Fiscal federalism, Fiscal implications, Fiscal issues, Fiscal misbehaviour, Fiscal operations, Fiscal policies, Fiscal policy, Fiscal position, Fiscal problems, Fiscal provisions, Fiscal restrictions, Fiscal rules, Fiscal stance, Fiscal turnaround, Foreign currency, Future european, Good indicator, Government accounts, Government assets, Government debt, Government deficit, Government finance statistics, Government sector, Grauwe, Gros, Gross concept, Gross debt, Growth rate, Higher interest rates, Holzmann, Increase taxes, Indebted countries, Individual member states, Ineffective, Interest rate, Interest rate externalities, Interest rates, Internal market, Internal market programme, Intertemporal budget constraint, Large majority, Liabilities, Maastricht, Maastricht criteria, Maastricht criterion, Maastricht treaty, Market value, Measurement concept, Member countries, Member country, Member state, Member states, Monetary income, Monetary union, National accounts, Negative externalities, Negative spillovers, Neumann, Next section, Nominal value, Number fudging, Numerical example, Oecd, Oecd countries, Operational deficiencies, Other countries, Other member countries, Other member states, Pecuniary externalities, Pension liabilities, Percent deficit rule, Percent threshold, Percentage point, Policy circles, Political economy, Political level, Premia, Present value, Price stability, Primary balance, Private sector, Programme, Public debt, Public enterprises, Public sector, Real economy, Real growth rate, Real interest rate, Real interest rates, Reference value, Reference values, Regime shift, Residual, Revenue side, Risk premia, Risk premium, Risk premium spread, Robert holzmann, Robert holzmannet, Sanction, Secondary legislation, Security liability, Single currency, Single european currency, Social security debt, Soft interpretation, Solvency, Staff papers, Strict application, Strict ceiling, Strong reduction, Structural adjustment, Structural budget balance, Structural deficit, Structural deficits, Supplementary criteria, Supplementary measures, Sustainability, Sustainable government, Theoretical level, Time preference, Trade flows, Transaction costs, Unequal treatment, Unsound, Unsustainable, Unsustainable debt level, Unsustainable debt levels, Various proposals, Western europe.
- Teeft :
- Additional indicators, Adjustment instrument, Alternative measures, Alternative sanctions, Asset position, Automatic stabilisers, Balancing item, Bayoumi, Belgium, Better assessment, Broader measurement concept, Budget deficits, Budgetary resources, Capital mobility, Capital transfers, Central government transfers, Cepr discussion paper, Common currency, Comparable basis, Consolidation efforts, Contingency claims, Contingency liabilities, Convergence, Convergence criteria, Credit supply curve, Criterion, Cyclical, Debt, Debt consolidation, Debt criterion, Debt default, Debt definition, Debt expansion, Debt level, Debt ratio, Default, Default risk, Deficit, Deficit criteria, Deficit criterion, Deficit level, Deficit ratio, Delors report, Demand curve, Demand curves, Devaluation, Devaluation risk, Eastern europe, Eastern european reform countries, Economic benefits, Economic environment, Economic framework, Economic growth, Effective sanctions, Efficient risk premia, Empirical evidence, Enforcement costs, Enterprises shares, Entry conditions, Estimation techniques, European commission, European countries, European economy, European integration, European union, Excessive deficit, Excessive deficit procedure, Excessive deficits, Excessive externalities, Exchange rate, Exchange rate effects, Externality, Financial account, Financial assets, Financial debt, Financial intermediation, Financial market integration, Financial markets, Fiscal consolidation, Fiscal constitution, Fiscal criteria, Fiscal deficit, Fiscal deficit concept, Fiscal expansion, Fiscal federalism, Fiscal implications, Fiscal issues, Fiscal misbehaviour, Fiscal operations, Fiscal policies, Fiscal policy, Fiscal position, Fiscal problems, Fiscal provisions, Fiscal restrictions, Fiscal rules, Fiscal stance, Fiscal turnaround, Foreign currency, Future european, Good indicator, Government accounts, Government assets, Government debt, Government deficit, Government finance statistics, Government sector, Grauwe, Gros, Gross concept, Gross debt, Growth rate, Higher interest rates, Holzmann, Increase taxes, Indebted countries, Individual member states, Ineffective, Interest rate, Interest rate externalities, Interest rates, Internal market, Internal market programme, Intertemporal budget constraint, Large majority, Liabilities, Maastricht, Maastricht criteria, Maastricht criterion, Maastricht treaty, Market value, Measurement concept, Member countries, Member country, Member state, Member states, Monetary income, Monetary union, National accounts, Negative externalities, Negative spillovers, Neumann, Next section, Nominal value, Number fudging, Numerical example, Oecd, Oecd countries, Operational deficiencies, Other countries, Other member countries, Other member states, Pecuniary externalities, Pension liabilities, Percent deficit rule, Percent threshold, Percentage point, Policy circles, Political economy, Political level, Premia, Present value, Price stability, Primary balance, Private sector, Programme, Public debt, Public enterprises, Public sector, Real economy, Real growth rate, Real interest rate, Real interest rates, Reference value, Reference values, Regime shift, Residual, Revenue side, Risk premia, Risk premium, Risk premium spread, Robert holzmann, Robert holzmannet, Sanction, Secondary legislation, Security liability, Single currency, Single european currency, Social security debt, Soft interpretation, Solvency, Staff papers, Strict application, Strict ceiling, Strong reduction, Structural adjustment, Structural budget balance, Structural deficit, Structural deficits, Supplementary criteria, Supplementary measures, Sustainability, Sustainable government, Theoretical level, Time preference, Trade flows, Transaction costs, Unequal treatment, Unsound, Unsustainable, Unsustainable debt level, Unsustainable debt levels, Various proposals, Western europe.
Abstract
Abstract: The paper investigates the rationale for, and the effectiveness of the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht treaty against the background of two questions: What are the incentives for an unsound fiscal policy in EMU, and what are the (potential) negative externalities if such a policy were to occur. The paper argues that EMU creates both incentives for a higher fiscal deficit while respecting solvency, and incentives for not rectifying a potentially unsustainable debt level once one is a member. Unsound fiscal policy could trigger important negative extermalities for the other member countries. The paper concludes that the current fiscal provisions of the Maastricht treaty are not sufficiently well defined and the envisaged sanctions not strong enough to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance. This leads to proposals of supplementary measures for surveillance and alternative sanctions. Staying within the framework of the Maastricht treaty, it is strongly suggested that both debt and deficit criteria should be strictly surveyed, but in view of their conceptual and operational deficiencies they should be supplemented by additional indicators. Based on this broader measurement concept, it is proposed to use semi-automatic and market-led sanctions to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance.
Url:
DOI: 10.1007/BF00925007
Links to Exploration step
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<term>Adjustment instrument</term>
<term>Alternative measures</term>
<term>Alternative sanctions</term>
<term>Asset position</term>
<term>Automatic stabilisers</term>
<term>Balancing item</term>
<term>Bayoumi</term>
<term>Belgium</term>
<term>Better assessment</term>
<term>Broader measurement concept</term>
<term>Budget deficits</term>
<term>Budgetary resources</term>
<term>Capital mobility</term>
<term>Capital transfers</term>
<term>Central government transfers</term>
<term>Cepr discussion paper</term>
<term>Common currency</term>
<term>Comparable basis</term>
<term>Consolidation efforts</term>
<term>Contingency claims</term>
<term>Contingency liabilities</term>
<term>Convergence</term>
<term>Convergence criteria</term>
<term>Credit supply curve</term>
<term>Criterion</term>
<term>Cyclical</term>
<term>Debt</term>
<term>Debt consolidation</term>
<term>Debt criterion</term>
<term>Debt default</term>
<term>Debt definition</term>
<term>Debt expansion</term>
<term>Debt level</term>
<term>Debt ratio</term>
<term>Default</term>
<term>Default risk</term>
<term>Deficit</term>
<term>Deficit criteria</term>
<term>Deficit criterion</term>
<term>Deficit level</term>
<term>Deficit ratio</term>
<term>Delors report</term>
<term>Demand curve</term>
<term>Demand curves</term>
<term>Devaluation</term>
<term>Devaluation risk</term>
<term>Eastern europe</term>
<term>Eastern european reform countries</term>
<term>Economic benefits</term>
<term>Economic environment</term>
<term>Economic framework</term>
<term>Economic growth</term>
<term>Effective sanctions</term>
<term>Efficient risk premia</term>
<term>Empirical evidence</term>
<term>Enforcement costs</term>
<term>Enterprises shares</term>
<term>Entry conditions</term>
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<term>European commission</term>
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<term>European integration</term>
<term>European union</term>
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<term>Excessive deficit procedure</term>
<term>Excessive deficits</term>
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<term>Fiscal policies</term>
<term>Fiscal policy</term>
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<term>Fiscal stance</term>
<term>Fiscal turnaround</term>
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<term>Future european</term>
<term>Good indicator</term>
<term>Government accounts</term>
<term>Government assets</term>
<term>Government debt</term>
<term>Government deficit</term>
<term>Government finance statistics</term>
<term>Government sector</term>
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<term>Gros</term>
<term>Gross concept</term>
<term>Gross debt</term>
<term>Growth rate</term>
<term>Higher interest rates</term>
<term>Holzmann</term>
<term>Increase taxes</term>
<term>Indebted countries</term>
<term>Individual member states</term>
<term>Ineffective</term>
<term>Interest rate</term>
<term>Interest rate externalities</term>
<term>Interest rates</term>
<term>Internal market</term>
<term>Internal market programme</term>
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<term>Member countries</term>
<term>Member country</term>
<term>Member state</term>
<term>Member states</term>
<term>Monetary income</term>
<term>Monetary union</term>
<term>National accounts</term>
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<term>Negative spillovers</term>
<term>Neumann</term>
<term>Next section</term>
<term>Nominal value</term>
<term>Number fudging</term>
<term>Numerical example</term>
<term>Oecd</term>
<term>Oecd countries</term>
<term>Operational deficiencies</term>
<term>Other countries</term>
<term>Other member countries</term>
<term>Other member states</term>
<term>Pecuniary externalities</term>
<term>Pension liabilities</term>
<term>Percent deficit rule</term>
<term>Percent threshold</term>
<term>Percentage point</term>
<term>Policy circles</term>
<term>Political economy</term>
<term>Political level</term>
<term>Premia</term>
<term>Present value</term>
<term>Price stability</term>
<term>Primary balance</term>
<term>Private sector</term>
<term>Programme</term>
<term>Public debt</term>
<term>Public enterprises</term>
<term>Public sector</term>
<term>Real economy</term>
<term>Real growth rate</term>
<term>Real interest rate</term>
<term>Real interest rates</term>
<term>Reference value</term>
<term>Reference values</term>
<term>Regime shift</term>
<term>Residual</term>
<term>Revenue side</term>
<term>Risk premia</term>
<term>Risk premium</term>
<term>Risk premium spread</term>
<term>Robert holzmann</term>
<term>Robert holzmannet</term>
<term>Sanction</term>
<term>Secondary legislation</term>
<term>Security liability</term>
<term>Single currency</term>
<term>Single european currency</term>
<term>Social security debt</term>
<term>Soft interpretation</term>
<term>Solvency</term>
<term>Staff papers</term>
<term>Strict application</term>
<term>Strict ceiling</term>
<term>Strong reduction</term>
<term>Structural adjustment</term>
<term>Structural budget balance</term>
<term>Structural deficit</term>
<term>Structural deficits</term>
<term>Supplementary criteria</term>
<term>Supplementary measures</term>
<term>Sustainability</term>
<term>Sustainable government</term>
<term>Theoretical level</term>
<term>Time preference</term>
<term>Trade flows</term>
<term>Transaction costs</term>
<term>Unequal treatment</term>
<term>Unsound</term>
<term>Unsustainable</term>
<term>Unsustainable debt level</term>
<term>Unsustainable debt levels</term>
<term>Various proposals</term>
<term>Western europe</term>
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<keywords scheme="Teeft" xml:lang="en"><term>Additional indicators</term>
<term>Adjustment instrument</term>
<term>Alternative measures</term>
<term>Alternative sanctions</term>
<term>Asset position</term>
<term>Automatic stabilisers</term>
<term>Balancing item</term>
<term>Bayoumi</term>
<term>Belgium</term>
<term>Better assessment</term>
<term>Broader measurement concept</term>
<term>Budget deficits</term>
<term>Budgetary resources</term>
<term>Capital mobility</term>
<term>Capital transfers</term>
<term>Central government transfers</term>
<term>Cepr discussion paper</term>
<term>Common currency</term>
<term>Comparable basis</term>
<term>Consolidation efforts</term>
<term>Contingency claims</term>
<term>Contingency liabilities</term>
<term>Convergence</term>
<term>Convergence criteria</term>
<term>Credit supply curve</term>
<term>Criterion</term>
<term>Cyclical</term>
<term>Debt</term>
<term>Debt consolidation</term>
<term>Debt criterion</term>
<term>Debt default</term>
<term>Debt definition</term>
<term>Debt expansion</term>
<term>Debt level</term>
<term>Debt ratio</term>
<term>Default</term>
<term>Default risk</term>
<term>Deficit</term>
<term>Deficit criteria</term>
<term>Deficit criterion</term>
<term>Deficit level</term>
<term>Deficit ratio</term>
<term>Delors report</term>
<term>Demand curve</term>
<term>Demand curves</term>
<term>Devaluation</term>
<term>Devaluation risk</term>
<term>Eastern europe</term>
<term>Eastern european reform countries</term>
<term>Economic benefits</term>
<term>Economic environment</term>
<term>Economic framework</term>
<term>Economic growth</term>
<term>Effective sanctions</term>
<term>Efficient risk premia</term>
<term>Empirical evidence</term>
<term>Enforcement costs</term>
<term>Enterprises shares</term>
<term>Entry conditions</term>
<term>Estimation techniques</term>
<term>European commission</term>
<term>European countries</term>
<term>European economy</term>
<term>European integration</term>
<term>European union</term>
<term>Excessive deficit</term>
<term>Excessive deficit procedure</term>
<term>Excessive deficits</term>
<term>Excessive externalities</term>
<term>Exchange rate</term>
<term>Exchange rate effects</term>
<term>Externality</term>
<term>Financial account</term>
<term>Financial assets</term>
<term>Financial debt</term>
<term>Financial intermediation</term>
<term>Financial market integration</term>
<term>Financial markets</term>
<term>Fiscal consolidation</term>
<term>Fiscal constitution</term>
<term>Fiscal criteria</term>
<term>Fiscal deficit</term>
<term>Fiscal deficit concept</term>
<term>Fiscal expansion</term>
<term>Fiscal federalism</term>
<term>Fiscal implications</term>
<term>Fiscal issues</term>
<term>Fiscal misbehaviour</term>
<term>Fiscal operations</term>
<term>Fiscal policies</term>
<term>Fiscal policy</term>
<term>Fiscal position</term>
<term>Fiscal problems</term>
<term>Fiscal provisions</term>
<term>Fiscal restrictions</term>
<term>Fiscal rules</term>
<term>Fiscal stance</term>
<term>Fiscal turnaround</term>
<term>Foreign currency</term>
<term>Future european</term>
<term>Good indicator</term>
<term>Government accounts</term>
<term>Government assets</term>
<term>Government debt</term>
<term>Government deficit</term>
<term>Government finance statistics</term>
<term>Government sector</term>
<term>Grauwe</term>
<term>Gros</term>
<term>Gross concept</term>
<term>Gross debt</term>
<term>Growth rate</term>
<term>Higher interest rates</term>
<term>Holzmann</term>
<term>Increase taxes</term>
<term>Indebted countries</term>
<term>Individual member states</term>
<term>Ineffective</term>
<term>Interest rate</term>
<term>Interest rate externalities</term>
<term>Interest rates</term>
<term>Internal market</term>
<term>Internal market programme</term>
<term>Intertemporal budget constraint</term>
<term>Large majority</term>
<term>Liabilities</term>
<term>Maastricht</term>
<term>Maastricht criteria</term>
<term>Maastricht criterion</term>
<term>Maastricht treaty</term>
<term>Market value</term>
<term>Measurement concept</term>
<term>Member countries</term>
<term>Member country</term>
<term>Member state</term>
<term>Member states</term>
<term>Monetary income</term>
<term>Monetary union</term>
<term>National accounts</term>
<term>Negative externalities</term>
<term>Negative spillovers</term>
<term>Neumann</term>
<term>Next section</term>
<term>Nominal value</term>
<term>Number fudging</term>
<term>Numerical example</term>
<term>Oecd</term>
<term>Oecd countries</term>
<term>Operational deficiencies</term>
<term>Other countries</term>
<term>Other member countries</term>
<term>Other member states</term>
<term>Pecuniary externalities</term>
<term>Pension liabilities</term>
<term>Percent deficit rule</term>
<term>Percent threshold</term>
<term>Percentage point</term>
<term>Policy circles</term>
<term>Political economy</term>
<term>Political level</term>
<term>Premia</term>
<term>Present value</term>
<term>Price stability</term>
<term>Primary balance</term>
<term>Private sector</term>
<term>Programme</term>
<term>Public debt</term>
<term>Public enterprises</term>
<term>Public sector</term>
<term>Real economy</term>
<term>Real growth rate</term>
<term>Real interest rate</term>
<term>Real interest rates</term>
<term>Reference value</term>
<term>Reference values</term>
<term>Regime shift</term>
<term>Residual</term>
<term>Revenue side</term>
<term>Risk premia</term>
<term>Risk premium</term>
<term>Risk premium spread</term>
<term>Robert holzmann</term>
<term>Robert holzmannet</term>
<term>Sanction</term>
<term>Secondary legislation</term>
<term>Security liability</term>
<term>Single currency</term>
<term>Single european currency</term>
<term>Social security debt</term>
<term>Soft interpretation</term>
<term>Solvency</term>
<term>Staff papers</term>
<term>Strict application</term>
<term>Strict ceiling</term>
<term>Strong reduction</term>
<term>Structural adjustment</term>
<term>Structural budget balance</term>
<term>Structural deficit</term>
<term>Structural deficits</term>
<term>Supplementary criteria</term>
<term>Supplementary measures</term>
<term>Sustainability</term>
<term>Sustainable government</term>
<term>Theoretical level</term>
<term>Time preference</term>
<term>Trade flows</term>
<term>Transaction costs</term>
<term>Unequal treatment</term>
<term>Unsound</term>
<term>Unsustainable</term>
<term>Unsustainable debt level</term>
<term>Unsustainable debt levels</term>
<term>Various proposals</term>
<term>Western europe</term>
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<abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Abstract: The paper investigates the rationale for, and the effectiveness of the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht treaty against the background of two questions: What are the incentives for an unsound fiscal policy in EMU, and what are the (potential) negative externalities if such a policy were to occur. The paper argues that EMU creates both incentives for a higher fiscal deficit while respecting solvency, and incentives for not rectifying a potentially unsustainable debt level once one is a member. Unsound fiscal policy could trigger important negative extermalities for the other member countries. The paper concludes that the current fiscal provisions of the Maastricht treaty are not sufficiently well defined and the envisaged sanctions not strong enough to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance. This leads to proposals of supplementary measures for surveillance and alternative sanctions. Staying within the framework of the Maastricht treaty, it is strongly suggested that both debt and deficit criteria should be strictly surveyed, but in view of their conceptual and operational deficiencies they should be supplemented by additional indicators. Based on this broader measurement concept, it is proposed to use semi-automatic and market-led sanctions to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance.</p>
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<ArticleNote Type="PresentedAt"><SimplePara>Revised version of a paper presented at the EMPIRICA Economic Policy and European Institute Workshop “Maastricht — Monetary Constitution Without Fiscal Constitution?”, University of Saarland, October 2–3, 1995. We want to thank our discussants Giancarlo Corsetti, Otmar Issing and Manfred J.M. Neumann for valuable written comments, and the participants of the Workshop and the staff of the European Institute for further useful critique and suggestions. All errors and omissions are, of course, our own doing.</SimplePara>
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