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The Principle of "Effectiveness" in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Its Different Dimensions and Its Consistency with Public International Law – No Need for the Concept of Treaty Sui Generis

Identifieur interne : 006307 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 006306; suivant : 006308

The Principle of "Effectiveness" in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Its Different Dimensions and Its Consistency with Public International Law – No Need for the Concept of Treaty Sui Generis

Auteurs : Daniel Rietiker

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RBID : ISTEX:C75872A9D59095AA157519AD0CD02ECD8D259BFB

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DOI: 10.1163/157181010X12668401899039

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ISTEX:C75872A9D59095AA157519AD0CD02ECD8D259BFB

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<p>Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/157181010X12668401899039 brill.nl/nord NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Th e Principle of “Eff ectiveness” in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Its Diff erent Dimensions and Its Consistency with Public International Law – No Need for the Concept of Treaty Sui Generis Daniel Rietiker * Senior Legal Offi cer, Registry of the European Court of Human Rights Abstract Th e recent past has shown an ever-growing fragmentation of the international legal system where lawyers and judges are facing more and more the phenomenon of the same legal question being discussed in diff erent fora. Th is is particularly the case in the fi eld of human rights that entails the dispersal of responsibilities for interpretation of numerous instruments among various diff erent judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, of both universal and regional nature. In order to secure coher- ence and legal certainty in the system, it is important to respect a set of principles and rules of general international law, in particular Articles 31–33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Th e fi rst goal of this article is to analyse whether the Court applies the rules of the VCLT to the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Secondly, assuming that the VCLT fully applies, it will be analysed whether Article 31(1) VCLT is fl exible enough to allow nevertheless some leeway for the development of specifi cities, especially as a result of the particular nature of the ECHR. Th irdly, it will be shown that the Court has indeed developed a set of specifi c methods of interpretation, aiming to render the rights enshrined in the ECHR eff ective. From the author’s point of view, they can all be regarded as sub-forms (or partial aspects) of the teleological interpretation. He distinguishes between four dimensions of the principle of “eff ectiveness”. Keywords treaty interpretation ; VCLT ; fragmentation of the international legal system ; European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) ; principle of eff ectiveness ; teleological interpretation ; dynamic inter- pretation ; systemic interpretation * ) Ph.D. (University of Lausanne), MA (Graduate Institute of International Relations, Geneva). Th e views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily refl ect the views of the ECtHR. Th e basis of the present article was a speech delivered at the International Symposium “A Unique European Institution: Th e European Court of Human Rights after 50 Years”, Centre for European Constitutionalization, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, March 21–22, 2009. Th e author wants to thank Michael O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as his colleagues James Brannan, Zeynep O. Usal, Sergei Golubok and Søren Prebensen for their precious help and their useful comments on the earlier drafts of this article.</p>
<p>246 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 1. Introduction Th e European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a unique instrument. But does this mean that it follows its own logic, as a treaty sui generis , setting aside the principles and rules of general international law? Indeed, already on the basis of the case of Belilos v. Switzerland , 1 it was submitted that human rights treaties are legal regimes that deserve special treatment because, inter alia , they are said to be deprived of reciprocity between the rights and obligations of the parties. Consequently, it is proposed to treat them as a “special branch” of international law, widely immune to the principles of general international law. 2 On the one hand, such an idea is of course tempting for the ever-growing number of specialists in certain branches of international law, since they can con- centrate on their core fi elds without looking too much to the right and to the left. 3 On the other hand, this tendency can lead to a phenomenon which Koskenniemi calls “fragmentation” of the international legal system, the eff ect of which might undermine its coherence and universality and thus be detrimental to legal certainty. 4 Rosalyn Higgins, the then President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), on the occasion of a ceremony marking the 50th anniversary of the European Court of Human Rights, declared that the recent case of Georgia v. Russia was a signifi cant example of the contemporary phenomenon of the same or similar legal question surfacing in diverse fora, thus entailing the dispersal of responsibility for interpreting international law, especially human rights law, 1) In this case, the Court viewed a declaration made by Switzerland in its instrument of ratifi cation as in fact a reservation, struck it down as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, and held Switzerland to be bound by the Convention “irrespective of the validity of the declaration” ( Belilos v. Switzerland , Judgment of 29 April 1988, ECHR Series A (1988), N° 132, p. 28, para. 60). 2) In cases subsequent to Belilos , the Court has pointed out that the normal rules on reservations to treaties do not as such apply to human rights law: “a fundamental diff erence in the role and purpose of the respective tribunals, coupled with the existence of a practice of unconditional acceptance … provides a compelling basis for distinguishing Convention practice from that of the International Court” ( Loizidou v. Turkey , Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 23 March 1995, ECHR, Series A (1995), N° 310, p. 29, para. 67). 3) Cf. in this sense L. Cafl isch, ‘L’application du droit international général par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme’, in I. Buff ard et al. (eds . ), International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation , Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008) pp. 627–647, pp. 627–628: “Ainsi, des spécialistes du droit du commerce international ont pu affi rmer que cet ordre juridique constitue un système à part dont ils sont seuls à pénétrer les mystères ; certains pénalistes voudraient séparer le droit international pénal du droit international général ; et quelques « droits-de-l’hommistes » souhaiteraient en faire autant pour leur domaine de prédilection, oubliant que ce sont précisément des instruments internationaux – des traités – qui fondent leurs activités.” Cf. also , concerning the phenomenon of fragmentation of the international legal order, R. Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench’, 52 ICLQ (2003) pp. 791–804. 4) International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi culties Arising from the Diversifi cation and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi , A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006.</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 247 5) Speech by Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice, 30 January 2009, ‘Th e International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights: Partners for the Protection of Human Rights’, Dialogue between Judges , European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, 2009. 6) Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT (Use of terms): “ ‘treaty’ means an international agreement con- cluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”. 7) Article 1 VCLT: “Th e present Convention applies to treaties between States.” 8) Other examples are Article 20(2) or Article 56(1)(b) VCLT. among diff erent judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. 5 Th e following proposals are therefore far from being merely of theoretical importance. Th e fi rst goal of this study will be to analyse, in theory and in practice, the relationship between the ECHR and general international law, in particular the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (Section 2). Secondly, assuming that the VCLT fully applies to the ECHR, it will be necessary to analyse the question whether there is nevertheless some leeway for the development of specifi cities in the fi eld of its interpretation, not necessarily because it is consid- ered a “human rights treaty”, but perhaps as a result of other factors. It will be seen that the key to the special dynamics of the ECHR is the concept of the “object and purpose” of a treaty that serves as the cornerstone for the unique dynamics of the Court’s case-law (Section 3). Furthermore, it will be shown that the Court has developed – from the author’s point of view, in the logic of eff ective interpretation – some specifi c methods of interpretation (Section 4). 2. Th e Place of the Convention in the International Legal Order: Th e Temptation of the “ Lex Specialis ” and “ Self-contained Regime ” Concepts 2.1. In Th eory: Full Applicability of Articles 31–33 VCLT to the ECHR When seeking to analyse the relationship between the ECHR and the 1969 VCLT, the starting point must be Article 2(1)(a) VCLT, which defi nes the con- cept of “treaty”. 6 Th ere is no doubt that this defi nition, customary in nature, applies without any restriction to the ECHR. Th us, in accordance with Article 1 VCLT, 7 the ECHR is fully subject to the regime of this “treaty on treaties”. It is true that sometimes, but only very rarely, the VCLT seems to take into account the special nature of certain treaties. Th e most prominent example is paragraph 5 of Article 60, which excludes “provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in par- ticular to provisions prohibiting any forms of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties”. 8 Since Articles 31–33 VCLT, the authoritative guide for the</p>
<p>248 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 9) See also the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Ziemele in the case of Andrejeva v. Latvia , GC, 18 February 2009, para. 19: “Indeed, since the Convention remains an international treaty, even with a special character, the rule of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provide the backbone for the interpretation of the Convention as a matter of international law …” 10) According to A. Mowbray, in ‘Th e Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’, 5 Human Rights Law Review (2005) pp. 57–79, at p. 59, a study of the Court’s judgments between 1960 and 1987 revealed that although Articles 31–33 VCLT were not always cited, they seemed nevertheless to be a constant source of inspiration in the judgments of the Court. See , for an over- view of the practice of the Court concerning the diff erent methods of interpretation, L. Cafl isch and A. A. Cançado Trindade, ‘Les Conventions américaine et européenne des droits de l’homme et le droit international général’, RGDIP , t. CVIII, 2004, pp. 5–62. See also the joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Cafl isch, Türmen and Kovler in the case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (GC), 4 February 2005, in particular point 4 (Th e European Convention on Human Rights in the light of the canon of treaty interpretation). 11) Golder v. the United Kingdom, no. 4451/70, Series A no. 18, 1979, para. 29. 12) See , for an early confi rmation of the application of the VCLT by the Court, the case of Luedicke, Belkacem, and Koç v. Germany , Series A N° 29, 1978, para. 46, in which the Court adopted the “ordinary meaning” of the expressions “ gratuitement ” and “free” according to Article 6(3)(e). Concerning this case see also D. J. Harris et al. , Law of the European Convention on Human Rights , 2nd ed. (Oxford, 2009) p. 5. interpretation of international treaties, do not make a distinction according to the nature of the treaty, it may be concluded that their rules are of a general nature, applicable to all kinds of international agreements, bilateral or multilat- eral, and therefore also to human rights instruments. 9 2.2. In Practice 2.2.1. Numerous References in the Court’s Case-law to Articles 31–33 VCLT Th e most tangible confi rmation of the applicability of the interpretation regime of the VCLT to the ECHR is obviously the numerous references in the Court’s judgments themselves. 10 In the case of Golder v. United Kingdom , it declared explicitly its willingness to “be guided by Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention”; the Convention had not yet entered into force, but the Court con- sidered these provisions to be of customary nature. 11 Possible examples in the practice of the Court concerning Article 31 are very numerous. 12 Th ose relating to Articles 32 and 33 are rarer. Th e Court recently had occasion to refer to Article 33, which deals with the interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages, in the case of Stoll v. Switzerland , where it examined the diff erence in the wording of Article 10(2) of the ECHR: 58. Whereas the French wording of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention talks of measures neces- sary “ pour empêcher la divulgation d’informations confi dentielles ”, the English text refers to measures necessary “for preventing the disclosure of information received in confi dence”. Th e latter wording might suggest that the provision relates only to the person who has dealings in confi dence with the author of a secret document and that, accordingly, it does not encompass third parties, including persons working in the media.</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 249 13) Stoll v. Switzerland (GC), judgment of 10 December 2007, paras. 59–62. In para. 59, the Court refers even explicitly to the LaGrand case (ICJ, Reports 2001, para. 101), in which the International Court of Justice recognised that Article 33(4) VCLT refl ected customary international law in rela- tion to the interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages. 14) Report by Koskenniemi, supra note 4, para. 254. See also para. 21 : “… But this cannot be so inasmuch as the characterizations (‘trade law’, ‘environmental law’) have no normative value per se. 59. Th e Court does not subscribe to such an interpretation, which it considers unduly restric- tive. Given the existence of two texts which, although equally authentic, are not in com- plete harmony, it deems it appropriate to refer to Article 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the fourth paragraph of which refl ects international customary law in relation to the interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages (see the LaGrand case, International Court of Justice, 27 June 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, § 101). 60. Under paragraph 3 of Article 33, “the terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text”. Paragraph 4 states that when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a diff erence of meaning which the application of Articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, is to be adopted (see, in this regard, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) , judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 30, § 48, and James and Others v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 31, § 42). 61. Th e Court accepts that clauses which allow interference with Convention rights must be interpreted restrictively. Nevertheless, in the light of paragraph 3 of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the drafting history of Article 10, the Court considers it appropriate to adopt an interpretation of the phrase “preventing the disclosure of information received in confi dence” which encom- passes confi dential information disclosed either by a person subject to a duty of confi - dence or by a third party and, in particular, as in the present case, by a journalist. 62. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the Government were entitled to invoke the legitimate aim of preventing the “disclosure of information received in confi dence. 13 2.2.2. Th e Practical Diffi culty (Impossibility?) of Defi ning the “ Lex Specialis ” in International Law: “Mere Labels”? Th e authors favouring the sui generis nature of the ECHR build their claim on the classifi cation of this treaty as an instrument protecting the human being. But this raises the question whether special consequences really fl ow from the classifi ca- tion of an international instrument as a “human rights”, “humanitarian law” or “environmental” treaty. In fact, according to Koskenniemi, these classifi cations are nothing more than “labels” without legal signifi cance: Terms such as ‘human rights law’, ‘trade law’ or ‘environmental law’ and so on are arbitrary labels on forms of professional specialisation. Th ere are no rules on how to qualify particular treaty regimes and most regimes could be qualifi ed from a number of such perspectives. Human rights treaties, for example, are often used to further environmental objectives and trade regimes presuppose and are built upon the protection of human rights (in particular the right to property). 14</p>
<p>250 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 Th ey are only informal labels that describe the instruments from the perspective of diff erent inter- ests or diff erent policy objectives. Most international instruments may be described by from various perspectives: a treaty dealing with trade may have signifi cant human rights and environmental implications and vice versa. A treaty on, say, maritime transport of chemicals, relates at least to the law of sea, environmental law, trade law, and the law of maritime transport. Th e characterizations have less to do with the ‘nature’ of the instrument than the interest from which it is described.” 15) Article 1(1) (a) of the Convention (General Obligations). 16) See , for instance, the Preamble to the Ottawa Convention: “ Determined to put and end to the suff ering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic devel- opment and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement” (alinea 1), “ Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims” (alinea 3), and: “ Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed confl ict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed confl icts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfl uous injury or unnecessary suff ering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combattants (last alinea); see also concerning the Ottawa Convention, St. Maslen, Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties , Vol. 1: Th e Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Oxford, 2004). 17) C. Greenwood, ‘ Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion’ in L. Boisson de Chazournes and Ph. Sands (eds.), International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, (Cambridge, 1999) pp. 247–266, at p. 252. 18) For details see Report of Koskenniemi, supra note 4, para. 123, diff erentiating between three approaches to “self-contained regimes”. Th is statement is convincing and a good example is, from my point of view, the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines, followed last year by the adoption of its “sister” treaty, the Oslo Convention on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions. I am of the view that these are very interesting mixed treaties dealing with arms control, environmental issues, humanitarian law, prohibition of the use of arms also in peacetime 15 – even human rights trea- ties. 16 I thus fully endorse the opinion that the mere label of “human rights” instrument is, as such, not relevant to justify special treatment with regard to the interpretation of the ECHR. 2.2.3. Th e Rejection by the Court Itself of the Idea of the ECHR as a “Self-contained Regime” Another question to be addressed is whether the ECHR constitutes a “self- contained regime”, a “special branch” of international law which is “autonomous” towards its surroundings and can indeed work in a vacuum, in a “watertight com- partment”, to use Professor Greenwood’s very pertinent metaphor. 17 First of all, it is submitted that the concept of “self-contained regime” is far from being free of ambiguity and fi nds very little confi rmation in international adjudication. 18</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 251 19) ICJ, Reports 1980, p. 41, para. 86. 20) Th is point of view possibly fi nds confi rmation by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case (ICJ, Reports 1986, paras. 267–268). 21) See for instance the Belilos case, supra note 1, or the case of Loizidou v. Turkey , 13 March 1995 (preliminary objections), ECHR, Series A n° 310. See also the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma in the 2006 Congo v. Rwanda judgment, ICJ Reports, 2006, paras. 22–23: “Human Rights courts and tribunals have not regarded themselves as precluded by this Court’s 1951 Advisory Opinion from doing other than noting whether a particu- lar State has objected to a reservation. Th is development does not create a ‘schism’ between general international law as represented by the Court’s 1951 Advisory Opinion, a ‘deviation’ therefrom by these various courts and tribunals. … Rather, it is to be regarded as developing the law to meet contemporary realities, nothing in the specifi c fi ndings of the Court in 1951 prohibiting this. Indeed, it is clear that the practice of the International Court itself refl ects this trend for tribunals and courts themselves to pronounce on compatibility with object and purpose, when the need arises.” 22) See also Cafl isch and Cançado Trindade, supra note 10, pp. 22–23. 23) In the sense given by the PCIJ in the S.S. Wimbledon case (Series A, N° 1, 1923, pp. 23–24). 24) Report Koskenniemi, supra note 4, para. 161. See also Cafl isch and Cançado Trindade, supra note 10, in particular pp. 32 et seq. 25) McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], no. 31253/96, para. 37, ECHR 2001-XI (extracts), Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 37112/97, para. 36, ECHR 2001-XI (extracts), and Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, paras. 66 and 67, ECHR 2001-XI. Moreover, one is entitled to doubt whether this concept can be applied to the ECHR. It might perhaps be agreed that it falls under the notion of “self- contained regime” in its narrowest form, as recognised by the ICJ in the Hostage case, 19 in the sense of providing for a specifi c regime of accountability (under Articles 41 and 46 ECHR) that might make other forms of reaction inappropriate. 20 Th e question of reservations to the ECHR constitutes probably another exception, because the ECHR provides, in its Article 57, for a lex specialis vis-à-vis the gen- eral rules of Articles 19 et seq. VCLT, implemented by the Court on several occa- sions. 21 Perhaps it is justifi ed, with regard to these specifi c issues, to talk of a “self-contained regime”. 22 But as far as the broader sense is concerned, 23 implying a “system” or “subsys- tem” of rules that cover some particular problem diff erently from the way it would be covered under general law, it is clear that this is not normally the case with the ECHR. It suffi ces to recall that the Court refers to rules and principles of general international law concerning not only treaty interpretation, but also matters such as statehood, jurisdiction and immunity. 24 Concerning the question of immunities, it should be pointed out that in three Grand Chamber judgments of 2001 against the United Kingdom and Ireland, the Court held that the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, eff ec- tively preventing legal proceedings against foreign governments, did not violate the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. 25 As far as the notion of “jurisdiction” is concerned, the Court held in the very recent Grand Chamber judgment of Andrejeva v. Latvia as follows:</p>
<p>252 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 26) Application no. 7142/01. 27) Application no. 7166/01. 28) Para. 35. See also Cafl isch and Cançado Trindade, supra note 10, pp. 24–25. 29) ACDI, 1966-II, p. 218, para. 4: “Th eir suitability [the suitability of principles and maxims in international practice] for use in any given case hinges on a variety of considerations which have fi rst to be appreciated by the interpreter of the document; the particular arrangement of the words and sentences, their relation to each other and to other parts of the document, the general nature and subject-matter of the document, the circumstances in which it was drawn up, etc. Even when a possible occasion for their application may appear to exist, their application is not automatic but depends on the conviction of the interpreter that it is appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words, recourse to many of these principles is discretionary rather than obligatory and the interpretation of documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science.” 30) I. R. Sinclair, Th e Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , 2 nd ed. (Manchester, 1984) pp. 70–71; M. K. Yasseen, ‘L’interprétation des traités d’après la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités’, Collected Courses of Th e Hague Academy of International Law , t. 151, 1976-III, pp. 3–114, at p. 16. Th e Court reiterates that the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention refl ects the term’s meaning in public international law and is closely linked to that of the international responsibility of the State concerned (see Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (GC), n° 48787/99, § 312, ECHR 2004-VII). Moreover, it is noteworthy that in the cases of Behrami and Behrami v. France 26 and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway , 27 the Court referred to Article 30 VCLT concerning the question of the confl ict of norms in international law. 28 Finally, one should not forget that even the text of the Convention refers in a few places to external law, in particular in Article 35 (Admissibility criteria), where it is said that the Court may only deal with a case after all domestic remedies have been exhausted “according to the generally recognised rules of international law”. 3. Th e Possibility of Specifi cities in the Interpretation of the ECHR as a Result of its Special Nature and the Flexible Wording of Article 31 VCLT 3.1. Th e Flexibility of Article 31(1) VCLT Th e operation of treaty interpretation is not an exact science but rather the art of identifying those rules among many others whose application seems appropriate in a certain situation. 29 Legal writers normally agree that Article 31(1) VCLT, the starting point of treaty interpretation, constitutes a sound compromise between the three perception-related methods normally adopted: the objective method based on the text, the subjective method based on the intention of the drafters of the treaty and the teleological method in accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty. 30 Th e general adherence to Articles 31 and 32 may be attributable to the fact that they adopt a set of practical considerations that are familiar from the</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 253 31) Report Koskenniemi, supra note 4, p. 215, para. 427. Th is author nevertheless claims that the Convention does not purport to be an exhaustive statement of interpretative techniques and points out that there is no mention, for instance, of lex specialis or lex posterior rules. See also R. Bernhardt, ‘Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention of Human Rights’, 42 GYIL (1999) pp. 11–25, at p. 14; he observes that the principle that treaties should be interpreted restrictively and in favour of State sovereignty, in dubio mitius , is also not mentioned in Article 31 VCLT, rightly claiming that this principle is no longer relevant in international law. 32) Th is controversy goes back to the days of the work of the International Law Commission on the draft articles (Sinclair, supra note 30, pp. 114–119). 33) Golder v. the United Kingdom , supra note 11, para. 30. 34) D. McRae, ‘Approaches to the Interpretation of Treaties : Th e European Court of Human Rights and the WTO Appellate Body’, S. Breitenmoser et al. , Droits de l’homme, démocratie et état de droit, liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Zurich, 2007) pp. 1407–1422, at p. 1410. 35) See , in this sense, Judge Ziemele, supra note 9, para. 19: “It is to be noted that Article 31 has the heading ‘General rule of interpretation’. Th ere is one single rule of interpretation with several parts. However, … not all parts will always be relevant in all cases; but when they are, they must be utilized (D. French, “Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly , 2006, p. 301).” 36) See for instance A. Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, 14 EJIL (2003) pp. 529–568, at p. 534. See also G. Ress, ‘Die Bedeutung der nachfolgenden Praxis für die Vertragsinterpretation nach der Wiener Vertragskonvention’, in R. Bieber and G. Ress (dir.), Die Dynamik des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts/Th e Dynamics of EC-Law. Die Auslegung des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts im Lichte nachfolgender Praxis der Mitgliedstaaten und der EG-Organe (Baden-Baden, 1987) pp. 49–52, national context and at the same time general and fl exible enough to provide a reasonable response to most interpretative problems. While they avoid taking a fi rm stand on any of the great doctrinal debates on interpretation, it is hard to think of any approach to interpretation that would be totally excluded from Articles 31–33. 31 Having said that, the precise inter-relationship of the diff erent elements of Article 31(1) VCLT has nevertheless been a matter of controversy. 32 In the Golder case, the Court did not see any need to separate these elements as part of the interpretation process: In the way in which it is presented in the ‘general rule’ in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the process of interpretation of a treaty is a unity, a single combined operation; this rule, closely integrated, places on the same footing the various elements enumerated in the four paragraphs of the Article. 33 In other words, the Court, in its earlier days, did not give any priority to the ordinary meaning, context or object and purpose in paragraph 1 or elevate or diminish the other paragraphs of that Article, 34 considering the interpretation process as a single operation. 35 It is thus submitted that the fl exible formulation of Article 31(1) VCLT allows a balance between the diff erent elements, the result of which may change in accordance with the nature or type of the treaty being interpreted. 36</p>
<p>254 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 at p. 52: “ Es gehört zu den Irrtümern, die durch die WVRK hervorgerufen der zumindest gefördert wurden, dass bei der Auslegung völkerrechtlicher Verträge nicht zwischen verschiedenen Vertragstypen zu unterscheiden und sozusagen eine Art ‚einheitliche Interpretationsmethode’ stets massgeblich sei. Die Grundregel des Artikel 31 Abs. 1 WVRK gestattet nicht nur, sie verlangt sogar über die ‚object and purpose’-Formel, dass vertragsspezifi sche Besonderheiten bei der Auslegung berücksichtigt werden. Je nach Gegenstand, Zweckrichtung und Funktion des Vertrages sind Gesichtspunkte wie ‚eff et utile’ und ‚implied powers’ als Elemente des teleologischen Vertragsverständnisses stärker oder geringer zu berücksichtigen .” See also McRae, supra note 34, p. 1421. For an author who seems to consider the fl exibility of the Court to be extreme see Orakhelashvili, this footnote, p. 567: “Th e general impression fl owing from Bankovic and Al-Adsani is that the European Court feels free to pick and choose between diff erent methods of interpretation as if there were no order or hierarchy between these methods.” 37) Second Report, YBILC, vol. II, pp. 54, paras. 124–126 (cited in Report Koskenniemi, supra note 4, p. 133). See more details in McRae, supra note 34, p. 1417, with quotations. 38) It is true that, in accordance with Article 58, the Convention is subject to denunciation, but this provision is probably – and hopefully – nowadays only of theoretical relevance. 39) Orakhelashvili, supra note 36, p. 534. 40) See in this sense Bernhardt, supra note 31, p. 17. 41) See , for a defi nition, the famous passage in the Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited , Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports, 1970, para. 33: “When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be aff orded them. Th ese obligations, however, are neither absolute nor unqualifi ed. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the fi eld of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the 3.2. Th e Justifi cation for the Special Weight Given to Teleological Interpretation in the light of the “Object and Purpose” of the ECHR After questioning the utility of classifying an international instrument as, for example, a “human rights treaty” or “humanitarian law treaty”, one may never- theless endeavour to identify some characteristics which make the ECHR a “spe- cial” treaty. First of all, the particular structure (or nature) of the Convention is notewor- thy, as it imposes so-called “integral” or “ absolute ” obligations which, according to the second Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, Fitzmaurice, are of such a nature that their performance is altogether independent of the performance by other parties. 37 As a result of this law-making aspect of the Convention, con- cluded as it is for an indefi nite duration, 38 it is often said that it is part of the ordre public of Europe. 39 A second feature of note is the institutional framework of the Convention system that provides for a permanent judicial body – the Court – which is moreover authorised to render legally binding judgments (Article 46 ECHR). 40 Th irdly, reference can be made to the guarantees fl owing from the ECHR, which are formulated often in very general terms, and are considered in part to be of a peremptory nature ( ius cogens) and are to be secured in the inter- est of the international community as a whole ( erga omnes ). 41 Finally, one should</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 255 importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes .” 42) See Report Koskenniemi, supra note 4, pp. 102–115 (“Regionalism”). 43) See McRae, supra note 34, p. 1422. 44) See judgment in Wemhoff v. Germany, 27 June 1968, ECHR, Series A, no. 7, p. 23, para. 8. 45) In this sense Bernhardt, supra note 31, p. 16: “Th e object and purpose of a treaty plays … a central role in treaty interpretation.” 46) See similar concepts proposed by E. de Vattel and Ch. Wolff in J. Klabbers, Th e Concept of Treaty in International Law (La Haye/Londres/Boston, 1996) pp. 139 et seq. ; according to L. Boisson de Chazournes, A. M. La Rosa and M. M. Mbengue, ‘Article 18 de la CVDT de 1969’, in O. Corten and P. Klein (dir.), Les Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traités. Commentaire article par article , vol. 1 (Bruxelles, 2006) p. 610, the object and purpose of a treaty constitutes a “matrice substan- tielle, un substratum du droit des traités”. 47) See , inter alia , the title of the contribution of I. Buff ard and K. Zemanek, ‘Th e “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty : an Enigma ?’, 3 Austrian Review of International and European Law (1998) pp. 311–343. 48) See Bernhardt, supra note 31, p. 16: “Th is reference to object and purpose can be understood as entry into a certain dynamism.” not underestimate the fact that we are talking about a regional system of protection of human rights with well-defi ned borders and within which, gener- ally speaking of course, a stronger solidarity is created than in a universal system. 42 Under these circumstances, in view of the special nature of the ECHR, it was only natural for the Court sooner or later to introduce the teleological approach to interpretation. 43 In fact, as early as in 1968, the Court held as follows concern- ing a complaint under Article 5(3) ECHR: Given that it is a law-making treaty, it is also necessary to seek the interpretation that is most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by the Parties. 44 It is obvious from the above that the “ object and purpose of a treaty ” constitutes the key concept. 45 Th e idea of a general clause refl ecting what could be called the essence of a treaty goes even further back, namely to the Advisory Opinion on the Reservation to the Genocide Convention of 1951. 46 But it might not be a coinci- dence that it was also in respect of a human rights treaty, at least in the broader sense, that the concept was fi nally shaped judicially. It will now be shown that the fl exibility of the “object and purpose” formula – which for some may be an enigma 47 – has allowed the Court to develop its own methods of interpretation that can be regarded as sub-forms (partial aspects) of the teleological interpretation and thus do not call for application of the sui generis doctrine. 48</p>
<p>256 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 49) According to D. Nguyen, P. Daillier and A. Pellet, Droit international public , 7th ed. (Paris, 2002) para. 169, p. 264, the notion of “object and purpose” of a treaty refers implicitly to the rule of “ eff et utile ”. See also A. A. Cançado Trindade, ‘La interpretacion de tratados en el derecho inter- nacional y la especifi dad de los tratados de derechos humanos’, in Z. Drnas de Clément (dir.), Estudios de derecho internacional en homenaje al Prof. E.J. Rey Caro , vol. 1 (Cordoba, 2003) pp. 747–776, at pp. 749 et seq. Th e ICJ mentioned this rule for instance in the Corfu Channel case: “It would indeed be incompatible with the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort occurring in a special agreement should be devoid of purport or eff ect. In this connexion, the Court refers to the views expressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice with regard to similar questions of interpretation.” In Advisory Opinion No. 13 of 23 July 1926, that Court said (Series B., No. 13, p. 19): “But, so far as concerns the specifi c question of compe- tence now pending, it may suffi ce to observe that the Court, in determining the nature and scope of a measure, must look to its practical eff ect rather than to the predominant motive that may be conjectured to have inspired it.” In its Order of 19 August 1929, in the Free Zones case, the Court said (Series A., No. 22, p. 13): “in case of doubt, the clauses of a special agreement by which a dispute is referred to the Court must, if it does not involve doing violence to their terms, be con- strued in a manner enabling the clauses themselves to have appropriate eff ects” (ICJ Reports 1949, p. 24). 50) For this reason, the expression “ eff et pratique ” has sometimes been preferred (Nguyen, Daillier, Pellet, supra note 49, para. 169, p. 263); see also K. Ipsen, Völkerrecht , 4th ed. (Munich, 1999) p. 120, n° 16, who uses the notion of “ Eff ektivitätsgrundsatz ” . 51) See , for example, the Barrios Altos v. Peru case, Interpretation, Judgment of 3 September 2001, IACHR, Series C, no. 83, para. 17, or the Advisory Opinion No. 16 of 1 October 1999, Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law , para. 58. 52) According to Kosekenniemi, “it has become a practice of human rights bodies to adopt readings of human rights conventions that look for their eff et utile to an extent perhaps wider than regular treaties” (Report, supra note 4, p. 216, para. 428). 4. Th e Implementation of the Teleological Approach to Interpretation: Th e Principle of “Eff ectiveness” and Its Various Dimensions 4.1. Th e Principle of “Eff ectiveness” in Its Narrow Sense On the one hand, it may be said that the principle of “eff ectiveness” is not a proper invention of the Strasbourg judges. In general international language, this principle is called interpretation according to the eff et utile of a norm, which has not been incorporated by the drafters of the VCLT, but which is somehow a prin- ciple underlying paragraph 1 of Article 31 VCLT. 49 Th is rule simply implies that the drafters of a treaty have adopted a norm in order to be applied and, thus, the judge has to choose, among diff erent possibilities, that interpretation which is most likely to guarantee the eff ectiveness of the treaty ( ut res magis valeat quam pereat ). 50 It can be traced back in the practice of the ICJ as well as in the jurispru- dence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 51 On the other hand, it is without doubt in the framework of the ECHR that the principle of “eff ectiveness” has taken its most prominent place, and it is certain that it has become a fundamental cornerstone for the protection of Convention rights and freedoms. 52 Here, it means that the ECHR is supposed to</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 257 53) Series A (1979), para. 31. See also Mowbray, supra note 10, p. 72. 54) McRae, supra note 34, pp. 1411–1412. 55) Mowbray, supra note 10, p. 72. 56) Airey v. Ireland , Series A N° 32, 1979–1980. 57) Artico v. Italy , Series A N° 37, 1980–1981. 58) Ozgur Gundem v. Turkey , App. N° 23144/93, ECHR 2000-III. 59) McCann and others v. United Kingdom , App. N° 18984/91, Series A N° 324, 1996. be interpreted in a manner that seeks to ensure that the Convention rights and freedoms are applied in ways that are of “ practical and eff ective ” use to complain- ants. It goes back to the early case of Marckx v. Belgium. 53 Th e initial idea of this approach is that states cannot be in compliance with the ECHR simply by pro- hibiting conduct that contravenes the Convention. Th ey may have to go beyond being passive and take action to protect rights or ensure that individuals can take advantage of their rights under the Convention. 54 Th e case of Marckx turned out to establish the notion of “eff ectiveness” as a foundation for the subsequent devel- opment of many diff erent positive obligations under the Convention. 55 Th is has included ensuring the eff ectiveness of, inter alia , access to judicial remedies, 56 the right to legal assistance in criminal proceedings, 57 the protection of individuals from disruption caused by demonstrations or threats, 58 and providing proper investigative process when crimes have been committed. 59 It should also be noted that in a recent case against Switzerland the Court pro- ceeded to what we might call an enlargement of the principle of “eff ectiveness” by applying it to the criterion of “legitimate aim”. In the Grand Chamber case of Stoll v. Switzerland , concerning the divulgation by a journalist of a confi dential paper written by the Swiss ambassador to the United States concerning compen- sation due to Holocaust victims for unclaimed assets deposited in Swiss bank accounts, the Court held as follows: 128. At the same time the Court would reiterate the principle whereby the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and eff ec- tive (see, for example, Artico v. Italy , judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, p. 16, § 33). Th is principle must also be adhered to when it comes to assessing interference with a right. Consequently, in order to appear legitimate, the arguments relied on by the opposing party must also address in a practical and eff ective manner the grounds set forth in the second paragraph of Article 10. As exceptions to the exercise of freedom of expression, these must be subjected to close and careful scrutiny by the Court. In other words, while the confi dentiality of diplomatic reports is justifi ed in principle, it cannot be protected at any price. Furthermore, like the Press Council, the Court takes the view that the media’s role as critic and watchdog also applies to the sphere of foreign policy (see paragraph 5 of the Press Council opinion, paragraph 24 above). Accordingly, pre- venting all public debate on matters relating to foreign aff airs by invoking the need to protect diplomatic correspondence is unacceptable.</p>
<p>258 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 60) See also the principle applied in the case of Emonet and Others v. Switzerland , no. 39051/03, ECHR 2007-…, para. 77: “It should be remembered that the aim of the Convention is to guaran- tee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and eff ective (see, mutatis mutandis, Artico v. Italy, judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, p. 16, § 33). It follows that, to be considered legitimate, the arguments used to justify an interference must pursue the aims referred to in Article 8 § 2 in a practical and eff ective manner. Being exceptions to the exercise of the right to respect for private and family life, they call for close and careful examination by the Court.” 61) See , for example, the case of İzmir Savaş Karşıtları Derneği v. Turkey , App. 46257/99, 2 March 2006, paras. 34–39 (only in French). 62) Case of Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) (G.C.), no. 32772/02, para. 84, ECHR 2009-…; see also para. 89 of this judgment: “With regard in particular to the reopening of proceedings, the Court clearly does not have jurisdiction to order such measures (see, among other authorities, Saïdi v. France , 20 September 1993, § 47, Series A no. 261-C, and Pelladoah v. the Netherlands , 22 September 1994, § 44, Series A no. 297-B). However, where an individual has been convicted following proceedings that have entailed breaches of the require- ments of Article 6 of the Convention, the Court may indicate that a retrial or the reopening of the case, if requested, represents in principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation (see, among other authorities, Gençel v. Turkey , no. 53431/99, § 27, 23 October 2003; Öcalan , cited above, § 210; and Claes and Others v. Belgium , nos. 46825/99, 47132/99, 47502/99, 49010/99, 49104/99, 49195/99 and 49716/99, § 53, 2 June 2005). Th is is in keeping with the guidelines of the Committee of Ministers, which in Recommendation R (2000) 2 called on the States Parties to the 129. Consequently, in weighing the interests at stake against each other, the content of the diplomatic report in question and the potential threat posed by its publication are of even greater importance than its nature and form. 60 It will be interesting to see if the Court will be able to make use of this new approach in order to enforce the element of “legitimate aim” contained in Articles 8–11, which has so far been invoked only very rarely by the Court to pronounce a violation of one of these provisions. 61 Moreover, in another recent case against Switzerland, the Grand Chamber of the Court stressed the importance of the principle of “eff ectiveness” in the fi eld of the execution of judgments and made it clear that the unique Convention system – although imposing legally binding obligations on the state parties – would nevertheless be toothless without the effi cient supervision and implemen- tation of the Court’s judgments: 85. As regards the requirements of Article 46, it should fi rst be noted that a respondent State found to have breached the Convention or its Protocols is under an obligation to abide by the Court’s decisions in any case to which it is a party. In other words, a total or partial failure to execute a judgment of the Court can engage the State Party’s international responsibility. Th e State Party in question will be under an obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to take individual and/or, if appropriate, general measures in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress the eff ects, the aim being to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position he would have been in had the requirements of the Convention not been disregarded (see, among many other authorities, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000-VIII, and Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 198, ECHR 2004 II). 62</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 259 Convention to introduce mechanisms for re-examining the case and reopening the proceedings at domestic level, fi nding that such measures represented ‘the most effi cient, if not the only, means of achieving restitutio in integrum ’ .” 63) See for instance Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, ECHR 2006-…, para. 114: “It follows from the above analysis that, as long as the statutory distinction itself is proportionate and not discriminatory as regards the whole category or group specifi ed in the legislation, the task of the domestic courts may be limited to establishing whether a particular individual belongs to the impugned statutory category or group. Th e requirement for ‘individualisation’, that is the necessity of the supervision by the domestic judicial authorities of the proportionality of the impugned statu- tory restriction in view of the specifi c features of each and every case, is not a precondition of the measure’s compatibility with the Convention”; and para. 115: “(d) Th e need for individualisation of a legislative measure alleged by an individual to be in breach of the Convention, and the degree of that individualisation where it is required by the Convention, depend on the circumstances of each particular case, namely the nature, type, duration and consequences of the impugned statutory restriction. For a restrictive measure to comply with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, a lesser degree of individualisation may be suffi cient, in contrast to situations concerning an alleged breach of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention” ( see also , following the same logic, the case of Ādamsons v. Latvia , no. 3669/03, para. 121, 24 June 2008). 64) As an example, we can mention the case of Stoll v. Switzerland , supra note 13, para. 61: “Th e Court accepts that clauses which allow interference with the Convention rights must be interpreted restrictively.” 65) Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, para. 39: “Th ese various factors could justify even a somewhat restrictive interpretation of the Convention but, without going as far as that, they must be said, unquestionably, not only to justify, but positively to demand, a cautious and conservative interpretation, particularly as regards any provisions the meaning of which may be Lastly, if it is true that the aim of the Convention is to guarantee rights that are practical and eff ective, it is nevertheless noteworthy that in the framework of the right to free elections enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, owing to its very special nature, the Court is satisfi ed with a lower standard of “individualisation”, noting that the task of the domestic courts may be limited to establishing whether a particular individual belongs to the impugned statutory category or group. 63 4.2. Th e “Substantive Dimension” of the Principle of “Eff ectiveness”: Th e Principle that Imposes a Broad Interpretation of the Convention Rights and Freedoms, but a Narrow Interpretation of Th eir Exceptions and Restrictions It is submitted that the principle which imposes a broad interpretation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention but a narrow interpretation of their excep- tions and restrictions is another aspect of the principle of “eff ectiveness”. A restric- tive approach to the interpretation of the Convention would endanger respect for the individual rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention. 64 What seems commonplace today was far from being granted in the early years of the Convention and had fi rst to become an acquis strasbourgeois. In fact, in the case of Golder , Judge Fitzmaurice considered that the Convention, a treaty that makes heavy inroads into the domestic jurisdiction of States, demands a restric- tive, cautious and conservative interpretation. 65 Is it obvious that this kind of</p>
<p>260 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 uncertain, and where extensive constructions might have the eff ect of imposing upon the contract- ing States obligations they had not really meant to assume, or would not have understood them- selves to be assuming.” 66) PCIJ, Series A, 1927, N° 10, p. 18: “International law governs relations between independent States. Th e rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing inde- pendent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.” 67) Wemhoff v. Germany , supra note 44, p. 23; see also Harris et al. , supra note 12, p. 6. 68) Bernhardt, supra note 31, p. 14. 69) L. Wildhaber, ‘Th e European Court of Human Rights in Action’, 83 Ritsumeikan Law Review (2004) pp. 83 et seq. , at p. 84. See also S. C. Prebensen, ‘Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights’, in P. Mahoney et al. (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: Th e European Perspective , Studies in Memory of Rolv Ryssdal (Cologne/Berlin/Bonn/Munich, 1999) pp. 1123– 1137, and G. Letsas, A Th eory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, 2007) in particular pp. 58–79. approach reminds us of the “ Lotus ” principle, according to which restrictions to the sovereignty of the States “[could] not … be presumed” in international law as it existed in the 1930s. 66 It is clear that the subsequent practice of the Court after the Golder case moved in another direction. An approach that emphasises the character of the Conven- tion as a contract by which sovereign states agree to limitations upon their sover- eignty has now given way to the idea of the Convention as a law-making instrument. 67 Professor Bernhardt, a former President of the Court, is very precise on that issue: Th ese articles (31 and 32) of the Vienna Convention are remarkable in several respects. Firstly, one principle of treaty interpretation, which was often invoked in older text books, is not even mentioned. Namely, the principle that treaties should be interpreted restrictively and in favor of State sovereignty, in dubio mitius. Th is principle is no longer relevant, it is neither men- tioned in the Vienna Convention nor has it ever been invoked in the recent jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. Treaty obligations are in case of doubt and in principle not to be interpreted in favour of State sovereignty. It is obvious that this conclusion can have considerable conclusions for human rights conventions: Every eff ective protection of indi- vidual freedoms restricts State sovereignty, and it is by no means State sovereignty which in case of doubt has priority. Quite the contrary, the object and purpose of human rights treaties may often lead to a broader interpretation of individual rights on one hand and restrictions on State activities on the other. 68 4.3. Th e “Temporal Dimension” of the Principle of “Eff ectiveness”: Th e “Living Instrument” Approach to Interpretation Th e “living instrument” approach has been described by the former President of the Court, Judge Wildhaber, as “one of the best known principles of Stras- bourg case-law”. 69 In his words, it “expresses the principle that the Convention is</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 261 70) Wildhaber, ibid. Th at is why this principle is also called the doctrine of “present day conditions”. 71) See Bernhardt, supra note 31, p. 12; he is probably right claiming that the expression “evolutive” is more appropriate since it indicates more the time factor of interpretation. 72) Mowbray, supra note 10, p. 57. See also Bernhardt, supra note 31, p. 12. 73) See in this sense Prebensen, supra note 69, p. 1125, and Harris et al. , supra note 12, p. 7, accord- ing to which “it follows from the emphasis placed upon the ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention that it must be given a dynamic or evolutive interpretation”; see also E. Dubout, ‘Interprétation téléologique et politique jurisprudentielle de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme’, 74 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2008) pp. 383–418, in particular at pp. 392–393. He refers to the notion of “ interprétation téléologique ‘actualisation’ ”. 74) [GC], no. 10249/03, para. 104, 17 September 2009. 75) See also the recent Grand Chamber case of Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, para. 81, 15 October 2009. 76) See the jurisprudence quoted by Cafl isch and Cançado Trindade, supra note 10, pp. 20–21; see for a recent example also Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, ECHR 2009-…, para. 109 (i): “However, having regard to the travaux préparatoires of Article 3 of the Protocol and the interpreted ‘in the light of present day conditions’, that it evolves through the interpretation of the Court”. 70 Th e “dynamic” or “evolutive” 71 approach is a response to a problem of time in treaty interpretation. Its idea is to enable the Court to face and take into account situations that were not envisaged by the drafters of the European Convention in the late 1940s, resulting from the inevitable evolution of societies and their changing values and ideologies. 72 Th us it may be said to constitute the temporal dimension of the “eff ectiveness” principle in treaty interpretation. 73 Th e Court took the opportunity to summarise the essence of this approach in the recent Grand Chamber case of Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) : 74 104. While the Court is not formally bound to follow any of its previous judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without cogent reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases (see, for example, Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, § 70, ECHR 2001-I). Since the Convention is fi rst and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must however have regard to the changing conditions in the respondent State and in the Contracting States in general and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved (see, among other judgments, Cossey v. the United Kingdom , 27 September 1990, § 35, Series A no. 184, and Staff ord v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, §§ 67-68, ECHR-2002-IV). It is of crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights practical and eff ective, not theoretical and illusory. A failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement (see Staff ord, cited above, § 68, and Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 74, ECHR 2002-VI). 75 Owing to its evolutive logic, this approach renders interpretation according to the travaux préparatoires under Article 32 VCLT less important, but does not completely replace it. 76 On the other hand, it is certainly not submitted that a</p>
<p>262 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 way the provision has been interpreted in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has established that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and the right to stand for election (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt , cited above).” See also Dubout, supra note 73, pp. 394–395, who refers to “ interprétation téléologique ‘originelle’ ou ‘générique’ ”. 77) In this sense Bernhardt, supra note 31, p. 14. 78) Ibid. , p. 15. 79) Ibid. , p. 15. 80) ICJ, Reports 1971, p. 31. 81) Bernhardt, supra note 31, p. 16. 82) Tyrer v. United Kingdom , judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A N° 26, para. 31. See also the remarks of Bernhardt concerning this judgment, ibid. , p. 18. 83) McRae, supra note 34, pp. 1410–1411. 84) Marckx v. Belgium , 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31. 85) Staff ord v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, ECHR 2002-IV. 86) Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom , 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45. 87) Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, ECHR 1999-I. 88) Sigurður A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland , 30 June 1993, Series A no. 264. more fl exible temporal approach to interpretation is contrary to the theory or practice of general international law. In fact, it should be pointed out, fi rst of all, that the travaux préparatoires as a means of interpretation are, even in general international law, only a “supplementary” one. 77 Furthermore, it has to be noted that the rules on interpretation embodied in the VCLT take account of possible developments in the life of a treaty, namely through paragraph 3 of its Article 31, which refers to subsequent agreements and subsequent practice. 78 Lastly, it can be observed that the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice contains a certain number of examples of treaty interpretation that demonstrate the need for some fl exibility in time. 79 An interesting general statement can be found in the Namibia Advisory Opinion of 1971, in which the ICJ held that “an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the entire legal system pre- vailing at the time of the interpretation”. 80 In short, it cannot be denied that there is a certain dynamism that is relevant in treaty interpretation in general, 81 but this article will show that it was the European Court of Human Rights that was to perfect the “living instrument” doctrine. In fact, in the framework of the ECHR, the “living instrument” approach was applied for the fi rst time in the Tyrer 82 case, serving to prohibit judicial corporal punishment. Since then, although subject to some criticism, it has been followed by the Court quite coherently. 83 Th e “living instrument” doctrine has enabled the Court to creatively update the interpretation of a number of Convention articles in various situations. Th e judgments have, inter alia , eliminated the distinction between the legal position of children of married parents and children born out of wedlock, 84 limited the role of a government minister in determining the release of a prisoner, 85 abolished criminal prosecution of homosexuals, 86 contributed to reducing the “democratic defi cit” in the European Union, 87 recognised a right not to be compelled to belong to a trade union/employers’ association, 88 required the</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 263 89) Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, ECHR 2002-VI . 90) Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, ECHR 1999-V. 91) Öneryıldız v. Turkey , no. 48939/99, 18 June 2002. 92) Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, para. 122, ECHR 2003-VIII. 93) See the summary of the jurisprudence in Harris et al. , supra note 12, pp. 390–392. legal recognition of the new identity of post-operative transsexuals, 89 expanded the meaning of what constitutes torture, 90 or declared the state responsible for not having protected the population against dangerous and environmentally harmful activities by a private company. 91 But it is advocated here that this approach to interpretation may play its most prominent role in the fi eld of the right to respect for family and private life in accordance with Article 8 ECHR, a provision that is particularly exposed to changing social realities. In that respect, it may be somewhat surprising that as late as 2001 the majority of the Grand Chamber in Hatton v. United Kingdom determined as follows: Environmental protection should be taken into consideration by Governments in acting within their margin of appreciation and by the Court in its review of that margin, but it would not be appropriate for the Court to adopt a special approach in this respect by reference to a special status of environmental human rights. 92 It was exactly on the basis of the “living instrument” doctrine that the fi ve dis- senters condemned the approach of the majority: 2. As the Court has often underlined: “Th e Convention is a living instrument, to be inter- preted in the light of present-day conditions” (see, among many other authorities, Airey v. Ireland , judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, pp. 14-16, § 26, and Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, pp. 26-27, § 71). Th is “evolutive” interpretation by the Commission and the Court of various Convention requirements has generally been “progressive”, in the sense that they have gradually extended and raised the level of protection aff orded to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention to develop the “European public order”. In the fi eld of environmental human rights, which was practically unknown in 1950, the Commission and the Court have increasingly taken the view that Article 8 embraces the right to a healthy environment, and therefore to protection against pollution and nuisances caused by harmful chemicals, off ensive smells, agents which precipitate respiratory ailments, noise and so on. Since the adoption of the Hatton judgment in 2001, the Court’s case-law in the fi eld of environmental protection has taken a very progressive and protective turn. 93 It follows from the practice of the Court that the main aim – and achievement – of the “living instrument” doctrine was to allow it to enlarge the scope of the substantive provisions of the Convention. But it certainly has not stopped there. A further development, and one that is very important for the protection of</p>
<p>264 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 94) Mowbray, supra note 10, p. 63. 95) Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, para. 71, Series A no. 310. See Mowbray’s comments, ibid. , pp. 62–63. See also , in this context, Mamatkulov and Askarov , supra note 10 , para. 121, concerning Article 34 of the Convention. 96) Selmouni v. France , supra note 90, para. 101, and Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium , no. 13178/03, 12 October 2006, para. 48. 97) “ Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity between members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (third sub-paragraph of the Preamble). See in this sense Prebensen, supra note 69, p. 1137. 98) Mowbray, supra note 10, p. 69; Harris et al. , supra note 12, p. 8. individual rights and freedoms in Europe, 94 albeit less known, is that the Court has applied the “living instrument” approach to the procedural provisions, such as Articles 25 or 46 ECHR. In fact, in the Loizidou case, the Court said: 71. Th at the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions is fi rmly rooted in the Court’s case-law (see, inter alia, the Tyrer v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, pp. 15-16, para. 31). Such an approach, in the Court’s view, is not confi ned to the substantive provisions of the Convention, but also applies to those provisions, such as Articles 25 and 46 (art. 25, art. 46), which govern the operation of the Convention’s enforcement machinery. It follows that these provisions cannot be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of their authors as expressed more than forty years ago. 95 It is possible even to identify a third aspect of the evolutive approach to inter- pretation, namely the principle “ that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspond- ingly and inevitably requires greater fi rmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies” . 96 It would appear that this phrase refl ects nothing less than the ongoing tendency of the Court to be increasingly demanding vis-à- vis states in order to fulfi l the ultimate goal of the exercise, that is, justice and peace in the world through universal respect for human rights and dignity, as expressed in the Preamble to the Convention. 97 Moreover, another question is how the Court measures whether there is a rel- evant development to be taken into account since the adoption of the Convention and what contemporary conditions necessitate? In fact, as the Court pointed out in the case of Scoppola v. Italy (relevant paragraph cited above), the Strasbourg judges rely to a large extent on the question whether there is a common approach of the member states of the Council of Europe towards a certain problem or phe- nomenon. 98 If there is an evolving consensus among member states – a situation which is probably quite rare in practice – the margin of appreciation of states will be much reduced and it may be easier for the Court to decide a case by reference to the dynamic character of the Convention. Th e simple fact that a certain rule exists only in the respondent state but not elsewhere is an element to take into</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 265 99) See for instance the recent case of Glor v. Switzerland , no. 13444/04, ECHR 2009-…, in which the applicant claimed, with success, that he had been treated in a discriminatory way because he had been declared unfi t for military service as he was suff ering from diabetes (diabetes mellitus type 1), but without being exempted from paying the military-service exemption tax. In para. 83 of the judgment, in the section “margin of appreciation of the authorities”, the Court pointed out that this kind of tax did not exist in any other member states of the Council of Europe. 100) See for instance the case of Cossey v. United Kingdom , 27 September 1990, para. 40, Series A no. 184, where the Court held that standards of recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals were still in transition with “little common ground between the contracting States, an area in which they enjoy a wide margin of appreciation…” 101) See for instance Handyside v. the United Kingdom , 7 December 1976, para. 48, Series A no. 24, or Müller and Others v. Switzerland , 24 May 1988, Series A, 133, para. 35. See also in this context C. Ovey, ‘Th e Margin of Appreciation and Article 8 the Convention’, 19:1 Human Rights Law Journal (1998) pp. 10–12, at p. 11, as well as S. Prebensen, ‘Th e Margin of Appreciation and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention’, 19:1 Human Rights Law Journal (1998) pp. 13–17, at pp. 15–16. 102) Th e margin of appreciation of states is particularly broad in the context of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (Right to Free Elections). See for instance Yumak and Sadak , supra note 76, para. 109 (ii): “Th e rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. Th ere is room for ‘implied limita- tions’, and Contracting States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere. (see, among other authorities, Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999- I, and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV).” 103) See for instance the case of Ādamsons v. Latvia , no. 3669/03, para. 122, 24 June 2008 (only in French): “La Cour garde à l’esprit le contexte socio-historique particulier dans lequel s’inscrit la présente aff aire. Elle tient à rappeler que, pendant près d’un demi-siècle, la Lettonie a été annexée par l’Union soviétique et a vécu sous un régime totalitaire communiste (voir Ždanoka , précité, §§ 12-18). Or, dans un Etat totalitaire qui, par défi nition, tend à investir et à contrôler tous les domaines de la vie, il est très diffi cile, sinon impossible, d’échapper à l’emprise du régime. Dès lors, tous ceux qui ne choisissaient pas la voie de la résistance – et il s’agissait de toute évidence de la majorité absolue de la population – étaient amenés, d’une manière ou d’une autre, à participer à la vie publique contrôlée par les autorités en place. Par conséquent, lorsqu’elle applique le critère de proportionnalité dans des aff aires similaires à l’espèce, la Cour ne peut pas adopter une approche uniforme dans tous les cas.” Cf. also the case of Yumak and Sadak , supra note 76, paras. 109 (iii), and 131–132, as well as the – very casuistic – conclusions reached in para. 147: “In conclusion, the Court considers that in general a 10% electoral threshold appears excessive. In that connection, it concurs with the organs of the Council of Europe, which have stressed the threshold’s exceptionally high level and recommended that it be lowered … It compels political parties to make use of strata- gems which do not contribute to the transparency of the electoral process. In the present case, however, the Court is not persuaded that, when assessed in the light of the specifi c political context of the elections in question, and attended as it is by correctives and other guarantees which have limited its eff ects in practice, the threshold has had the eff ect of impairing in their essence the rights secured to the applicants by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.” account but is not as such the decisive factor in the Court’s analysis. 99 On the contrary, if no consent exists, the state party has a broader margin of apprecia- tion, 100 for instance, where questions of morality 101 or political participation 102 are at stake and where the solutions vary more according to the special circumstances of each individual case. 103 Taking into consideration the complexity of the ques- tions that the Court has to face, its approach cannot be a mathematically precise one. Whilst it has generally been cautious, preferring to follow State practice</p>
<p>266 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 104) Harris et al. , supra note 12, p. 8. 105) Para. 85 ; see also the case of Sheffi eld and Horsham , paras. 35 and 57, ECHR 1998-V. 106) Scoppola v. Italy , supra note 74, para. 104. 107) Harris et al. , supra note 12, p. 7. 108) Ibid. , pp. 7–8. 109) See infra section 4.4.1. 110) Decision on admissibility, App. N° 62915/00, 21 June 2005 (in French only). 111) Mowbray, supra note 10, p. 61. rather than to precipitate a new approach, 104 it is noteworthy that it overturned its earlier rulings in the case of Christine Goodwin , cited above, by “clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals”. 105 Another question concerns the possible limits to the “living instrument” approach. Th e Court has made it quite clear that the “living instrument” doctrine is not a passe-partout and has to be applied with some caution. Th e interests of legal certainty, forseeability and equality before the law being the guiding princi- ples, the Court pointed out that it should not depart, without cogent reasons, from its previous case law. 106 Moreover, in theory, the Court is not entitled to interpret the Convention in response to “present day conditions” so as to intro- duce into it a right that was not intended to be included by the drafters. 107 But of course the line between necessary – and permissible – judicial interpretation and – more controversial – judicial legislation can be diffi cult to draw. It suffi ces to recall the above-mentioned states’ obligations in the fi eld of environmental protection: they may be regarded both as a simple enlargement of the scope ratione materiae of Article 8 or as new obligations imposed on the contracting parties that were not intended by the drafters of the Convention. 108 A more practical problem raised by the evolutive approach to interpretation is the necessity of the coherence of the interpretation of the Convention as a whole, which, as stated above, has to constitute a single harmonious operation. It will be necessary to return to this question in discussing the “systemic” dimension of the principle of “eff ectiveness” and, more precisely, the principle of “internal coher- ence” in the interpretation of the Convention. 109 One may even go a step further by asking whether the dynamic or evolutive approach to interpretation can serve the Court not only to broaden the scope of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention but, on the contrary, to restrict them. Indeed, in the case of Bacchini v. Switzerland , the Court concluded that the delivery of a judgment on the Internet may suffi ce, under certain circum- stances, to satisfy the principle of public delivery in conformity with Article 6(1) of the Convention. 110 To sum up, it is obvious that the doctrine of the “living instrument” has become the basis of the Court’s considerable judicial creativity. 111 Th e Court’s fl exibility</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 267 112) Ibid. , p. 79. 113) Bernhardt, supra note 31, pp. 21–25, claims that basic documents of international organisa- tions, such as the Charter of the United Nations, probably provide the best examples of the need for an evolutive interpretation. 114) See in this respect Ch. Rozakis, ‘Th e European Judge as Comparatist’, Tulane Law Review (Nov. 2005) pp. 257–279, who distinguishes between the “dialogue with the European legal order”, the “dialogue with the international legal order” and the “dialogue with foreign jurisdictions”. 115) See for instance Stec v. the United Kingdom [GC], para. 48, ECHR 2006-V; also the much earlier case of Klass v. Germany , Series A no. 28 (1978), para. 68: “Th e Convention is to be read as a whole and therefore, as the Commission indicated in its report, any interpretation of Article 13 must be in harmony with the logic of the Convention. Th e Court cannot interpret or apply Article 13 so as to arrive at a result tantamount in fact to nullifying its conclusion that the absence of notifi cation and openness to changes in ethical and moral standards in society as well as to technological progress has rendered the “eff ectiveness” doctrine even more tangi- ble. Moreover, I am generally convinced that the Court has struck a fair balance between judicial innovation and respect for considerations of policy-making in the member states. 112 But here again I do not think that the ECHR is the only treaty that deserves the “living instrument” approach to interpretation. On the contrary, I would argue that multilateral treaties representing a similar interest for the international community as a whole, and concluded for a long or indefi nite duration, for instance in the fi eld of humanitarian law, environmental protection and in particular arms control, an area subject to constantly changing technology, also call for an evolutive and dynamic interpretation. 113 4.4. Th e “Systemic Dimension” of the Principle of “Eff ectiveness” One of the fundamental conditions for eff ectiveness is coherence. We have seen in the fi rst part that the Convention is part of a larger system, namely the inter- national legal order. 114 Moreover, the Convention is an international treaty – in this particular regard probably having a sui generis nature – which stands between national (constitutional) law and (public) international law. Th is relationship must be governed by a certain logical hierarchy. Moreover, the Convention itself constitutes a system of diff erent obligations and procedural norms. Th is article will now look at these three aspects in succession, starting with the principle according to which a Convention right has to be interpreted in the light of the Convention as a whole. I propose to call this last aspect the “internal coherence” principle. 4.4.1. Th e Principle of “Internal Coherence” in the Interpretation of the Convention It is a well-established principle that the “Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions”. 115 Th is point of view is not surprising since it clearly follows the solution adopted in public international law where reference is</p>
<p>268 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 to the person concerned is compatible with Article 8 in order to ensure the effi cacy of surveillance measures … Consequently, the Court, consistently with its conclusions concerning Article 8, holds that the lack of notifi cation does not, in the circumstances of the case, entail a breach of Article 13.” 116) Article 31(1) and 2 of the 1969 VCLT. For this reason Dubout calls this approach “ l’interprétation téléologique ‘contextuelle’ ” . 117) Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 provides: “Th e High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expres- sion of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.” 118) See for instance the case of Yumak and Sadak , supra note 76, para. 109 (i). usually made to interpretation “in the context” of the treaty provisions, thus comprising the whole text, including the preamble and the annexes to the treaty in question. 116 As far as the Convention is concerned, two diff erent situations can be distin- guished. On the one hand, the Court refers to other Convention rights and freedoms in order to fi nd inspiration for the interpretation of the provision which needs clarifi cation. A good example of this type of situation is Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 which provides for the right to free elections. Th is right has undergone a rather astonishing development. Its plain and unassertive text reminds us more of a non-self-executing international agreement, deprived of eff et direct and which thus has to be incorporated into national law. 117 But it follows from the travaux préparatoires , as well as from the jurisprudence of the Court that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees individual rights such as the right to vote and the right to stand for election. 118 However, the general wording of this provision had to be shaped and rendered eff ective by the Court through reference to other freedoms and rights under the Convention, without putting aside the diff erence in nature and logic between the provisions: 115. Against the background of the aforementioned cases, the Court reaches the following conclusions as to the test to be applied when examining compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. (a) Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is akin to other Convention provisions protecting various forms of civic and political rights such as, for example, Article 10 which secures the right to freedom of expression or Article 11 which guarantees the right to freedom of associa- tion including the individual’s right to political association with others by way of party membership. Th ere is undoubtedly a link between all of these provisions, namely the need to guarantee respect for pluralism of opinion in a democratic society through the exercise of civic and political freedoms. In addition, the Convention and the Protocols must be seen as a whole. However, where an interference with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is in issue the Court should not automatically adhere to the same criteria as those applied with regard to the interference permitted by the second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, and it should not necessarily base its conclusions under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 on the principles derived from the application of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. Because of the relevance of Article 3 of Protocol</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 269 119) Ždanoka v. Latvia , supra note 63, para. 115; see also Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, paras. 57–62, ECHR 2005-IX, and Ādamsons v. Latvia , supra note 63, para. 111. 120) Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, 30 June 2009. 121) App. 24699/94, judgment of 28 June 2001. 122) Para. 83. No. 1 to the institutional order of the State, this provision is cast in very diff erent terms from Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is phrased in col- lective and general terms, although it has been interpreted by the Court as also implying specifi c individual rights. Th e standards to be applied for establishing compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 must therefore be considered to be less stringent than those applied under Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. (b) Th e concept of “implied limitations” under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is of major importance for the determination of the relevance of the aims pursued by the restric- tions on the rights guaranteed by this provision. Given that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is not limited by a specifi c list of “legitimate aims” such as those enumerated in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, the Contracting States are therefore free to rely on an aim not contained in that list to justify a restriction, provided that the compatibility of that aim with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention is proved in the particular circumstances of a case. 119 Another example can be found in the above-mentioned Grand Chamber case of Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (No. 2) 120 in which the Court held that the respondent State had failed to comply with the obligation to take the necessary measures to allow a television commercial, whose censorship had previously been found (in 2001) to entail a violation of Article 10, 121 to be broadcast. Th e Court thus found a fresh violation of the right to freedom of expression. Concerning the systemic interpretation of the Convention, it held as follows: Th e Court reiterates that the Convention must be read as a whole. In the context of the present case, the examination of whether there has been a fresh violation of Article 10 must take into account the importance in the Convention system of eff ective execution of the Court’s judgments in accordance with Article 46 of the Convention … 122 On the other hand, the “internal” systemic approach can, under certain circum- stances, restrict the ambit of a Convention guarantee. A typical example of this situation can be found in the case of Pretty v. the United Kingdom , where the Court – after referring to it – refused to apply the “living instrument” doctrine to recognise a positive obligation of States, under Article 3 of the Convention, to sanction the assisted suicide of a terminally ill person. It held as follows: While the Court must take a dynamic and fl exible approach to the interpretation of the Convention, which is a living instrument, any interpretation must also accord with the fundamental objective of the Convention and its coherence as a system of human rights</p>
<p>270 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 123) Pretty v. the United Kingdom , no. 2346/02, paras. 54–55, ECHR 2002-III. See also , in this respect, the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, ECHR 2005-XI, para. 155: “Such restrictions must not confl ict with other rights enshrined in the Convention and its Protocols either … Th e provisions of the Convention and its Protocols must be considered as a whole. Accordingly, the fi rst sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 must, where appropriate, be read in the light in particular of Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention …” 124) See the explanations of Mowbray, supra note 10, pp. 66–67. 125) In this case Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty. 126) Series A N° 22. As far as the Commission is concerned, see Twenty One Detained Persons v. Germany , EcomHR, 1968, Collection 27, at 97–116, para. 4. 127) G. Letsas, ‘Th e Truth in Autonomous Concepts : How to Interpret the ECHR’, 15 EJIL (2004) pp. 279–305, at p. 281. protection. Article 3 must be construed in harmony with Article 2, which hitherto has been associated with it as refl ecting basic values respected by democratic societies … 123 Th us the Court found that an application of the doctrine to an extent which would amount to recognising such a positive obligation of states would be at odds with the “object and purpose” of the Convention and would moreover be con- trary to an interpretation of the treaty clause in its context, in accordance with Article 31(1) VCLT. In this connection, the cases of Soering v. the United Kingdom and Öcalan v. Turkey should also be mentioned. 124 In these two instances, the Court did not invoke the “living instrument” doctrine to update the interpreta- tion of the Convention to bring it into line with contemporary standards because the relevant provision fell within the ambit of a Protocol to the Convention. 125 In such circumstances the impetus for evolution had been assumed by the states themselves and the Court would be trespassing upon the policy-making powers of member states if it sought to circumvent the Convention amendment process by interpreting the existing text to achieve similar developments of Convention rights and freedoms. 4.4.2. Th e Rejection of a Mere “Vertical” Reference to the Internal Law of the State Party Concerned: Th e Doctrine of “Autonomous Concepts” Th e principle according to which Convention clauses cannot be construed as a mere reference to the domestic law of the State Party concerned, but relate to an “autonomous concept” which must be interpreted independently, reveals the mixed nature of the Convention, situated between national (constitutional) law and public international law. Th e doctrine was used by the Court for the fi rst time in the case of Engel and Others v. Netherlands. 126 In this instance, the Court was confronted with the ques- tion whether Article 6 ceased to be applicable just because the competent organs of a state party classifi ed as disciplinary an act or omission and the proceedings it took against the off ender, or whether, on the contrary, it did apply in certain cases notwithstanding this classifi cation. 127 Th e answer given by the Court is well</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 271 128) At paras. 80–81. 129) See , for jurisprudence concerning these notions, Letsas, supra note 127, pp. 282–283. 130) Report Koskenniemi, supra note 4, p. 206. 131) Opinion, para. 4 . known. Th e Court feared that some acts or omissions might be classifi ed by the states as disciplinary off ences in a way that escaped the ambit of Article 6. It argued as follows: If the Contracting Parties were able at their discretion to classify an off ence as disciplinary instead of criminal … the operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and 7 would be subordinated to their sovereign will. 128 It does not appear far-fetched to regard the “autonomous concepts” doctrine as another sub-form of the “eff ectiveness” approach to treaty interpretation. In fact, an approach that gives the state parties a free hand in defi ning core concepts, such as “criminal charge”, 129 “civil rights and obligations”, “possessions”, “association”, “victim”, “civil servant”, “lawful detention” or “home”, would inevitably hamper the eff ective and indiscriminate implementation of the Convention rights and freedoms in all member states, thus undermining the coherence of the Court’s jurisprudence and the principle of legal certainty. 4.4.3. Th e Principle of “External Coherence”: Th e Importance of a “Horizontal” Inspiration through other Relevant Sources of International Law Th e importance of the method of interpretation contemplated in Article 31(3)(c) VCLT in the Court’s case-law, especially more recently, is striking. In accordance with this provision, “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the rela- tions between the parties” must be taken into account in the interpretation of a treaty. In other words, a treaty cannot be interpreted in a vacuum, but must be considered as part of a wider legal system. In other words, although a tribunal may only have jurisdiction with regard to a particular instrument, it must always interpret and apply that instrument according to its relationship with its norma- tive environment. Koskenniemi refers to this means of interpretation by the expression “systemic integration”. 130 In her long and elaborative dissenting opinion in the case of Andrejeva v. Latvia , Judge Ziemele relied heavily on that doctrine in order to claim that the majority of the judges, who had found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, had looked at the relevant provisions of the Latvian State Pensions Act in isolation from the relevant inter- national law context. 131 She claimed that the judgment completely ignored the context of the demise of the Soviet Union and the special status of the Baltic States in international law, namely their illegal annexation and long occupation,</p>
<p>272 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 132) Ibid ., para. 16. 133) See also the recent judgment of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], No. 34503/97, 12 November 2008, ECHR 2009-…, in which the Court clearly stated that Article 31(3)(c) VCLT imposes a legally binding obligation on the states parties : “Th e Court … can and must take into account elements of international law other than the Convention… “ (para. 85). 134) See the numerous examples cited by Cafl isch and Cançado Trindade, supra note 10, pp. 14–16. 135) Report Koskeniemmi, supra note 4, p. 215, para. 426. within which the dispute between the applicant and the respondent State had arisen. 132 By ignoring the “obligation” to take into account the surrounding legal framework, as imposed by Article 31(1)(c) VCLT, 133 the Court, in the name of human rights, had allegedly contributed to the fragmentation of international law and had thus acted ultra vires . Below is a quotation from the conclusion to her dissenting opinion: 41. Th e issue that this case raised is many times more complicated and delicate than meets the eye and the rather simplistic approach of the majority is hard to understand … Be that as it may, the Court cannot always avoid taking a position on complex matters and instead deal with issues in a narrow and isolated manner. Th e Court should not go against the general rule of interpretation as set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and thus act ultra vires . In international law this raises a somewhat new challenge as con- cerns the value of such judicial decisions. Th e Court should not contribute to the frag- mentation of international law in the name of alleged human rights, nor should it readily take decisions that may undermine State-building since the enforcement of human rights still requires strong and democratic State institutions (for an example where the Court follows this approach, see Ždanoka , cited above). As stated earlier, the weight given by the Court to this means of interpretation is quite striking. 134 What might be the reasons for the Court’s many references to this means of interpretation? It would appear to be a direct consequence of the ever expanding scope of the Convention rights and freedoms, also under the infl uence of the above-mentioned “living instrument” doctrine. It is obvious that the more the Court has to deal with new areas and fi elds of human existence and co-existence, the more it will be confronted with a constantly growing volume of legal norms, because new phenomena are normally accompanied by legislative measures. Th e text of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT refers to “rules of international law” in gen- eral and covers all the sources of international law, as indicated in Article 38(1) (a)–(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, including custom, general principles, and, where applicable, other treaties. 135 To give only a few examples of the widespread practice of the Court, it found, fi rstly, in the Golder case that a right of access to the civil courts was a “general principle of law recognized by civilized nations” according to Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute and that this could be relied upon in interpreting the meaning of</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 273 136) ECHR Series A1975, N° 18, pp. 17–18, para. 35. 137) ECHR 1996-VI, p. 2231, para. 44. 138) See Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom , supra note 25, para. 55; see also Fogarty v. the United Kingdom , para. 35, and McElhinney v. the United Kingdom , para. 36, both at supra note 25. 139) See Carlson v. Switzerland , no. 49492/06, 6 November 2008, para. 76. 140) Ibid ., paras. 75 and 77. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 136 Later on, in the Loizidou case, the Court was asked to decide whether to recognise as valid certain acts of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Based on Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, it referred to United Nations Security Council resolutions and evidence of state practice, concluding that the TRNC was not to be regarded as a state under international law. 137 For an example of a customary rule to be taken into consideration, it is appropriate to refer again to the three Grand Chamber cases of 2001 in which the Court had to weigh the right of access to a court against the customary international law on state immunity. In making this assess- ment, the Court very convincingly summarised the theory of “systemic integra- tion” as follows: the Convention has to be interpreted in the light of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention … and … Article 31 § 3 (c) … indicates that account is to be taken of ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’. Th e Convention, including Article 6, cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. Th e Court must be mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human rights treaty, and it must also take the relevant rules of interna- tional law into account … Th e Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in har- mony with other rules of international law of which it forms part, including to those relating to the grant of State immunity. 138 Lastly, one of the best examples of “systemic integration” via another treaty can be found in the inspiration that the Court derives from the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction when confronted with such a situation. It is surprising to observe that the Court looks so closely into the Hague Convention that it is sometimes diffi cult to tell whether the judges are applying the European Convention on Human Rights or the Hague Convention, or both. For instance, in the case of Carlson v. Switzerland , the applicant com- plained about the slow or ineffi cient approach by the national authorities to his return request. In that case the Court referred to the six-week-rule (under Article 11 of the Hague Convention) as if it was applying the Hague Convention as such. 139 Moreover, in the same case, it continued to rely on that Convention to denounce the shift in the burden of proof by the Swiss authorities, as well as the fact that the authorities had joined the guardianship proceedings to those con- cerning the child’s return. 140 Such violations, which are explicitly prohibited by the Hague Convention, led in that case almost automatically to a violation of the procedural limb of Article 8 ECHR. Th e profound “systemic integration” applied</p>
<p>274 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 141) Paras. 65–68. 142) Paras. 69–84. 143) As far as the application of a “soft-law” instrument is concerned, see for instance Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, para. 33, 23 June 2008, where the Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2000)15 concerning the security of long-term migrants is quoted. For a critical comment on this expression see G. Abi-Saab, ‘Cours général de droit international public’, Collected Courses of Th e Hague Academy of International Law , Vol. 213, 1989-I, pp. 205–213. 144) See , on this question, U. Linderfalk, ‘Who are “the parties”? Article 31, paragraph 3 (c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the ‘principle of systemic integration’ revisited’, LV Netherlands International Law Review (2008) pp. 343–364. 145) See , in this respect, Report Koskenniemi, supra note 4, paras. 470–472. He proposes to permit reference to another treaty provided that the parties in dispute are also parties to that other treaty and especially if the latter can be said to have been “implicitly” accepted or at least tolerated by the other parties. by the Court might seem surprising, but, on the other hand, it is perhaps only natural and justifi ed that the Court should take inspiration from a relevant, very specifi c treaty in the fi eld of child abduction which has moreover been ratifi ed by the state party in question. A very good example of “systemic integration” is the recent judgment in the case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey , cited above, where the Court took the opportunity not only to recall and explain this principle in detail, 141 but also to give numerous examples of situations where the Court had previously applied this method of interpretation. 142 Th e Court pointed out that it takes into account legally binding instruments as well as documents which are generally considered as “soft law” or to which the state is not a party. 143 Interestingly, the Grand Chamber did not refrain from relying on Articles 5 and 6 of the European Social Charter (revised) in order to examine if Article 11 of the Convention enshrines nowadays, fi rst, the right to form trade unions and, second, the right to engage in collective bargaining and to enter into collective agreements, in spite of the fact that Turkey had not accepted these provisions. 144 Th e respondent government questioned, at least implicitly, the observance of the conditions of interpretation according to Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, which requires that “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties ” be taken into account. I do not necessarily share this criticism. First of all, it has to be under- lined that the Court did not “apply” Articles 5 and 6 of the Social Charter to Turkey, but took them only into consideration in the “interpretation” of Article 11 of the Convention. Moreover, it is obvious that, when shaping the wording of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, its authors had in mind the “classical” type of interna- tional agreements that work in a bilateral (contractual) manner, on the basis of perfect reciprocity of the rights and obligations between the state parties. Th us, it seems that some fl exibility has to be applied in interpreting multilateral treaties, such as human rights instruments, imposing “integral” obligations that are owed to individuals rather than to the other states parties. 145 Furthermore, the Court did not rely exclusively on Articles 5 and 6 of the Social Charter, but on a very</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 275 146) See paras. 37–52. 147) Para. 151. 148) See for example Asylum case (ICJ Reports 1950, pp. 276 et. seq. ), Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (ICJ Reports 1951, pp. 136–139) and United States Nationals in Morocco case (ICJ Reports 1952, p. 200). 149) Th e concept of “persistent objector” has been invoked by the government of the United Kingdom in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (ICJ Reports 1951, p. 116). See , for a critical com- ment on this concept, Abi-Saab, supra note 143, pp. 180–182. widely accepted state practice as well as on various European and international instruments of diff erent legal value, 146 to which the “vast majority” 147 of the European states have adhered and that also Turkey mostly had ratifi ed or approved. Th e Court summarised its approach in the following terms: 85. Th e Court, in defi ning the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, can and must take into account elements of international law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the practice of European States refl ecting their common values. Th e consensus emerging from specialised interna- tional instruments and from the practice of Contracting States may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the provisions of the Convention in spe- cifi c cases. 86. In this context, it is not necessary for the respondent State to have ratifi ed the entire col- lection of instruments that are applicable in respect of the precise subject matter of the case concerned. It will be suffi cient for the Court that the relevant international instru- ments denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles applied in international law or in the domestic law of the majority of member States of the Council of Europe and show, in a precise area, that there is common ground in modern societies… From an international public law point of view, this reasoning might be com- pared to the process of crystallisation of a rule of international – more precisely regional – 148 customary law, that is binding even on states which have not explic- itly accepted it. Following this approach, Turkey would have had to prove that from the very beginning of the negotiations it had been opposed to the right to form trade unions as well as the right to engage in collective bargaining and to enter into collective agreements. 149 5. Conclusions To sum up, it has been shown, in Section 2, that Articles 31–33 are fully applica- ble to the interpretation of the ECHR. It has also been shown that the Court itself often refers explicitly to these provisions. Th is led to the conclusion that it is a diffi cult – or even impossible – task to defi ne the lex specialis in international law, particularly because of the lack of legal signifi cance of the classifi cations used and the ever growing number of very complex treaties of a mixed nature (for</p>
<p>276 D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 150) McRae, supra note 34, p. 1422; he is of the opinion that the Court has been “remarkably suc- cessful” as an interpretative body. instance the Ottawa Convention). Lastly, it has been observed that there is not much authority for consideration of the ECHR as a “self-contained regime”; per- haps only the fact that it provides for its own regime of accountability and con- stitutes a lex specialis as regards the regime of reservations. To sum up Section 3, it should be noted fi rst of all that the wording of Article 31(1) VCLT, the starting point of all treaty interpretation, is fl exible enough to allow a balance between the diff erent means of interpretation, with the nature of a given treaty being taken into account. It has also been shown that the specifi c nature of the ECHR justifi es by far a more teleological and eff ective interpreta- tion of the Convention, based in particular on its “object and purpose”. One of the special features of the Convention is its law-making nature and the fact that it was concluded for an indefi nite period. As such, it is part of the ordre public of Europe and imposes “integral” obligations that must be fulfi lled in the interest of the international community as a whole, on pain of sanctions by a permanent judicial body entitled to render legally binding judgments. Further, we have seen the diff erent dimensions of the teleological approach but have also discovered that these aspects of teleological interpretation are nothing very exotic in international law and are obviously more important in the frame- work of the ECHR than in other fi elds. Th erefore, the Court’s approach can be regarded as a proper application of the VCLT, and for this reason there is abso- lutely no need to have recourse to the doctrine of a treaty sui generis as far as the ECHR is concerned. As an overall assessment, the conclusion can be drawn that the Court has proven fl exible enough to react to external challenges, for instance the changing of European societies and technical progress, as well as the rapid accession to the Convention of the former members of the Soviet Union in the early 90s. It now has 800 million potential “clients”. Of course there are more critical voices, but as a rule it may be claimed that the Court has generally struck an appropriate balance between judicial creativity, on the one hand, and legal coherence and certainty, on the other. An approach that focuses excessively on judicial creativity could endanger the credibility of the Court. One of the criteria seems to be the general acceptance by the community that is concerned with the interpretation and application of the ECHR, namely the non-governmental organisations. 150 More recent jurisprudence, such as Andrejeva , Kononov or Korbely , shows that many other cases involving questions of the transition from the Cold War envi- ronment to the post-Soviet era might be brought to Strasbourg. Another issue with which the Court will be dealing increasingly is the destruction (and protec- tion) of the natural environment and the movements of mass migration towards</p>
<p>D. Rietiker / Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) 245–277 277 151) Higgins, supra note 5, pp. 112–113. Europe. But as President Rosalyn Higgins has predicted, there can be little doubt that the European Court of Human Rights will generally be well prepared to face these new challenges: the European Court of Human Rights is surely one of the busiest and most exemplary of international judicial bodies. It exerts a profound infl uence on the laws and social realities of its member States and has become the paradigm for other regional human rights courts, not to mention other international judicial bodies in general. It is a Court that continually renews itself, adjusting its procedures to maximise effi ciency and to address the considerable opera- tional problems that face it. From our seat in Th e Hague, the Judges of the International Court of Justice admire all that you have achieved, and we will continue to follow your work with the greatest interest, constantly looking for ways in which we can be partners in protect- ing human rights. 151</p>
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