EdenteV2, Istex, Corpus, bibRecord, 005C10

Collective Action, Rival Incentives, and the Emergence of Antisocial Norms

Identifieur interne : 005C10 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 005C09; suivant : 005C11

Collective Action, Rival Incentives, and the Emergence of Antisocial Norms

Auteurs : James A. Kitts

Source :

American sociological review [ 0003-1224 ] ; 2006.

RBID : ISTEX:B8D833AC5160B1890668C455B414CF97CACA9B77

English descriptors

KwdEn :
- Actor, Actor utility, Alternative simulation protocols, American journal, Annual review, Antisocial, Antisocial norms, Auxiliary assumptions, Berkeley, Broad range, California press, Cambridge university press, Central enforcement agent, Certain kinds, Chicago press, Choice processes, Classic research, Cohesiveness, Collective, Collective action, Collective action literatures, Collective action outcomes, Collective action problem, Collective action problems, Collective action theory, Collective goods, Collective interest, Collective interests, Collective sanctions, Collective welfare, Computational, Computational experiment, Computational experiments, Contingent effect, Control efforts, Conventional assumption, Corporate actor, Costly behavior, Critical mass, Dilemma norms, Downward pressure, Economic behavior, Effective peer influence, Ellickson, Emergence, Emergent norms, Empirical contexts, Empirical investigation, Empirical research, Enforcement agent, Enforcement choice, Enforcement cost, Enforcement costs, Enforcement efforts, Entire group, Equal share, Evolutionary game theory, Experimental study, Externality, Extreme belief, Factorial design, Finite group size, First experiment, Formal control, Formal rules, Full value, Fundamental problem, General propositions, General theories, Grade point, Greater number, Group cohesiveness, Group dynamics, Group heterogeneity, Group induction, Group members, Group size, Group solidarity, Harvard university press, Hechter, Heckathorn, Heterogeneity, High level, High rivalness, Higher values, Incentive, Incentive system, Incentive value, Individuals value, Ineffective peer influence, Influence efforts, Influence peers, Influence scope, Informal control, Informal norms, Informal pressure, Initial conditions, Interest groups, Many goods, Marginal cost, Maximum rivalness, Michael hechter, Middle range, More peers, Negative externalities, Negative interdependence, Nonmonotonic relationship, Nonrival, Nonrival condition, Nonrival incentive, Nonrival incentives, Norm, Norm enforcement, Normative valence, Numeric investigation, Oppositional norms, Organizational performance, Other students, Other workers, Participation choices, Payoff, Peer, Peer enforcement, Peer influence, Peer pressure, Peers work, Personal inclinations, Pressure peers, Production decrease, Production function, Productive capacity, Prosocial, Prosocial behavior, Prosocial norms, Public goods, Qualitative behavior, Qualitative conclusions, Rational actors, Regulatory, Regulatory behavior, Regulatory efforts, Regulatory interest, Regulatory interest function, Regulatory interests, Replication, Response surface, Reward function, Rigorous derivation, Rival condition, Rival incentive, Rival incentives, Rivalness, Robust, Robust observations, Schachter, Science review, Scope conditions, Selective, Selective incentive, Selective incentives, Sensitivity analyses, Sequential decision model, Simulation, Simulation protocol, Small groups, Social consequences, Social control, Social influence, Social networks, Social norms, Social pressure, Social psychology, Social psychology schachter, Sociological review, Stanford university press, Status differentiation, Subjective scope, Subjective value, Such elaborations, Supplementary materials, Task group, Transaction costs, Valence, Valuable incentive, Voluntary associations, Work choice, Work choices, Work decreases, Work increases, Work level.
Teeft :
- Actor, Actor utility, Alternative simulation protocols, American journal, Annual review, Antisocial, Antisocial norms, Auxiliary assumptions, Berkeley, Broad range, California press, Cambridge university press, Central enforcement agent, Certain kinds, Chicago press, Choice processes, Classic research, Cohesiveness, Collective, Collective action, Collective action literatures, Collective action outcomes, Collective action problem, Collective action problems, Collective action theory, Collective goods, Collective interest, Collective interests, Collective sanctions, Collective welfare, Computational, Computational experiment, Computational experiments, Contingent effect, Control efforts, Conventional assumption, Corporate actor, Costly behavior, Critical mass, Dilemma norms, Downward pressure, Economic behavior, Effective peer influence, Ellickson, Emergence, Emergent norms, Empirical contexts, Empirical investigation, Empirical research, Enforcement agent, Enforcement choice, Enforcement cost, Enforcement costs, Enforcement efforts, Entire group, Equal share, Evolutionary game theory, Experimental study, Externality, Extreme belief, Factorial design, Finite group size, First experiment, Formal control, Formal rules, Full value, Fundamental problem, General propositions, General theories, Grade point, Greater number, Group cohesiveness, Group dynamics, Group heterogeneity, Group induction, Group members, Group size, Group solidarity, Harvard university press, Hechter, Heckathorn, Heterogeneity, High level, High rivalness, Higher values, Incentive, Incentive system, Incentive value, Individuals value, Ineffective peer influence, Influence efforts, Influence peers, Influence scope, Informal control, Informal norms, Informal pressure, Initial conditions, Interest groups, Many goods, Marginal cost, Maximum rivalness, Michael hechter, Middle range, More peers, Negative externalities, Negative interdependence, Nonmonotonic relationship, Nonrival, Nonrival condition, Nonrival incentive, Nonrival incentives, Norm, Norm enforcement, Normative valence, Numeric investigation, Oppositional norms, Organizational performance, Other students, Other workers, Participation choices, Payoff, Peer, Peer enforcement, Peer influence, Peer pressure, Peers work, Personal inclinations, Pressure peers, Production decrease, Production function, Productive capacity, Prosocial, Prosocial behavior, Prosocial norms, Public goods, Qualitative behavior, Qualitative conclusions, Rational actors, Regulatory, Regulatory behavior, Regulatory efforts, Regulatory interest, Regulatory interest function, Regulatory interests, Replication, Response surface, Reward function, Rigorous derivation, Rival condition, Rival incentive, Rival incentives, Rivalness, Robust, Robust observations, Schachter, Science review, Scope conditions, Selective, Selective incentive, Selective incentives, Sensitivity analyses, Sequential decision model, Simulation, Simulation protocol, Small groups, Social consequences, Social control, Social influence, Social networks, Social norms, Social pressure, Social psychology, Social psychology schachter, Sociological review, Stanford university press, Status differentiation, Subjective scope, Subjective value, Such elaborations, Supplementary materials, Task group, Transaction costs, Valence, Valuable incentive, Voluntary associations, Work choice, Work choices, Work decreases, Work increases, Work level.

Abstract

Centralized sanctions (selective incentives) and informal norms have been advanced as distinct solutions to collective action problems. This article investigates their interaction, modeling the emergence of norms in the presence of incentives to contribute to collective goods. Computational experiments show how collective action depends on a three-way interaction among the value of incentives, the rivalness of incentives (ranging from independence to zero-sum competition), and group cohesiveness (effectiveness of peer influence). This investigation shows a broad range of conditions in which social norms promote the collective good and thus peer influence complements a centralized regime of selective incentives. It also shows conditions in which the two systems clash because incentives lead to antisocial norms that discourage contributions to collective goods. In these conditions, social scientists must reconsider the widely predicted relationships of collective action to selective incentives, group cohesiveness, and second-order free riding.

Url:

https://api.istex.fr/document/B8D833AC5160B1890668C455B414CF97CACA9B77/fulltext/pdf

DOI: 10.1177/000312240607100204

Links to Exploration step

ISTEX:B8D833AC5160B1890668C455B414CF97CACA9B77

Le document en format XML

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<term>Dilemma norms</term>
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<front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Centralized sanctions (selective incentives) and informal norms have been advanced as distinct solutions to collective action problems. This article investigates their interaction, modeling the emergence of norms in the presence of incentives to contribute to collective goods. Computational experiments show how collective action depends on a three-way interaction among the value of incentives, the rivalness of incentives (ranging from independence to zero-sum competition), and group cohesiveness (effectiveness of peer influence). This investigation shows a broad range of conditions in which social norms promote the collective good and thus peer influence complements a centralized regime of selective incentives. It also shows conditions in which the two systems clash because incentives lead to antisocial norms that discourage contributions to collective goods. In these conditions, social scientists must reconsider the widely predicted relationships of collective action to selective incentives, group cohesiveness, and second-order free riding.</div>
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<author-notes><corresp id="corresp1-000312240607100204">Direct correspondence to James A. Kitts, Department of Sociology, University of Washington, 202 Savery Hall, Box 353340, Seattle, WA 98195 (<email xlink:href="kitts@u.washington.edu" xlink:type="simple">kitts@u.washington.edu</email>
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<abstract><p>Centralized sanctions (selective incentives) and informal norms have been advanced as distinct solutions to collective action problems. This article investigates their interaction, modeling the emergence of norms in the presence of incentives to contribute to collective goods. Computational experiments show how collective action depends on a three-way interaction among the value of incentives, the rivalness of incentives (ranging from independence to zero-sum competition), and group cohesiveness (effectiveness of peer influence). This investigation shows a broad range of conditions in which social norms promote the collective good and thus peer influence complements a centralized regime of selective incentives. It also shows conditions in which the two systems clash because incentives lead to antisocial norms that discourage contributions to collective goods. In these conditions, social scientists must reconsider the widely predicted relationships of collective action to selective incentives, group cohesiveness, and second-order free riding.</p>
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<name type="personal"><namePart type="given">James A.</namePart>
<namePart type="family">Kitts</namePart>
<affiliation>Direct correspondence to James A. Kitts, Department of Sociology, University of Washington, 202 Savery Hall, Box 353340, Seattle, WA 98195 (</affiliation>
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<abstract lang="en">Centralized sanctions (selective incentives) and informal norms have been advanced as distinct solutions to collective action problems. This article investigates their interaction, modeling the emergence of norms in the presence of incentives to contribute to collective goods. Computational experiments show how collective action depends on a three-way interaction among the value of incentives, the rivalness of incentives (ranging from independence to zero-sum competition), and group cohesiveness (effectiveness of peer influence). This investigation shows a broad range of conditions in which social norms promote the collective good and thus peer influence complements a centralized regime of selective incentives. It also shows conditions in which the two systems clash because incentives lead to antisocial norms that discourage contributions to collective goods. In these conditions, social scientists must reconsider the widely predicted relationships of collective action to selective incentives, group cohesiveness, and second-order free riding.</abstract>
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Collective Action, Rival Incentives, and the Emergence of Antisocial Norms

Collective Action, Rival Incentives, and the Emergence of Antisocial Norms

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