On the Relation Between Metaphor and Simile: When Comparison Fails
Identifieur interne : 005A62 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 005A61; suivant : 005A63On the Relation Between Metaphor and Simile: When Comparison Fails
Auteurs : Glucksberg Sam ; Haught CatrinelSource :
- Mind & Language [ 0268-1064 ] ; 2006-06.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Adjective, Adjective type, Aptness, Authors journal compilation, Blackwell, Blackwell publishing, Bowdle, Career hypothesis, Carston, Categorical, Categorical assertions, Categorical form, Categorization, Categorization form, Comparison form, Comparison forms, Comparison theories, Comprehensible, Comprehension time, Comprehension times, Conventional metaphors, Corresponding metaphors, Corresponding simile, Corresponding similes, Dual reference, Dual reference function, Enron, Gentner, Glucksberg, Grammatical form, Grammatical forms, Haught, Lexical concepts, Metaphor, Metaphor comprehension, Metaphor hypothesis, Metaphor vehicle, Metaphor vehicles, Metaphorical, Metaphorical shark, Metaphors similes, More comprehensible, Msec, Next enron, Novel metaphors, Novel similes, Original source metaphors, Paraphrased, Polysemous, Privilege comparison, Psychological review, Response times, Sardine, Shark, Simile, Simile form, Source metaphor, Such metaphors, Superordinate, Trope, Trope form.
- Teeft :
- Adjective, Adjective type, Aptness, Authors journal compilation, Blackwell, Blackwell publishing, Bowdle, Career hypothesis, Carston, Categorical, Categorical assertions, Categorical form, Categorization, Categorization form, Comparison form, Comparison forms, Comparison theories, Comprehensible, Comprehension time, Comprehension times, Conventional metaphors, Corresponding metaphors, Corresponding simile, Corresponding similes, Dual reference, Dual reference function, Enron, Gentner, Glucksberg, Grammatical form, Grammatical forms, Haught, Lexical concepts, Metaphor, Metaphor comprehension, Metaphor hypothesis, Metaphor vehicle, Metaphor vehicles, Metaphorical, Metaphorical shark, Metaphors similes, More comprehensible, Msec, Next enron, Novel metaphors, Novel similes, Original source metaphors, Paraphrased, Polysemous, Privilege comparison, Psychological review, Response times, Sardine, Shark, Simile, Simile form, Source metaphor, Such metaphors, Superordinate, Trope, Trope form.
Abstract
Abstract: Since Aristotle, many writers have treated metaphors and similes as equals: any metaphor can be paraphrased as a simile, and vice‐versa. This property of metaphors is the basis for psycholinguistic comparison theories of metaphor comprehension. However, if metaphors cannot always be paraphrased as similes, then comparison theories must be abandoned. The different forms of a metaphor—the comparison and categorical forms—have different referents. In comparison form, the metaphor vehicle refers to the literal concept, e.g. ‘in my lawyer is like a shark’, the term ‘shark’ refers to the literal fish. In categorical form, ‘my lawyer is a shark’, ‘shark’ refers to an abstract (metaphorical) category of predatory creatures. This difference in reference makes it possible for a metaphor and its corresponding simile to differ (a) in interpretability and (b) in meaning. Because a metaphor cannot always be understood in terms of its corresponding simile, we conclude that comparison theories of metaphor are fundamentally flawed.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00282.x
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ISTEX:B5D4E1E6AC436121335F6EC3C0570B3686509E29Le document en format XML
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This property of metaphors is the basis for psycholinguistic comparison theories of metaphor comprehension. However, if metaphors cannot always be paraphrased as similes, then comparison theories must be abandoned. The different forms of a metaphor—the comparison and categorical forms—have different referents. In comparison form, the metaphor vehicle refers to the literal concept, e.g. ‘in my lawyer is like a shark’, the term ‘shark’ refers to the literal fish. In categorical form, ‘my lawyer is a shark’, ‘shark’ refers to an abstract (metaphorical) category of predatory creatures. This difference in reference makes it possible for a metaphor and its corresponding simile to differ (a) in interpretability and (b) in meaning. Because a metaphor cannot always be understood in terms of its corresponding simile, we conclude that comparison theories of metaphor are fundamentally flawed.</abstract><qualityIndicators><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractWordCount>154</abstractWordCount><abstractCharCount>1041</abstractCharCount><keywordCount>0</keywordCount><score>8.848</score><pdfWordCount>7185</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>44302</pdfCharCount><pdfVersion>1.3</pdfVersion><pdfPageCount>19</pdfPageCount><pdfPageSize>431 x 649 pts</pdfPageSize></qualityIndicators><title>On the Relation Between Metaphor and Simile: When Comparison Fails</title><genre><json:string>article</json:string></genre><host><title>Mind & Language</title><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><doi><json:string>10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0017</json:string></doi><issn><json:string>0268-1064</json:string></issn><eissn><json:string>1468-0017</json:string></eissn><publisherId><json:string>MILA</json:string></publisherId><volume>21</volume><issue>3</issue><pages><first>360</first><last>378</last><total>19</total></pages><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre></host><namedEntities><unitex><date><json:string>2000</json:string><json:string>2006</json:string><json:string>3245</json:string><json:string>2004</json:string><json:string>2872</json:string></date><geogName></geogName><orgName><json:string>Department of Psychology Princeton University</json:string><json:string>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</json:string></orgName><orgName_funder></orgName_funder><orgName_provider></orgName_provider><persName><json:string>My Lawyer</json:string><json:string>Roger Brown</json:string><json:string>S. 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Email: samg@princeton.edu</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-0001"><persName><forename type="first">HAUGHT</forename><surname>CATRINEL</surname></persName><affiliation>Department of Psychology
Princeton University</affiliation></author><idno type="istex">B5D4E1E6AC436121335F6EC3C0570B3686509E29</idno><idno type="ark">ark:/67375/WNG-C7KFCJDV-P</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00282.x</idno><idno type="unit">MILA282</idno><idno type="toTypesetVersion">file:MILA.MILA282.pdf</idno></analytic><monogr><title level="j" type="main">Mind & Language</title><title level="j" type="alt">MIND LANGUAGE</title><idno type="pISSN">0268-1064</idno><idno type="eISSN">1468-0017</idno><idno type="book-DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0017</idno><idno type="book-part-DOI">10.1111/mila.2006.21.issue-3</idno><idno type="product">MILA</idno><idno type="publisherDivision">ST</idno><imprint><biblScope unit="vol">21</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="360">360</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="378">378</biblScope><biblScope unit="page-count">19</biblScope><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2006-06"></date></imprint></monogr></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><abstract xml:lang="en" style="main"><p><hi rend="bold">Abstract: </hi> Since Aristotle, many writers have treated metaphors and similes as equals: any metaphor can be paraphrased as a simile, and vice‐versa. This property of metaphors is the basis for psycholinguistic comparison theories of metaphor comprehension. However, if metaphors cannot always be paraphrased as similes, then comparison theories must be abandoned. The different forms of a metaphor—the comparison and categorical forms—have different referents. In comparison form, the metaphor vehicle refers to the literal concept, e.g. ‘in my lawyer is like a shark’, the term ‘shark’ refers to the literal fish. In categorical form, ‘my lawyer is a shark’, ‘shark’ refers to an abstract (metaphorical) category of predatory creatures. This difference in reference makes it possible for a metaphor and its corresponding simile to differ (a) in interpretability and (b) in meaning. Because a metaphor cannot always be understood in terms of its corresponding simile, we conclude that comparison theories of metaphor are fundamentally flawed.</p></abstract><textClass><keywords rend="tocHeading1"><term>Original Articles</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en"></language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/B5D4E1E6AC436121335F6EC3C0570B3686509E29/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component version="2.0" type="serialArticle" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><publisherInfo><publisherName>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisherName><publisherLoc>Oxford, UK</publisherLoc></publisherInfo><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0017</doi><issn type="print">0268-1064</issn><issn type="electronic">1468-0017</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="MILA"></id><id type="publisherDivision" value="ST"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title type="main" sort="MIND LANGUAGE">Mind & Language</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="06003"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/mila.2006.21.issue-3</doi><numberingGroup><numbering type="journalVolume" number="21">21</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue" number="3">3</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2006-06">June 2006</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" type="article" position="5" status="forIssue"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00282.x</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="MILA282"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count type="pageTotal" number="19"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="tocHeading1">Original Articles</title></titleGroup><copyright>2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd</copyright><eventGroup><event type="firstOnline" date="2006-05-26"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2006-05-26"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:BPG_TO_WML3G version:2.3.5 mode:FullText source:Header result:Header" date="2010-04-07"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:3.8.8" date="2014-02-02"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.1.7 mode:FullText,remove_FC" date="2014-10-31"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst" number="360">360</numbering><numbering type="pageLast" number="378">378</numbering></numberingGroup><correspondenceTo>Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540 USA.
<b>Email</b>: <email>samg@princeton.edu</email></correspondenceTo><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:MILA.MILA282.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="0"></count><count type="tableTotal" number="0"></count><count type="formulaTotal" number="0"></count><count type="referenceTotal" number="19"></count><count type="wordTotal" number="0"></count><count type="linksPubMed" number="0"></count><count type="linksCrossRef" number="0"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main">On the Relation Between Metaphor and Simile: When Comparison Fails</title></titleGroup><creators><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr1" affiliationRef="#a1" corresponding="yes"><personName><givenNames>GLUCKSBERG</givenNames><familyName>SAM</familyName></personName></creator><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr2" affiliationRef="#a1"><personName><givenNames>HAUGHT</givenNames><familyName>CATRINEL</familyName></personName></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="a1"><unparsedAffiliation><i>Department of Psychology
Princeton University</i></unparsedAffiliation></affiliation></affiliationGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><p><b>Abstract: </b> Since Aristotle, many writers have treated metaphors and similes as equals: any metaphor can be paraphrased as a simile, and vice‐versa. This property of metaphors is the basis for psycholinguistic comparison theories of metaphor comprehension. However, if metaphors cannot always be paraphrased as similes, then comparison theories must be abandoned. The different forms of a metaphor—the comparison and categorical forms—have different referents. In comparison form, the metaphor vehicle refers to the literal concept, e.g. ‘in my lawyer is like a shark’, the term ‘shark’ refers to the literal fish. In categorical form, ‘my lawyer is a shark’, ‘shark’ refers to an abstract (metaphorical) category of predatory creatures. This difference in reference makes it possible for a metaphor and its corresponding simile to differ (a) in interpretability and (b) in meaning. Because a metaphor cannot always be understood in terms of its corresponding simile, we conclude that comparison theories of metaphor are fundamentally flawed.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta><noteGroup><note xml:id="n-fnt-1" numbered="no"><p>We thank Kay Deaux, Geoffrey Goodwin, Phillip Johnson‐Laird, Louis Lee, Susanna Reynolds and the other members of our lab group for their valuable suggestions and comments on the various drafts of this article.</p></note></noteGroup></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>On the Relation Between Metaphor and Simile: When Comparison Fails</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>On the Relation Between Metaphor and Simile: When Comparison Fails</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">GLUCKSBERG</namePart><namePart type="family">SAM</namePart><affiliation>Department of PsychologyPrinceton University</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: samg@princeton.edu</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">HAUGHT</namePart><namePart type="family">CATRINEL</namePart><affiliation>Department of PsychologyPrinceton University</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-6N5SZHKN-D">article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2006-06</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2006</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><extent unit="figures">0</extent><extent unit="tables">0</extent><extent unit="formulas">0</extent><extent unit="references">19</extent><extent unit="linksCrossRef">0</extent><extent unit="words">0</extent></physicalDescription><abstract>Abstract: Since Aristotle, many writers have treated metaphors and similes as equals: any metaphor can be paraphrased as a simile, and vice‐versa. This property of metaphors is the basis for psycholinguistic comparison theories of metaphor comprehension. However, if metaphors cannot always be paraphrased as similes, then comparison theories must be abandoned. The different forms of a metaphor—the comparison and categorical forms—have different referents. In comparison form, the metaphor vehicle refers to the literal concept, e.g. ‘in my lawyer is like a shark’, the term ‘shark’ refers to the literal fish. In categorical form, ‘my lawyer is a shark’, ‘shark’ refers to an abstract (metaphorical) category of predatory creatures. This difference in reference makes it possible for a metaphor and its corresponding simile to differ (a) in interpretability and (b) in meaning. Because a metaphor cannot always be understood in terms of its corresponding simile, we conclude that comparison theories of metaphor are fundamentally flawed.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Mind & Language</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0268-1064</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1468-0017</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0017</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">MILA</identifier><part><date>2006</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>21</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>3</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>360</start><end>378</end><total>19</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">B5D4E1E6AC436121335F6EC3C0570B3686509E29</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/WNG-C7KFCJDV-P</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00282.x</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">MILA282</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-L0C46X92-X">wiley</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/B5D4E1E6AC436121335F6EC3C0570B3686509E29/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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