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THE EFFECTS OF INSURANCE MANDATES ON CHOICES AND OUTCOMES IN INFERTILITY TREATMENT MARKETS

Identifieur interne : 005A60 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 005A59; suivant : 005A61

THE EFFECTS OF INSURANCE MANDATES ON CHOICES AND OUTCOMES IN INFERTILITY TREATMENT MARKETS

Auteurs : Barton H. Hamilton ; Brian Mcmanus

Source :

RBID : ISTEX:B5D349EC26A29385F54F1B1096E5514AA05BB3E2

English descriptors

Abstract

For the 10% to 15% of American married couples who experience reproductive problems, in vitro fertilization (IVF) is the leading technologically advanced treatment procedure. However, IVF's expense may prevent many couples from receiving treatment, and those who are treated may take an overly aggressive approach to reduce the probability of failure. Aggressive treatment, which occurs through an increase in the number of embryos transferred during IVF, can lead to medically dangerous multiple births. We evaluated the principle policy proposal—insurance mandates—for improving IVF access and outcomes. We used data from US markets during 1995–2003 to show that broad insurance mandates for IVF result in not only large increases in treatment access but also significantly less aggressive treatment. More limited insurance mandates, which may apply to a subset of insurers or provide weaker guidelines for insurer behavior, generally have little effect on IVF markets. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Url:
DOI: 10.1002/hec.1776

Links to Exploration step

ISTEX:B5D349EC26A29385F54F1B1096E5514AA05BB3E2

Le document en format XML

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<div type="abstract">For the 10% to 15% of American married couples who experience reproductive problems, in vitro fertilization (IVF) is the leading technologically advanced treatment procedure. However, IVF's expense may prevent many couples from receiving treatment, and those who are treated may take an overly aggressive approach to reduce the probability of failure. Aggressive treatment, which occurs through an increase in the number of embryos transferred during IVF, can lead to medically dangerous multiple births. We evaluated the principle policy proposal—insurance mandates—for improving IVF access and outcomes. We used data from US markets during 1995–2003 to show that broad insurance mandates for IVF result in not only large increases in treatment access but also significantly less aggressive treatment. More limited insurance mandates, which may apply to a subset of insurers or provide weaker guidelines for insurer behavior, generally have little effect on IVF markets. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</div>
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