Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination
Identifieur interne : 005828 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 005827; suivant : 005829Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination
Auteurs : Miles KahlerSource :
- Journal of Public Policy [ 0143-814X ] ; 1988-07.
Abstract
Systems of policy coordination since 1945 may be classified as rule-governed systems relying on decentralized national decisions (a stylized Bretton Woods system) or discretionary bargaining in which coordination decisions are taken collectively at the international level (e.g. world economic summits). The European Monetary System combines elements of these two models. National attachments to rules cannot be explained solely by the strength of international institutions. A discretionary bargaining model of coordination is more likely to be successful when national leaders share a policy diagnosis that both cuts across economic issue areas and divides their own domestic political coalitions and governments. International organizations may facilitate policy coordination under a rule-based system through provision of resources to ease adjustment costs and rule clarification, and in a discretionary bargaining system by brokering, providing information and model building.
Url:
DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X00008679
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0Le document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title>Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination</title><author><name sortKey="Kahler, Miles" sort="Kahler, Miles" uniqKey="Kahler M" first="Miles" last="Kahler">Miles Kahler</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>International Relations, University of California, San Diego</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0</idno><date when="1988" year="1988">1988</date><idno type="doi">10.1017/S0143814X00008679</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">005828</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">005828</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a">Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination</title><author><name sortKey="Kahler, Miles" sort="Kahler, Miles" uniqKey="Kahler M" first="Miles" last="Kahler">Miles Kahler</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>International Relations, University of California, San Diego</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Journal of Public Policy</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">J. Pub. Pol.</title><idno type="ISSN">0143-814X</idno><idno type="eISSN">1469-7815</idno><imprint><publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher><pubPlace>Cambridge, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="1988-07">1988-07</date><biblScope unit="volume">8</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3-4</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="375">375</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="401">401</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0143-814X</idno></series></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0143-814X</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract">Systems of policy coordination since 1945 may be classified as rule-governed systems relying on decentralized national decisions (a stylized Bretton Woods system) or discretionary bargaining in which coordination decisions are taken collectively at the international level (e.g. world economic summits). The European Monetary System combines elements of these two models. National attachments to rules cannot be explained solely by the strength of international institutions. A discretionary bargaining model of coordination is more likely to be successful when national leaders share a policy diagnosis that both cuts across economic issue areas and divides their own domestic political coalitions and governments. International organizations may facilitate policy coordination under a rule-based system through provision of resources to ease adjustment costs and rule clarification, and in a discretionary bargaining system by brokering, providing information and model building.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>cambridge</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Miles Kahler</name><affiliations><json:string>International Relations, University of California, San Diego</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><articleId><json:string>00867</json:string></articleId><arkIstex>ark:/67375/6GQ-RWMF8F49-G</arkIstex><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>research-article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>Systems of policy coordination since 1945 may be classified as rule-governed systems relying on decentralized national decisions (a stylized Bretton Woods system) or discretionary bargaining in which coordination decisions are taken collectively at the international level (e.g. world economic summits). The European Monetary System combines elements of these two models. National attachments to rules cannot be explained solely by the strength of international institutions. A discretionary bargaining model of coordination is more likely to be successful when national leaders share a policy diagnosis that both cuts across economic issue areas and divides their own domestic political coalitions and governments. International organizations may facilitate policy coordination under a rule-based system through provision of resources to ease adjustment costs and rule clarification, and in a discretionary bargaining system by brokering, providing information and model building.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>8.596</score><pdfWordCount>10427</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>66917</pdfCharCount><pdfVersion>1.5</pdfVersion><pdfPageCount>27</pdfPageCount><pdfPageSize>434.88 x 665.28 pts</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractWordCount>133</abstractWordCount><abstractCharCount>981</abstractCharCount><keywordCount>0</keywordCount></qualityIndicators><title>Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination</title><pii><json:string>S0143814X00008679</json:string></pii><genre><json:string>research-article</json:string></genre><host><title>Journal of Public Policy</title><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><issn><json:string>0143-814X</json:string></issn><eissn><json:string>1469-7815</json:string></eissn><publisherId><json:string>PUP</json:string></publisherId><volume>8</volume><issue>3-4</issue><pages><first>375</first><last>401</last><total>27</total></pages><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre></host><ark><json:string>ark:/67375/6GQ-RWMF8F49-G</json:string></ark><publicationDate>1988</publicationDate><copyrightDate>1988</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1017/S0143814X00008679</json:string></doi><id>B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0</id><score>1</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a">Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination</title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher scheme="https://publisher-list.data.istex.fr">Cambridge University Press</publisher><pubPlace>Cambridge, UK</pubPlace><availability><licence><p>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988</p></licence><p scheme="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-G3RCRD03-V">cambridge</p></availability><date>1988</date></publicationStmt><notesStmt><note type="research-article" scheme="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</note><note type="journal" scheme="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</note></notesStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a">Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination</title><author xml:id="author-0000"><persName><forename type="first">Miles</forename><surname>Kahler</surname></persName><affiliation>International Relations, University of California, San Diego</affiliation></author><idno type="istex">B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0</idno><idno type="ark">ark:/67375/6GQ-RWMF8F49-G</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1017/S0143814X00008679</idno><idno type="PII">S0143814X00008679</idno><idno type="article-id">00867</idno></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Journal of Public Policy</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">J. Pub. Pol.</title><idno type="pISSN">0143-814X</idno><idno type="eISSN">1469-7815</idno><idno type="publisher-id">PUP</idno><imprint><publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher><pubPlace>Cambridge, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="1988-07"></date><biblScope unit="volume">8</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3-4</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="375">375</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="401">401</biblScope></imprint></monogr></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>1988</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract style="normal"><p>Systems of policy coordination since 1945 may be classified as rule-governed systems relying on decentralized national decisions (a stylized Bretton Woods system) or discretionary bargaining in which coordination decisions are taken collectively at the international level (e.g. world economic summits). The European Monetary System combines elements of these two models. National attachments to rules cannot be explained solely by the strength of international institutions. A discretionary bargaining model of coordination is more likely to be successful when national leaders share a policy diagnosis that both cuts across economic issue areas and divides their own domestic political coalitions and governments. International organizations may facilitate policy coordination under a rule-based system through provision of resources to ease adjustment costs and rule clarification, and in a discretionary bargaining system by brokering, providing information and model building.</p></abstract></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="1988-07">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="corpus cambridge not found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v2.2 20060430//EN" URI="journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article dtd-version="2.2" article-type="research-article"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">PUP</journal-id><journal-title>Journal of Public Policy</journal-title><abbrev-journal-title>J. Pub. Pol.</abbrev-journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">0143-814X</issn><issn pub-type="epub">1469-7815</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Cambridge University Press</publisher-name><publisher-loc>Cambridge, UK</publisher-loc></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1017/S0143814X00008679</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="pii">S0143814X00008679</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">00867</article-id><title-group><article-title>Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn01">*</xref></article-title><alt-title alt-title-type="left-running">Miles Kahler</alt-title><alt-title alt-title-type="right-running">International Institutions and Policy Coordination</alt-title><fn-group><fn id="fn01" symbol="*"><label>*</label><p>Revised version of a paper prepared for the Annual Meetings, American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1988. The author wishes to thank Robert G. ilpin, Stephan Haggard, and John Odell for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.</p></fn></fn-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib><name><surname>Kahler</surname><given-names>Miles</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"></xref></contrib></contrib-group><aff id="aff1"><addr-line>International Relations</addr-line>, <institution>University of California</institution>, <addr-line>San Diego</addr-line></aff><pub-date pub-type="ppub"><month>07</month><year>1988</year></pub-date><volume>8</volume><issue>3-4</issue><fpage seq="10">375</fpage><lpage>401</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988</copyright-statement><copyright-year>1988</copyright-year><copyright-holder>Cambridge University Press</copyright-holder></permissions><abstract abstract-type="normal"><title>ABSTRACT</title><p>Systems of policy coordination since 1945 may be classified as rule-governed systems relying on decentralized national decisions (a stylized Bretton Woods system) or discretionary bargaining in which coordination decisions are taken collectively at the international level (e.g. world economic summits). The European Monetary System combines elements of these two models. National attachments to rules cannot be explained solely by the strength of international institutions. A discretionary bargaining model of coordination is more likely to be successful when national leaders share a policy diagnosis that both cuts across economic issue areas and divides their own domestic political coalitions and governments. International organizations may facilitate policy coordination under a rule-based system through provision of resources to ease adjustment costs and rule clarification, and in a discretionary bargaining system by brokering, providing information and model building.</p></abstract><counts><page-count count="27"></page-count></counts><custom-meta-wrap><custom-meta><meta-name>pdf</meta-name><meta-value>S0143814X00008679a.pdf</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta><meta-name>dispart</meta-name><meta-value>Articles</meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-wrap></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>BIBLIOGRAPHY</title><ref><citation id="ref001" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Artis</surname><given-names>Michael</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Ostry</surname><given-names>Sylvia</given-names></name>. <source>International Economic Policy Coordination</source>. <publisher-loc>London</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Routledge and Kegan Paul</publisher-name>, <year>1986</year>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref002" citation-type="journal"><name><surname>Axelrod</surname><given-names>R.</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Keohane</surname><given-names>R.</given-names></name> (<year>1985</year>) <article-title>Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions</article-title>. <source>World Politics</source>, <volume>38</volume>, <issue>1</issue>, <fpage>226</fpage>–<lpage>254</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref003" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Bryant</surname><given-names>Ralph</given-names></name> (<year>1986</year>) Comment. In <name><surname>Buiter</surname><given-names>Willem H.</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Marston</surname><given-names>Richard C.</given-names></name>, (eds.), <source>International Economic Policy Coordination</source>. <publisher-loc>Cambridge</publisher-loc>, <publisher-name>Cambridge University Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref004" citation-type="journal"><name><surname>Crockett</surname><given-names>Andrew</given-names></name>. (<year>1988</year>) <article-title>Indicators and International Economic Cooperation</article-title>. <source>Finance and Development</source>, <volume>25</volume>, <issue>3–4</issue>, <fpage>20</fpage>–<lpage>21</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref005" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Cooper</surname><given-names>Richard N.</given-names></name> (<year>1985</year>) Economic Interdependence and Coordination of Economic Policies. In <name><surname>Jones</surname><given-names>R. W.</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Kenen</surname><given-names>P. B.</given-names></name>, eds., <source>Handbook of International Economics</source>, volume <volume>II</volume>. <publisher-name>Elsevier Science Publishers</publisher-name>, <publisher-loc>B.V.</publisher-loc>, <fpage>1195</fpage>–<lpage>1234</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref006" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Dam</surname><given-names>Kenneth</given-names></name> (<year>1982</year>) <source>The Rules of the Game</source>. <publisher-loc>Chicago</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>University of Chicago Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref007" citation-type="book"><name><surname>De Menil</surname><given-names>George</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Solomon</surname><given-names>Anthony M.</given-names></name>. (<year>1983</year>) <source>Economic Summitry</source>. <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Council on Foreign Relations</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref008" citation-type="book"><name><surname>De Vries</surname><given-names>Margaret G.</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Horsefield</surname><given-names>J. Keith</given-names></name>. (<year>1969</year>) <source>The International Monetary Fund 1945–1965</source>, volume <volume>II</volume>. <publisher-loc>Washington DC</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>International Monetary Fund</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref009" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Deane</surname><given-names>Majorie</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Pringle</surname><given-names>Robert</given-names></name>. (<year>1984</year>) <source>Economic Cooperation from the Inside</source>. <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Group of Thirty</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref010" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Dudler</surname><given-names>Hermann-Josef</given-names></name>. (<year>1984</year>) Domestic Monetary Control in EC Countries Under Different Exchange Rate Regimes: National Concerns and Community Options. In <name><surname>Masera</surname><given-names>Rainer S.</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Triffin</surname><given-names>Robert</given-names></name>, (eds.), <source>Europe's Money: Problems of European Monetary Coordination and Integration</source>. <publisher-loc>Oxford</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Clarendon</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref011" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Eichengreen</surname><given-names>Barry</given-names></name>. (<year>1986</year>) International Policy Coordination in Historical Perspective: A View From the Interwar Years. In <name><surname>Buiter</surname><given-names>Willem H.</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Marston</surname><given-names>Richard C.</given-names></name>. (eds.) <source>International Economic Policy Coordination</source>. <publisher-loc>Cambridge</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Cambridge University Press</publisher-name>, <fpage>139</fpage>–<lpage>178</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref012" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Funabashi</surname><given-names>Yoichi</given-names></name>. (<year>1988</year>) <source>Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre</source>. <publisher-loc>Washington, DC</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Institute for International Economics</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref013" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Gowa</surname><given-names>Joanne</given-names></name>. (<year>1983</year>) <source>Closing the Gold Window</source>. <publisher-loc>Ithaca</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Cornell University Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref014" citation-type="journal"><name><surname>Gowa</surname><given-names>Joanne</given-names></name>. (<year>1984</year>) <article-title>Hegemons, IOs, and Markets: The Case of the Substitution Account</article-title>. <source>International Organization</source>, <volume>38</volume>, <issue>4</issue>, <fpage>661</fpage>–<lpage>683</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref015" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Guitian</surname><given-names>Manuel</given-names></name> <etal></etal>, (<year>1988</year>) <source>The European Monetary System: Recent Developments</source>. <publisher-loc>Washington, DC</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>International Monetary Fund</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref016" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Hamada</surname><given-names>Koichi</given-names></name>. (<year>1979</year>) Macroeconomic Strategy and Coordination Under Alternative Exchange Rates. In <name><surname>Dombush</surname><given-names>Rudiger</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Frenkel</surname><given-names>Jacob A.</given-names></name>, (eds.), <source>International Economic Policy: Theory and Evidence</source>. <publisher-loc>Baltimore</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Johns Hopkins University Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref017" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Holtham</surname><given-names>Gerald</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Hallett</surname><given-names>Andrew Hughes</given-names></name>. (<year>1987</year>) International Policy Cooperation and Model Uncertainty. In <name><surname>Bryant</surname><given-names>Ralph C.</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Portes</surname><given-names>Richard</given-names></name>, (eds.), <source>Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflicts and Cooperation</source>. <publisher-loc>London</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Macmillan</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref018" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Katzenstein</surname><given-names>Peter J.</given-names></name> (<year>1978</year>) <source>Between Power and Plenty</source>. <publisher-loc>Madison, WI</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>University of Wisconsin Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref019" citation-type="other"><name><surname>Keohane</surname><given-names>Robert O.</given-names></name> (<year>1986</year>) The Study of International Regimes and the Classical Tradition in International Relations. Paper delivered at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August <year>1986</year>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref020" citation-type="journal"><name><surname>Kratochwil</surname><given-names>F.</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Ruggie</surname><given-names>John Gerard</given-names></name>. (<year>1986</year>) <article-title>International Organization: a State of the Art on an Art of the State</article-title>. <source>International Organization</source>, <volume>40</volume>, <issue>4</issue>, <fpage>771</fpage>–<lpage>774</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref021" citation-type="thesis"><name><surname>Nanto</surname><given-names>Dick Kazuyuki</given-names></name>. (<year>1976</year>) The United States' Role in the Postwar Economic Recovery of Japan. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, <publisher-name>Harvard University</publisher-name>, December 1976.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref022" citation-type="journal"><name><surname>Oudiz</surname><given-names>Gilles</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Sachs</surname><given-names>Jeffrey</given-names></name>. (<year>1984</year>) <article-title>Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Among Industrial Economies</article-title>, <source>Brookings Papers on Economic Activity</source>, <volume>1</volume>, <fpage>1</fpage>–<lpage>65</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref023" citation-type="journal"><name><surname>Oye</surname><given-names>Kenneth A.</given-names></name> (<year>1985</year>) <article-title>The Sterling-Dollar-Franc Triangle: Monetary Diplomacy 1929–1937</article-title>, <source>World Politics</source>, <volume>38</volume>, <issue>1</issue>, <fpage>173</fpage>–<lpage>199</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref024" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Padoa-Schioppa</surname><given-names>Tommaso</given-names></name>. (<year>1985</year>) Rules and Institutions in the Management of Multi-Country Economies. In <name><surname>Tsoukalis</surname><given-names>Loukas</given-names></name>, (ed.), <source>The Political Economy of International Money</source>. <publisher-loc>London</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>SAGE Publications (Royal Institute of International Affairs)</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref025" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Padoa-Schioppa</surname><given-names>Tommaso</given-names></name>. (<year>1986</year>) Policy Cooperation and the EMS Experience. In <name><surname>Buiter</surname><given-names>Willem H.</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Marston</surname><given-names>Richard C.</given-names></name>, (eds.), <source>International Economic Policy Coordination</source>. <publisher-loc>Cambridge</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Cambridge University Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref026" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Putnam</surname><given-names>Robert D.</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Bayne</surname><given-names>Nicholas</given-names></name>. (<year>1987</year>) <source>Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven Power Summits</source>, (revised edition) <publisher-loc>London</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Sage Publications</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref027" citation-type="journal"><name><surname>Putnam</surname><given-names>Robert D.</given-names></name> (<year>1988</year>) <article-title>Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games</article-title>, <source>International Organization</source>, <volume>42</volume>, <issue>3–4</issue>, <fpage>427</fpage>–<lpage>460</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref028" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Thygesen</surname><given-names>Niels</given-names></name>. (<year>1984</year>) Exchange-Rate Policies and Monetary Targets in the EMS Countries. In <name><surname>Masera</surname><given-names>Rainer</given-names></name> and <name><surname>Triffin</surname><given-names>Robert</given-names></name>, (eds.), <source>Europe's Money</source>. <publisher-loc>Oxford</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Clarendon Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref029" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Ungerer</surname><given-names>Horst</given-names></name> <etal></etal>, (<year>1983</year>) <source>The European Monetary System: The Experience igjgSs</source>. <publisher-loc>Washington, DC</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>The International Monetary Fund</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref030" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Ungerer</surname><given-names>Horst</given-names></name> <etal></etal>, (<year>1986</year>) <source>The European Monetary System: Recent Developments</source>. <publisher-loc>Washington DC</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>The International Monetary Fund</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation id="ref031" citation-type="book"><name><surname>Williamson</surname><given-names>John</given-names></name>. (<year>1983</year>) <source>The Exchange Rate System</source>. <publisher-loc>Washington DC</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Institute for International Economics</publisher-name>.</citation></ref></ref-list></back></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative"><title>Miles Kahler</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination*</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Miles</namePart><namePart type="family">Kahler</namePart><affiliation>International Relations, University of California, San Diego</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Cambridge, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1988-07</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">1988</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><abstract type="normal">Systems of policy coordination since 1945 may be classified as rule-governed systems relying on decentralized national decisions (a stylized Bretton Woods system) or discretionary bargaining in which coordination decisions are taken collectively at the international level (e.g. world economic summits). The European Monetary System combines elements of these two models. National attachments to rules cannot be explained solely by the strength of international institutions. A discretionary bargaining model of coordination is more likely to be successful when national leaders share a policy diagnosis that both cuts across economic issue areas and divides their own domestic political coalitions and governments. International organizations may facilitate policy coordination under a rule-based system through provision of resources to ease adjustment costs and rule clarification, and in a discretionary bargaining system by brokering, providing information and model building.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Journal of Public Policy</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>J. Pub. Pol.</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0143-814X</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1469-7815</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">PUP</identifier><part><date>1988</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>8</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>3-4</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>375</start><end>401</end><total>27</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/6GQ-RWMF8F49-G</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1017/S0143814X00008679</identifier><identifier type="PII">S0143814X00008679</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">00867</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-G3RCRD03-V">cambridge</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Santé/explor/EdenteV2/Data/Istex/Corpus
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 005828 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Istex/Corpus/biblio.hfd -nk 005828 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Wicri/Santé
|area= EdenteV2
|flux= Istex
|étape= Corpus
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:B0C364E88E4363765A5819789273FB0164E097D0
|texte= Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.32. |  |