Paying for Patented Drugs is Hard to Justify: An Argument about Time Discounting and Medical Need
Identifieur interne : 005674 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 005673; suivant : 005675Paying for Patented Drugs is Hard to Justify: An Argument about Time Discounting and Medical Need
Auteurs : James WilsonSource :
- Journal of Applied Philosophy [ 0264-3758 ] ; 2012-08.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Additional weighting, Antibiotic, Atemporal approach, Atemporal list, Chemical entities, Commodity, Competition commission, Cost savings, Current budgets, Current healthcare budgets, Current system, Different people, Different times, Discount rate, Discounting, Drug, Drug cocktail, Drug development, Drug discovery, Equal claim, Essential medicines, Fund drug development, Future reductio, Generic, Generic drug, Generic drugs, Generic version, Generics account, Generics manufacturers, Global health, Greater number, Healthcare, Healthcare budget, Healthcare system, Healthcare systems, Higher priority, Highest priority person, Incentivising drug development, Innovation premium, James wilson, John broome, John taurek, Larger group, Larger number, Latest medicines, Limited resource, Mark sheehan, Medical ethics, Medical need, Medical treatment, Medical treatments, Moral claim, Moral claims, Moral duty, Moral urgency, More people, Narrow intervals, Need treatment, Numbers scepticism, Obvious solution, Overall drugs budget, Patent claim, Patent period, Patent system, Pharmaceutical, Pharmaceutical companies, Pharmaceutical innovation, Prima facie obligation, Proportionate contribution, Psychological propensity, Public affairs, Public domain, Public goods, Public healthcare systems, Public policy, Pure discount rate, Pure discounting, Resource, Resource constraints, Same unit, Scarce resource, Scarce resources, Schematic principle, Sector inquiry, Something worryingly, Strong reason, Such cases, Such schemes, Support drug innovation, Time discounting, Uncontroversial assumption, Whilst.
- Teeft :
- Additional weighting, Antibiotic, Atemporal approach, Atemporal list, Chemical entities, Commodity, Competition commission, Cost savings, Current budgets, Current healthcare budgets, Current system, Different people, Different times, Discount rate, Discounting, Drug, Drug cocktail, Drug development, Drug discovery, Equal claim, Essential medicines, Fund drug development, Future reductio, Generic, Generic drug, Generic drugs, Generic version, Generics account, Generics manufacturers, Global health, Greater number, Healthcare, Healthcare budget, Healthcare system, Healthcare systems, Higher priority, Highest priority person, Incentivising drug development, Innovation premium, James wilson, John broome, John taurek, Larger group, Larger number, Latest medicines, Limited resource, Mark sheehan, Medical ethics, Medical need, Medical treatment, Medical treatments, Moral claim, Moral claims, Moral duty, Moral urgency, More people, Narrow intervals, Need treatment, Numbers scepticism, Obvious solution, Overall drugs budget, Patent claim, Patent period, Patent system, Pharmaceutical, Pharmaceutical companies, Pharmaceutical innovation, Prima facie obligation, Proportionate contribution, Psychological propensity, Public affairs, Public domain, Public goods, Public healthcare systems, Public policy, Pure discount rate, Pure discounting, Resource, Resource constraints, Same unit, Scarce resource, Scarce resources, Schematic principle, Sector inquiry, Something worryingly, Strong reason, Such cases, Such schemes, Support drug innovation, Time discounting, Uncontroversial assumption, Whilst.
Abstract
Drugs are much more expensive whilst they are subject to patent protection than once patents expire: patented drugs make up only 20% of NHS drugs prescriptions, but consume 80% of the total NHS drugs bill. This article argues that, given the relatively uncontroversial assumption that we should save the greater number in cases where all are equally deserving and we cannot save both groups, it is more difficult than is usually thought to justify why publicly funded healthcare systems should pay for patented treatments. The claim to medical treatment of those who will be sick with a given condition once the patent runs out is just as strong as those who are sick with it now, but we will be able to treat more people with the same unit of resource in the future. Hence, when resource constraints entail that both cannot be funded, publicly funded healthcare systems ought to wait until patents expire before approving drugs for general use in the publicly funded system.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2012.00567.x
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:ADE428E04F17690D175183E6EC7162DEC29E46FFLe document en format XML
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This article argues that, given the relatively uncontroversial assumption that we should save the greater number in cases where all are equally deserving and we cannot save both groups, it is more difficult than is usually thought to justify why publicly funded healthcare systems should pay for patented treatments. The claim to medical treatment of those who will be sick with a given condition once the patent runs out is just as strong as those who are sick with it now, but we will be able to treat more people with the same unit of resource in the future. 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Hansen</json:string><json:string>Brantner</json:string><json:string>Just Health</json:string><json:string>Thomas W. Pogge</json:string><json:string>Mike Palmedo</json:string></persName><placeName><json:string>United States</json:string><json:string>UK</json:string><json:string>Canada</json:string><json:string>Europe</json:string><json:string>CT</json:string><json:string>Berkeley</json:string><json:string>Gola</json:string><json:string>Chicago</json:string><json:string>CA</json:string><json:string>MA</json:string><json:string>Cambridge</json:string><json:string>England</json:string><json:string>New Haven</json:string></placeName><ref_url><json:string>http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/ Consultations/Responsestoconsultations/DH</json:string><json:string>http://www.fda.gov/ Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm</json:string><json:string>http://www.imshealth.com/imshealth/Global/Content/Document/Market_Measurement_TL/Generic</json:string><json:string>http://ideas.repec.org/p/ rpp/wpaper/</json:string><json:string>http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/ fact_sheet</json:string><json:string>http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/</json:string><json:string>http://www.nuf</json:string><json:string>http://www.gphaonline.org/about-gpha/about-generics/facts</json:string><json:string>http://www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/researchpapers/CHERP</json:string><json:string>http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html</json:string></ref_url><ref_bibl><json:string>University of California Press, 2004</json:string><json:string>Anthony Costello et al.</json:string><json:string>London: Nuffield Trust, 2010</json:string><json:string>New York, Random House, 2004</json:string><json:string>May 2000</json:string><json:string>October 2001</json:string><json:string>London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013</json:string><json:string>Society for Applied Philosophy, 2012</json:string><json:string>October 2000</json:string><json:string>Bristol: White Horse Press, 1992</json:string><json:string>February 2001</json:string><json:string>Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007</json:string></ref_bibl><bibl></bibl></unitex></namedEntities><ark><json:string>ark:/67375/WNG-D52C6J9D-W</json:string></ark><categories><wos><json:string>1 - social science</json:string><json:string>2 - ethics</json:string></wos><scienceMetrix></scienceMetrix><scopus><json:string>1 - Social Sciences</json:string><json:string>2 - Arts and Humanities</json:string><json:string>3 - Philosophy</json:string></scopus></categories><publicationDate>2012</publicationDate><copyrightDate>2012</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1111/j.1468-5930.2012.00567.x</json:string></doi><id>ADE428E04F17690D175183E6EC7162DEC29E46FF</id><score>1</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/ADE428E04F17690D175183E6EC7162DEC29E46FF/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/ADE428E04F17690D175183E6EC7162DEC29E46FF/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/ADE428E04F17690D175183E6EC7162DEC29E46FF/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a" type="main">Paying for Patented Drugs is Hard to Justify: An Argument about Time Discounting and Medical Need</title><respStmt><resp>Références bibliographiques récupérées via GROBID</resp><name resp="ISTEX-API">ISTEX-API (INIST-CNRS)</name></respStmt></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>Wiley Publishing Ltd</publisher><availability><licence>© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2012</licence></availability><date type="published" when="2012-08"></date></publicationStmt><notesStmt><note type="content-type" subtype="article" source="article" scheme="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-6N5SZHKN-D">article</note><note type="publication-type" subtype="journal" scheme="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</note></notesStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="article"><analytic><title level="a" type="main">Paying for Patented Drugs is Hard to Justify: An Argument about Time Discounting and Medical Need</title><title level="a" type="short">Patented Drugs: Time Discounting and Medical Need</title><author xml:id="author-0000"><persName><forename type="first">James</forename><surname>Wilson</surname></persName><email>james-gs.wilson@ucl.ac.uk</email><affiliation><orgName>Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health and Comprehensive Biomedical Research Centre</orgName><orgName>University College London</orgName><address><settlement type="city">London</settlement><postCode>WC1E 6BT</postCode><country key="GB">UK</country></address></affiliation></author><idno type="istex">ADE428E04F17690D175183E6EC7162DEC29E46FF</idno><idno type="ark">ark:/67375/WNG-D52C6J9D-W</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1468-5930.2012.00567.x</idno><idno type="unit">JAPP567</idno><idno type="toTypesetVersion">file:JAPP.JAPP567.pdf</idno></analytic><monogr><title level="j" type="main">Journal of Applied Philosophy</title><title level="j" type="alt">JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY</title><idno type="pISSN">0264-3758</idno><idno type="eISSN">1468-5930</idno><idno type="book-DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-5930</idno><idno type="book-part-DOI">10.1111/japp.2012.29.issue-3</idno><idno type="product">JAPP</idno><imprint><biblScope unit="vol">29</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="186">186</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="199">199</biblScope><biblScope unit="page-count">14</biblScope><date type="published" when="2012-08"></date></imprint></monogr></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><abstract style="main"><head>abstract</head><p><hi rend="fc">NHS</hi><hi rend="fc">NHS</hi><:t>Drugs are much more expensive whilst they are subject to patent protection than once patents expire: patented drugs make up only 20% of</:t><:t>drugs prescriptions, but consume 80% of the total</:t><:t>drugs bill. This article argues that, given the relatively uncontroversial assumption that we should save the greater number in cases where all are equally deserving and we cannot save both groups, it is more difficult than is usually thought to justify why publicly funded healthcare systems should pay for patented treatments. The claim to medical treatment of those who will be sick with a given condition once the patent runs out is just as strong as those who are sick with it now, but we will be able to treat more people with the same unit of resource in the future. Hence, when resource constraints entail that both cannot be funded, publicly funded healthcare systems ought to wait until patents expire before approving drugs for general use in the publicly funded system.</:t></p></abstract><textClass><keywords rend="tocHeading1"><term>Original Articles</term></keywords><keywords rend="articleCategory"><term>Original Article</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en"></language></langUsage></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change>undefined</change><change>[object Object]</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/ADE428E04F17690D175183E6EC7162DEC29E46FF/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component type="serialArticle" version="2.0" xml:id="japp567" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-5930</doi><issn type="print">0264-3758</issn><issn type="electronic">1468-5930</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="JAPP"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title sort="JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY" type="main">Journal of Applied Philosophy</title><title type="short">J Appl Philos</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="08103"><doi>10.1111/japp.2012.29.issue-3</doi><copyright ownership="thirdParty">© 2012 Society for Applied Philosophy</copyright><numberingGroup><numbering number="29" type="journalVolume">29</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue">3</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2012-08">August 2012</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" position="20" status="forIssue" type="article"><doi>10.1111/j.1468-5930.2012.00567.x</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="JAPP567"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count number="14" type="pageTotal"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="tocHeading1">Original Articles</title><title type="articleCategory">Original Article</title></titleGroup><copyright ownership="thirdParty">© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2012</copyright><eventGroup><event agent="bestset" date="2012-07-16" type="xmlCreated"></event><event date="2012-08-09" type="xmlCorrected"></event><event type="publishedOnlineEarlyUnpaginated" date="2012-07-25"></event><event type="firstOnline" date="2012-07-25"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2012-08-13"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:3.8.8" date="2014-01-28"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.3.4 mode:FullText" date="2015-02-25"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst">186</numbering><numbering type="pageLast">199</numbering></numberingGroup><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:JAPP.JAPP567.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><titleGroup><title type="short">Patented Drugs: Time Discounting and Medical Need</title><title type="shortAuthors"><fc>J</fc>ames <fc>W</fc>ilson</title><title type="main">Paying for Patented Drugs is Hard to Justify: An Argument about Time Discounting and Medical Need</title></titleGroup><creators><creator affiliationRef="#japp567-aff-0001" creatorRole="author" xml:id="japp567-cr-0001"><personName><givenNames>James</givenNames><familyName>Wilson</familyName></personName><contactDetails><email>james-gs.wilson@ucl.ac.uk</email></contactDetails></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation countryCode="GB" xml:id="japp567-aff-0001"><orgDiv>Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health and Comprehensive Biomedical Research Centre</orgDiv><orgName>University College London</orgName><address><city>London</city><postCode>WC1E 6BT</postCode><country>UK</country></address></affiliation></affiliationGroup><fundingInfo><fundingAgency>Department of Health's NIHR Biomedical Research Centres</fundingAgency></fundingInfo><abstractGroup><abstract type="main"><title type="main">abstract</title><p>Drugs are much more expensive whilst they are subject to patent protection than once patents expire: patented drugs make up only 20% of <fc>NHS</fc> drugs prescriptions, but consume 80% of the total <fc>NHS</fc> drugs bill. This article argues that, given the relatively uncontroversial assumption that we should save the greater number in cases where all are equally deserving and we cannot save both groups, it is more difficult than is usually thought to justify why publicly funded healthcare systems should pay for patented treatments. The claim to medical treatment of those who will be sick with a given condition once the patent runs out is just as strong as those who are sick with it now, but we will be able to treat more people with the same unit of resource in the future. Hence, when resource constraints entail that both cannot be funded, publicly funded healthcare systems ought to wait until patents expire before approving drugs for general use in the publicly funded system.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Paying for Patented Drugs is Hard to Justify: An Argument about Time Discounting and Medical Need</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated" lang="en"><title>Patented Drugs: Time Discounting and Medical Need</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Paying for Patented Drugs is Hard to Justify: An Argument about Time Discounting and Medical Need</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">James</namePart><namePart type="family">Wilson</namePart><affiliation>E-mail: james-gs.wilson@ucl.ac.uk</affiliation><affiliation>Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health and Comprehensive Biomedical Research Centre, University College London, WC1E 6BT, London, UK</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: james-gs.wilson@ucl.ac.uk</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-6N5SZHKN-D">article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2012-08</dateIssued><dateCreated encoding="w3cdtf">2012-07-16</dateCreated><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2012</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><abstract>Drugs are much more expensive whilst they are subject to patent protection than once patents expire: patented drugs make up only 20% of NHS drugs prescriptions, but consume 80% of the total NHS drugs bill. This article argues that, given the relatively uncontroversial assumption that we should save the greater number in cases where all are equally deserving and we cannot save both groups, it is more difficult than is usually thought to justify why publicly funded healthcare systems should pay for patented treatments. The claim to medical treatment of those who will be sick with a given condition once the patent runs out is just as strong as those who are sick with it now, but we will be able to treat more people with the same unit of resource in the future. 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