Metacognition may be more impaired than mindreading in autism
Identifieur interne : 003A03 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 003A02; suivant : 003A04Metacognition may be more impaired than mindreading in autism
Auteurs : David M. Williams ; Sophie E. Lind ; Francesca HappéSource :
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences [ 0140-525X ] ; 2009.
Abstract
This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support Carruthers' rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3 (metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).
Url:
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X09000818
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Lind</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Psychology, City University, London, EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Happe, Francesca" sort="Happe, Francesca" uniqKey="Happe F" first="Francesca" last="Happé">Francesca Happé</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Social, Genetic, and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, London, SE5 8AF, United Kingdom. f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:754C590DADE2210E4BB171BDC4B319470D356060</idno><date when="2009" year="2009">2009</date><idno type="doi">10.1017/S0140525X09000818</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/754C590DADE2210E4BB171BDC4B319470D356060/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">003A03</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">003A03</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a">Metacognition may be more impaired than mindreading in autism</title><author><name sortKey="Williams, David M" sort="Williams, David M" uniqKey="Williams D" first="David M." last="Williams">David M. Williams</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Institute of Child Health, University College London, London, WC1N 1EH, United Kingdom d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Lind, Sophie E" sort="Lind, Sophie E" uniqKey="Lind S" first="Sophie E." last="Lind">Sophie E. Lind</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Psychology, City University, London, EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Happe, Francesca" sort="Happe, Francesca" uniqKey="Happe F" first="Francesca" last="Happé">Francesca Happé</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Social, Genetic, and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, London, SE5 8AF, United Kingdom. f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Behavioral and Brain Sciences</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">Behav Brain Sci</title><idno type="ISSN">0140-525X</idno><idno type="eISSN">1469-1825</idno><imprint><publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher><pubPlace>New York, USA</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2009">2009</date><biblScope unit="volume">32</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="162">162</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="163">163</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0140-525X</idno></series></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0140-525X</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract">This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support Carruthers' rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3 (metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>cambridge</corpusName><author><json:item><name>David M. Williams</name><affiliations><json:string>Institute of Child Health, University College London, London, WC1N 1EH, United Kingdom d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk</json:string><json:string>E-mail: d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Sophie E. Lind</name><affiliations><json:string>Department of Psychology, City University, London, EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</json:string><json:string>E-mail: Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Francesca Happé</name><affiliations><json:string>Social, Genetic, and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, London, SE5 8AF, United Kingdom. f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</json:string><json:string>E-mail: f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><articleId><json:string>00081</json:string></articleId><arkIstex>ark:/67375/6GQ-5RGPF5RW-M</arkIstex><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>research-article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. 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autism</title><author xml:id="author-0000"><persName><forename type="first">David M.</forename><surname>Williams</surname></persName><email>d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk</email><affiliation>Institute of Child Health, University College London, London, WC1N 1EH, United Kingdom d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-0001"><persName><forename type="first">Sophie E.</forename><surname>Lind</surname></persName><email>Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</email><affiliation>Department of Psychology, City University, London, EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-0002"><persName><forename type="first">Francesca</forename><surname>Happé</surname></persName><email>f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</email><affiliation>Social, Genetic, and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, London, SE5 8AF, United Kingdom. f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</affiliation></author><idno 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ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract style="normal"><p>This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support Carruthers' rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3 (metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).</p></abstract></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2009">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="corpus cambridge not found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v2.2 20060430//EN" URI="journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article dtd-version="2.2" article-type="research-article"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">BBS</journal-id><journal-title>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</journal-title><abbrev-journal-title>Behav Brain Sci</abbrev-journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">0140-525X</issn><issn pub-type="epub">1469-1825</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Cambridge University Press</publisher-name><publisher-loc>New York, USA</publisher-loc></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1017/S0140525X09000818</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="pii">S0140525X09000818</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">00081</article-id><title-group><article-title>Metacognition may be <italic>more</italic> impaired than mindreading in autism</article-title><alt-title alt-title-type="left-running"><italic>Commentary</italic>/Carruthers: How we know our own minds</alt-title><alt-title alt-title-type="right-running"><italic>Commentary</italic>/Carruthers: How we know our own minds</alt-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib><name><surname>Williams</surname><given-names>David M.</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">a</xref></contrib><contrib><name><surname>Lind</surname><given-names>Sophie E.</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">b</xref></contrib><contrib><name><surname>Happé</surname><given-names>Francesca</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff3">c</xref></contrib></contrib-group><aff id="aff1"><label><sup>a</sup></label><institution>Institute of Child Health, University College London</institution>, <addr-line>London, WC1N 1EH</addr-line>, <country>United Kingdom</country> <email xlink:href="d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk">d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk</email></aff><aff id="aff2"><label><sup>b</sup></label><addr-line>Department of Psychology</addr-line>, <institution>City University</institution>, <addr-line>London, EC1V 0HB</addr-line>, <country>United Kingdom</country> <email xlink:href="Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk">Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</email></aff><aff id="aff3"><label><sup>c</sup></label><institution>Social, Genetic, and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, London, SE5 8AF</institution>, <country>United Kingdom</country>. <email xlink:href="f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk">f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</email></aff><pub-date><month>04</month><year>2009</year></pub-date><volume>32</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage seq="30">162</fpage><lpage>163</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2009</copyright-year><copyright-holder>Cambridge University Press</copyright-holder></permissions><related-article related-article-type="commentary-article" journal-id="BBS" journal-id-type="publisher-id" vol="32" issue="2" id="S0140525X09000545" page="121"><article-title>How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition</article-title> <name><surname>Carruthers</surname><given-names>Peter</given-names></name> Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 <email xlink:href="pcarruth@umd.edu">pcarruth@umd.edu</email> <uri xlink:href="http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/">http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/</uri></related-article><abstract abstract-type="normal"><title>Abstract</title><p>This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support Carruthers' rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3 (metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).</p></abstract><counts><page-count count="2"></page-count></counts><custom-meta-wrap><custom-meta><meta-name>pdf</meta-name><meta-value>S0140525X09000818a.pdf</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta><meta-name>dispart</meta-name><meta-value>Open Peer Commentary</meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-wrap></article-meta></front><body><sec id="sec1"><title>Impaired metacognition in autism</title><p>We agree with Carruthers' claim that both mindreading <italic>and</italic> metacognition are impaired in autism, and that this speaks against models 1 and 3. However, we wish to provide more decisive evidence for impaired metacognition in autism, given that the evidence cited by Carruthers is problematic. For example, contrary to Carruthers' suggestion (sect. 10, para. 10), Kazak et al. (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">1997</xref>) did <italic>not</italic> find statistically significant differences between participants with and without autism in either mindreading or metacognition (see Kazak et al., p.1005).</p><p>Clearer evidence for metacognitive deficits among children with autism emerges from Williams and Happé (in press a), who assessed awareness of own intentions. Compared to age- and ability-matched comparison children, children with autism were significantly less likely to (a) correctly report their reflex movements as unintentional, and (b) correctly recognise their own mistaken actions (drawing a picture different to that intended, through experimenter manipulation) as unintended. The performance of children with autism on these measures was significantly associated with performance on traditional false belief tasks, independent of verbal ability. These findings suggest that children with autism have a limited ability to represent their own intentions and that these difficulties are fundamentally associated with established difficulties in representing others' mental states (in this case, false beliefs). These findings provide robust evidence against both models 1 and 3, but do not differentiate models 2 and 4.</p></sec><sec id="sec2"><title>Impaired episodic memory in autism implies impaired metacognition</title><p>Several researchers (e.g., McGeer <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">2004</xref>; Nichols & Stich <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">2003</xref>; Raffman <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">1999</xref>) have claimed that the autobiographical reports of individuals with autism show that metacognition is intact in autism (supporting models 1 and 3). However, none of these authors, nor Carruthers in his target article, distinguishes between semantic and episodic memory.</p><p>Episodic memory is associated with consciously remembering <italic>personally experienced</italic> events, whereas semantic memory is concerned with <italic>factual</italic> information. Caution must be exercised when attributing to people with autism memory processes of the <italic>episodic</italic> kind. I may <italic>know</italic> that a particular event has happened to me in the past, and hence report details of the event quite accurately, without actually <italic>remembering</italic> the event. Only this latter kind of “remembering” is thought to rely on metacognition (e.g., Perner <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">2000</xref>).</p><p>Contrary to models 1 and 3, it may be that people with autism do not engage the same metacognitive processes as typical individuals do when reporting events from their past (Lind & Bowler <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">2008</xref>). Lind and Bowler (under revised review; see also Lind <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">2008</xref>) found that children with autism (n=53) were as able as age- and ability-matched comparison participants to distinguish events that had occurred from events that had not (whether or not a picture had been picked up and named earlier in the test session). However, participants with autism were significantly impaired at remembering the <italic>source</italic> of such events (i.e., who – themselves or the experimenter – had picked up the picture and named it). That is, the participants knew that X event had occurred, but they had difficulty in <italic>remembering</italic> the spatio-temporal context in which X occurred. Therefore, the metacognitive status of the personal memories reported by individuals with autism might justifiably be questioned, and cannot be taken as support for models 1 and 3.</p></sec><sec id="sec3"><title>A case of impaired metacognition but intact mindreading? Distinguishing model 2 from model 4</title><p>The autism research cited earlier supports equally models 2 and 4. As far as we can tell, once Carruthers concedes (sect. 3) that the mindreading system has different information available to it for the cases of self and others, respectively, the only way in which model 2 differs <italic>theoretically</italic> from model 4 is with respect to the role of introspection of own propositional attitudes. Other commentators will no doubt debate whether it is possible to introspect our propositional attitudes directly. Here we concentrate on Carruthers' suggestion that different <italic>predictions</italic> emerge from models 2 and 4.</p><p>Williams and Happé (in press b; see also Williams <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">2008</xref>) addressed a potential confound within the classic “Smarties” unexpected contents task (Hogrefe et al. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">1986</xref>), the task used most widely to assess awareness of false beliefs in self and others. In the Smarties task, participants <italic>state</italic> what they (falsely) believe is inside a Smarties box <italic>before</italic> they are asked the critical false-belief test questions. As such, it may be possible to answer the Self test question (‘What did you think was inside the box, before you looked?’) simply by remembering what one <italic>said</italic> and not necessarily what one <italic>believed</italic>. Although parallel performance across the Self and Other test questions of the task is usually observed among children with autism (e.g., Fisher et al. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">2005</xref>), this potential confound may have led to an over-estimation of the ability of children with autism to reflect on their own false beliefs.</p><p>To test this possibility, we rigged a situation in which participants were asked by the experimenter (who feigned mild injury) to “get me a plaster,” and had ready access to three different boxes: a plasters box, a crisps tube, and a sweets box. By opening the plasters box (which actually contained candles), participants demonstrated their (false) belief that the box contained plasters. However, having never verbalised their belief, success of the Self test question of this task (“What did you think was in the box, before you looked?”) must reflect participants' recall of their false belief rather than of any prior statement.</p><p>We found that participants with autism were unique in finding the Self test question significantly harder than the Other-person question (“What will <italic>x</italic> think is inside the box, before s/he looks inside?”). Almost a quarter (21%) of our sample of 52 children with autism <italic>failed</italic> the Self question but <italic>passed</italic> the Other-person question. In contrast, less than 4% of participants with autism showed the opposite pattern of performance. Parallel performance across the test questions was observed in age- and ability-matched comparison participants, and in typically developing 3- to 5-year-olds. These results seem to show the kind of dissociation between mindreading and metacognition that Carruthers suggests would follow from model 2, but not from model 4.</p><p>In conclusion, we believe the data so far from autism support model 2 over model 4. But we are grateful for Carruthers' bold and exciting analysis, which helps to shape a new research agenda to answer the fascinating question: How well can people with autism “read their own minds”?</p></sec></body><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref><citation citation-type="journal" id="ref1"><name><surname>Fisher</surname><given-names>N.</given-names></name>, <name><surname>Happé</surname><given-names>F.</given-names></name> & <name><surname>Dunn</surname><given-names>J</given-names></name>. 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M.</given-names></name> & <name><surname>Happé</surname><given-names>F.</given-names></name> (in press b) <article-title>“What did I say?” versus “What did I think?”: Attributing false beliefs to self amongst children with and without autism</article-title>. <source>Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders</source>.</citation></ref></ref-list></back></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>Metacognition may be more impaired than mindreading in autism</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative"><title>Commentary/Carruthers: How we know our own minds</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>Metacognition may be more impaired than mindreading in autism</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">David M.</namePart><namePart type="family">Williams</namePart><affiliation>Institute of Child Health, University College London, London, WC1N 1EH, United Kingdom d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Sophie E.</namePart><namePart type="family">Lind</namePart><affiliation>Department of Psychology, City University, London, EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Francesca</namePart><namePart type="family">Happé</namePart><affiliation>Social, Genetic, and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, London, SE5 8AF, United Kingdom. f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">New York, USA</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2009</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2009</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><abstract type="normal">This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support Carruthers' rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3 (metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>Behav Brain Sci</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0140-525X</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1469-1825</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">BBS</identifier><part><date>2009</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>32</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>2</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>162</start><end>163</end><total>2</total></extent></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="reviewOf"><identifier type="commentary-article"></identifier><part><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>32</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>121</start></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">754C590DADE2210E4BB171BDC4B319470D356060</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/6GQ-5RGPF5RW-M</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1017/S0140525X09000818</identifier><identifier type="PII">S0140525X09000818</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">00081</identifier><identifier type="related-article-ID">S0140525X09000545</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-G3RCRD03-V">cambridge</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/754C590DADE2210E4BB171BDC4B319470D356060/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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