Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?
Identifieur interne : 002540 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 002539; suivant : 002541Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?
Auteurs : Annalisa ColivaSource :
- Philosophical Investigations [ 0190-0536 ] ; 2010-01.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Alternative epistemic method, Annalisa, Annalisa coliva, Azande, Basic beliefs, Bigger area, Blackwell, Blackwell publishing, Boghossian, Certain beliefs, Certain facts, Certain phenomenon, Certain propositions, Characteristic feature, Coliva, Conceptual relativism, Conceptual schemes, Deviant community, Different communities, Different community, Different concept, Different epistemic practice, Different hinges, Different logic, Different ones, Different system, Different systems, Empirical evidence, Empirical propositions, Empirical questions, Epistemic, Epistemic practices, Epistemic rationality, Epistemic relativist, Epistemic system, Everyday life, Factual epistemic relativist, Family resemblance, Golden bough, Hinge, Human beings, Incompatible epistemic systems, Italics mine, Language games, Little wood, Long time, Marconi, Metaphysical possibility, More wood, Negative answer, Other areas, Other ones, Oxford university press, Page reference, Palgrave macmillan, Philosophical investigations, Philosophical review, Rational considerations, Rational persuasion, Rationality, Relativism, Relativist, Relativist interpretations, Relativist readings, Religious attitude, Religious elements, Saudade, Something animal, Striking feature, Virtual epistemic relativist, Virtual relativism, Virtual relativist, Widespread agreement, Winch, Witch doctor, Witch doctors, Wittgenstein.
- Teeft :
- Alternative epistemic method, Annalisa, Annalisa coliva, Azande, Basic beliefs, Bigger area, Blackwell, Blackwell publishing, Boghossian, Certain beliefs, Certain facts, Certain phenomenon, Certain propositions, Characteristic feature, Coliva, Conceptual relativism, Conceptual schemes, Deviant community, Different communities, Different community, Different concept, Different epistemic practice, Different hinges, Different logic, Different ones, Different system, Different systems, Empirical evidence, Empirical propositions, Empirical questions, Epistemic, Epistemic practices, Epistemic rationality, Epistemic relativist, Epistemic system, Everyday life, Factual epistemic relativist, Family resemblance, Golden bough, Hinge, Human beings, Incompatible epistemic systems, Italics mine, Language games, Little wood, Long time, Marconi, Metaphysical possibility, More wood, Negative answer, Other areas, Other ones, Oxford university press, Page reference, Palgrave macmillan, Philosophical investigations, Philosophical review, Rational considerations, Rational persuasion, Rationality, Relativism, Relativist, Relativist interpretations, Relativist readings, Religious attitude, Religious elements, Saudade, Something animal, Striking feature, Virtual epistemic relativist, Virtual relativism, Virtual relativist, Widespread agreement, Winch, Witch doctor, Witch doctors, Wittgenstein.
Abstract
The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty. It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so‐called “naturalist” readings of On Certainty, which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal in On Certainty as a form of “internal rationalism.”
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2009.01394.x
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:4C3B27EC271FFC4224D898B1FBA6FB217ED5E3ABLe document en format XML
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In passing, it considers also so‐called “naturalist” readings of On Certainty, which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal in On Certainty as a form of “internal rationalism.”</abstract><qualityIndicators><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractWordCount>88</abstractWordCount><abstractCharCount>606</abstractCharCount><keywordCount>0</keywordCount><score>8.056</score><pdfWordCount>9409</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>52956</pdfCharCount><pdfVersion>1.3</pdfVersion><pdfPageCount>23</pdfPageCount><pdfPageSize>391.181 x 612.283 pts</pdfPageSize></qualityIndicators><title>Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?</title><genre><json:string>article</json:string></genre><host><title>Philosophical Investigations</title><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><doi><json:string>10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9205</json:string></doi><issn><json:string>0190-0536</json:string></issn><eissn><json:string>1467-9205</json:string></eissn><publisherId><json:string>PHIN</json:string></publisherId><volume>33</volume><issue>1</issue><pages><first>1</first><last>23</last><total>25</total></pages><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre></host><namedEntities><unitex><date><json:string>1969</json:string><json:string>2010</json:string></date><geogName></geogName><orgName><json:string>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</json:string><json:string>Blackwell Publishing Ltd.</json:string></orgName><orgName_funder></orgName_funder><orgName_provider></orgName_provider><persName><json:string>Edward E. 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41100 Modena
Italy</correspondenceTo><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:PHIN.PHIN1394.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="0"></count><count type="tableTotal" number="0"></count><count type="formulaTotal" number="0"></count><count type="referenceTotal" number="33"></count><count type="wordTotal" number="9994"></count><count type="linksPubMed" number="0"></count><count type="linksCrossRef" number="0"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main">Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?<link href="#fn1"><sup>1</sup></link></title><title type="shortAuthors">Annalisa Coliva</title><title type="short">Philosophical Investigations</title></titleGroup><creators><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr1" affiliationRef="#a1" corresponding="yes"><personName><givenNames>Annalisa</givenNames><familyName>Coliva</familyName></personName></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="a1"><unparsedAffiliation>University of Modena and Reggio Emilia</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation></affiliationGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><title type="main">Abstract</title><p>The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in <i>On Certainty</i>. It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so‐called “naturalist” readings of <i>On Certainty</i>, which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal in <i>On Certainty</i> as a form of “internal rationalism.”</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated" lang="en"><title>Philosophical Investigations</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?1</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Annalisa</namePart><namePart type="family">Coliva</namePart><affiliation>University of Modena and Reggio Emilia</affiliation><affiliation>Correspondence address: Dipartimento di Scienze del linguaggio e della culturaFacoltà di Lettere e FilosofiaLargo Sant'Eufemia 1941100 ModenaItaly</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-6N5SZHKN-D">article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2010-01</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2010</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><extent unit="figures">0</extent><extent unit="tables">0</extent><extent unit="formulas">0</extent><extent unit="references">33</extent><extent unit="linksCrossRef">0</extent><extent unit="words">9994</extent></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty. It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so‐called “naturalist” readings of On Certainty, which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal in On Certainty as a form of “internal rationalism.”</abstract><note type="content">*I would like to thank for their comments on previous versions of this paper: Paolo Leonardi, Danièle Moyal‐Sharrock, Eva Picardi, Duncan Pritchard and Crispin Wright. This paper was partially written during my tenure of an Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship (Heidelberg), for whose support I am deeply grateful.</note><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Philosophical Investigations</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0190-0536</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1467-9205</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9205</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">PHIN</identifier><part><date>2010</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>33</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>1</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>1</start><end>23</end><total>25</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">4C3B27EC271FFC4224D898B1FBA6FB217ED5E3AB</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/WNG-ZM09Q2G6-T</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-9205.2009.01394.x</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">PHIN1394</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-L0C46X92-X">wiley</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/4C3B27EC271FFC4224D898B1FBA6FB217ED5E3AB/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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